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INTRODUCTION  
 
A. Purpose and Hypothesis 
 
The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS 
Agreement) came along with the promise of resolving existing and mitigating 
prospective trade disputes. When the SPS Agreement came into effect in 1995, a 
burning issue was the transatlantic trade dispute over hormone-treated beef. The 
background of the beef – hormones dispute was the fact that the European 
Communities (EC) blocked the importation of hormone-treated beef, a move 
which particularly affected beef exporters from the United States (US). Whereas 
US exporters averred that their beef is safe, the EC unceasingly claimed that 
hormone-treated beef may pose a risk to consumers. In addition to the beef – 
hormones dispute, another trade conflict already loomed on the horizon, spurred 
by controversies over GMOs. In either case, the US and other highly efficient 
agricultural producers pointed at the weak scientific basis of the EC’s position, 
thus implying disguised protectionisms. The EC, on the other hand, were driven 
by a critical general public mounting a broad array of arguments such as health 
concerns, environmental and socio-economic considerations and precaution.  
 
Confronted with rising transatlantic tensions, the SPS Agreement was 
introduced as a novel approach for neutral and objective arbitration in 
international trade disputes. The novelty of the SPS Agreement consists in its 
deference to science. Unlike the juristic weighing and balancing required by 
Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1947), the 
SPS Agreement was expected to deliver judgements upon the legitimacy of SPS 
measure to science. That paradigm shift from juridical argument to scientific 
rigour was operationalised by the legal requirement to base any SPS measure on 
a risk assessment.  
 
In reality, however, the promise of the SPS Agreement to resolve trade disputes 
by deference to science did not materialise. Instead of the expected 
objectification and scientification of trade policies, Panels and the Appellate 
Body witnessed a politicisation of science. Fundamentally, Panels and the 
Appellate Body were challenged by two conflicting conceptions of science. Is 
science absolute and universal, yet to the price of a limited scope of 
applicability, restricted to laboratory containment? Or, at the other hand, is 
science relative, contingent upon the conditions within which it operates, which 
means to scarify commensurability? 
 
In the beef – hormones dispute, the US relied on scientific evidence 
demonstrating that the hormones in question, if applied according to good 
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veterinary practices, do not pose a risk to human health. The EC, to the contrary, 
pointed at the fact that in some instances, compliance with good veterinary 
practices cannot be ensured. Therefore, the EC argued that in cases of misuse or 
abuse, the hormones in question may pose a risk to consumers. The Panel in the 
EC – Hormones dispute basically followed the argument of the US and scientific 
evidence validating its claim, stating that the hormones in question, if applied 
according to good veterinary practices, are safe. The Appellate Body, in 
contrast, adopted a more nuanced position. In particular, the Appellate Body 
considered the EC’s argument for taking into account potential malpractices in 
the application of the hormones in question. The Appellate Body found that the 
Panel erred by restricting the scope of scientific analysis to the extent that it 
excluded “all matters not susceptible of quantitative analysis by the empirical or 
experimental laboratory methods commonly associated with the physical 
sciences“ (EC – Hormones, Appellate Body report, para. 187). In light of the 
conflict between two antagonistic conceptions of science, the following famous 
quote of the Appellate Body in the beef – hormones dispute gets its deeper 
meaning:  
 
“It is essential to bear in mind that the risk that is to be evaluated in a 
risk assessment under Article 5.1 is not only risk ascertainable in a 
science laboratory operating under strictly controlled conditions, but 
also risk in human societies as they actually exist, in other words, the 
actual potential for adverse effects on human health in the real world 
where people live and work and die” (EC – Hormones, Appellate 
Body report, para. 187).  
 
Notably, the conflict between absolute concepts of laboratory ascertainability vs. 
relative conceptions of “real world” – science re-emerged in following WTO 
disputes, dividing Panels and the Appellate Body. Prominent in this respect is 
the Continued Suspension case, launched by the EC in 2005. In rather similar 
ways as was the case in EC – Hormones, the Panel in the Continued Suspension 
case tried to exclude real-world problems, such as compliance with good 
veterinary practices, from scientific analysis. The formal tool for making a 
distinction between “pure science” and the “real world” was the separation of 
different risk analysis phases. According to the Panel, the phase of risk 
assessment has to focus on scientific evidence only, whereas in the subsequent 
risk management phase “real world” – issues might be taken into account. The 
Appellate Body, however, confirmed its earlier broad, that is, relative 
conception of science taking into account risks as they actually exist in the real 
world:  
 
“Therefore, in our view, the Panel’s interpretation of ‘risk 
assessment’ resulted in the same ‘restrictive notion of risk 
assessment’ that the Appellate Body found to be erroneous in EC – 
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Hormones. The Panel sought in this case to rewrite the Appellate 
Body Report in EC – Hormones and to re-establish the rigid 
distinction between ‘risk assessment’ and ‘risk management’ that the 
Appellate Body had rejected in that case” (US – Continued 
Suspension, Appellate Body Report, para. 542).  
 
Various attempts can be found for explaining gaps between US and EU trade 
policies related to agriculture and food safety, ranging from protectionism 
charges to cultural differences. It seems, however, to be eye-opening 
considering gaps in trade policy approaches together with corresponding Panel 
and Appellate Body findings. Doing so, one comes to realise that trade policy 
gaps may be reflected in controversial reasoning provided by Panels and the 
Appellate Body respectively. Such a comprehensive approach leads to the 
preliminary finding that varying trade policies as well as contradictory verdicts 
by Panels and the Appellate Body may have deeper-rooted causes. The 
preliminary assumption that there are deeper-rooted causes for persistent trade 
disputes over SPS issues and corresponding divisions between Panel and 
Appellate Body interpretations serves as working hypothesis for the study at 
hand. Building upon the working hypothesis, deeper-rooted causes for 
antagonistic concepts of science and their inconsistent reading by Panels and the 
Appellate Body shall be examined. Tracing underlying causes for persisting SPS 
disputes and inconsistent Panel and Appellate Body rulings back to antithetic 
philosophical world conceptions shall enable a rational understanding of 
respective worldviews. If the assumption holds that antithetic philosophical 
world conceptions are at the root of many actual SPS disputes, a rational 
understanding of these philosophical concepts is a precondition for the 
resolution of the disputes in question. The key applied for opening the door 
towards a rational analysis and understanding of antithetic world conceptions 
underlying actual food safety controversies and trade disputes is critical 
epistemology, as developed by Karl R. Popper in particular. The purpose of the 
research endeavour presented in the study at hand may hence be summarised as 
an attempt to transcend the narrow scope of most discussions over SPS 
problems. Ordinarily, SPS disputes are perceived as particular expressions of the 
conflict between trade liberalisation and protectionism.1 To pursue the SPS 
                                                 
1 John H. Jackson, for instance, considered that the SPS Agreement tries “to reconcile 
international goals of liberalizing trade and thus requiring scientific evidence of potential 
harm (to avoid barriers that are really due to protectionist motives), while still giving each 
member the ‘sovereign’ right to determine the level of risk which should be tolerated in its 
society” (John H. Jackson, Sovereignty, the WTO and Changing Fundamentals of 
International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 247). Going beyond the trade 
angle, some authors refer to different legal and political traditions for explaining conflicting 
regulatory approaches. Joost Pauwelyn, for instance, introduced the terms “European 
Absolutism’ and ‘American Voluntarism’ for approaching the phenomenon (see Joost 
Pauwelyn, Optimal Protection of International Law. Navigating between European 
 4 
discussion beyond the juxtaposition of liberalisation and protectionisms shall 
enable deeper insights as a comprehensive basis for new approaches towards a 
reform of the SPS Agreement.  
 
B. Outline 
 
In Part One, the debate about SPS risks is related to underlying philosophical 
concepts.  
 
In chapter 1, diverging concepts of risk are located on a spectrum introduced by 
Shrader-Frechette in her seminal work on Risk and Rationality. Philosophical 
Foundations for Populist Reforms (1991). According to Shrader-Frechette, 
exponents in risk debates “are arrayed on a spectrum extending from the 
relativists to the naive positivists”.2 
 
In chapter 2, the antithetical philosophical world conceptions are outlined. On 
the one hand, there is Positivism. From a positivist perspective, risk analysis is a 
scientific concept, and scientific concepts are considered appropriate for 
establishing “the truth”. Following Positivism, science is able to provide 
answers to all questions sooner or later, e.g. whether something is safe or not or 
whether something is true or not, with absolute precision and universal validity. 
Relativism, on the other hand, considers science as part and parcel of the 
environment within which it operates. Albeit considered an indispensable tool, 
science is regarded just as one possible way for approaching burning issues of 
society. Given its contingency upon real world conditions, scientific findings are 
not considered universally valid, but relative to the circumstances, the time and 
the place of their making.  
 
In chapter 3, the origins of the risk concept are examined. It is shown that the 
concept of risk once was developed as a business tool for entrepreneurs, 
designed for expanding the scope of rational economic action. For rational 
entrepreneurs, the concept of risk is a tool for prospecting possible profits and 
losses. The entrepreneurial concept of risk alludes to the positivist world 
conception. It was not until the Industrial Age and corresponding threats such as 
                                                                                                                                                        
Absolutism and American Voluntarism (Cambridge University Press, 2008), in particular pp. 
16-25). 
2 Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, Risk and Rationality. Philosophical Foundations for Populist 
Reforms (University of California Press, 1991), p. 8. As will be shown, terms may vary. Ian 
Holland and Aynsley Kellow, for instance, used the terms ‘Reductionism’ and 
‘Constructivism’ for describing similar epistemological variances (see Ian Holland and 
Aynsley Kellow, ‘Trade and risk management: exploring the issues’, in David Robertson and 
Aynsley Kellow, Globalization and the Environment. Risk Assessment and the WTO (Edward 
Elgar, 2001), pp. 235-239).  
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large-scale food contamination, chemical spills and nuclear accidents when risk 
transcended the economic sphere and immersed broader society, bringing about 
Risk societies. For the general public potentially affected in the event of loss, 
risk is not a tool for prospective analysis but a topos for manifest harm. 
Considering its societal implications, risk perceived in Risk societies comes 
close to Relativism. Thus, depending on perspective and interest, risk may be 
perceived differently. That is the reason for entitling part one of the study The 
Janus Face of Risk.  
 
In chapter 4, the two distinct expressions of the risk concept are applied to food 
and agriculture. On the one hand, there are agricultural producers applying 
methods of risk management as tools for enlarging production and maximising 
profits. On the other hand, there is society, implementing food safety laws and 
environmental regulation, thus restricting producers and processors along the 
food chain.  
 
In chapter 5, frontlines between the two antithetic approaches towards food and 
agriculture are examined. A stringent line is established between farming 
practices, philosophical concepts and actual SPS disputes. Following Justus von 
Liebig, empirical farming relates to Positivism, whereas rational farming refers 
to Relativism. Empirical farming focuses on production increase and profit 
maximisation, whereas rational farming tries to maintain nutrient cycles and 
equilibria between farm inputs and outputs. The controversy about the 
application of GMOs in agriculture, so-called green biotechnology, is presented 
as a last frontier between empirical and rational agriculture.  
 
In Part Two of the study, entitled Science and Judgement in Risk Assessment, 
today’s application of the risk concept in the field of food safety risk analysis is 
examined. In chapter 6 and 7, it is shown how the two antithetic philosophical 
world conceptions materialised into distinct concepts of risk. From a positivist 
perspective, science and judgement can be – and shall be – separated in the 
process of risk analysis. For a relativist perspective, in contrast, science and 
judgement are inevitably interwoven at all stages of the risk analysis process. It 
is described how the doctrine of clear-cut separations between ‘science-based’ 
risk assessment and ‘policy-driven’ risk management, established in the 1980s, 
was superseded by new and more holistic approaches. In particular deliberative 
approaches to risk assessment, such as those developed by the National 
Research Council (NRC), resemble rather to arts than to science.  
 
In Part Three on Attempts for Separating Risk Assessment and Risk 
Management, various practical attempts for addressing the problem of science 
and judgement in risk assessment are discussed. In chapter 8 and 9, attempts of 
the US and the EU are compared. In chapter 10, the Codes Alimentarius 
Commission and its approach towards risk analysis is introduced. In chapter 11, 
 6 
finally, it is looked at the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety as an example of a 
regulation separating risk assessment and risk management. It was noted, 
however, that in none of the case studies examined, i.e., the Red Book in the US, 
the EU’s White Paper, the Codex Alimentarius and the Cartagena Protocol, the 
doctrine of separating risk assessment and risk management was implemented in 
a positivist, that is, substantive manner. 
 
Part Four, entitled The Science-Based Approach of the SPS Agreement in 
Particular, now turns to the SPS Agreement. In chapter 12, the promise for 
objectivity, as implied in the science-based approach of the Agreement, is 
outlined. In chapter 13 – 15, inconsistent interpretations of Panels and the 
Appellate Body are related to distinct risk concepts and corresponding 
antagonistic philosophical concepts. In chapter 13, the Panel’s interpretation of 
risk and science is associated with the positivist tradition. In contrast, the 
Appellate Body’s quest for middle ground is found to be closer to relativist 
positions (chapter 14). In chapter 15, selected problems resulting from diverging 
interpretations of risk and science by Panels and the Appellate Body are 
scrutinised. It is looked at the tendency to expand the scope of the SPS 
Agreement to environmental issues and the problem of inconsistent 
interpretations of the precautionary principle in international law, in particular 
regarding the SPS Agreement and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, 
respectively.  
 
In chapter 16, it is established that fundamental choices among different types of 
assessment are influenced by underlying worldviews of those who decide. Based 
on such findings, the need for alternative approaches towards risk assessment is 
expressed. As a model for more holistic assessments, the International 
Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for 
Development (IAASTD) is presented.  
 
The final Part Five on Future Prospects for Regulation embarks on exploring 
alternative proposal for SPS regulation. To this purpose, positivist and relativist 
approaches are conceived in respective pure forms and juxtaposed (chapter 17 
and 18). From a positivist perspective, the jurisdiction of the Appellate Body 
was a misconception of the science-based approach of the SPS Agreement. 
From a positivist point of view, science should be the one and only arbiter in 
international trade disputes over food safety questions and animal and plant 
health issues. Therefore, a positivist attempt would accomplish the promise for 
objectivity implied in the science-based approach of the SPS Agreement by 
making international standards really mandatory. From a positivist perspective, 
there is no need for higher levels of protection than those established by 
‘science’. 
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From a relativist perspective, the problem is not primarily the jurisdiction of the 
Appellate Body. From a relativist point of view, the main problem is the 
science-based approach of the SPS Agreement as such. From a relativist 
perspective, science is neither objective nor value-free. Hence, science is an 
inappropriate arbiter in international trade disputes. In contrast, a relativist 
proposal essentially consists in the claim for abandoning science as primary 
yardstick for deciding upon the legitimacy of SPS measures and appropriate 
levels of protection (ALOP). Hence, instead of the science-based approach of 
the SPS Agreement, relativist proposals are calling for more room for 
manoeuvre for national sovereigns in deciding upon levels of protection deemed 
appropriate. However, relativist proposals might bring back the epistemological 
problem of subjectivity in risk assessment and foster protectionism.  
 
Based on a rational analysis of the two antipodes, an alternative approach is 
finally elaborated (chapter 19). A rational analysis of positivist and relativist 
attempts enables to build upon strengths and avoid weaknesses of the two 
antithetic approaches. For doing so, reference is made to the theory of 
multilayered governance and critical epistemology. The proposal put forward, 
termed critical approach, differs from both the positivist and the relativist 
proposal. On the one hand, the critical approach recognises science as an 
indispensable source of knowledge. On the other hand, the critical approach 
abandons the ideal of objective, yet ‘pure’ science. Following critical 
rationalism, the critical approach aims at re-contextualise science, exposing it to 
permanent criticism by peers and society at large. Once implemented, the 
proposed critical approach would refocus the objective of the SPS Agreement. 
Instead of only safeguarding fair competition in agricultural trade, a reformed 
SPS Agreement would assume the additional role of a guardian for open 
competition of scientific opinions at the international level. Through new 
meaning, a reformed SPS Agreement would recall the sometimes forgotten 
‘idealistic’ objective of the GATT/WTO framework: the advancement of the 
‘Open Society’ through trade.  
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PART ONE: THE JANUS FACE OF RISK  
 
In part one, the Janus face of risk shall be examined in more detail. As a starting 
point, various approaches analysing the spectrum between the two antipodes 
positivism and Relativism from different angles are presented.  
 
 
CHAPTER 1 BETWEEN POSITIVISM AND RELATIVISM  
 
In her seminal work Risk and Rationality (1991), Shrader-Frechette introduced 
the terms naïve positivism and cultural relativism for setting the scene for the 
risk debate: “In the debate over what methodological norms, if any, guarantee 
the rationality of risk evaluation, analysts are arrayed on a spectrum extending 
from the relativists to the naive positivists”.3 Shrader-Frechette described the 
two antithetic poles as follows:  
 
“At the left end of the spectrum are the cultural relativists, such as 
anthropologist Mary Douglas and political scientist Aaron 
Wildavsky. They believe that ‘risks are social constructs,’ that ‘any 
form of life can be justified…. no one is to say that any one is better 
or worse,’ that there is ‘no correct description of the right behavior 
[regarding risk],’ and therefore that the third stage of risk assessment, 
risk evaluation, is wholly relative. At the other, naïve-positivists, end 
of the spectrum are engineers such as Chauncey Starr and 
Christopher Whipple. They maintain that risk evaluation is objective 
in the sense that different risks may be evaluated according to the 
same rule – for example, a rule stipulating that risks below a certain 
level of probability are insignificant. They also claim that risk 
assessment, at least at the stage of calculating probabilities associated 
with harms and estimating their effects, is completely objective, 
neutral, and value free.” 4 
 
Naïve positivist, Shrader-Frechette explained, only trust in facts and empirical 
confirmability. They believe that facts, and only facts, are neutral and objective. 
The trust in facts, in turn, makes naïve positivist to believe that the factual stages 
of risk assessment, i.e., hazard identification and risk estimation, “can be wholly 
                                                 
3 Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, Risk and Rationality. Philosophical Foundations for Populist 
Reforms (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1991), p. 8. 
4 Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, ibid. p. 8 (footnotes omitted, italics in the original).  
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objective and value free”.5 The overemphasis of facts over value judgements 
makes naïve positivists to believe “that risk estimates can completely exclude 
normative (ethical and methodological) components”.6 Shrader-Frechette termed 
the naïve positivists’ belief in objective and allegedly “neutral” facts as the 
“principle of complete neutrality”.7 As the root of naïve positivists’ obsession 
with facts and neutrality, Shrader-Frechette identified the fact-value dichotomy:  
 
“Perhaps many risk assessors and scientists have erroneously 
believed that it is possible to make value-free, confirmed judgments, 
about either risks or science, because they subscribe to an extreme 
form of the fact-value dichotomy, a famous tenet of naive positivism. 
This is the belief that facts and values are completely separable, and 
that there are facts that include no value judgments. Applied to 
hazard assessment, this claim is that risk analysis ought to consist of 
factual and neutral risk estimates, although the policy decision made 
as a consequence of them may be evaluative.” 8 
 
Albeit questioning whether complete objectivity is achievable, Shrader-
Frechette admitted that “the traditional positivist motivation behind belief in the 
fact-value dichotomy is a noble and important one”.9 Shrader-Frechette 
acknowledged that value-free observations, “if they exited, would guarantee the 
objectivity of one’s research”.10 The problem of the naïve positivists’ approach, 
however, is that risk assessments are typically applied in situations where factual 
information is either incomplete or under conditions of scientific uncertainty: in 
cases where all possible outcomes of an activity as well as the probability of 
each outcome would be known, obviously there would be no need for risk 
estimates. With view on the problem of insufficient scientific information and 
“probabilistic uncertainty”, Shrader-Frechette noted:  
                                                 
5 Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, ibid. p. 39. Shrader-Frechette applied a three-step model of risk 
assessment, consisting of the following steps: (1) hazard identification, (2) risk estimation, 
and (3) risk evaluation (ibid. p. 5). 
6 Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, ibid. p. 39. 
7 Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, ibid. p. 39. 
8 Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, ibid. p. 43 (underlining added, italics in original, footnotes 
omitted).  
9 Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, ibid. p. 43. 
10 Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, ibid. p. 44. In contrast to naïve positivists, however, Shrader-
Frechette was of the view that both facts and values are forming human perception of reality. 
In particular, Shrader-Frechette considered that values are indispensable components for the 
development of scientific theory: “A great many philosophers of science (myself included) 
maintain that both our values and the action of the external world on our senses are 
responsible for our perceptions, observations, and facts. Even though facts are value laden, we 
still may have a sufficient reason for accepting one theory over another. Conceptual and 
logical reasons also ground theory choice and hence objectivity. One theory may have more 
explanatory or predictive power, or unify more facts, for example” (ibid. p. 44, footnotes 
omitted).  
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“As witness of this uncertainty, the current technological landscape 
is littered with the bodies of victims of various hazards. From 
Chernobyl to Bhopal, there are victims of risks that experts allegedly 
measured objectively, catastrophes that were not supposed to 
happen.”11 
 
Turning to the other end of the epistemological spectrum, Shrader-Frechette 
observed that cultural relativism, in contrast to naïve positivism, tends to 
overemphasise value judgements.12 With regard to risk assessment, these 
observations translated to the finding that positivists overemphasise the 
“objective” first two steps of risk assessment, i.e., hazard identification and 
hazard estimation, whereas relativists overemphasise the following, “subjective” 
step of risk assessment, i.e. risk evaluation.13 
 
Starting point of the critique of cultural relativists is what Shrader-Frechette 
called “an astute (although not original) insight”.14 The relativists’ insight 
consisted of recognising the impossibility to achieve wholly objective, i.e., value 
free risk evaluations.15 As a consequence, relativists criticised “[risk] assessors 
for their repeated error in assuming that lay estimates of risk are mere 
‘perceptions’ whereas expert analyses are ‘objective’.”16 And Shrader-Frechette 
conceded that “the cultural relativists are correct in affirming that engineers and 
housewives both employ value judgments, especially in evaluating risk 
acceptability”.17 From that insight, cultural relativists conclude that “any  
 
                                                 
11 Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, ibid. p. 30, footnotes omitted). Shrader-Frechette discerned 
between risk and (probabilistic) uncertainty. In situations of risk, probabilities of given 
outcomes are know, whereas in situations of uncertainty, probabilities of given outcomes are 
unknown (ibid. pp. 101-102; see also chapter 6.B).  
12 Considering arguments of cultural relativists, Shrader-Frechette extensively referred to the 
seminal work of Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky, Risk and Culture (University of 
California Press, 1982). 
13 As mentioned, Shrader-Frechette applied a three-step model of risk assessment, consisting 
of the three steps (1) hazard identification, (2) risk estimation, and (3) risk evaluation; see 
Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, Risk and Rationality,  ibid. p. 5.  
14 Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, ibid. p. 31.  
15 Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, ibid. p. 31. 
16 Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, ibid. p. 31. 
17 Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, ibid. p. 31. However, Shrader-Frechette observed that “[s]ome 
of these relativists reserve their harshest criticism for the U.S. public”, i.e., the mentioned 
“housewives, while sparing the “engineers”. Thus, Shrader-Frechette pointed at an obvious 
inconsistency in the line of arguments of “some of these relativists”. On the one hand, cultural 
relativists base their major argument, namely that risk evaluation is wholly relative and a 
social construct, on the observation that risk evaluation unavoidably comes along with value 
judgements. On the other hand, however, the same relativists “single out U.S. 
environmentalist or sectarian laypersons (as opposed to technical experts) as having 
particularly biased constructs”. Therefore, Shrader-Frechette concluded that “cultural 
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judgement of risk evaluation is merely a social construct”.18 
 
Shrader-Frechette’s review of considerations developed and employed by 
various risk relativists19 provided a set of five main relativist arguments.20 
Following Shrader-Frechette, these five main arguments put forward by risk 
relativist are the following [start citation]:  
 
(1) Increased knowledge and additional reasoning about risks do not 
make people more rational about hazards.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
relativism contributes to a proindustry bias towards risk, a bias that disenfranchises the lay 
public and supports the status quo” (Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, Risk and Rationality, ibid. 
p. 31, emphasis added). Such findings may have motivated Shrader-Frechette to focus 
particularly on cultural relativism. Her attempt for rehabilitating environmental concerns and 
laypersons’ judgement, as expressed in Risk and Rationality (1991), may be better understood 
in context. In context of the U.S.A. of the 1980ies, Risk and Rationality may also be read as a 
defence of environmental movements concerned with, and federal agencies in charge of 
environmental protection and public health. In the wake of the Presidency of Ronald Reagan, 
environmental and public health concerns came under pressure:   
“The Reagan administration in the early 1980s was hostile towards the 
environmental movement, attempting a strategy of active exclusion. Attempts 
were made to demonize and exclude environmentalists from government. the 
regulatory basis of environmental administration was wound back, in keeping 
with market liberalism and individualist values. (…) In keeping with its 
ideological commitment to reducing the burden of regulation on business, the 
Reagan administration immediately began to dismantle the institutional capacity 
of the state to manage and regulate environmental affairs” (John S. Dryzek, 
David Downes, Hans-Kristian Hernes, Christian Hunold, David Schlosberg, 
Green States and Social Movements. Environmentalism in the United States, 
United Kingdom, Germany, and Norway (Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 34 
and 136).  
Political headwinds against environmental concerns did not left academia unaffected. As 
Shrader-Frechette observed, relativists such as Douglas and Wildavsky questioned the ability 
of laypersons for making rational risk decisions. On the other hand, segments of Congress, 
unhappy with regulatory activities in the field of environment and public health, initiated 
evaluations of risk assessment procedures applied by federal agencies, in particular the EPA 
and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). One of these evaluations was the famous 
report Risk Assessment in the Federal Government: Managing the Process, published 1983 by 
the National Research Council (NRC) and known as the Red Book). With its emphasis on a 
conceptual separation between science and policy, i.e., risk assessment and risk management, 
the Red Book may be considered as a positivist attempt to contain regulatory activities of 
federal agencies in the United States.  
18 Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, ibid. p. 31 (emphasis added).  
19 Shrader-Frechette’s review comprised, among many others, relativists such as Mary 
Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky (Risk and Culture), Melville Herskovits (Cultural 
Anthropology), William Graham Sumner (Folkways). See Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, Risk 
and Rationality, ibid. pp. 31 and 235 and footnotes 27 and 29-33; with references to John 
Ladd (Ethical Relativism).  
20 Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, ibid. p. 31.  
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(2) Risk assessments are like judgments in aesthetics.  
(3) “Any form of life,” including risk behavior and attitudes, “can be 
justified,” since all people – including experts who disagree about 
hazard analysis – are biased in their perceptions of danger.  
(4) Modern persons are no different from “primitives” (Douglas and 
Wildavsky’s term) in that social structures dictate their views on, and 
responses to, alleged hazards.  
(5) More specifically, environmentalists’ views on risk are a result of 
their “sectarian problems”.21 [citation end].  
 
Albeit environmental issues, as addressed in point 5 above, were a major point 
in Shrader-Frechette’s Risk and Rationality,22 they are factored out in the 
following, thus providing room for an analysis of relativist arguments in general. 
Bare from contemporary political context, the four remaining arguments of 
relativists are considered as general expressions of relativism and not only 
targeted on laypersons in the United States. For generalising the four remaining 
relativist arguments properly, they are rewritten and commented as follows:  
 
(1) Increased knowledge and additional reasoning about risks do not 
make people more rational about hazards.  
 In other words, people are unreceptive to scientific 
explanation. This means that relativists consider the 
knowledge gap between scientific experts and the public as 
unbridgeable (public – expert divide).  
 
(2) Risk assessments are like judgments in aesthetics.  
 In other words, risk assessment is rather an art than science. 
Argument (2) is an expression of epistemological 
subjectivity.  
 
(3) “Any form of life,” including risk behavior and attitudes, “can be 
justified,” since all people – including experts who disagree about 
hazard analysis – are biased in their perceptions of danger.  
 In other words, there is neither right or wrong, nor correct 
or incorrect, in risk assessment. Argument (3) expresses the 
notion of epistemological relativism.  
 
                                                 
21 Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, ibid. pp. 31-32.  
22 A major point of Shrader-Frechette in Risk and Rationality was her refutation of claims that 
laypeople are irrational environmentalists and sectarians. In particular, Shrader-Frechette 
disproved arguments of a vocal segment of “antipopulist” social scientists asserting that 
laypersons “are dominated by ‘superstitions’ about environmental risks and by fundamentalist 
desires for unrealistic environmental ‘purity’ ” (Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, Risk and 
Rationality, ibid., in particular pp. 15-17.  
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(4) Modern persons are no different from “primitives” (Douglas and 
Wildavsky’s term) in that social structures dictate their views on, and 
responses to, alleged hazards.  
 Douglas and Wildavsky argue that the views on hazards of 
“modern persons” and “primitives” alike are shaped by 
respective social structures. It has to be noted that Douglas 
and Wildavsky have equated “modern persons” with 
“primitives” only in the way their views on hazards are 
shaped. Because the observation of Douglas and Wildavsky 
only makes sense under the assumption that these social 
structures are different, i.e., not equal, argument (4) can be 
termed culturalist. Furthermore, because social structures 
are embedded in particular contexts, e.g., linguistic and 
geographic contexts, argument (4) is also an expression of 
contextualism.  
 
Hence, the relativist approach to risk and risk assessment, as observed by 
Shrader-Frechette, can be summarised as follows: consent over risk and risk 
assessment is impossible because knowledge gaps between experts and the 
public are unbridgeable (argument 1) and the assessment of risk is inevitably 
subjective and relative to the assessor and contingent upon social and cultural 
context (arguments 2-4).  
 
In today’s post-ideological times, the antagonism between positivism and 
Relativism is barely made explicit. More likely, the gap between the two 
worldviews is expressed as an inclination or affiliation to a more “realist” or 
“rationalist” approach, on the one hand, or to a more “sociologist” or 
“historical” approach, on the other hand. Before proceeding to the specific 
questions about epistemological problems with respect to risk, it may be helpful 
to shed some light on expressions of the positivism-relativism distinction 
commonly used today.  
 
In this perspective, Philip Kitcher discerned between a “realist-rationalist 
cluster”, on the one hand, and a “socio-historical cluster”, on the other hand. 
According to Kitcher, the “realist-rationalist cluster” is characterised by the 
following features [start citation]:  
 
1. In the most prominent areas of science, the research is progressive, 
and this progressive character is manifest in increased powers of 
prediction and intervention.  
2. Those increased powers of prediction and intervention give is the 
right to claim that the kinds of entities described in scientific 
research exist independently of our theorizing about them and that 
many of our descriptions are approximately correct.  
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3. Nonetheless, our claims are vulnerable to future refutation. We have 
the right to claim that tour representations of nature are roughly 
correct while acknowledging that we may have to revise them 
tomorrow.  
4. Typically our views in the most prominent areas of science rest upon 
evidence, and disputes are settled by appeal to canons of reason and 
evidence.  
5. Those canons of reason and evidence also progress with time as we 
discover not only more about the world but also more about how to 
learn about the world23 [citation end]. 
 
On the other hand, the “socio-historical cluster” was characterised by Kitcher by 
outlining the following points [start citation]:  
 
1. Science is done by human beings, that is, by cognitively limited 
beings who live in social groups with complicated structures and 
long histories.  
2. No scientist ever comes to a laboratory or the field without 
categories and preconceptions that have been shaped by the prior 
history of the group to which he or she belongs.  
3. The social structures present within science affect the way in which 
research is transmitted and received, and this can have an impact on 
intratheoretical debates.  
4. The social structures in which science is embedded affect the kinds 
of questions that are taken to be most significant and, sometimes, the 
answers that are proposed and accepted 24 [citation end].  
 
However, regardless of respective labels, divisions between ‘realist’ and 
‘rationalist’ approaches, on the one hand, and ‘sociologist’ or ‘historical’ 
approaches, on the other hand, are the result of a more fundamental schism. In 
essence, the conflict revolved around the question what should follow in the 
footsteps of religious explanations of human life; science or philosophy, 
positivism or historicism? As long as religious, i.e. metaphysical explanations 
prevailed, inconsistencies between scientific evidence and religious beliefs 
could be bridged.25 However, as soon as science began to emancipate from 
religion, new approaches to the old question about the meaning of life were 
required. Muhsin Mahdi described the challenged represented by new scientific 
                                                 
23 Cited from Philip Kitcher, ‘A Plea for Science Studies’, in Noretta Koertge (ed.), A House 
Built on Sand. Exposing Postmodernist Myths about Science (Oxford University Press, 1998), 
pp. 34-35.  
24 Cited from Philip Kitcher, ibid. p. 36. 
25 A contemporary example for attempts to reconcile scientific evidence with religious faith is 
creationism. In short, creationism rejects the scientific theory of evolution and explains life on 
earth by referring to a metaphysical ‘creator.’  
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disciplines as “the difficulty that emerged in the study of man and society as a 
result of the emancipation of philosophically neutral physics and chemistry.”26 
 
Challenged by the emancipation of science, one approach consisted in refraining 
from explanation and interpretation. Hence, that approach resulted in a 
separation of scientific activities from corresponding interpretation and 
valuation. Such attempts are usually subsumed under the generic term of 
‘positivism.’ Muhsin Mahdi explained:  
 
“Positivism resolves this difficulty [i.e. the emancipation of science] 
by means of a science of man and society that is philosophically 
neutral regarding values or judgements of value, the things about 
which people have disagreed and will continue to disagree. Facts, on 
the other hand, are thought to be things about which people could 
agree regardless of their judgments of value.” 27 
 
The other approach for answering fundamental question was to integrate new 
scientific discoveries into respective actual context. The generic term for such 
attempts is historicism, Contextualism, or Relativism. Muhsin Mahdi described 
historicism as an approach realising that “the hope for agreement regarding facts 
is illusory: one needs a science that recognizes the fact of unresolvable 
disagreement regarding facts as well.”28 As its name indicates, the scientific 
method selected by historicism is the science of history. With regard to the 
historical scientific method, Muhsin Mahdi noted the following:  
 
“As regards judgements of value, this science [i.e. history] will 
overcome disagreements regarding them not by asserting that they 
cannot be understood as judgments of value but by a peculiar 
understanding of these judgments of value: by understanding them as 
relative to comprehensive views and by understanding that these 
comprehensive views change and differ from one period to another 
or one culture to another.” 29 
 
With view on the focus of the study at hand, the crucial difference between 
positivism and historicism is the respective approach towards facts and values: 
whereas the hallmark of positivism is the distinction between facts and values, 
historicism rejects that distinction:  
 
                                                 
26 Muhsin Mahdi, ‘Approaches to the history of Arabic science’, postface to Roshdi Rashed 
(ed.), Encyclopedia of the History of Arabic Science (vol. 3), Technology, Alchemy and Life 
Sciences (Routledge, 1996), pp. 1026-1044, p. 1038.  
27 Muhsin Mahdi, ibid. pp. 1026-1044, p. 1038. 
28 Muhsin Mahdi, ibid. pp. 1026-1044, p. 1039. 
29 Muhsin Mahdi, ibid. pp. 1026-1044, p. 1039 (emphasis added). 
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“… [H]istoricism rejects the distinction between facts and values 
because it believes that both depend on a comprehensive view or a 
world view (a Weltanschauung) that changes from one society to 
another and from one period to another. By limiting itself to the 
study of facts and relations between facts, positivism sticks to part of 
the surface, as it were, and is not able to penetrate to the origin of 
these manifestations, which can be properly understood only as 
manifestations of the comprehensive view that underlies them. These 
manifestations include values, what people think or believe to be 
good or true or beautiful, and the articulation of these thoughts in 
science and art.” 30 
 
Turning to risk as an epistemological phenomenon specifically, the antagonism 
between positivist and relativist concepts may take various forms, terms and 
expressions. Although applying different terms, several authors have depicted 
the phenomenon of risk from an antithetic perspective. Ulrich Beck, for 
example, used the terms Realism and Constructivism for referring to the 
epistemological debate.31 
 
Ulrich Beck traced the epistemological Realism – Constructivism dichotomy 
back to two distinguished types of science. Beck observed:  
 
“In this context it is useful to distinguish two types of science which 
are beginning to diverge in the civilization of threat. On the one 
hand, there is the old, flourishing laboratory science, which 
penetrates and opens up the world mathematically and technically 
but devoid of experience and encapsulated in a myth of precision; on 
the other, there is a public discursivity of experience which brings 
objectives and means, constraints and methods, controversially into 
                                                 
30 Muhsin Mahdi, ibid. pp. 1026-1044, p. 1038. However, beside these obvious differences, 
Mahdi pointed at important – and frequently overlooked – similarities between positivism and 
Historicism: “Positivism and historicism have many things in common. Both are essentially 
modern, the stepchildren of the distinction between philosophy and the peculiarly modern 
view of science, and the offspring of the belief in progress and the absolute superiority of 
modern science and scientific history over all earlier thought” (Muhsin Mahdi, ibid. p. 1041). 
Mahdi’s observation highlights the fact that both approaches, i.e. Positivism as well as 
Historicism, were similarly ambitious endeavours initially. Original Positivism, as conceived 
by Auguste Comte, was inspired by the vision that agreements regarding scientifically 
established facts are attainable and thus universally valid. Historicism, in turn, was carried by 
the belief “that values and philosophies and comprehensive views can be known, and can be 
known scientifically” (Muhsin Mahdi, ibid. pp. 1038-1039). Hence, whereas Positivism was 
based on the presumption that natural sciences provide value-free outcomes, Historicism 
basically claimed similar philosophically neutrality for its historical method.  
31 Ulrich Beck, World Risk Society. First published in 1999 (Polity Press, 2005), in particular 
pp. 23-26. 
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view. Both types have their particular perspective, shortcomings, 
constraints and methods. Laboratory science is systematically more 
or less blind to the consequences which accompany and threaten its 
successes. The public discussion – and illustration – of threats, on the 
other hand, is related to everyday life, drenched with experience and 
plays with cultural symbols. It is also media-dependent, manipulable, 
sometimes hysterical and in any case devoid of a laboratory, 
dependent in that sense upon research and argumentation, so that it 
needs an accompanying science (classical task of the universities). It 
is thus based more on a kind of science of questions than on one of 
answers. It can also subject objectives and norms to a public test in 
the purgatory of oppositional opinion, and in just this way it can stir 
up repressed doubts, which are chronically excluded in standard 
science, with its blindness to threats and consequences.” 32 
 
On these grounds, Beck doubted whether experts – torn between the positivism 
of their professional background and the relativism of societies’ expectations – 
are able to deliver unbiased outcomes. Beck explained, taking into account 
societal interdependencies: “In risk issues, no one is an expert, or everyone is an 
expert, because the experts presume what they are supposed to make possible 
and produce: cultural acceptance [of risk]”.33 
 
The perception of two types of science goes back to the Greek distinction 
between techne or episteme, on the one hand, and phronesis, on the other hand. 
Whereas the former is said to be “represented by the laboratory science”, the 
latter is said to be “based on common sense-based science befitting the ‘real 
world where people live and work and die’”.34 Hence, the distinction between 
                                                 
32 Ulrich Beck, ‘The Reinvention of Politics: Towards a Theory of Reflexive Modernization’, 
in Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens and Scott Lash, Reflexive Modernization. Politics, Tradition 
and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order (Polity Press, 1994), pp. 30-31.  
33 Ulrich Beck, ‘The Reinvention of Politics: Towards a Theory of Reflexive Modernization’, 
in Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens and Scott Lash, Reflexive Modernization. Politics, Tradition 
and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order. Polity Press, 1994), p. 9. Anthony Giddens 
defined an expert as an “individual who can successfully lay claim to either specific skills or 
types of knowledge which the layperson does not possess” Anthony Giddens, ‘Living in a 
Post-Traditional Society’, in Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens and Scott Lash, Reflexive 
Modernization. Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order (Polity Press, 
1994), p. 84.  
34 Sungjoon Cho, ‘From Control to Communication: Science, Philosophy and World Trade 
Law’ (2010). Cornell International Law Journal, forthcoming. Available at SSRN:  
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1583023 (visited December 5, 2010). The initial Greek distinction 
established by Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics was, however, that between phronesis, on 
the one hand, and sophia on the other hand. In an earlier draft version of the paper, dated July 
31, 2009 and entitled ‘Science, Hermeneutics and International Law: Rethinking the 
Hormones Dispute’ presented at the ESIL-ASIL research forum in Helsinki, October 2-3, 
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abstract laboratory sciences and contextualised common-sense approaches has a 
long tradition. In this respect, Sungjoon Cho observed:  
 
“In everyday lives, scientific inquiries, particularly those related to 
health risks, tend to connote a certain “truth” claim: for example, 
“hormone-treated beef is unsafe to consume,” or in a more 
radicalized form “we may get cancer if we eat a hormone-treated 
beef.” As discussed above, the conventional (mainstream) science 
tackles these inquiries through a sophisticated set of 
“methodologies” which positivistic scientific knowledge produces 
after rigorous scientific investigation. Therefore, according to this 
conventional standpoint being scientific means being “objective” and 
“universal.” Under this rubric, what science means in the United 
States should be the same as in Europe.” 35 
 
Having related positivist scientific approaches to techne or episteme, Sungjoon 
Cho associated contextualising and historicizing approaches such as Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics with phronesis:  
 
“However, philosophers have long challenged this positivistic lab 
scientism. Edmund Husserl famously criticized this version of 
modern science as a “mathematization of nature” which is arguably 
detached from our real life, that is to say, “lifeworld” (Lebenswelt). 
Following Husserl’s tradition, Hans-Georg Gadamer objected to the 
conventional premise that an exhaustible scientific “method” is an 
exclusive avenue to a truth claim. According to Gadamer, this 
version of science is nothing more than the “paradigmatic expression 
of the condition that gave rise to epistemology” or even the “naiveté 
of an ontology of the world based on the objectivism of 
mathematical natural science.” According to Gadamer, the lifeworld 
is an “intuitively given world” amid ever streaming horizons and has 
a “finite, structure-relative” arrangement yet with “indeterminate 
open horizons.” In contrast, the world of science holds the “symbolic 
givenness of a logical substruction that can no more be given by 
itself than infinite series of numbers.” While “objective science may 
be a factor in our own lifeworld,” it can only be understood by 
“historical exploration of its origin and its limits of validity”.” 36 
 
The concept of ‘lifeworld’ (Lebenswelt) and Gadamer’s hermeneutics may help 
to shed light on a crucial divide within risk assessment concepts. On the one 
                                                                                                                                                        
2009, Cho himself suggested the opposite episteme – phronesis for discerning between 
opposite approaches towards science, i.e. positivist and constructivist approaches respectively.  
35 Sungjoon Cho, ibid. (emphasis added).  
36 Sungjoon Cho, ibid. (emphases added, footnotes omitted). 
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hand, there are approaches aiming at separating facts from values in risk 
assessment, basing on the premise that science can be neutral, context-free and 
carried out without any prejudice. On the other hand, opposing voices argue that 
any kind of human knowledge is inevitably embedded in the human ‘lifeworld’:  
 
“In sum, Gadamer’s hermeneutics accuse scientific positivism, the 
pedigree of which might be traced back to August Comte, of a self-
fulfilling prophesy gravely detached from the lifeworld. According 
to Gadamer, those presuppositions or prejudices, which constitute 
our lifeworld or tradition (history), are in fact necessary for us to 
unearth the truth, including the scientific truth, from those texts or 
phenomena before us. They never distract or prevent us from getting 
to the truth.” 37 
 
From a legal perspective, antagonistic worldviews can be found, for instance, in 
different theories of administrative constitutionalism. In this respect, Elizabeth 
Fisher contrasted a rational-instrumental with a deliberative-constitutive 
paradigm of administrative constitutionalism.38 The rational-instrumental 
paradigm of administrative constitutionalism, on the one hand, is based on a 
rather instrumental or functional understanding of public administration. In 
particular, Elizabeth Fisher observed that the rational-instrumental paradigm of 
administrative constitutionalism  
 
“… construes public administration to be an ‘instrument’ of the 
legislature – a ‘robot’ or ‘transmission belt’ whose task is strictly to 
obey the preordained democratic will (as expressed in legislation) 
and to act effectively and efficiently. Its discretion is to be 
constrained as much as possible, and ideally by an analytical 
methodology (such as risk assessment or cost/benefit analysis) which 
ensures that administration applies the facts to the legislative 
mandate in as accurate a way as possible.” 39 
 
Hence, the rational-instrumental paradigm of administrative constitutionalism 
addresses risk as “objective and quantifiable and the problems of complexity, 
uncertainty and socio-political ambiguity as largely manageable”.40  
 
                                                 
37 Sungjoon Cho, ibid. (emphases added, footnotes omitted). 
38 Elizabeth Fisher, ‘Beyond the Science/Democracy Dichotomy: The World Trade 
organisation Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement and Administrative Constitutionalism’, in 
Christian Joerges and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (eds.), Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade 
Governance and Social Regulation (Hart Publishing, 2006), pp. 327-349. 
39 Elizabeth Fisher, ibid. p. 335.  
40 Elizabeth Fisher, ibid. p. 337.  
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On the other hand, the deliberative-constitute paradigm of administrative 
constitutionalism promotes 
 
“… a model of public administration that is designed to address the 
complexities of risk problems by understanding public 
administration as being constituted by the legislature so as to wield 
substantial and continuing problem-solving discretion in relation to 
particular issues.  This exercise of discretion is wide ranging and the 
nature and exercise of this discretion will vary depending on the 
specific problem. Tools such as risk assessment may have a role to 
play, but their legitimacy is not guaranteed, and, in every 
circumstance, the quality and veracity of scientific knowledge must 
be assessed. Likewise, a significant role is recognised for 
deliberation, in that the process of considering the different factors 
involved in a decision will produce a result which is greater than the 
sum of these factors.” 41 
 
Thus, the deliberative-constitutive paradigm of administrative constitutionalism 
considers risks as inherently “complex socio-political disputes in which 
complexity, uncertainty and socio-political ambiguity dominate”.42 
 
Thomas Hellström applied the terms Objectivism and 
Constructivism/Contextualism for describing antagonistic approaches towards 
risk. In the scope of the study at hand, the terms Objectivism and 
Constructivism/Contextualism are used tantamount to the terms introduced by 
Shrader-Frechette, i.e., positivism and relativism.43 
 
A basic distinction between the two concepts of risks relates to the dimensions 
against which risks are assessed. Objectivist concepts of risk, which encompass 
technical risk analysis in general and food safety risk analysis in particular, are 
typically assessing risks against only one dimension. Hellström pointed at the 
following examples of risk dimensions: (i) risk may be presented as the 
probability of harm (“risk of exposure”); or (ii) risk may be presented as a 
consequence (“the risk from smoking”); or (iii) risk may be presented as 
describing a dangerous situation (“a hazardous waste plant creates a risk”).44 
Hellström noted that “[a] statement of risk based on only one of these aspects 
(e.g. probability of occurrence) has been referred to as a one-dimensional 
                                                 
41 Elizabeth Fisher, ibid. pp. 335-336. 
42 Elizabeth Fisher, ibid. p. 337.  
43 Tomas Hellström, Risk-Based Planning. Institutional Uncertainty in the Science-Policy 
Interface, Doctoral Dissertation at Göteborg University, Department of Theory of Science and 
Research, (Göteborg University, 1998), in particular pp. 4-6. 
44 Hellström, Tomas, ibid. p. 7.  
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concept of risk”.45 Hellström contrasted such one-dimensional concepts of risk 
to multi-dimensional approaches which are typically found in environmental risk 
assessment. Whereas one-dimensional risk concepts were related to objectivist 
approaches, including technical and toxicological risk analysis, Hellström 
seemed to connoted multi-dimensional concepts of risk to constructivist and 
contextualist approaches. 
 
Objectivists presume that there is a “true and real risk” which can be expressed 
in one single number and to which, finally, everybody must agree by virtue of 
rational arguments.46 The perception of scientifically ascertainable risks as 
generally acknowledged facts introduces a notion of universalism into the 
objectivist risk concept. A proponent of scientific universalism and the belief in 
the universal validity of scientific principles was Robert Merton. Merton’s 
emphasis on universalism as a determining ‘norm’ of science is based on a 
distinction between internal and external factors. Whereas internal factors have 
to follow certain methodological standards, external factors should be kept out 
of the realm of scientific activity.47 Particularly scholars with an interest in the 
history and philosophy of science, such as Toulmin, Duhem and von Helmholtz, 
have criticised Merton’s distinction between internal and external factors.48 
From a broader perspective, Tracey Epps summarised criticism on Merton’s 
concept as follows:  
 
“Merton’s ideas are useful in summarizing familiar characteristics of 
science. Nevertheless, they have been subject to much criticism and 
the perception of science as objective and neutral is far from being 
universally accepted. Instead, it is subject to challenge both in 
academia, and in the wider world. The academic challenge focuses 
on whether objective knowledge is possible and the extent to which 
science is socially constructed. In the wider world, the challenge 
focuses more on the actual use of science in different contexts, 
including in regulatory decision-making.” 49 
 
Volker Böhnigk explained that Merton’s insistence of science as an “aseptic” 
endeavour is based on an understanding of science as a purely rational 
                                                 
45 Hellström, Tomas, ibid. p. 7, italics by Hellström.  
46 The notion that risk can be quantified in a number which then reflects a universal “reality” 
shows the vicinity of the objectivist approach to the philosophical school of Positivism and 
the interchangeability of both terms.  
47 Volker Böhnigk, Weltversionen. Wissenschaft zwischen Relativismus und Pluralismus 
(Passagen Verlag, 1999), Wien, p. 44.  
48 Volker Böhnigk, ibid., referring to Stephen E. Toulmin, Pierre Duhem, and Hermann v. 
Helmholtz, in footnotes no. 32-36. p. 44-45.  
49 Tracey Epps, International Trade and Health Protection. A Critical Assessment of the 
WTO’s SPS Agreement (Edward Elgar, 2008), p. 148.  
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endeavour and scientists as rationalistic machines.50 In a rationalistic mindset, 
Böhnigk argued, science is perceived as an authoritative set of norms and 
criteria, such as universal validity, neutrality, ken accumulation and the idea of 
the unity of all sciences.51 For a perception of science as a discipline based on an 
authoritative canon of abstract norms, Böhnigk used the term Objectivism.52 
 
With regard to risk theory in particular, Hellström referred to the “objectivist 
orientation” as “those practices within risk research that treat risk as a 
measurable physical attribute”.53 Hellström further discerned between 
approaches focusing on one measurable attribute and others taking into account 
varieties of factors. Examples for the former are financial, actuarial and health 
risk analyses, focusing on the probability of occurrence of a loss or a health risk. 
Objectivist approaches focusing on one single aspect (e.g. probability of 
occurrence) are called one-dimensional risk concepts.54 On the other hand, there 
are multi-dimensional concepts of risk, in particular environmental risk 
assessments. Albeit multi-dimensional risk concepts are integrating a variety of 
factors, objectivist approaches to environmental risk assessments are inclined to 
physical attributes amenable to probability calculations.  
 
The objectivist approach towards risk was deconstructed by the school of the 
constructivists, or contextualists. The constructivists pointed at the fact that risk, 
by definition of the objectivists themselves, is not real, but the product of a 
probability prediction in relation to the severity of the issue at stake.55 However, 
predictions of future events and the idea of probability itself are, by definition, 
not a matter of universal truth or “reality”, but the product of human 
presumptions. Instead, the constructivists perceived risk as a social construct, 
emphasising its social context.56 The constructivists observe that risk, as a 
function of probability considerations, is contingent upon the perspective of the 
                                                 
50 Volker Böhnigk, Weltversionen. Wissenschaft zwischen Relativismus und Pluralismus 
(Passagen Verlag, 1999), Wien, p. 46-47. 
51 Volker Böhnigk, ibid. p. 16. 
52 Volker Böhnigk, ibid. p. 16. The term objectivism is used in various contexts. For instance, 
Gottlob Frege used the term objectivism as an opposing philosophical concept to Immanuel 
Kant’s rationalism; and a particular notion of objectivism was developed by Ayn Rand and 
her objectivist movement.  
53 Tomas Hellström, Risk-Based Planning. Institutional Uncertainty in the Science-Policy 
Interface, Doctoral Dissertation at Göteborg University, Department of Theory of Science and 
Research, (Göteborg University, 1998), p. 11.  
54 Tomas Hellström, ibid. p. 7.  
55 Technically, risk (R) is commonly defined as the product of the magnitude of negative 
consequences (C) as a result of a certain event, and the probability (P) of occurrence of that 
event, providing the formula R = P x C (see chapter 3.B. Response from the Risk Society).  
56 Hence, the synonymous term contextualists.  
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person and its social context; risk is never an absolute number, but relative to the 
circumstances and the people involved.57 
 
Hellström also noted some common features with approaches putting forward a 
so-called “objective – perceived risk dichotomy”. Particularly popular among 
technocrats criticising “subjective biases of laypersons”, the objective – 
perceived risk dichotomy is based on the assumption that “irrational emotional 
factors enormously multiply public judgments of the scale of some objective 
risks, such as nuclear power, while reducing the scale of others, such as car 
accidents”. 58 
 
Hellström pointed out three categories of objectivist approaches to risk: (a) 
technical approaches, (b) economic approaches, and (c) psychometric 
approaches. Technical approaches towards risk are intended to measure and 
forecast probabilities of system failure and accidents. Under the term technical 
approaches, Hellström subsumed (i) actuarial analysis, (ii) 
toxicological/epidemiological analysis and (iii) probabilistic risk assessments.59 
Hence, toxicological and food safety risk analysis belongs to the cluster of 
technical approaches.  
 
The focus of toxicological and epidemiological risk analysis is on the causality 
between hazards and risks. Hellström explained: “Through toxicological (e.g. 
animal experimentation) and epidemiological (e.g. quasi-experimental 
                                                 
57 The fact that risk is relative to its observer was illustrated by Kaplan and Garrick and the 
example of the rattlesnake in the mailbox. Kaplan and Garrick recalled: “We had a case in 
Los Angeles recently that illustrates this idea. Some people put a rattlesnake in a man’s 
mailbox. Now if you had asked that man: ‘Is it a risk to put your hand in your mailbox?’ He 
would have said, ‘Of course not.’ We, however, knowing about the snake, would say it is very 
risky indeed.” For Kaplan and Garrick, the allegory of the rattlesnake in the mailbox 
demonstrates that risk “is a subjective thing – it depends who is looking”. As Kaplan and 
Garrick noted, some scholars refer to the fact that risk is relative by using the phrase 
“perceived risk”. However, Kaplan and Garrick worried that the phrase “perceived risk” 
suggests the existence of another kind of risk which is not only perceived, that is to say, the 
existence of an “absolute risk”. The problem of Kaplan and Garrick was that notions of 
absolute and perceived risk “brings us in touch with some fairly deep philosophical matters, 
which incidentally are reminiscent of those raised in Einstein’s theory of the relativity of 
space and time”; see Stanley Kaplan and B. John Garrick ‚’On The Quantitative Definition of 
Risk’ (1981), 1(1) Risk Analysis, 1, pp. 11-27. 
58 Brian Wynne, ‘Risk Perception, Decision Analysis, and the Public Acceptance Problem’, in 
Brian Wynne (ed.), Risk Management and Hazardous Waste. Implementation and the 
Dialectics of Credibility (Springer-Verlag, Berlin 1987), p. 357. 
59 Tomas Hellström, Risk-Based Planning. Institutional Uncertainty in the Science-Policy 
Interface, Doctoral Dissertation at Göteborg University, Department of Theory of Science and 
Research, (Göteborg University, 1998), p. 12. 
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comparison between exposed and non-exposed populations) causal agents are 
isolated from intervening variables to produce a risk characterization”.60 
 
Hellström provided the following overview over the objectivist/constructivist 
divide:61 
 
 Objectivism Constructivism-
contextualism 
View of science  Instrumentalist, 
essentially 
truthseeking, natural 
science oriented, 
experimental, 
demarcationist, 
analytical reduction in 
defining the research 
object.  
Critical function, 
socially contingent, 
socially responsible, 
anti-reductionist in its 
attempt to expand a 
research problem 
outwards and upwards 
rather than narrowing 
them down.  
View of reality  Realist, essentialist, 
focus on the 
explanatory properties 
of representation of the 
causal structure of the 
world. Causalist, 
mechanistic.  
Images of reality are 
viewed as essentially 
contingent on social 
and cultural factors. 
Organismic types of 
explanatory factors are 
sought in human 
actions as derived from 
imageries and social 
perceptions.  
Ethos  Strives to emancipate 
humans from nature. 
Ethos is procedural 
scientific and 
instrumentalist. 
Strives to emancipate 
humans from social 
and political control, in 
some cases predicated 
on the assumption that 
the human condition is 
essentially one 
divorced from nature.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
60 Tomas Hellström, ibid. p. 12.  
61 Tomas Hellström, ibid. p. 10.  
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Shrader-Frechette herself adopted some sort of “middle position” between the 
cultural relativists and the naïve positivists which she called “scientific 
proceduralism”.62 Her aim was to show “how risk evaluation (the third stage of 
[risk] assessment) can be rational and objective, even though there are not 
completely value-free rules applicable to every risk-evaluation situation”.63 To 
this purpose, Shrader-Frechette articulated in “why and how both the cultural 
relativists and the naive positivists err in their general accounts of risk 
evaluation”.64  
 
In the following, threads established by Shrader-Frechette shall be picked up and 
the opposing positions, i.e. positivism and relativism, shall be traced further 
back to respective epistemological and philosophical origins.65 
                                                 
62 Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, Risk and Rationality. Philosophical Foundations for Populist 
Reforms (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1991), pp. 8 and 9. Shrader-Frechette 
defended her ‘middle-position’, that is, scientific proceduralism, “by means of arguments 
drawn from analogous debates over naturalism in contemporary philosophy of science” 
(Kristin K. Shrader-Frechette, ibid., p. 9). Following the analogy drew by Shrader-Frechette, 
for philosophers of science as well as for risk evaluators holding some sort of middle-position, 
the challenges are rather similar. Naturalistic philosophers such as Dudley Shapere, Larry 
Laudan, and Roland Giere, holding a middle-position between the relativists and the logical 
empiricists, are challenged “to show precisely how theory choice or theory evaluation can be 
rational, even thought there are no universal, absolute rules of scientific method that apply to 
every situation” (Kristin K. Shrader-Frechette, ibid., p. 8). Risk evaluators in pursuit of some 
middle-position between the cultural relativists and the naïve positivists are challenged “to 
show how risk evaluation (the third stage of [risk] assessment) can be rational and objective, 
even though there are no completely value-free rules applicable to every risk-evaluation 
situation” (Kristin K. Shrader-Frechette, ibid., p. 8).  
63 Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, ibid. p. 8. 
64 Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, ibid. p. 8. Shrader-Frechette summarised her attempt as 
follows: “My purpose in this volume [i.e., Risk and Rationality] is (1) to articulate why and 
how both the cultural relativists and the naïve positivists err in their general accounts of risk 
evaluation; (2) to explain the misconceptions in a number of specific risk-evaluation strategies 
allegedly deemed ‘rational’; and (3) to argue for a ‘middle-position’ on the methodological 
spectrum of views about how to guarantee the rationality of risk evaluation” (Kristin S. 
Shrader-Frechette, ibid. p. 8).  
65 I am well aware that the philosophical traditions mentioned in the paper at hand are all 
Western concepts. The reason for taking Western philosophical concepts as examples was that 
in my case, they were the easiest to access. In no way the focus on Western concepts shall 
imply a disregard of non-Western philosophical concepts. But due to limited knowledge about 
non-Western philosophical concepts, I rely on the assumption that people challenged by risk 
and risk theory are always and everywhere influenced by some kind of philosophical ideas. 
Nevertheless, an example of a ‘heterodox’ non-Western school of thought may be provided in 
short: the Carvaka philosophy, also known as Lokayata, was an Indian school of thought 
critical to orthodox strands of Hindu philosophy. In fundamental criticism to predominant 
philosophical strands of Hinduism, Carvaka philosophers developed a thorough form of 
materialism, arguing that mental activities basically are excited by material causes (see Hans 
Joachim Störig, Kleine Weltgeschichte der Philosophie, Vol. 1 (Fischer, 1980), p. 43). 
Basnagoda Rahula, in turn, provided evidence that Greek philosophy, in particular the Sophist 
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school of thought, was heavily influenced by Indian philosophy. Rahula provided evidence 
that “the possible availability of Buddhist and other Indian rationalist concepts in Greece and 
the certain search of by some Greeks for such concepts in India, Persia and Babylon (…) 
strongly support the argument that sophist rhetoric was nourished by Indian rationalism” 
(Basnagoda Rahula, The Untold Story about Greek Rational Thought: Buddhist and other 
Indian Rationalist Influences on Sophist Rhetoric, PhD Dissertation submitted to the Graduate 
Faculty of Texas Tech University, December 2000, p. 350). However, the findings of Rahula 
went further. Rahula provided arguments that atomic theory, usually accredited to Greek 
philosophers Leucippus (Greek: Leukippos) and Democritus (Greek: Demokritos) as 
originally developed theory, was actually inspired by Indian thinking (Basnagoda Rahula, 
ibid., p. 206). Moreover, Rahula explained that there existed two distinct strands of atomic 
theory, or atomism, in India. At the one hand, Rahula observed, there was “[t]he concept of 
Brahma, the earliest idealistic myth in India and the absolute truth behind the sensory world, 
attained maturity, holding within itself the origin of atomic development” (Basnagoda Rahula, 
ibid., p. 207, emphasis added). On the other hand, however, the idealistic concept of Brahma 
faced challenge by “sceptics, materialists, and some schools within the Brahmin tradition 
itself” (Basnagoda Rahula, ibid., p. 208). In particular, Rahula noted that “dissenters of the 
Brahmin tradition used the same theory of atoms to deny any permanent entity in the 
individual and beyond-sensory phenomenon” (Basnagoda Rahula, ibid., p. 208). Rahula 
summarised the two conflicting concepts of atomism developed in India as follows:  
“As far as the available evidence indicates, the Brahmin tradition [i.e., the 
idealistic conception] emphasized a single essence or anu behind human body 
and sensual objects while materialists and Ajivikas recognised the elements as 
immutable atomic units” (Basnagoda Rahula, ibid., p. 209).  
In the scope of the study at hand, Rahula’s findings are of particular interest in two respects. 
First, it is recalled that the Vienna Circle itself diagnosed “an affinity with the Sophists, not 
with the Platonists; with the Epicureans, not with the Pythagoreans” (see Otto Neurath, 
Empiricism and Sociology, edited by Marie Neurath and Robert S. Cohen, volume 1 of the 
Vienna Circle Collection (D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1973), p. 306). Second, the schism 
between idealistic Brahmin philosophy and materialistic critique, as expressed by Ajivikas 
and Carvakas, among others, may be considered as the real foundation of the materialism-
idealism dichotomy in Western philosophy (with similar conclusions, but from a critical 
perspective on scientific theories in general, see John Desmond Bernal, The Freedom of 
Necessity, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1949), p. 96. Bernal noted: 
 “[A] historical continuity links the theory as held in the ancient world with the 
modern one; and even, in a great number of cases, it is the ancient theory that 
has led to the propounding of the modern one rather than any evidence drawn 
from observation. As a concrete example we may take the case of the atomic 
theory: its origin is obscure, but there are hints of it both in Babylonian and 
Indian philosophies. Even if we give the credit of its first statement to 
Democritus we cannot imagine that it was arrived at otherwise than by that 
analogical type of reasoning that gave rise to the four elements and the four 
humours. There is no logical support for atomism, no reason, possibly within the 
reach of the Greeks, to put a stop arbitrarily to the concept of repeatedly dividing 
bodies; but once the analogy of a universe built out of sand or bricks is grasped, 
it associates itself with an aesthetic and moral attraction for certain types of 
mind. A universe of particles – how fascinating to build for oneself such a 
universe. The particles being inert, the gods retire into an indefinite background, 
and man is left the master of the universe if he can understand how this building 
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CHAPTER 2 TWO CONCEPTS OF REALITY 
 
In Risk and Rationality (1991), Shrader-Frechette based her account of opposing 
approaches to risk, i.e., positivism and relativism, on two conflicting 
philosophical positions. Starting point of Shrader-Frechette’s account was her 
observation that the terms rationality and rational are normative. On these 
grounds, Shrader-Frechette noted:  
 
“Controversies about the ‘rationality’ of various evaluations of risk 
are no easier to settle than analogous debates in science. Conflicts 
among philosophers of science (about what methodological rules, if 
any, guarantee the rationality of science) generate alternative 
accounts of scientific explanation, as well as disputes over which 
scientific theory is correct. Likewise, conflicts among risk assessors 
(about what methodological rules, if any, guarantee the rationality of 
responses to hazards) generate both alternative accounts of 
acceptable harm and disputes over whose risk-evaluation theory is 
correct.” 66 
 
In the following, some light shall be shed on alternative accounts of the 
philosophy of science and scientific theory which, in turn, are forming the bases 
for alternative accounts of risk-evaluation theories. Shrader-Frechette tracked 
the alternative accounts of the philosophy of science back to two opposing 
positions. On one side, Shrader-Frechette observed pluralist or relativist views, 
whereas, on the other side, she found logical-empiricist positions. Shrader-
Frechette noticed:  
 
“In the debate over the rationality of science, philosophers and 
scientists are arrayed on a spectrum extending from pluralist or 
relativist views to logical-empiricist positions. At the left end of the 
spectrum, the pluralist end, are epistemological anarchist Paul 
Feyerabend and others who believe that there is no scientific method, 
that ‘anything goes’, and that ‘no system of [scientific] rules and 
standards is ever safe’. At the other end of the spectrum are logical 
empiricists, such as Israel Scheffler and Rudolf Carnap, who believe 
that there are at least some universal and fixed criteria for theory 
choice and that these criteria guarantee the rationality of science.” 67 
                                                                                                                                                        
takes place” (John Desmond Bernal, ibid., pp. 95-96, emphasis added). On Arab 
and Chinese philosophy, see footnotes no. 124 and 125 below.  
66 Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, Risk and Rationality. Philosophical Foundations for Populist 
Reforms (University of California Press, 1991), p. 7 (emphasis added).  
67 Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, ibid. p. 7 (footnotes omitted). Shrader-Frechette further 
pointed at some sort of middle-position between the relativist and the logical empiricists, 
where she located the so-called naturalists, such as Dudley Shapere, Larry Laudan, and 
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Scott Lash used slightly different terms for describing the same dichotomy 
between scientism and culturalism.68 Lash discerned between antagonistic 
approaches which he called ‘rationalistic (cognitivist) or scientistic 
understandings’, on the one hand, and ‘culturalist or hermeneutic views’, on the 
other hand.69 According to Lash, scientism and culturalism should be viewed as 
part of a ‘continuum in contemporary theory’.70 For Lash, the division between 
scientism and culturalism “represents the distinction between in the broadest 
sense scientific sociology on the one side and cultural theory on the other”.71 
Lash depicted respective ends of the ‘continuum in contemporary theory’ as 
follows:  
 
“At the science end of continuum there is the hard realism of an 
Althusserian Marxist such as David Harvey. Harvey pits his Marxist 
historical materialism against the ‘soft’ dialectical materialism of 
hermeneutic Marxism. For him culture, postmodern or other, is more 
or less reduced to a causal effect of transnational capital. For Harvey 
it makes sense only to understand nature instrumentally, and 
environmental matters as matters almost exclusively for experts. A 
concerns with other sorts of cultural and emotional involvements and 
responses of laypeople with the natural would be dismissed by 
analysts such as Harvey as the concerns of back-to-nature communal 
Romantic dreamers.  
At the ‘culturalist’ end of the spectrum stand such unlikely 
bedfellows such as Mary Douglas and Jacques Derrida, who reduce 
the social to the cultural and deconstruct the distinction between 
tradition and modernity.” 72 
 
Obviously, however, the respective thinkers mentioned by Kristin Shrader-
Frechette and Scott Lash did not operate in an intellectual vacuum; they stood in 
much older philosophical and epistemological traditions.  
 
John Rawls, for instance, discerned between two traditions in political 
philosophy. On the one hand, Rawls identified the Platonic conception 
according to which political philosophy is assigned to establish truth and justice 
                                                                                                                                                        
Roland Giere. According to Shrader-Frechette, naturalists “maintain that theory evaluation 
can be rational even though there are no absolute rules for science, applicable in every 
situation” (Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, ibid., pp. 7-8).  
68 Scott Lash, ‘Expert-Systems or Situated Interpretation? Culture and Institutions in 
Disorganized Capitalism’, in Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens and Scott Lash, Reflexive 
Modernization. Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order (Polity Press, 
1994), p. 199. 
69 Scott Lash, ibid. 
70 Scott Lash, ibid. 
71 Scott Lash, ibid. 
72 Scott Lash, ibid. 
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authoritatively.73 Rawls explained that the Platonic conception of political 
philosophy not only comes along with a truth-claim, but also implies the 
implementation of the established truth by any means necessary. As examples, 
Rawls referred to Plato’s philosopher kings and Lenin’s revolutionary avant-
garde.74 On the other hand, Rawls identified a conception which he called 
‘democratic’. According to the democratic conception, political philosophy 
forms part of the stock of ideas and beliefs inherent to society. In this latter 
conception, political philosophy may influence political decision-making to a 
certain extent, but not in authoritative manners.75  
 
Steve Fuller summarised the underlying epistemological dichotomy by the 
following stark contrast:  
 
“Is whether a sentence is true or false, or whether a state of affairs 
obtains or not, relative to our state of knowledge? ‘No,’ says the 
realist. ‘Yes,’ says the antirealist.” 76 
 
                                                 
73 In the scope of the study at hand, two issues are of particular interest with regard to the 
Platonic conception. 
First, Plato discerned between “the upper-world”, i.e., the world of ideas, and a “lower-
world”, where things different from ideas may exist. According to Georgescu-Roegen, Plato 
perceived ideas as living “in a world of their own, ‘the upper-world’, where each retains ‘a 
permanent individuality’ and, moreover, remains ‘the same and unchanging’” (Nicholas 
Georgescu-Roegen, Analytical Economics. Issues and Problems (Harvard University Press, 
1967, Massachusetts), p. 25, with reference to Plato’s Dialogues, e.g. Phaedo, and Philebus. 
In this regard, Georgescu-Roegen noted that “Plato’s doctrine of ideas being ‘fixed patterns’ 
permeated all his Dialogues (Georgescu-Roegen, ibid., p. 25, footnote no. 27). Hence, the 
notion of an “upper-world” and a “lower-world” may indicate some sort of division between a 
“world of ideas” and a “world of things”.  
Second, Georgescu-Roegen noted that Plato’s “extreme idealism” … “underlies many modern 
thoughts of ‘clear thinking’” (Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, ibid. p. 25). In particular, 
Georgescu-Roegen pointed at the “Platonic tenet that only a privileged few are acquainted 
with ideas but cannot describe them publicly” (Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, ibid. p. 25). The 
notion of the chosen few who are more clear-sighted than the many is reflected in the 
increasing demand for expert advice and tendencies, as critiques claim, towards technocratic 
rule.  
74 John Rawls, Geschichte der politischen Philosophie (Suhrkamp 2008), p. 27. It has to be 
noted that John Rawls, by pointing to the examples of Plato’s philosopher kings and Lenin’s 
revolutionary avant-garde, did not rely on ideological categories, but on political 
implementation. From the viewpoint of ideological categories, Platonism and Leninism are 
rather opposing worldviews. Rawls, however, pointed at similarities of Platonism and 
Leninism when it comes to the implementation of respective ideologies by political means.  
75 John Rawls, ibid. pp. 27-28. 
76 Steve Fuller, Social Epistemology. 2nd Edition (Indiana University Press, 2002), p. 65 
(original emphases).  
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From a broader perspective, Steve Fuller found correlations between religious 
concepts and risk concepts. In lucid words, Fuller related scientific traditions to 
cornerstones of the European mindset:  
 
“One of the most vivid metaphors that Jesus used to address his 
Apostles was of the lamp hidden beneath a bushel basket, a situation 
that of course only served to subvert the lamp’s illumination. By this 
metaphor, Jesus meant to decry the reluctance of Christian converts 
to spread the Gospel, for fear of persecution as they inevitably upset 
the social order. (…) The episode’s exemplariness comes from 
revealing the dual-tracked character of Western conception of 
Reason. The first track extends from Socratic questioning in the 
Athenian forum through the Enlightenment to Ernst Mach and Karl 
Popper. It is critical, libertarian, and risk seeking – and it also seems 
to be the track that Jesus himself espoused. The second track extends 
from the cloistered setting of Plato’s Academy through positivism 
(probably in all of its incarnations but certainly in Auguste Comte’s) 
to Max Planck and Thomas Kuhn. It is foundational, authoritarian, 
and risk averse – and it also characterizes the track with which 
institutional Christianity, especially the Roman Catholic Church, has 
often identified.” 77 
 
Focusing on epistemological differences, certain aspects of these distinct 
philosophical traditions shall be outlined. Starting from the right end of the 
spectrum opened by Shrader-Frechette, one has to consider Rudolf Carnap and 
the school of neo-positivism.  
 
A. Positivist Traditions  
1. The Vienna Circle  
 
Rudolf Carnap (1891-1970) was an eminent member of the Vienna Circle 
which, in turn, was part of a broader school of thought called logical positivism, 
logical empiricism or neo-positivism.78 The Vienna Circle was operational in 
                                                 
77 Steve Fuller, Thomas Kuhn. A Philosophical History of Our Times (The University of 
Chicago Press, 2000), pp. 38-39. 
78 However, neither Neopositivism as a philosophical concept nor the term Neopositivism 
itself was entirely new. Along with Henri Poincaré, Pierre Duhem and the concept of 
conventionalism, Anastasios Brenner particularly pointed at the French philosopher Édouard 
Le Roy as inventor of the term “new positivism”:  
“[A] historical examination of the philosophical context of the turn of the 19th 
and 20th centuries reveals that the endeavor to reformulate positivism preceded 
the Vienna Circle considerably. Before taking root in Austria, neo-positivism 
was a French current of thought. Indeed, as early as 1901, Édouard Le Roy 
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Vienna since around 1929.79 Due to the rise of the Nazi regime in Germany and 
Austria, many members of the Vienna Circle emigrated, disseminating the ideas 
of the Vienna Circle particularly in Britain and the United States.80 Parameters 
of the Vienna Circle were a centring on logical explanation and verification and 
a denegation of metaphysics.81 For example, the Vienna Circle criticised 
metaphysics on the ground that the latter was not intersubjective. With 
intersubjectivity, the Vienna Circle understood that verification and evidentiary 
value requires that at least two persons, if not everybody, must be able to 
comprehend a certain statement.82 Though, for expressing intersubjectivity 
today, objectivity and objectivism as its ideological expression seem to be more 
common terms. Because metaphysics are lacking such clarity, it was rejected. 
The rejection of metaphysics, however, was tantamount of rejecting philosophic 
traditions and philosophers basing on, or at least not rejecting, metaphysics, such 
as the so-called Neo-Hegelians and Martin Heidegger.83 An excerpt of the 
Vienna Circle’s manifesto The Scientific Conception of the World (1929) may 
shed some light on the positivist approach:  
 
“We have characterised the scientific world-conception essentially 
by two features. First it is empiricist and positivist: there is 
knowledge only from experience, which rests on what is 
immediately given. This sets the limits for the content of legitimate 
science. Second, the scientific world-conception is marked by 
application of a certain method, namely logical analysis. The aim of 
scientific effort is to reach the goal, unified science, by applying 
logical analysis to the empirical material.”84 
                                                                                                                                                        
published an article entitled ‘Un positivisme nouveau’. He claimed in this article 
to perceive the beginning of an intellectual movement and drew up the program 
of reorienting positivism” Anastasios Brenner, ‘The French Connection: 
Conventionalism and the Vienna Circle’, in Michael Heidelberger, Friedrich 
Stadler (eds.), History of Philosophy of Science. New Trends and Perspectives 
(Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002), p. 278).  
79 In 1929, the Vienna Circle published its programmatic scripture Wissenschaftliche 
Weltauffassung (in English: Scientific Conception of the World).  
80 Philosophical schools in Britain and the United States influenced by the Vienna Circle are 
usually referred to as Analytical Philosophy. Analytical philosophers were, for example, 
Charlie Dunbar Broad, Richard Mervyn Hare and Charles Leslie Stevenson (Hans Joachim 
Störig, Kleine Weltgeschichte der Philosophie, Vol. 2 (Fischer, 1980), p. 332. 
81 An early but fundamental work of Rudolf Carnap was entitled Der logische Aufbau der 
Welt (1928), which was later translated by Rolf A. George and published under the title The 
Logical Structure of the World, and Pseudoproblems in Philosophy (Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, London 1967).  
82 Hans Joachim Störig, Kleine Weltgeschichte der Philosophie, Vol. 2 (Fischer, 1980), p. 
323. 
83 Hans Joachim Störig, ibid., in particular pp. 320-333. 
84 Excerpt from ‘The Scientific Conception of the World: The Vienna Circle’, known as the 
Vienna Circle Manifesto (in German: Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung), published by the 
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Thus, positivist, i.e. empiricist science and a positivist method, i.e. logical 
analysis, are the two pillars of the Vienna Circle’s world-conception. The goal 
of Neo-positivists was to bridge the two pillars, the pillar of empirical science on 
the one hand, and its understanding by logical analysis, on the other hand. The 
bridge between ‘the given’ and its analytical perception would be unified 
science. In other words, the scientific world-conception was based on the 
assumption that there were two kinds of realities requiring bridging operations. 
The scientific world-conception presupposed a division between ‘the given’, on 
the one hand, and human perception, on the other hand. Harold Kincaid 
explained the assumption underlying Neo-positivism as follows:  
 
“The [neo-]positivists believed that there are two kinds of truths: 
empirical, factual truths of observations and truths based on the 
meaning of words. Good science was the paradigm of the former; 
mathematics and logic, the paradigm of the latter. Like Hume before 
them, the [neo-]positivists used this division to draw some striking 
conclusions. Traditional philosophy clearly was not based on facts of 
experience; yet, its metaphysical claims about substance, soul, and 
the like were not true simply by definition, and the [neo-]positivists 
thus recommended – in Humes’s words – that such doctrines should 
be ‘committed to the flames’.” 85 
 
Neopositivists, Kincaid observed, were on the one hand “philosophical radicals” 
in many respects. However, “they were nonetheless quite traditional in others”.86 
The radicalism of the Neo-positivists seemed of having centred on the second of 
the two pillars of the scientific world-conception, i.e., logical analysis, and 
bridging operations between the two pillars, namely ‘the given’ and its 
perception. On the other hand, however, Neo-positivists seemed of having 
adhered to rather traditional approaches. The observation of persisting 
traditionalism seems particularly true with respect to the underlying assumption 
of a division between “the given” and its perception, and the empirical approach 
to ‘the given’. With regard to the latter, it is remarkable that most Neo-
positivists remained committed to traditional epistemology. Harold Kincaid 
observed:  
                                                                                                                                                        
Vienna Circle in 1929, reprinted in Otto Neurath, Empiricism and Sociology, edited by Marie 
Neurath and Robert S. Cohen, volume 1 of the Vienna Circle Collection (D. Reidel 
Publishing, 1973), p. 309 (original emphases). The Vienna Circle did not provide the author’s 
name(s). The pamphlet was produced in teamwork: Otto Neurath did the writing, Hans Hahn 
and Rudolf Carnap the editing of the text, and other members of the Vienna Circle contributed 
as well, for example Herbert Feigl and Friedrich Waismann (see Otto Neurath, Empiricism 
and Sociology, edited by Marie Neurath and Robert S. Cohen, volume 1 of the Vienna Circle 
Collection (D. Reidel Publishing, 1973), p. 318, reference no. 2).  
85 Harold Kincaid, Philosophical Foundations of the Social Sciences. Analyzing Controversies 
in Social Research (Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 18. 
86 Harold Kincaid, ibid. 
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“For example, some [neo-]positivists were committed to ‘the given,’ 
the doctrine that sensory experience directly confronts us with 
information that is self-evident, relying upon no further inferences or 
theory. That idea had a long philosophical history and was far from 
radical. In the [neo-]positivist’s philosophy of science, the given 
appeared as ‘protocol sentences’ or ‘observation reports’ – the 
empirical bedrock of experience which is certain and from which all 
theories are derived and confirmed. Quoting Carnap (1934, p. 45) 
again, protocol sentences ‘refer to the given, and describe directly 
given experience’; they are ‘statements needing no justification and 
serving as the foundation for the remaining statements of science’.” 
87 
 
The neo-positivist traditionalism with regard to scientific empiricism on the one 
hand, and their radicalism with respect to logical analysis on the other hand are 
at the heart of the scientific world-conception. It provided the epistemological 
basis for the rigorous separation of the two realms, i.e. empirical truths and 
conceptual truths. Kincaid summarised the core notions of Neo-positivism as 
follows:  
 
“But these core notions – that there is a clear distinction between 
empirical truths and conceptual ones, that science provides the 
former by beginning with the certainty of direct experience, that 
philosophy can, via conceptual analysis, tell us what explanation, 
evidence, and other scientific concepts require – formed a lasting 
legacy. That legacy has influenced how philosophers and scientists 
view the scientific enterprise and that legacy continues.” 88 
 
In terms of a conclusion, core notions of Neopositivism can be summarised as 
follows:  
 
1. There is a division between the real world, ‘the given’, and its 
perception and expression by humans.  
2. The real world, ‘the given’, can be grasped by empirical sciences.  
3. The truth, established by empirical sciences, can be expressed in 
protocol sentences and observation reports. 
4. Protocol sentences and observation reports can be understood, 
described and conceptualised by logical analysis, thereby bridging 
the division between the world and words, ‘the given’ and concepts, 
facts and theory: Unified science.  
                                                 
87 Harold Kincaid, ibid. pp. 18-19.  
88 Harold Kincaid, ibid. p. 19. Kincaid added that “unnoticed positivist assumptions” may 
continue to influence epistemological debates.  
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With regard to the focus of the study at hand on the separation of facts and 
values in risk assessment, it is noteworthy that the neopositivist approach put 
emphasis on the second pillar of knowledge, i.e. logical analysis. As mentioned 
above, Neopositivists rather traditionally presumed that ‘the given’ can, and 
shall be approached by empirical sciences. The rigour of Neopositivists centred 
on the methodology for logically analysing ‘given facts’ provided by empirical 
sciences. The application of logical and mathematical methods for 
conceptualising empirical facts was an attempt to bridge the division between 
‘the given’ and its perception. The application of logic, i.e., scientific analysis 
was conceived as an appropriate tool for bridging the division between the 
factual and the perceived world. However, the application of logical analysis 
was intended as means, not as end. The goal of Neopositivism was to bridge the 
gap between the two worlds and to achieve unified science. In other words, the 
division between the real world and human perception was conceived a major 
obstacle for human knowledge, a gap to be overcome.  
 
David Stump noted that the scientific world conception was not genuine to 
Neopositivism or scientific philosophy in general, but part of a broader 
movement extending to art, literature and social movements.89 In particular, 
Stump pointed at connections between the Vienna Circle and the Bauhaus, and 
observed:  
 
“The two institutions [i.e. the Vienna Circle and the Bauhaus] 
supported each other by expressing a modern, scientific world view 
and more broadly by developing a modern, scientific way of life 
(…). While striving for a new kind of objectivity, they developed, 
respectively, an anti-traditional philosophy, and an anti-traditional 
aesthetic that shared scientism and the use of machine images, and 
that built from simple elements according to explicit rules in order to 
avoid intuition and general concepts.”90 
 
Along with objectivism, empiricism, logicism and the verification principle, 
another important feature of the Vienna Circle was its quest for unified 
science.91 Starting from the observation that no scientific discipline, neither 
                                                 
89 David J, Stump, ‚From the Values of Scientific Philosophy to the Value Neutrality of the 
Philosophy of Science’, in Michael Heidelberger, Friedrich Stadler (eds.), History of 
Philosophy of Science. New Trends and Perspectives (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002), p. 
151.  
90 David J, Stump, ibid.; with references to Peter Galison (1990), ‘Aufbau/Bauhaus: Logical 
Positivism and Architectural Modernism’, in Critical Inquiry 16:709-52). With view on 
Neurath’s work in particular, Stump found that the scientific world conception “is connected 
to progressive, educated, Enlightenment values, and to the idea of modernity in general” 
(David J, Stump, ibid. p. 152). 
91 Volker Böhnigk criticised positivists’ attempts for establishing “unified science”. Böhnigk 
noted that the “unified science” programme of logical empiricists such as Rudolf Carnap, Otto 
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natural sciences nor social sciences, could operate in isolation, but are using 
terms and methods from each other, the Vienna Circle was searching for 
unifying principles.92 Because of the belief that only material things are 
                                                                                                                                                        
Neurath and Ernest Nagel basically consisted of reducing the whole scientific apparatus to a 
last and fundamental (physical) theory (Volker Böhnigk, Weltversionen. Wissenschaft 
zwischen Relativismus und Pluralismus (Passagen Verlag, 1999), p. 48). The tool for 
achieving such a unified scientific formula was reduction and reductionism. However, as 
Böhnigk explained, it turned out that the reduction of scientific theories faced insurmountable 
methodological hurdles and logical limits (Volker Böhnigk, ibid. pp. 48-49). Even in the field 
of physics, various theories can be found whose relationships remain unclear. As an example 
from the field of quantum mechanics, Böhnigk pointed at the relationship between theories 
provided by Erwin Schrödinger’s wave mechanics, on the one hand, and Werner Heisenberg’s 
matrix mechanics, on the other hand. Although the theory goes that the two approaches are 
isomorphic in nature, that is, waves may transform into particles and vice versa, the theory is 
only heuristically proved. As Paul Dirac noted, it is still uncertain, therefore, whether the two 
approaches are really isomorphic or not (Volker Böhnigk, ibid. p. 50; with reference to Paul 
Dirac who worked together with Werner Heisenberg and Erwin Schrödinger on the theory of 
quantum mechanics in the 1920s (see also Stephen Hawking, A Brief History of Time. From 
the Big Bang to Black Holes (Bantam Books, 1989), p. 59). From this and other examples 
Böhnigk concluded that neither the natural sciences nor the social sciences have been able to 
develop a unified, coherent theory. On these grounds, Böhnigk refuted a philosophical stance 
pretending universal validity of scientific findings and convergence of scientific theories as 
“hollow assumption” (Volker Böhnigk, ibid. p. 51. On the other hand, Böhnigk defended 
himself against criticism of being a relativist, bewailing that some philosophers have 
developed an “idiosyncratic idea of relativism, with a bizarre content” (ibid., p. 113). 
92 The attempt to apply methods and principles from the physical sciences to social sciences, 
in particular onto sociology, maintained its potential for controversy. An example is the so-
called Positivismusstreit (debate about positivism) among scholars in the 1960ies in Germany 
(at the same time, a similar debate took place in the United States, known as the Behaviorism 
controversy; see footnote no. 173 below). On one side stood Karl Raimund Popper, a critical 
rationalist, who was invited as a keynote speaker to a conference of the German Society of 
Sociology in Tübingen, Germany, in 1961. On the other side were representatives of the 
Frankfurt School of sociologists, in particular Theodor W. Adorno and Jürgen Habermas. At 
the conference, Popper developed 27 theses with which he argued that, firstly, the method 
applied – or should be applied – by social sciences is basically the same as in natural sciences, 
namely “trial and error” (thesis no. 6). Secondly, Popper insisted on the existence and 
viability of a strictly objective approach also for social sciences. Calling it situational logic or 
logic of the situation, Popper asserted that a method relating individual action to the situation 
within which it is performed shall enable objective analyses also in social sciences (thesis no. 
25) (see Karl R. Popper, ‘Die Logik der Sozialwissenschaften’, in Heinz Maus, Friedrich 
Fürstenberg (eds.) Der Positivismusstreit in der deutschen Soziologie (Luchterhand 1969), pp. 
103-123, in particular pp. 105-106 and 120-121). In response, Adorno and Habermas argued 
that methodological rationality may bear different implications, depending on whether 
rational methods are applied in physical or in social sciences. In particular, Adorno and 
Habermas emphasised that rationality in end-and-means relationships is not tantamount to 
rational decisions on particular ends at issue. In other words, when it comes to interests and 
power in human societies, the application of rational methods for raising efficiency does not 
guarantee that the ultimate purpose, for instance productivity increase, is itself rational (see 
Theodor W. Adorno, Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften. Korreferat’, in Heinz Maus, 
Friedrich Fürstenberg (eds.) Der Positivismusstreit in der deutschen Soziologie (Luchterhand 
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accessible for intersubjective statements,93 the Vienna Circle based its search for 
a language virtually unifying all sciences on physics and physical principles.94 
                                                                                                                                                        
1969), pp. 135-143, in particular pp. 137-138; and Jürgen Habermas, ‘Analytische 
Wissenschaftstheorie und Dialektik. Ein Nachtrag zur Kontroverse zwischen Popper und 
Adorno’, in Heinz Maus, Friedrich Fürstenberg (eds.) Der Positivismusstreit in der deutschen 
Soziologie (Luchterhand, 1969), pp. 155-191, in particular pp. 187 and 190-191). In 
philosophical terms, the dispute can be seen as a controversy between Popper’s approach of 
critical rationalism centring on scientific rigour, objectivity and the value freedom of rational 
scientific method, whereas on the other side Adorno and Habermas argued in favour of a 
dialectical approach, able to apply the critical method (which both camps upheld) also 
against the power structure within which (social) science actually operates. Before this 
background, the term ‘Positivismusstreit’ (dispute about positivism) is a misnomer (in the 
same sense Hans Albert, ‘Kleines verwundertes Nachwort zu einer groβen Einleitung,’ in 
Heinz Maus, Friedrich Fürstenberg (eds.) Der Positivismusstreit in der deutschen Soziologie 
(Luchterhand, 1969), p. 336). Popper himself wondered about the discretionary (mis-)use of 
the term positivism, noting that “[t]he suggestion that anybody interested in natural science is 
to be condemned as a positivist would make positivists not only of Marx and Engels, but also 
of Lenin – the man who introduced the equation of ‘positivism’ and ‘reaction’ “ (see Karl R. 
Popper, ‘Reason or Revolution?’ in The Myth of the Framework. In defence of science and 
rationality. Edited by M.A. Notturno (Routledge, 1994), p. 76). The irreconcilable positions 
of diverging philosophical approaches in the so-called positivism debate may shed light on 
comparably opposing views in the risk assessment controversy. In the risk assessment 
controversy, positivist attempts for streamlining scientific risk assessment by isolating it from 
societal interference are standing in conflict with relativist suggestions for ‘democratising’ 
risk assessment by introducing public debate and deliberative procedures in risk assessment 
and risk polices.  
93 In his doctoral thesis, An Attempt at a Realistic Interpretation of Experience, Paul 
Feyerabend related language to philosophical concepts. In short, Feyerabend contrasted two 
paradigms, Positivism on the one hand, with Realism, on the other hand. Feyerabend observed 
that the positivist focus on logical language renders the validity of (positivist) theory 
contingent upon intersubjective rapprochement. In this regard, Steve Fuller explained that “a 
positivist theory of reference would group together observation sentences uttered by 
individuals in different languages that were triggered by sensations of the same type. It would 
thus depend crucially on the possibility of intersubjective agreement among language users”. 
In contrast, Fuller continued, “a realist theory of reference would be identical with the latest 
physical theory, or at least the best available account of the causes of linguistic behavior, 
regardless of whether most actual language users know (the best theory of) what their 
observation sentences are true of” (Steve Fuller, Social Epistemology. 2nd Edition (Indiana 
University Press, 2002), p. 102). 
94 Popper observed that the search of Positivists for unified science by means of a language 
covering all sciences came at the price of decontextualisation. Popper noted:  
“… [The Positivists] believed that their criterion of meaning could be applied 
to any linguistic expression, without reference to its context. (They thought 
that all that was needed was a knowledge of the rules of the language to which 
the expression belonged.). They believed that their criterion of meaning would 
enable them to detect nonsense wherever it might occur. Thus they sometimes 
described their aim as ‘the elimination of metaphysics by way of language 
analysis’. And they believed that they had a method, a technique, which would 
allow them to eliminate metaphysical elements – that is to say nonsense – also 
from scientific theories” (Karl R. Popper, Realism and the Aim of Science. 
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Therefore, the quest of the Vienna Circle for unified science was also termed 
physicalism.95 The Vienna Circle provided the following insight into its project 
for unifying science:  
 
“The scientific world conception is characterised not so much by 
theses of its own, but rather by its basic attitude, its points of view 
and direction of research. The goal ahead is unified science. The 
endeavour is to link and harmonise the achievements of individual 
investigators in their various fields of science. From this aim follows 
the emphasis on collective efforts, and also the emphasis on what can 
be grasped intersubjectively; from this springs the search for a 
neutral system of formulae, for a symbolism freed from the slag of 
historical languages; and also the search for a total system of 
concepts. Neatness and clarity are striven for, and dark distances and 
unfathomable depths rejected. In science there are no 'depths'; there 
is surface everywhere: all experience forms a complex network, 
which cannot always be surveyed and can often be grasped only in 
parts. Everything is accessible to man; and man is the measure of all 
things. Here is an affinity with the Sophists, not with the Platonists; 
with the Epicureans, not with the Pythagoreans; with all those who 
stand for earthly being and the here and now. The scientific world-
conception knows no unsolvable riddle.” 96 
                                                                                                                                                        
From the Postscript to the Logic of Scientific Discovery. Edited by W.W. 
Bartley, III (Hutchinson & Co., 1983), p. 179; original emphases).  
In a footnote, referring to the clause ‘the elimination of metaphysics by way of language 
analysis’, Popper noted that “[t]his was Carnap’s research programme” (Karl R. Popper, ibid).  
95 Hans Joachim Störig, Kleine Weltgeschichte der Philosophie, Vol. 2 (Fischer Taschenbuch 
Verlag, 1980, Frankfurt a.M.), p. 327.  
96 Carnap, Rudolf; Hahn, Hans; and Neurath Otto, ‘The Scientific Conception of the World: 
The Vienna Circle’, known as the Vienna Circle Manifesto, in Otto Neurath, Empiricism and 
Sociology, edited by Marie Neurath and Robert S. Cohen, volume 1 of the Vienna Circle 
Collection (D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland, 1973), p. 306 (original 
emphases). Somehow surprisingly, the neopositivist pursuit of unified science experiences 
some sort of revival these days. Inspired by scientific discoveries at the nano scale, a new, yet 
rather physicalistic theory of converging (physical) sciences appeared. In a report on the 
convergence of nanotechnology, biotechnology, information technology and cognitive science 
(NBIC), proponents of the thesis of scientific convergence declared:  
“We stand at the threshold of a new renaissance in science and technology, 
based on a comprehensive understanding of the structure and behavior of matter 
from the nanoscale up to the most complex system yet discovered, the human 
brain. Unification of science based on unity in nature and its holistic 
investigation will lead to technological convergence and a more efficient societal 
structure for reaching human goals. In the early decades of the twenty-first 
century, concentrated effort can bring together nanotechnology, biotechnology, 
information technology, and new technologies based in cognitive science” 
(Mihail C. Roco and William Sims Bainbridg (eds.), Converging Technologies 
for Improving Human Performance. Nanotechnology, Biotechnology, 
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An additional characterising feature of logical positivism was internationalism. 
David Stump observed “that the two waves of international [scientific] 
cooperation – before and after WWI – coincide with the rise of scientific 
philosophy and with the rise of Logical Positivism, respectively”.97 
 
Carnap’s mindset was influenced by, inter alia, the philosopher Bertrand Russell 
(1872-1970).98 Russell’s legacy as a political thinker and pacifist is still vivid.99 
At the beginning of the 20th century, however, Russell became famous as an 
outstanding philosopher and mathematician.100 Together with Alfred North 
                                                                                                                                                        
Information Technology and Cognitive Science. Joint report of the National 
Science Foundation (NSF) and the Department of Commerce (Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 2003), p. 1 (emphasis added). For more on NBIC, see footnotes 193, 
265 and 516 below.  
97 David J, Stump, ‚From the Values of Scientific Philosophy to the Value Neutrality of the 
Philosophy of Science’, in Michael Heidelberger, Friedrich Stadler (eds.), History of 
Philosophy of Science. New Trends and Perspectives (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002), p. 
151. With view on politics, Stump added that “[i]nternationalism was important to the Logical 
Positivists as a vehicle to express their opposition to rising German nationalism” (David J, 
Stump, ibid.). However, Stump cautioned against ostensible parallels between science and 
internationalism. Stump noted:  
“One tends to think of science as intrinsically international, thus is would be 
natural to think of scientific philosophy as intrinsically international as well. 
However, the temporal parallels between the rise of scientific philosophies and 
of internationalism in general society require us to consider whether 
internationalism really is a necessary aspect of scientific philosophy. 
International cooperation in science went through a difficult period during WWI, 
with scientists participating in the war effort, especially in Germany, and again 
in WWII, but science as it is practiced today is surely an international institution. 
A close comparison of how philosophy has been organized over the last two 
centuries would be required to see the affect, if any that the rise and fall of 
international cooperation had on philosophical institutions” (David J, Stump, 
ibid.) 
98 See, for example, David J, Stump, ibid. p. 147. Stump observed that “Russel’s program 
influenced Carnap directly, though the idea of applying modern logic to philosophical 
problems became a defining feature of analytical philosophy and was applied to many areas 
of philosophy, not only to the philosophy of science” (David J, Stump, ibid.).  
99 Albeit the focus of the study at hand is not on individual thinkers but on respective 
philosophical traditions, an exception has to be made in the case of Bertrand Russell. During 
his long life, Russell was dedicated to the pacifist cause. During World War I, in 1916, he was 
dismissed from college because of his pacifist activities and later even imprisoned. My 
grandmother told me about Bertrand when I was a child. In her younger days herself a 
member of pacifist groups in Switzerland associated to the Nie-wieder-Krieg! (nevermore 
war!) movement in Germany, my grandmother honoured Russell as one of the few 
intellectuals of her times staying committed to pacifism and humanitarianism. That is the 
reason why I devote this study to my grandmother. 
100 David Stump pointed at Russell’s aim of combining philosophical thought with scientific 
advancement. For an example, Stump pointed at Russell’s observation that “the mathematical 
theory of the infinite is a triumph of scientific method in philosophy” and that “the new 
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Whitehead, Russell authored the groundbreaking work Principia Mathematica 
(1910-1913). With his essay On Denoting (1905), Russell contributed to the 
development of a formalised, objective language, an issue which became an 
ideal of logical positivism and analytical philosophy.101 
 
Preparatory work for Russell’s Principia Mathematica and the formalism of 
logical positivism was provided by the mathematician Gottlob Frege (1848-
1925).102 Frege pioneered the modernising of traditional forms of logic, dating 
back to Aristotle, into a new logical system. His works, among others the 
seminal Begriffsschrift; the Foundations of Arithmetic, and the Basic Laws of 
Arithmetic 103 laid the foundations for various attempts of philosophers and 
scientists for establishing clear, i.e. intersubjective forms of objective scientific 
communication. Attempts to create a formula language (in German: 
Formelsprache) inspired further attempts to bridge communication gaps between 
two and more persons by new systems of procedural methods (‘protocols’, 
‘basic sentences’, ‘protocol sentences’). As Steve Fuller noted, “Frege is, of 
course, famous for maintaining that language was necessary for the expression 
of truth, which occurred whenever the truth conditions of a sentence were 
‘satisfied’ by a state of affairs”.104 
 
2. From Comte’s Positivism to Empiriocriticism 
 
As already indicated by the prefix neo- before positivism, the school called neo-
positivism, logical positivism or logical empiricism stood, in turn, in a much  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
mathematical theory of the infinite surpasses at least two thousand years of philosophical 
thinking about the infinite” (David J, Stump, ibid. p. 149).  
101 Hans Joachim Störig, Kleine Weltgeschichte der Philosophie, Vol. 2 (Fischer, 1980), pp. 
318-319. Russell called his concept of an ideal language logical atomism, which might be 
understood as an attempt for directly linking intersubjective language to objective reality, that 
is, formalised terms to information received. By connecting sensual perception (sense-data) 
with a logical system, Russell’s concept of logical atomism may be associated with stringent 
forms of empiricism.  
102 Hans Joachim Störig, ibid. p. 321.  
103 The German term Begriffsschrift may be translated as Concept Script. The Begriffsschriftt 
was published in 1879 under the full title Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen 
nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens. The Foundations of Arithmetic were 
published in 1884 under the German title Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik. Eine logisch 
mathematische Untersuchung über den Begriff der Zahl. Finally, Basic Laws of Arithmetic 
(German title: Grundgesetze der Arithmetik: begriffsschriftlich abgeleitet) was published in 
1893 (Vol. 1) and 1903 (Vol. 2) in Jena/Germany. 
104 Steve Fuller, Social Epistemology. 2nd Edition (Indiana University Press, 2002), p. 40.  
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older tradition, namely positivism105 itself.106 Positivism is usually depicted as 
being more some sort of mind-set rather than a monolithic philosophical 
system.107 As indicative for a positivist mind-set, the following common features 
can be observed:  
 
• The belief in perceptible, accessible and ascertainable, hence ‘given’ 
or ‘positive’ facts.108 A neat example for the concept of positivism is 
its application in law: legal positivism basically stipulates that the 
law has not to be interpreted but to be understood and applied as it is 
written.109 
                                                 
105 Looking at etymological origins of the word ‘Positivism,’ Walter Bröcker observed that 
originally there were two distinctions; one discerning the (originally Greek) words positivus – 
naturalis, the other distinguishing between affirmatio – negatio. Whereas the latter distinction 
was originally intended to describe judgements, it was later confused with the former 
distinction. On these grounds, Bröcker concluded, the term positive came into use also for 
indicating numbers (see Walter Bröcker, Dialektik Positivismus Mythologie (Vittorio 
Klostermann, 1958), p. 44).  
106 Following Eric Hobsbawm, Positivism is understood as a mindset conceptualising the 
world build upon “true” scientific theories and verifiable by “positive”, i.e. natural sciences. 
Considering lacunas of positive sciences discovered in the meantime, Neopositivism, in 
contrast, limited itself to a reconstruction of scientific purity by means of reduction, 
formalisation and axiomatisation. Following Henri Poincaré, the positivist criteria for 
scientific theories was no more the question whether they were right or wrong, but whether 
they were practical (see Eric J. Hobsbawm, Das imperiale Zeitalter 1875-1914. (Campus, 
2008), pp. 322-323.  
107 Hans Joachim Störig, Kleine Weltgeschichte der Philosophie, Vol. 2 (Fischer, 1980), pp. 
308-309. 
108 Nevertheless, positivism is not the same as empiricism. Störig pointed at the example of 
the philosopher Nicolai Hartmann. According to Störig, Hartmann could be called an 
empiricist, because his thinking derived from scientifically ascertainable facts. On the other 
hand, however, Hartmann’s critical realism and ontology considered the possibility that 
“things” might actually exist in an objective reality without being accessible to human 
perception Such considerations, though, are beyond the scope of positivism which rejects 
anything intangible as “metaphysics” (see Hans Joachim Störig, ibid. p. 310).  
109 Hans Joachim Störig, ibid. p. 309. In fact, the philosophy of Positivism “provided the 
primary jurisprudential resource for the jurists of the late nineteenth century” (Antony 
Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), p. 41. The new focus on ‘positive law’ marked a shift away from 
‘natural law’ which consisted of a set of ‘transcendental principles’ such as justice and 
morality and by which the sovereign was meant to be bound (Antony Anghie, ibid., pp. 41-
42). For legal positivist, in contrast,  
“The sovereign is the foundation of positivist jurisprudence; and nineteenth-
century positivist jurists essentially sought to reconstruct the entire system of 
international law based on their new version of sovereignty doctrine. (…) Thus 
for positivists, the rules of international law were to be discovered not by 
speculative inquiries into the nature of justice or teleology, but by a careful study 
of the actual behaviour of states and the institutions and laws which they 
created” (Antony Anghie, ibid., pp. 41 and 43).  
 41 
• The disbelief in any form of reality behind comprehensible facts. 
Accordingly, positivism rejects any notion of entities, beings, forces 
or laws operating behind the scenes of the perceptible world. As a 
consequence, positivism runs counter to all philosophical tendencies 
descending from Platonic ideas. In other words, a significant feature 
of positivism is its fierce disaffirmation of any kind of ‘metaphysics’. 
By the same token, strict positivists are also rejecting concepts of 
Materialism and Idealism alike, because both concepts are making 
statements beyond what is immediately verifiable; Materialism 
declares that basically everything is physical, whereas Idealism holds 
that essentially everything is ideational.110 In view of positivism, 
 
                                                 
110 Hans Joachim Störig, ibid. pp. 309-310. Whereas the positivist rejection of Idealism seems 
obvious, the positivist rejection of Materialism is not self-explanatory. The following 
ostensive explanation is taken from Karl R. Popper. Popper observed that Maxwell’s 
equations (modern field theory) emerged from a long sequence of scientific theories and 
respective refutations. In this regard, Popper noted that already Kant had refuted Leibnitz’ 
theory of monads. According to Leibnitz’ monadology, matter basically consists of 
individualised, point-shaped elements and is, therefore, not continuous. In contrast, Kant 
depicted the notion of matter as a continuous and dynamic phenomenon. Popper valuated 
Kant’s proposal primarily on the basis of its novel idea of matter as a dynamic continuity. 
Popper explained that Kant’s proposal was one of the philosophical basements upon which 
subsequent scientists and philosophers (Popper listed the names of Faraday, Maxwell, 
Einstein, De Broglie and Schrödinger) could build on theories such as modern field theory. 
By referring to the long tale of ideas about origins of matter and modern field theory, Popper 
argued that it is precisely the ‘speculative character’ of ideas developed by theoreticians 
advancing scientific knowledge. Owing to the predisposition of speculative or ‘metaphysical’ 
ideas to critical review, scientific knowledge as a whole may progress. Turning to the stance 
of positivism towards ‘speculation’ in science, Popper noted that Positivism has always been 
contrary to scientific speculations. In particular, Popper observed that the physicist and 
philosopher Ernst Mach (1838-1916) was still of the view that there is no physical 
explanation for matter. According to Mach, Popper noted, matter was just a metaphysical 
‘substance’, and thus redundant, if not meaningless. Notably, Mach advanced this view in a 
time when metaphysical theories about the structure of matter increasingly were transformed 
into testable physical theories. Ironically though, that Mach’s theory had its biggest influence 
in times where modern atomic theory became widely accepted and continued to influence 
leading nuclear physicists such as Bohr, Heisenberg and Pauli. Looking at these scientific 
trends, Popper exclaimed:  
“Yet the wonderful theories of these great physicists are the result of attempts to 
understand the structure of the physical world, and to criticize the outcome of 
these attempts. Thus their own physical theories may well be contrasted with 
what these physicists, and other positivists, try to tell us today: that we cannot, in 
principle, hope ever to understand anything about the structure of matter: that 
the theory of matter must forever remain the private affair of the expert, the 
specialist – a mystery shrouded in technicalities, in mathematical techniques, 
and in ‘semantics’: that science is nothing but an instrument, void of any 
philosophical or theoretical interest, and only of ‘technological’ or ‘pragmatic’ 
or ‘operational’ significance. I do not believe a word of this post-rationalist 
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both statements are beyond practical verification.111 
 
Founding father of the term positivism was Auguste Comte (1798-1857).112 In 
his fundamental work, The Course in Positivists Philosophy (in French: Cours 
de philosophie positive), a series of texts published between 1830 and 1842, 
Comte developed the law of three stages.113 According to the law of three 
stages, human development undergoes the following three stages: (i) the 
                                                                                                                                                        
doctrine” (Karl R. Popper, Quantum Theory and the Schism in Physics. From 
the Postscript to the Logic of Scientific Discovery. Edited by W.W. Bartley, III 
(Hutchinson & Co., 1982), pp. 170-173, emphases added). 
From this paragraph provided by Popper, one can educe additional features of Positivism: 
First, some sort of elitist understanding of scientific research which is considered “the private 
affair of the expert, the specialist”; and second, an ‘instrumentalist’, ‘technological’, 
‘pragmatic’ or ‘operational’ approach towards science which is depicted as “void of any 
philosophical or theoretical interest”. Third, Popper termed such an approach “a post-
rationalist doctrine”.  
111 Störig observed that already Vladimir Iilyich Lenin (1870-1924) was aware of increasing 
tensions between traditional perceptions of matter and the material world and new scientific 
knowledge. In his book Materialism and Empiriocriticism: Critical Comments on a 
Reactionary Philosophy (published 1909), Lenin rejected traditional and narrow notions of 
matter and the material world. In contrast, Lenin considered that matter is ‘a philosophical 
category’ for denominating ‘objective reality’ (Hans Joachim Störig, Kleine Weltgeschichte 
der Philosophie, Vol. 2 (Fischer, 1980), p. 246). By so doing, Lenin also took up position 
against what he called Empiriocriticists, in particular Ernst Mach and Richard Avenarius and 
their quest for economical abstractions of scientific phenomena (see Hans Joachim Störig, 
ibid. pp. 246 and 312). Karl Popper, in turn, argued that materialism as a philosophical school 
of thought had virtually overcome itself, due to the successful inspiration of scientific 
research which, at the end of the day, transcended traditional materialism (Karl R. Popper and 
John C. Eccles, Das Ich und sein Gehirn. 11th edition (Serie Piper, 1994), pp. 24-28). John 
Desmond Bernal, however, warned that overcoming materialism by modern scientific 
theories, such as the theory of relativity, may pave the way for reintroducing relativism and 
metaphysics through the backdoor. Bernal wrote:  
“Modern physics is supposed to have destroyed the older materialism and this is 
supposed to be an excuse for holding any kind of opinion, mystical, 
philosophical, or religious. In fact materialism has grown so rapidly that it has 
temporarily lost its language and is rapidly in the process of finding a new one 
through the connecting of the biophysics of sensation with the ultimate wave-
mechanics picture of the universe. But supposing materialism has lost its 
justification, there is still no excuse for returning to beliefs which will not 
tolerate historical or psychological criticism. If science is misunderstood at the 
present time, it is mostly for the lack of this criticism” (John Desmond Bernal, 
The Freedom of Necessity (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1949), p. 100). 
112 Hans Joachim Störig, Kleine Weltgeschichte der Philosophie, Vol. 2 (Fischer, 1980), p. 
309. Störig noted that albeit the term Positivism was new at that time, it actually paraphrased 
old ideas. According to Störig, the term Positivism may be used for denominating those 
schools of thoughts adhering to the basic principles outlined above, i.e., the belief in given, 
apprehensible facts and the rejection of metaphysics.  
113 Hans Joachim Störig, ibid. p. 137.  
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theological or fictitious stage, (ii) the metaphysical or abstract stage, and (iii) the 
positive or scientific stage.114 
 
In the theological or fictitious stage, man is affected by superstitious beliefs, 
expressed by fetishism, polytheism, and monotheism.115 In the metaphysical or 
abstract stage, philosophical concepts are replacing fictitious beliefs.116 
Superstitious ideas of divine powers are replaced by philosophical concepts 
about abstract laws of nature. In the positive stage, finally, human thinking 
abstains from trying to comprehend ultimate causes behind tangible reality, such 
as the genesis, the universe or the meaning of life. Instead, scientific thinking 
starts centring on factual issues ascertainable by sense and reason.117 According 
to Comte, society in the positive stage is governed by scientific experts: a 
council of positivist philosophers and sociologists shall be the supreme 
intellectual institution and oversee, in particular, education.118 Executive 
government, however, shall be in the hands of business-oriented practitioners, 
e.g., economists, bankers, merchants, manufactures and farmers.119 Thus, 
science and economy are the drivers of Comte’s positivist society of the 
future.120 
 
It is the particular role attributed to science distinguishing positivism from later 
and antagonistic philosophical approaches, in particular historicism. According 
to Muhsin Mahdi, positivism conceived science as an instrument for improving 
humanity. Mahdi observed that for positivism  
 
“[t]he aim of science is to describe and predict so as to ameliorate the 
human condition: ‘Science whence comes prediction; prediction 
whence comes action’, said Auguste Comte. This science is seen as 
the last stage in a general progress of mankind whose history has 
been dominated by a progressive evolution that has been universal, 
unilinear, continuous and necessary.” 121 
                                                 
114 Hans Joachim Störig, ibid. p. 139.  
115 Hans Joachim Störig, ibid.  
116 Hans Joachim Störig, ibid. 
117 Hans Joachim Störig, ibid. pp. 139-140. Störig noted that Comte’s ultimate goal would be 
a stage at which virtually all phenomena could be deduced from one overarching fact, for 
example gravitation. Störig drew the analogy to Einstein’s attempt for establishing a unified 
field theory (Hans Joachim Störig, ibid. p. 140). Hence, later attempts of neo-positivists for 
unifying science by a formula language can be seen as pursuits of Comte’s aspiration.  
118 Hans Joachim Störig, ibid. p. 144.  
119 Hans Joachim Störig, ibid. 
120 Hans Joachim Störig, ibid. 
121 Muhsin Mahdi, Approaches to the history of Arabic science, Postface to Roshdi Rashed 
(ed.), Encyclopedia of the History of Arabic Science (vol. 3), Technology, Alchemy and Life 
Sciences (Routledge, 1996), [pp. 1026-1044], p. 1036. The role attributed to science by 
Positivism is the distinct feature of the latter. The role of science distinguishes Positivism 
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The confidence in science and scientific expertise expressed by Comte’s law of 
three stages has to be understood in light of the tradition of scientific world-
conceptions dating back to the Renaissance and the Enlightenment in Europe. 
René Descartes (1596-1650) and other philosophers of the 17th century, in 
particular Francis Bacon (1561-1626), Blaise Pascal (1623-1662), Gottfried 
Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) and Christian Wolff (1679-1754), established 
mathematics – and sciences based thereupon – as the universally valid pathway 
to human knowledge.122 The inventive step taken by Descartes was to approach 
old philosophical questions by new means.123 Mediaeval philosophers such as 
Aurelius Augustinus (354-430) had approached fundamental questions, for 
instance questions about the relationship between man and God or between body 
and soul, with metaphysics, i.e. religion. In contrast, Descartes introduced 
                                                                                                                                                        
from antagonistic philosophical schools of thought, in particular Historicism. Whereas the 
role of science in Positivism is an absolute one, its role is relative in Historicism, namely 
contingent upon respective context.  
122 Hans Joachim Störig, Kleine Weltgeschichte der Philosophie, Vol. 1 (Fischer, 1979), p. 
317.  
123 The scientific worldview, however, did not appear out of nowhere. René Descartes and 
likeminded European philosophers did not ‘invent’ enlightened thinking out of the blue but 
built upon a long tradition of scientific knowledge. In mediaeval Europe, that knowledge was 
overshadowed by Christian mysticism. However, and contrary to widespread belief, the 
reorientation towards scientific concepts was less an inventive step by European philosophers 
but a rediscovery of scientific traditions (hence: re-naissance). In contrast to Eurocentric 
hypotheses such as the modernist thesis (see below), it is well-researched today that science 
was not only brought back to mediaeval Europe by the Arabs, but also revolutionised by the 
latter. In this respect, Robert Briffault observed:  
“The debt of our science to that of the Arabs does not consist in startling 
discoveries or revolutionary theories; science owes a great deal more to Arab 
culture, it owes its existence. The ancient world was, as we saw, pre-scientific. 
The astronomy and mathematics of the Greeks were a foreign importation never 
thoroughly acclimatized in Greek culture. The Greeks systematized, generalized 
and theorized, but the patient ways of investigation, the accumulation of positive 
knowledge, the minute methods of science, detailed and prolonged observation, 
experimental inquiry, were altogether alien to the Greek temperament. Only in 
Hellenistic Alexandria was any approach to scientific work conducted in the 
ancient classical world. What we call science arose in Europe as a result of a 
new spirit of inquiry, of new methods of investigation, of the method of 
experiment, observation, measurement, of the development of mathematics in a 
form unknown to the Greeks. That spirit and those methods were introduced into 
the European world by the Arabs” (Robert Briffault, The Making of Humanity 
(George Allen & Unwin Ltd., first published in 1919) p. 191, emphasis added).  
In 529, emperor Justinian of Byzantium had even ordered to close down the academy in 
Athens once founded by Plato himself. Therefore, as Rainer Traub noted, many of the most 
inventive minds of those days gathered in Alexandria (Rainer Traub, Sturz in den Schatten, in 
SPIEGEL GESCHICHTE, issue 5, 2010, p. 96). Alexandria, however, was taken over by the 
Arabs in 642, leading to a renewal and further development of scientific knowledge 
throughout the Arab Empire, extending from the Atlantic to the Hindu Kush (Rainer Traub, 
ibid.).  
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criteria of logic and of universal validity for evaluating the appropriateness of 
philosophical approaches to these fundamental questions.124 Thereby, only 
                                                 
124 In fact, the honour of inventor of scientific methodology is owed to outstanding Arab 
scientist Ibn Al-Haytham (965-1039; full name: Abu ‘Ali al-Hasan Ibn al-Haytham, also 
known in the West as Alhazen). In a nutshell, Ibn al-Haytham revolutionised Ptolemaic optics 
and invented the camera obscura (qamara; see Salim T S Al-Hassani (ed.), 1001 Inventions: 
Muslim Heritage in Our World. 2nd edition published by Foundation of Science, Technology 
and Civilisation (FSTC Ltd., 2007), p. 318. By testing theories empirically, Ibn al-Haytham 
pioneered scientific methodology:  
“Ibn al-Haitham revolutionised optics, taking the subject from one being 
discussed philosophically to a science based on experiments. He rejected the 
Greek idea that an invisible light emitting from the eye caused sight, and instead 
rightly stated that vision was caused by light reflecting off an object and entering 
the eye” (Salim T S Al-Hassani, ibid.).  
Ibn al-Haytham’s Book of Optics (Arabic: Kitab al-Manazir) was thus not only a critique of 
Ptolemy’s work Almagest, but laid the foundations for experimental scientific methodology 
and influenced following European scholars such as Roger Bacon (1214-1292), Nicolaus 
Copernicus (1473-1543), Galileo Galilei (1564-1642), Johannes Kepler (1571-1630) and 
René Descartes himself (see Salim T S Al-Hassani, ibid., pp. 322-323; Saleh Beshara Omar, 
Ibn al-Haytham’s Optics (Bibliotheca Islamica, Minneapolis, 1977), §§ 151-152; Henri 
Hugonnard-Roche, The influence of Arabic astronomy in the medieval West, in Roshdi 
Rashed (ed.), Encyclopedia of the History of Arabic Science, (vol. 1), Astronomy – 
Theoretical and Applied (Routledge, 1996), pp. 284-305; Gül A. Russell, The emergence of 
physiological optics, in Roshdi Rashed (ed.), Encyclopedia of the History of Arabic Science, 
(vol. 2), Mathematics and the Physical Sciences (Routledge, 1996), pp. 672-715; David C. 
Lindberg, The Western reception of Arabic optics, in Roshdi Rashed (ed.), Encyclopedia of 
the History of Arabic Science, (vol. 2), Mathematics and the Physical Sciences (Routledge, 
1996), pp. 716-729). It was the inventive combination of induction as a philosophical 
approach with experimental verification on the ground for which Ibn al-Haytham should be 
honoured as the founder of scientific methodology. The eminent role of Ibn al-Haytham for 
the advancement of modern science was summarised by Matthias Schramm as follows:  
“The problem of combining and harmonizing Aristotle’s metaphysical approach 
to nature with the mathematical description of the phenomena introduced by 
Greek astronomers and opticians was discussed already in later Antiquity. (…) 
[T]he discussion remained limited to the domain of problematic reasoning and it 
was not before the Islamic period that a different approach was made, when the 
Arab astronomer and optician Ibn al-Haytham advanced the first consistent 
theory aiming at a mechanical foundation of Ptolemy’s cinematics. (…) The 
experimental method, not yet fully developed in Ibn al-Haytham’s mechanics, 
assumes increasing significance in his optical writings. By examining the 
question of the moon’s capacity of emitting light without being a polished mirror 
Ibn al-Haytham was led to the discovery that all coloured bodies emit light, and 
that light and colour are virtually identical. By way of systematical experiment 
destined to prove these assertions he arrived at constructing the Camera obscura. 
On closer examination of Ibn al-Haytham’s conception of mathematical models 
and of the rôle they play in his theory of sense-perception, it becomes evident 
that he was the true founder of physics in the modern sense of the word; in fact 
he anticipated by six centuries the fertile ideas that were to mark the outset of 
this new branch of science” (Matthias Schramm, Ibn al-Haythams Weg zur 
Physik (Franz Steiner Verlag GmbH, 1963), p. XII (Summary).  
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logical and universal valid disciplines such as mathematics, geometry and 
sciences based thereupon stood the proof. As a consequence of further analysis 
pursued over following decades, the fundamental question about the relationship 
between man and God transformed in light of new approaches applied by 
analytical sciences.125 In particular, the focus on the man – God relationship was 
broken up into sub-questions accessible by the new sciences. Thus, the question 
about the relationship between man and God reappeared as questions about the 
relationship between man and ‘the given’, that is, pre-existing nature. However, 
the transformation of religious questions into scientific ones not only bore 
tremendous scientific achievements, but also philosophical upheavals. Medieval 
philosophers such as Augustinus had conceived the world as a holy entity 
governed by a metaphysical power, that was, the kingdom of God (Civitas 
Dei).126 In contrast, Descartes and his followers reconceived the man – God 
dichotomy as a dualism between mind and matter, man and nature. The 
Cartesian world-conception presumes a dualism between mathematical, logical, 
analytical and hence ‘rational’ concepts, on the one hand, and corporal matter 
unable to rational reasoning, on the other hand. A consequence of this dualism 
                                                                                                                                                        
According to some scholars, Ibn al-Haytham should not only be recognised as the founder of 
scientific methodology, but as the mastermind of the positivist school of thought. Roshdi 
Rashed, for example, noted the following:  
“In reforming optics he as it were adopted “positivism” (before the term was 
invented): we do not go beyond experience, and we cannot be content to use 
pure concepts in investigating natural phenomena. Understanding of these 
cannot be acquired without mathematics. Thus, once he has assumed light is a 
material substance, Ibn al-Haytham does not discuss its nature further, but 
confines himself to consider its propagation and diffusion. In his optics “the 
smallest parts of light”, as he calls them, retain only properties that can be 
treated by geometry and verified by experiment; they lack all sensible quality 
except energy. That is to say we begin by insisting on making optics 
geometrical, or on reforming geometrical optics, leaving aside the “why” 
questions that have to do with teleological physics (…)” (Roshdi Rashed, The 
Celestial Kinematics of Ibn al-Haytham, in Arabic Sciences and Philosophy, vol. 
17 (2007) [pp. 7-55] p. 19).  
125 Beside Arabic origins of rational, i.e. enlightened thinking, as mentioned above, another 
non-European philosophical tradition which influenced 17th century philosophers in Europe 
shall be briefly mentioned, namely Chinese Confucianism. It is well documented that 
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Christian Wolff in particular were influenced by the thinking 
of Chinese philosophers Confucius and Mencius. With his famous speech at the University of 
Halle in 1721, entitled ‘On the Practical Philosophy of the Chinese’ (in German: ‘Über die 
praktische Philosophie der Chinesen’), Wolff caused a scandal by arguing that a decent living 
within a working society can be based on rational thinking only, thus rendering Christian 
metaphysics obsolete (Henrik Jäger, ‘Die anderen Quellen der Aufklärung – Wie die 
chinesische Tradition in das europäische Denken des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts eingegangen 
ist’, in Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Nr. 241, October 16, 2010, p. 65. For further references to non-
European philosophy, see footnote no.  65 above).  
126 Hans Joachim Störig, Kleine Weltgeschichte der Philosophie, Vol. 1 (Fischer, 1979), pp. 
229-235.  
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was the perception of animals as machines. Störig observed that from a 
Cartesian point of view, an animal crying because it’s being beaten is no 
different than a pipe organ sounding because its keys are touched.127 Störig 
further noted that the mechanical world-conception of the Cartesian school of 
thought paved the way for later Materialists to extend the ‘rational’ approach 
from animals to humans; humans are conceived as machines, albeit rather 
complicated ones.128 And Eduard Kaeser observed that the Cartesian equation of 
animals with machines provided the following dangerous syllogism: animals are 
machines; men are animals; hence men are machines.129 
 
The Cartesian dualism between man and ‘the given’, i.e., nature, thus implied a 
separation between the two. The separation between man and nature, in turn, is a 
precondition for the re-validation of man and nature, respectively. Whereas 
medieval scholasticism implied the supremacy of metaphysics, i.e. God, the 
‘rational’ Cartesian world-conception subdued ‘given’ natural matters to the 
power of scientific analysis. The Cartesian approach ‘objectified’ natural 
matters, virtually making objects out of living beings. The example of animals 
shows how the de-valorisation of ‘the given’, i.e. nature, worked: by equating 
animals with machines, the former were de-valorised to mechanisms without 
any faculty of reason, hence sub-human structures. In other words, the Cartesian 
approach of objectifying ‘given’ matters of nature was the philosophical matrix 
underlying human domination and exploitation of nature.130 The scientific 
                                                 
127 Hans Joachim Störig, ibid. p. 322.  
128 Hans Joachim Störig, ibid. p. 322. 
129 Eduard Kaeser, Pop Science. Essays zur Wissenschaftskultur (Schwabe, 2009), p. 157. 
Kaeser added that “the ‘monstrosity is in the logic, not in the laboratory. And what happens 
with the animal in the laboratory may sooner or later happen with us too. We are its closest” 
(Eduard Kaeser, ibid.; in German: “Das Ungeheuerliche liegt in der Logik, nicht im Labor. 
Und was mit dem Tier im Labor geschieht, kann über kurz oder lang auch mit uns passieren. 
Wir sind seine Nächsten”).  
130 It was not by hazard that René Descartes lived and worked most of his lifetime in the 
Netherlands. The 17th Century was also called the Dutch Golden Age where riches from 
overseas trade spurred science, arts and civic liberties. Also termed ‘the venturesome era’ by 
Pradier, the Dutch Golden Age saw the rise of the Dutch East India Company, the first 
multinational corporation listed at the Amsterdam Stock Exchange. 17th Century Amsterdam 
was also at the centre of the first well-recorded speculative bubble, the so-called Tulip mania: 
during the 1630s, prices for tulip bulbs rose to extraordinary high levels, but suddenly 
collapsed in 1637. In the focus of the study at hand, it is noteworthy that the tulip bubble of 
the 1630s already showed the ambiguity of financial risk control again observed during the 
food crisis of 2008: the inventive financial instruments applied, in particular futures contracts 
and short selling, were primarily used for speculative purposes increasing the bubble, rather 
than for hedging purposes containing the mania (see Hans Joachim Störig, Kleine 
Weltgeschichte der Philosophie, Vol. 1 (Fischer, 1979), p. 318; Pierre-Charles Pradier, La 
notion de risqué en économie, (Éditions La Découverte, Paris, 2006), p. 14; André Kostolany, 
Die Kunst über Geld nachzudenken (Econ Ullstein List Verlag, 2000), pp. 146-149). See also 
footnotes no. 340 and no. 421 below. 
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approach of Cartesian objectivism transformed animals into res extensa, 
meaning ‘extended objects’.131 It is this particular function of the Cartesian 
subject – object dichotomy arousing many-voiced criticism, most notably from 
animal rights proponents and holistic approaches in ecology, such as deep 
ecology.  
 
The meaning of positivism, however, seems of having narrowed over time. 
Whereas Comte started with a holistic concept for effectively unifying science 
and to virtually erect an alternative, science-based religion,132 Neo-positivists 
contented themselves with developing a unifying language for all sciences. 
Nowadays and in particular in the aftermath of the so-called positivism dispute 
(in German: Positivismusstreit), the term positivism comes along with a rather 
negative connotation. In this context, Alfred Schmidt, a collaborator of Adorno 
and Horkheimer, provided a stringent description of a present-day notion of 
positivism: “Schmidt characterizes positivism as a tendency of thought in which 
‘the method of the various single sciences is taken absolutely as the only valid 
method of knowledge’ (die einzelwissenschaftlichen Verfahren als einzig gültige 
Erkenntnis verabsolutierende Denken), and he identifies it, correctly, with an 
over-emphasis on ‘sensually ascertainable facts’.” 133 Although Schmidt’s 
depiction of positivism was an intended allegation against Popper, Popper fully 
agreed in substance and added, slightly amused:  
 
“He [i.e. Alfred Schmidt] is clearly unaware of the fact that my 
alleged positivism, which was used to give the book Der 
Positivismusstreit its name, consisted of a fight against all this, 
which he describes (fairly correct) as ‘positivism’. I have always 
fought for the right to operate freely with speculative theories against 
the narrowness of the ‘scientistic’ theories of knowledge and, 
especially, against all forms of sensualistic empiricism. I have fought 
against the aping of the natural sciences by the social sciences, and I 
have fought for the doctrine that positivistic epistemology is 
                                                 
131 Eduard Kaeser, Pop Science. Essays zur Wissenschaftskultur (Schwabe Verlag Basel, 
2009), p. 154.  
132 Comte’s thinking amounted to an alternative religion, to a secular weltanschauung 
virtually covering all aspects of life. In his work The Catechism of Positive Religion, Comte 
established an alternative, i.e., positivist philosophy of life, based on the device: “Love as a 
principle and order as the basis; progress as the goal” (in French: “L'amour pour principe et 
l'ordre pour base; le progrès pour but”). (Hans Joachim Störig, Kleine Weltgeschichte der 
Philosophie, Vol. 2 (Fischer, 1980), p. 144). A shortened version of the positivist motto can 
still be seen on the national flag of Brazil. In Portuguese, it reads: “Ordem e Progresso” 
(“Order and Progress”).  
133 Karl R. Popper, ‘Reason or Revolution?’ in The Myth of the Framework. In defence of 
science and rationality. Edited by M.A. Notturno (Routledge, 1994), p. 75 and footnote no. 
10; with reference to a letter written by Dr Alfred Schmidt to the German newspaper Die Zeit, 
12 June 1970, p. 45.  
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inadequate even in its analysis of the natural sciences which, in fact, 
are not ‘careful generalizations from observation’, as is usually 
believed, but are essentially speculative and daring.”134 
 
Hence, from this statement of Popper, the following common features of today’s 
perception of positivism may be distilled: (i) narrow ‘scientistic’ theories of 
knowledge, i.e., scienticism in the form of ‘sensualistic empiricism’, (ii) “the 
aping of the natural sciences by the social sciences”, and (iii) the belief that 
positivistic epistemology is adequate in its analysis of the natural sciences.  
 
From these statements and positions, a fourth criterion emerges as a 
philosophical essence of positivism, namely its refutation of dialectics. Nicholas 
Georgescu-Roegen even observed an antagonistic relationship between 
dialectical concepts of science, often ascribed to Hegelian origins, and 
positivistic concepts of science.135 Georgescu-Roegen noted that from a 
positivistic point of view, dialectic concepts of science “are antagonistic to 
science: knowledge proper exists only to the extent to which it is expressed in 
arithmomorphic concepts. The position recalls that of the Catholic Church: holy 
thought can be expressed only in Latin.” 136 
                                                 
134 Karl R. Popper, The Myth of the Framework. In defence of science and rationality. Edited 
by M.A. Notturno (Routledge, 1994), p. 75 (footnote omitted, emphasises added). In 
diametric opposition to positivist notions, Popper’s critical rationalism even embraced 
metaphysics: “Finally I have not only stressed the meaningfulness of metaphysical assertions 
and the fact that I am myself a metaphysical realist, but I have also analysed the important 
historical role played by metaphysics in the formation of scientific theories” (see Karl R. 
Popper, The Myth of the Framework. In defence of science and rationality. Edited by M.A. 
Notturno (Routledge, 1994), p. 75). For such reasons, Nassim Nicholas Taleb said “I have to 
note that Popper is the antidote to positivism” (Nassim Nicholas Taleb, Fooled by 
Randomness. The Hidden Role of Chance in Life and in the Markets. 2nd Edition (Penguin 
Books, 2004), p. 128).  
135 Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, Analytical Economics. Issues and Problems (Harvard 
University Press, 1967), p. 27.  
136 Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, ibid. p. 27, italics added. Georgescu-Roegen introduced the 
term arithmomorphic concept to betoken scientific concepts expressing reality in real 
numbers. Georgescu-Roegen worked out the antinomy between arithmomorphic concepts and 
dialectical concepts of science; between concepts based on the idea that reality is scientifically 
ascertainable and reducible to one single number, on the one hand, and concepts emphasising 
the continuous flow of things requiring iterative approaches for grasping reality. The 
positivistic critique of dialectical concepts is encapsulated in the sentence of “the muddled 
waters of Hegelian dialectics”, whereas dialectical approaches may be traced back to the 
sentence of Herakleitos considering that “one cannot step twice into the same river” (see 
Georgescu-Roegen, ibid., pp. 21-35). The saying of Herakleitos is understood as expressing 
“the problem of the opposition between Being and Becoming”, a viewpoint in which science, 
according to Georgescu-Roegen, does not partake anymore: “Science, however, has long 
since [Herakleitos] decided to embrace the viewpoint of ‘vulgar philosophy’, which viewpoint 
is that there is both Being and Becoming” (see Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, Energy and 
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Following the rather authoritative fourth criterion, a fifth criterion may be 
added. The fifth criterion consists of a somewhat “elitist” understanding of 
science. The elitist attitude of certain positivist scientists was best described by 
Popper who noted that “these physicists, and other positivists, try to tell us 
[today]: that we cannot, in principle, hope ever to understand anything about the 
structure of matter: that the theory of matter must forever remain the private 
affair of the expert, the specialist – a mystery shrouded in technicalities, in 
mathematical techniques, and in ‘semantics’ ”.137 
 
A sixth criterion of Neopositivism, in particular its specific development in the 
United States, is the alleged “neutrality” of Neopositivism in political and 
religious matters. In this respect, Popper observed that positivists do not wish to 
address questions outside the range of problems ascertainable by ‘positive’ 
empirical sciences.138 Hence, positivists disregard philosophical problems as 
‘meaningless pseudo problems’.139 Popper noted that the disregard of 
philosophical problems as ‘meaningless pseudo problems’ is a very easy way to 
go: one only needs to define the term ‘meaning’ narrowly enough.140 A narrow 
definition of the term ‘meaning’, confining it to questions ascertainable by 
                                                                                                                                                        
Economic Myths. Institutional and Analytical Economic Essays (Pergamon Press, 1976), p. 
79).  
Georgescu-Roegen himself seemed of having taken some middle stance between positivistic 
and purely dialectic concepts. Georgescu-Roegen perceived theoretical science as “a living 
organism”. He recognised the aliveness of science in the fact that it “continuously creates new 
facts from old facts, but its growth is organic, not accretionary”. The organic growth of 
theoretical science is maintained by “a continuous secretion of experimental suggestions 
which are tested and organically integrated into the science’s anatomy” (Nicholas Georgescu-
Roegen, Analytical Economics. Issues and Problems (Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 
14-15). The notion that (theoretical) science is a living and evolving organism seemed to have 
moved Georgescu-Roegen beyond the opposition of arithmomorphic, e.g. positivistic, and 
strictly dialectical, i.e., Hegelian, concepts of science. Georgescu-Roegen himself referred to 
“vulgar philosophy” for denoting a viewpoint “that there is both Being and Becoming”, 
indicating that, as a matter of fact, both aspects are required to embrace an entire view of 
reality (Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, Energy and Economic Myths. Institutional and 
Analytical Economic Essays (Pergamon Press, 1976), p. 79. On the other hand, Georgescu-
Roegen noted that “to abandon this dualism [e.g. the dualism between positivistic and 
dialectic concepts], is to renounce analysis; and to renounce analysis is to do away with 
theoretical science. However, we must not expect that analysis can remain entirely immune to 
the epistemological ills inherent in any dualism” (Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, ibid., p. 79).  
137 Karl R. Popper, Quantum Theory and the Schism in Physics. From the Postscript to the 
Logic of Scientific Discovery. Edited by W.W. Bartley, III (Hutchinson & Co. Publishers 
Ltd., 1982), pp. 172-173). 
138 Karl R. Popper, Logik der Forschung (English title: The Logic of Scientific Discovery) 6th 
edition, (J.C.B Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tübingen 1976), p. 23.  
139 Karl R. Popper, ibid. p. 23. Yet, positivists’ disregard of philosophical problems as 
‘pseudo problems’ is not expressed as requests or proposals, but as knowledge (Karl R. 
Popper, ibid. pp. 23-24.  
140 Karl R. Popper, ibid. p. 24. 
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empirical sciences, renders any debate about the term ‘meaning’ meaningless.141 
Citing Wittgenstein, Popper concluded that, once ‘enthroned’, the ‘dogma of 
meaning’ is beyond criticism, but ‘sacrosanct and definitive’.142  
 
Fred Eidlin worked out differences within the positivist school of thought with 
regard to meaning and values. Eidlin discerned positivists who are value-
naturalists, on the one hand, from positivists who are value-non-cognitivists, on 
the other hand.143 Most positivists, Eidlin noted, are value-non-cognitivists.144 
Value-non-cognitivists are of the view that facts are logically independent from 
implied values and that statements about values, compared to factual statements, 
are non-scientific.145 Value-naturalists, in contrast, go farther. Value-naturalists 
do not only treat values in the same way as they are treating facts, that is, 
empirically; such an approach could also be tried by value-non-cognitivists and 
is not, per se, value-naturalistic. But value-naturalists go farther insofar they try 
to deduce ethical principles from factual premises.146 Eidlin provided the 
example of survival and the ban on killing. A ‘naïve positivist-oriented social 
scientists’, as Eidlin also called value-naturalists, may deduce from the fact that 
humans want to survive that survival is a natural value. Or, a naïve positivist-
oriented social scientist may deduce from the fact that murder is proscribed in 
most societies that the ban on killing is a value or norm deducible from facts.147 
Subsequently, such facts-to-value deductions are frivolously generalised by 
value-naturalists.148 Eidlin argued that the reason why value-naturalism is such 
an easy position is its congruence with common sense.149 In Eidlin’s view, the 
congruence of value-naturalism with common sense is the cause that positivist-
oriented research in social sciences is dispersed with implicit, if not explicit 
value-naturalist elements.150 
 
However, the standpoint of value-non-cognitivists, that is, considering facts as 
independent from values and statements about values as non-scientific, did also 
attract criticism. Criticism may arise, first of all, in cases value-non-cognitivism 
translates into silence and alleged ‘neutrality’ vis-à-vis political and ethical 
questions and religious metaphysics.  
                                                 
141 Karl R. Popper, ibid. p. 24. 
142 Karl R. Popper, ibid. p. 24. 
143 Fred Eidlin, ‚Poppers ethischer und metaphysischer Kognitivismus (Warum Wörter 
manchmal wichtig sein können)’. In Kurt Salamun (ed.), Karl R. Popper und die Philosophie 
des Kritischen Rationalismus. Zum 85. Geburtstag von Karl R. Popper (Rodopi, 1989), p. 
162.  
144 Fred Eidlin, ibid. p. 163.  
145 Fred Eidlin, ibid. p. 163.  
146 Fred Eidlin, ibid. p. 165.  
147 Fred Eidlin, ibid. p. 165. 
148 Fred Eidlin, ibid. p. 165.  
149 Fred Eidlin, ibid. pp. 165-166.  
150 Fred Eidlin, ibid. p. 166.  
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David Stump reflected on the question “whether there can be any connection 
between epistemologies and values and consider the philosophy of science as a 
possible political force”.151 By pursuing his reflections, Stump discovered “at 
least four possible ways to recover a modicum of value orientation within the 
philosophy of science”.152 As one of these possible ways to recover minimal 
value orientations, Stump suggested to look at epistemological approaches of 
respective philosophical schools of thought. Stump explained:  
 
“(…) even if there is no direct connection between a particular 
epistemology and political values, certain epistemologies may limit 
the range of possible values. This is shown in the philosophy of 
science itself, to some extent, by those who accept the fact/value 
distinction, thus eliminating value judgments from science.” 153 
 
Though, the disregard of values as “metaphysics” and the attempt to eliminate 
value judgements from science are characterising features of positivism and of 
Logical positivism in particular. Positivism and Logical positivism are applying 
an especially rigorous form of epistemology aiming at “eliminating value 
judgments from science”. Therefore, considered from the perspective of 
epistemology, positivism and Logical positivism can be added to those 
epistemologies which “limit the range of possible values”. Giving its aim at 
separating facts from values and science from judgement, the objective of the 
epistemological approach developed by positivism and logical positivism is, in 
fact, the counter piece to the connection of epistemology and values. Thus, from 
an epistemological point of view, positivism and logical positivism can be 
considered as the antithesis to Stumps’ notion of “the philosophy of science as a 
possible political force”: by virtue of the fact/value dichotomy, positivist 
epistemology is intrinsically apolitical.154 
                                                 
151 David J, Stump, ‚From the Values of Scientific Philosophy to the Value Neutrality of the 
Philosophy of Science’, in Michael Heidelberger, Friedrich Stadler (eds.), History of 
Philosophy of Science. New Trends and Perspectives (Kluwer, 2002), p. 155.  
152 David J, Stump, ibid. p. 156.  
153 David J, Stump, ibid. p. 156.  
154 However, positivist epistemology may be considered ‘a-political’ only insofar its 
methodological approach is concerned. On the other hand, mere abstention from value 
judgement is not unanimously considered as an ‘apolitical’ position. Lenin, for example, used 
the relationship of science and religion for demonstrating the political impact of allegedly 
‘apolitical’ positions of scientists. In particular, Lenin observed that certain Empiriocriticists, 
as he called Positivists, shunned to apply their ‘positive’, i.e. intersubjective methodological 
approach to religious matters. On these ground, Lenin noted that the non-appliance of 
objective epistemological methods on religious matters is tantamount to subjectivity. In 
political context, though, Lenin held that the silence or even ambiguity of Positivists such as 
Ernst Mach and Josef Petzoldt was amounting to abet “the bourgeois reaction”, noting that 
“the neutrality of a philosopher in this [religious] matter is tantamount to sycophancy vis-à-vis 
of Fideism [that is, a subjectivistic epistemological approach basing on the pre-eminence of 
faith]” (V. I. Lenin, ‘Materialismus und Empiriokritizismus. Kritische Bemerkungen über 
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Bringing the two observations made above together, i.e., the depolitisation of 
logical positivists immigrated to the United States, and the recognition of 
positivist epistemology as apolitical, a new feature of Neopositivism can be 
observed. Void of political ideas and ideals, only the epistemological method of 
separating facts and values remained, giving Neopositivism a new meaning. 
Whereas logical positivism in Europe had combined Enlightenment values with 
the idea of modernity in general and with modern science in particular, 
Neopositivism in the United States confined itself to the latter. Hence, the 
philosophy of logical positivism shrank to the application of positivist 
epistemology in scientific environments; the philosophy of positivism was 
reduced to a mere epistemological method which may be called positivist 
method, positivist approach, or empiriocriticism.  
 
3. Pensée Unique 
 
In the wake of the victory of conservative forces against Napoleonic France, 
sealed at the Vienna Congress (1814/15), times were rather unreceptive for 
Comte’s ideas on the continent.155 
In Britain, in contrast, Comte’s ideas fell on fertile ground. British philosophers 
such as Francis Bacon (1561-1626), Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) and John 
Stuart Mill (1806-1873) had prepared the ground for empirical, utilitarian and 
positivist approaches. Empiricism, utilitarianism and positivism, in turn, were 
well received by ascending middle classes, thriving overseas trade and 
accelerating industrialisation.156 Britain is thus a good example for 
interdependencies between politics, economy and philosophical ideas. Margaret 
C. Jacob, for instance, put forward the thesis that Empiricism in England was a 
tool for the emerging middle classes against absolutism. Jacob observed:  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
eine reaktionäre Philosophie’, in W. I. Lenin. Sämtliche Werke. Vol. XIII. Translated into 
German from the 2nd revised Russian Edition, published in 1909 (Verlag für Literatur und 
Politik, Wien-Berlin, 1927), p. 352, translation from German into English by the author). 
Whether adopting a Marxian perspective or not, the example shows the intellectual dubiety of 
allegedly ‘apolitical’ or ‘neutral’ scientific positions. On this note, it might be an interesting 
intellectual game to apply Lenin’s litmus test to contemporary positivist scientists. Assuming 
it turns out that a significant segment of today’s positivist scientists are still shunning to apply 
the requirement for scientific verification on religious matters (or the requirement for 
scientific falsification on atheism), then Positivism should, indeed, no longer be attributed to 
Materialism, but to Idealism.  
155 Hans Joachim Störig, Kleine Weltgeschichte der Philosophie, Vol. 2 (Fischer, 1980), p. 
145. Comte’s income situation was so deplorable that he was compelled to hinge on the 
support of his friends over extended periods of his life. One of his friends and supporters was 
John Stuart Mill (Hans Joachim Störig, ibid., p. 137).  
156 Hans Joachim Störig, ibid. pp. 145-147.  
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“Experimentalism was intended to channel the aggressions and 
ambitions of the great as well as the lowly. Boyle, Newton, and the 
next generations of interpreters – Bentley, Clarke, and their followers 
– were just as afraid of absolute sovereigns and their henchmen as 
they were afraid of republicans. The vision of science and religion 
that the Newtonians inherited and expanded gave birth to the 
physicotheology so beloved by eighteen-century liberal Protestants in 
Europe and the American colonies. This middle way worked for a 
time to prevent the return of absolutism. For its believers, it justified 
resistance to any pressure for reform.  
However imperfectly from our perspective, Erastian157 churchmen 
and experimental scientists grappled effectively with their historical 
moment because they were neither absolutists nor cynical 
relativists.”158 
 
It is this particular merger of science and Protestantism, termed physicotheology 
by Jacob, which bridged the role and the understanding of science in Britain and 
in the United States.   
 
positivism entered the United States in two waves. As mentioned above, a first 
wave of positivist thinking – instigated by Comte – fell on fertile grounds in 
Britain. Conveyed through the works of Francis Bacon, John Stuart Mill and 
Jeremy Bentham, positivist philosophy became accessible in the United States, 
too.  
 
A second wave of logical empiricist or neopositivist thinking arrived in the 
United States in the aftermath of the rise to power of the Nazi regime in 
Germany. Interestingly, though, the political impetus of the Vienna Circle seems 
of having faded away during the transatlantic crossing.159 A. W. Carus put it that 
                                                 
157 A term derived from Thomas Erastus and Erastianism, indicating an understanding of the 
state prevailing in religious matters.  
158 Margaret C. Jacob, ’Reflections on Bruno Latour’s Version of the Seventeenth Century’, 
in Noretta Koertge (ed.), A House Built on Sand. Exposing Postmodernist Myths About 
Science (Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 252 (emphasis added).  
159 In its heydays, the perception and self-perception of Neopositivism as a politically 
progressive movement was a rather self-explaining feature, seemingly. In retrospect, however, 
the association of the Vienna Circle with political Liberalism may require some explanation, 
best given by the Vienna Circle itself:  
“That Vienna was specially suitable ground for this development [i.e. a scientific 
world conception] is historically understandable. In the second half of the 
nineteenth century, liberalism was long the dominant political current. Its world 
of ideas stems from the enlightenment, from empiricism, utilitarianism and the 
free trade movement of England. In Vienna’s liberal movement, scholars of 
world renown occupied leading positions. Here an anti-metaphysical spirit was 
cultivated, for instance, by men like Theodor Gomperz who translated the works 
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of J. S. Mill, Suess, Jodl and others” (Rudolf Carnap, Hans Hahn, Otto Neurath, 
‘The Scientific Conception of the World: The Vienna Circle’, known as the 
Vienna Circle Manifesto, in Otto Neurath, Empiricism and Sociology, edited by 
Marie Neurath and Robert S. Cohen, volume 1 of the Vienna Circle Collection 
(D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1973), p. 301).  
With regard to later allegations that Neopositivism was coming along with an elitist 
understanding of science, as observed by Karl Popper for example, it may be informative to 
shed light on a particular field of interest of the Vienna Circle, namely progressive education: 
“Thanks to this spirit of enlightenment, Vienna has been leading in a 
scientifically oriented people’s education. With the collaboration of Victor Adler 
and Friedrich Jodl, the society of popular education was founded and carried 
forth; ‘popular university courses’ and the ‘people’s college’ were set up by the 
well-known historian Ludo Hartmann whose anti-metaphysical attitude and 
materialist conception of history expressed itself in all his actions. The same 
spirit also inspired the movement of the ‘Free School’ which was the forerunner 
of today’s school reform” (Rudolf Carnap, Hans Hahn, Otto Neurath, ‘The 
Scientific Conception of the World: The Vienna Circle’, known as the Vienna 
Circle Manifesto, in Otto Neurath, Empiricism and Sociology, edited by Marie 
Neurath and Robert S. Cohen, volume 1 of the Vienna Circle Collection (D. 
Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht-Holland, 1973), p. 302). 
The translation of Enlightenment values into concrete political action, in particular the call for 
popular education, marks a stark contrast between early Logical Empiricists of the Vienna 
Circle and later Neopositivists. As noted by Popper, for instance, later Neopositivism became 
more and more inclined to scientific elitism and punditocracy. The contrast between a 
political agenda presupposing the susceptibility of the public for scientific knowledge and an 
elitist concept of science should be treasured for the discussion about public involvement in 
risk assessment, following later in this paper. In terms of a preview, reference is made to 
Shrader-Frechette who observed that “methodological errors (…) arise out of an expert-
dominated conception of risk assessment as a wholly objective, purely scientific enterprise” 
(Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, Risk Analysis and Scientific Method. Methodological and 
Ethical Problems with Evaluating Societal Hazards (D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1985), 
p. 202). With view on methodological solutions, Shrader-Frechette continued:  
“The methodological solutions needed to correct these errors arise out of a 
cooperative (citizen plus scientist) conception of risk assessment as a normative, 
policy-oriented enterprise with significant scientific elements. Unless the 
normative aspect of risk assessment is recognized, and unless the conception of 
the enterprise is changed accordingly, real negotiation over controversial 
technological policies will be impossible. This is because the first step in 
negotiation is mutual recognition of the complex sources of conflict. In this case, 
the controversy over technological and environmental risk is not merely over 
scientific methodology, but also over social values. Bit if this conflict is at least 
in part a controversy over societal values, and if Thomas Jefferson was correct 
that the only safe locus of societal power is in the people themselves, then the 
risk-assessment powers of society ought to be placed in part in the people 
themselves. If so, then analytic assessors must help both to educate the public 
and to amend, reformulate, and clarify risk-assessment methods” (Kristin S. 
Shrader-Frechette, ibid.  pp. 202-203, emphasis added).  
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analytical philosophy, after having crossed the Atlantic, “has lost (…) the desire 
to change the world”.160 Carus observed:  
 
“[Analytical philosophy] has lost its continuity with the eighteen-
century Enlightenment; it has lost contact with the wellspring of 
philosophy since Socrates, the urge to criticize complacent, 
unreflective, and fashionable modes of thought. Analytical 
philosophy has reverted to the task philosophy professors have 
excelled at through the ages, which is to justify by detailed, abstruse 
arguments the unreflective common sense that everyone else already 
takes for granted. In short, analytical philosophy has become 
precisely the sort of thing that the Vienna Circle attacked so 
merciless during its vitriolic phase.” 161 
 
With reference to recent research, David Stump gave an account of some of the 
reasons for the depolitisation of remnants of the Vienna Circle after emigration 
from Nazi Germany to the United States. Stump noted:  
 
“Recent works explore why the members of the Vienna Circle 
became less political when they came to the United States (e.g. 
Giere, 1996) and the general chilling effect of McCarthyism on 
philosophy (McCumber, 2000). Members of the Vienna Circle may 
have been hiding their past connections to left-wing groups because 
of the anti-Communist climate in the United States, or thy may have 
felt the need to become respectable academic or (…) perhaps the 
political values expressed by the Vienna Circle, with the exception of 
Neurath, have been rather overstated (Ongley, 2000).” 162 
                                                 
160 A.W. Carus, ‘The Philosopher without Qualities’, in Michael Heidelberger, Friedrich 
Stadler (eds.), History of Philosophy of Science. New Trends and Perspectives (Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 2002), p. 374.  
161 A.W. Carus, ibid. pp. 374-375.  
162 David J, Stump, ‚From the Values of Scientific Philosophy to the Value Neutrality of the 
Philosophy of Science’, in Michael Heidelberger, Friedrich Stadler (eds.), History of 
Philosophy of Science. New Trends and Perspectives (Kluwer, 2002), p. 155. It seems, 
however, that John McCumber has reached a different final conclusion with regard to the 
impact of Positivism in the United States. Whereas A.W. Carus and David Stump regarded 
the depolitisation of Positivism in the United States as a loss of meaning, McCumber seemed 
of having arrived at a more nuanced conclusion. Thomas Uebel noted: “Rather than 
perpetuate the extremes of the Science Wars, McCumber employs the socio-political 
contextualization of analytical philosophy’s rise to dominance in the post-World War II North 
America to ground a discussion that seeks to transcend an ongoing and unproductive divide in 
philosophy” (Thomas Uebel, ‚The Poverty of ‘Constructivist’ History (and Policy Advice)’, 
in Michael Heidelberger, Friedrich Stadler (eds.), History of Philosophy of Science. New 
Trends and Perspectives (Kluwer, 2002), p. 389; with reference to John McCumber, Time in 
the Ditch. American Philosophy and the McCarthy Era (Northwestern University Press, 
2001).  
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Be that as it may, the depoliticised version of Neopositivism was welcomed in 
the United States with open arms. First of all, scientists and physicists in 
particular were welcomed for fostering US war efforts, in particular the 
Manhattan Project. Additionally though, a genuine US American philosophical 
tradition may have prepared receptive grounds for positivist approaches. That 
philosophical school of thought is known as Pragmatism and related to, inter 
alia, Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), William James (1842-1910) and John 
Dewey (1859-1952).163 Noteworthy features of Pragmatism are its refutation of 
idealistic speculation, as was the case in German Idealism, and the reduction of 
utility to tangible factors such as ‘cash-value’, ‘profit’ and ‘results’.164 By the 
same token, the notion of truth changed from a substantive question to a 
procedural issue. Peirce, for instance, relied on a procedural attempt for 
approaching truth: “The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all 
who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this 
opinion is the real” 165 Following Peirce, the “Community of (rational) 
Investigators” would form some kind of “Supreme Court of Rationality”, 
approaching truth by iterative procedures.166 By rendering truth contingent upon 
utility and reducing utility to cash-value, Pragmatism virtually boiled down the 
notion of truth to a measurable and quantifiable cash-equivalent.167 
 
The spin of Pragmatism towards utilitarianism was furthered by William James, 
in particular. According to Luc Ferry, US American expressions of utilitarianism 
consider ‘utility’ in light of the satisfaction a product or merchandise brings to 
the consumer: “It is this consumerist vision that critical intellectuals denounce, 
justifiably in part, as the sign of a ‘global Americanization’.” 168 Considering 
legal theory in particular, it was Ronald Dworkin relating legal positivism to 
utilitarianism. In Rights, Killing, and Suffering (1983), Raymond Frey observed:  
 
                                                 
163 Hans Joachim Störig, Kleine Weltgeschichte der Philosophie, Vol. 2 (Fischer, 1980), pp. 
241-243.  
164 Hans Joachim Störig, ibid. p. 241.  
165 Charles Sanders Peirce, Collected Papers, Vol. V/VI (1934), p. 268, cited from Jürgen 
Habermas, Kommunikatives Handeln und detranszendentalisierte Vernunft (Reclam 2001), p. 
20, footnote 13. 
166 Jürgen Habermas, Kommunikatives Handeln und detranszendentalisierte Vernunft (Reclam 
2001), p. 20-21. Although Habermas questioned the “epistemological” approach of Peirce as a 
model, he considered that to centring on truth as an angle might have a regulative function for 
evaluating (scientific) information. Furthermore, Peirce’s proposal for a ‘community of 
rational investigators’ resembles Arthur Kantrowitz’ model of a ‘Science Court’ (for more on 
the Science Court, see footnotes no. 166, 819 and 1418 below).  
167 Hans Joachim Störig, Kleine Weltgeschichte der Philosophie, Vol. 2 (Fischer, 1980), p. 
241.  
168 Luc Ferry, The new ecological order. Original title: Le nouvel ordre écologique: L’arbre, 
l’animal et l’homme (Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1992), translated by Carol Volk (The University 
of Chicago Press, 1995), p. 149. 
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“In Taking Rights Seriously, Ronald Dworkin opposes what he sees 
as the prevalent theory of law, which is the legal positivism that 
derives from the work of John Austin and Jeremy Bentham. One 
significant aspect to Dworkin’s discontent with positivism is his 
disenchantment with utilitarianism (or what he calls ‘economic’ 
utilitarianism), which he describe in his Introduction as the 
normative underpinning of positivism.” 169 
 
An example of the absorption of neopositivist approaches in the United States 
was Behaviourism. In a nutshell, Behaviourism can be defined as a theory 
explaining human and animal behaviour without reliance on psychological or 
mental processes.170 The influence of Neopositivism on Behaviourism can well 
be demonstrated by invoking the example of Skinner. Burrhus Frederic Skinner 
(1904-1990), a US American psychologist and philosopher, pioneered a specific 
form of Behaviourism also known as radical Behaviourism.171 Gerald Holton 
noted that Skinner got inspiration particularly from the lecture of the works of 
Ernst Mach (1838-1916), an Austrian physicist and philosopher.172 In the field 
of philosophy, Mach established the philosophy of science as a discrete 
philosophical branch which turned out as building block for Neopositivism. 
Working out elements of Neopositivism in Skinner’s work, Holton observed:  
 
“In writing his doctoral thesis, young Skinner saw a way of applying 
the Machian point of view [i.e. the point of view of neopositivist 
Ernst Mach] to the clarification of such concepts as the ‘reflex’ of 
intact organisms, something he considered to be as basic in 
psychology as, say, mass is in physics. As Skinner recollected, he 
was ‘following a strictly Machian line, in which behavior was 
analyzed as a subject matter in its own right as a function of 
environmental variables without reference to either mind or the 
nervous system’ (…). In this radically empiricist mode, the study of 
behavior reduced itself for Skinner, to start with, to the observation 
                                                 
169 Raymond G. Frey, Rights, Killing, and Suffering. Moral Vegetarianism and Applied Ethics 
(Basil Blackwell Publisher Limited, 1983), p. 61.  
170 See, for instance, Hans-Joachim Niemann, Lexikon des Kritischen Rationalismus (Mohr 
Siebeck, Tübingen 2004), p. 39.  
171 Jürgen Falter, for example, argued that only radical and classical expressions of 
Behaviourism, as they have been developed by Burrhus Frederic Skinner and John Broadus 
Watson, should be subsumed under the ‘Positivism’ label (Jürgen W. Falter, ‘Der 
‚Positivismusstreit’ in der amerikanischen Politikwissenschaft: Entstehung, Ablauf und 
Resultate der sogenannten Behavioralismus – Kontroverse in d. Vereinigten Staaten 1945-
1975’. In Beiträge zur sozialwissenschaftlichen Forschung, Band 37 (Westdeutscher Verlag, 
1982), p. 199.  
172 Gerald Holton, ‘B.F. Skinner and P.W. Bridgman: The Frustration of a 
Wahlverwandtschaft’ in Michael Heidelberger, Friedrich Stadler (eds.), History of Philosophy 
of Science. New Trends and Perspectives (Kluwer, 2002), pp. 335-337.  
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of the motion of the foot of a food-deprived rat, pressing down a 
small lever in an experimental box of standard size. Explanation was 
reduced to description, causation to the notion of function, and the 
chief goal was the correlation between observed events.” 173 
 
As exemplified by James’ pragmatism, Dewey’s instrumentalism and Skinner’s 
behaviourism, rigorous but practical applications of positivist approaches were 
characteristic features of positivism in the United States. Applied on economics, 
however, positivist approaches showed lasting impact. A particular strand of 
economics adopting scientific methodology was the Austrian School. 
Representatives of the Austrian School such as Carl Menger (1840-1921) 
conceived economics as hard science and economic ‘laws’ as something which 
has to be discovered scientifically. Cognitions of the Austrian School and other 
economic approaches applying scientific methodology in economics fell on 
fertile soil in the Anglo-Saxon world and in the United States in particular, 
showing a lasting impact. Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, for instance, wondered 
about the “stubborn attachment” to models of thought developed by hard 
sciences:  
 
“It is curious, therefore, that economists have over the last hundred 
years remained stubbornly attached to one particular idea, the 
mechanistic epistemology which dominated the orientation of the 
founders of the Neoclassical School. By their own proud admission, 
the greatest ambition of these pioneers was to build an economic 
science after the model of mechanics. (…) The latter-day 
economists, without a single second thought, have apparently been 
happy to develop their discipline on the mechanistic tracks laid out 
by their forefathers, fiercely fighting any suggestion that economics 
                                                 
173 Gerald Holton, ‘B.F. Skinner and P.W. Bridgman: The Frustration of a 
Wahlverwandtschaft’ in Michael Heidelberger, Friedrich Stadler (eds.), History of Philosophy 
of Science. New Trends and Perspectives (Kluwer, 2002), p. 337. Similar to the 
Positivismusstreit (debate about Positivism) in Europe and particularly in Germany (see 
footnote no. 92 above), applications of neopositivist approaches to social sciences 
encountered opposition in the United States also. A major opponent of neopositivist attempts 
in social sciences was, for example, the ‘Caucus for a New Political Science’, established in 
1967. The ‘Caucus for a New Political Science’ criticised expressions of Neopositivism in the 
United States, known as Behaviorism, in general and the neopositivist mainstream in the 
American Political Science Association (APSA) in particular. Accordingly, in the United 
States, the debate about Positivism became known as the Behaviorism controversy (Jürgen W. 
Falter, ‘Der ‚Positivismusstreit’ in der amerikanischen Politikwissenschaft: Entstehung, 
Ablauf und Resultate der sogenannten Behavioralismus – Kontroverse in den Vereinigten 
Staaten 1945-1975’. In Beiträge zur sozialwissenschaftlichen Forschung, Band 37 
(Westdeutscher Verlag, 1982), in particular pp. 53-62. 
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may be conceived otherwise than as a sister science of mechanics.” 
174 
 
As Georgescu-Roegen explained, the application of models developed by hard 
sciences resulted in a scientification of economics:  
 
“The consequence of this indiscriminate attachment to the 
mechanistic dogma, whether in an explicit or a tacit manner, is the 
viewing of the economic process as a mechanical analogue 
consisting – as all mechanical analogues do – of a principle of 
conservation (transformation) and a maximization rule. The 
economic science is thus reduced to a timeless kinematics. (…) The 
pillar of equilibrium theory is that, if events alter the demand and 
supply propensities, the economic world always returns to its 
previous conditions as soon as these events fade out. An inflation, a 
catastrophic drought, or a stock-exchange crash leaves absolutely no 
mark on the economy. Complete reversibility is the general rule, just 
as in mechanics.” 175 
 
Albeit recognising influences from history, culture and other ‘soft factors,’ the 
vision of a scientific approach in economics still lives on today. In the 
introduction to their book Economics, Paul Samuelson and William Nordhaus 
outlined ‘the logic of economics’ as follows:  
 
“Economists use the scientific approach to understand economic life. 
This involves observing economic affairs and drawing upon statistics 
and the historical record. For complex phenomena like the impacts of 
budget deficits of the causes of inflation, historical research has 
                                                 
174 Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, Energy and Economic Myths. Institutional and Analytical 
Economic Essays (Pergamon Press, 1976, New York), pp. 3-4.  
175 Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, ibid. p. 4 (original emphasis). Jacques Sapir, for instance, 
showed that positivist economists applied findings from thermodynamic studies, such as the 
ergodic hypothesis, and developed econometrics based thereupon (Jacques Sapir, Les trous 
noirs de la science économique. Essai sur l’impossibilité de penser le temps et l’argent 
(Éditions Albin Michel, 2003), pp. 111-114). With respect to the alleged scientificity of 
economics, Sapir observed that econometric methods were applied for testing economic 
‘laws’ which at the same time were foundational for these very same econometric methods [In 
French, the paragraph reads as follows: “Les tests économétriques sont ainsi réputés établir 
notre connaissance des lois du système; mais pour que nous puissions interpréter leurs 
résultats en ce sens, il faut supposer a priori que de telles lois existent, sont générales, et que 
nous les connaissions. Cette fétichisation  de l’usage des mathématiques et de la formalisation 
avait déjà été analysée et dénoncée par Keynes dans le Traité des probabilités” (Jacques 
Sapir, ibid., p. 114)]. Despite efforts to achieve scientificity, however, Sapir showed that 
positivist economics were unable to meet Popper’s refutability criteria (Jacques Sapir, ibid., 
pp. 50-53. The title of the chapter reads, in French: ”Les économistes et l’extinction du 
poppérisme”). 
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provided a rich mine of insights. Often, economics relies upon 
analysis and theories. Theoretical approaches allow economists to 
make broad generalizations, such as those concerning the advantages 
of international trade and specialization or the disadvantages of 
tariffs and quotas.” 176 
 
As already mentioned, scientific methodology in economics found a receptive 
environment in the United States already accustomed to pragmatism and 
instrumentalism. In the scope of the study at hand, reflections of positivism in 
economics applied in international trade and the GATT/WTO system are of 
particular interest. In the following, certain characterising features of positivism, 
as worked out above, shall be reconsidered as reflections of positivism in the 
GATT/WTO approach to international trade. Two particular features 
characterising notions of positivism, i.e. scientism and the aping of hard 
sciences, have already been mentioned. Another feature indicative for positivism 
are expressions of (scientific/epistemological) elitism. In this respect, the initial 
period of the GATT is a telling example, as Robert Howse observed:  
 
“As the high politics of international relations increasingly focused, 
with the Cold War, on matters of international security and the East-
West conflict, the administration and incremental development of the 
trade system was increasingly entrusted to a specialized policy elite 
insulated from, and not particularly interested in, the larger political 
and social conflicts of the age. (…) This new trade policy elite 
developed professional working procedures and norms within the 
GATT, organized the agenda for negotiations, and – with very little 
to go on from the treaty text itself – created and sustained an 
effective arbitral mechanism for dispute settlement. As persons with 
the bent of managers and technical specialists, they tended to 
understand the trade system in terms of the policy science of 
economics, not a grand normative political vision. A sense of pride 
developed that an international regime was being evolved that stood 
above the "madhouse" of politics (if one can borrow Pascal's image), 
a regime grounded in the insights of economic "science," and not 
vulnerable to the open-ended normative controversies and conflicts 
that plagued most international institutions and regimes, most 
notably, for instance, the United Nations.”177 
 
                                                 
176 Paul A. Samuelson and William D. Nordhaus, Economics. 16th edition (Irwin/McGraw-
Hill, 1998), p. 6 (original emphasis).  
177 Robert Howse, ‘From Politics to Technocracy – and Back Again: The Fate of the 
Multilateral Trading Regime’ (2002), 96 The American Journal of International Law, 1 [94-
117] 98 (footnote omitted, emphases added).  
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Joseph Weiler explained that the early GATT system was a self-referential 
system, made out of a network of selected professionals sharing a common 
agenda and operating in a shielded environment:  
 
“GATT successfully managed relative insulation from the “outside” 
world of international relations, and it established among its 
practitioners a closely knit environment revolving around shared 
normative values (of free trade) and shared institutional ambitions. 
GATT operatives became a classical “network” of first-name 
contacts and friendly relationships. (…) Within this ethos there was 
an institutional goal – preventing trade disputes from spilling into the 
wider circles of international relations. A trade dispute was an 
“internal” affair that needed to be resolved as quickly and smoothly 
as possible within the organization.”178 
 
Additional elements of positivism, as shown above, were the belief in positivist 
epistemology, the rejection of dialectics, and the abstention from value-
judgements and from political implications. In tandem with scientism, pursuing 
such a positivist economic agenda may result in an axiomatic and determinist 
economic doctrine. Terms associated with positivist economics in particular are 
usually known as Economism and economical Determinism; in the field of 
international trade in particular, the terms globalism and pensée unique became 
common. As Eva Maria Belser noticed, positivist economics applied on 
international trade came along with abstract claims for distributive justice based 
on economic theory.179 As Eva Maria Belser observed, arguments for trade 
                                                 
178 Joseph H. H. Weiler, ‘The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections on 
WTO Dispute Settlement’, in Roger B. Porter, Pierre Sauvé, Arvind Subramanian, and 
Americo Beviglia Zampetti (eds.), Efficiency, Equity, and Legitimacy. The Multilateral 
Trading System at the Millennium (Brookings Institution Press, 2001), pp. 334-350, pp. 336-
337.  
179 In particular, Eva Maria Belser referred to the economic concepts of the Pareto optimality 
and the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency (Eva Maria Belser, The White Man’s Burden. Arbeit und 
Menschenrechte in der globalisierten Welt (Stämpfli Verlag AG Bern, 2007), pp. 302-305. 
Belser, however, noticed that the Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is based on the assumption that 
distributive justice will happen at respective national levels. In this respect, Belser referred to 
Robert Howse who added the following:  
“Thus, the notion that a more effective policy instrument than trade protection is 
always available to achieve any legitimate public end vastly oversimplifies the 
problem of politics. This notion tended to convert the political vision of 
embedded liberalism – dependent upon a particular value-laden idea of the 
liberal democratic, progressive, redistributive social welfare state – into an 
apparently timeless truth or dogma, valid across regimes, and more or less valid 
regardless of changed or changing economic and social circumstances, or 
changing public values. One simply assumed a certain toolbox of effective 
nontrade policy instruments, and the stability and viability of the social bargains 
within states as well, or at least the stability of institutions that construct and 
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regulation vaporised in light of positivist economics: proponents for trade 
regulation were either criticised for not comprehending economic ‘laws’, or for 
being rent-seekers.180 Because the economic theory of comparative advantage 
comes along with the promise of rising general welfare in the abstract, Belser 
introduced the term “atavistic justice”.181 Other authors introduced different 
terms for referring to what Belser called “atavistic justice”.  
 
Ulrich Beck, for instance, used the term globalism for referring to the 
application of reductionist economic principles to world trade.182 Beck 
understood globalism as “the rule of a world market permeating and altering 
everything.” 183 Therefore, Beck aimed at revealing “the primacy and the 
dictates of the world market implied in neoliberal ideology.”184 According to 
Beck, the essence of globalism is “an antiquated economism, a restoration of 
historical metaphysics, an allegedly apolitical revolution from above.” 185 Beck 
revealed that the nature of globalism essentially consists of a reduction of 
complexity. According to Beck, globalism reduces the new complexity of global 
interdependencies to respective economic expressions.186 By doing so, all other 
non-economic dimensions of globalisation such as cultural, ecological and 
political expressions of new transnationalities are neglected. Hence, world 
society is reduced to a world market. On these grounds, Beck found that 
neoliberal globalism is a manifestation of linear, one-dimensional and mono-
causal thinking expressed by Economism. However, Beck explained that the 
                                                                                                                                                        
reconstruct such social bargains. Keynes had known better – for him, the 
prescription of free or freer trade was contingent and contextual, and might well 
have to yield to the demands of justice in given social and economic 
circumstances” (Robert Howse, ‘From Politics to Technocracy – and Back 
Again: The Fate of the Multilateral Trading Regime’ (2002), 96 The American 
Journal of International Law, 1 [94-117] 100 (original emphases, footnotes 
omitted).  
180 Eva Maria Belser, The White Man’s Burden. Arbeit und Menschenrechte in der 
globalisierten Welt (Stämpfli, 2007), pp. 304-305.  
181 Because positivist economics are factoring out concrete injustices at micro-levels but are 
referring to abstract justice qua rising general welfare, Belser coined the term “atavistic 
justice” (in German: Gerechtigkeitsatavismen; Eva Maria Belser, ibid., p. 302). 
182 Ulrich Beck, Was ist Globalisierung? (Suhrkamp, 1997), p. 195.  
183 Ulrich Beck, ibid. The German original reads: “Von dieser Komplexität der Globalität ist 
klar zu unterscheiden die neue Einfachheit des Globalismus, verstanden als alles 
durchdringende, alles verändernde Weltmarktherrschaft” (translation in English by the 
author).  
184 Ulrich Beck, ibid.  
185 Ulrich Beck, ibid. In the German original, the whole paragraph reads: “Vielmehr soll das 
in der neoliberalen Ideologie des Globalismus verkündete Primat und Diktat des Weltmarktes 
für alle – für alle Dimensionen der Gesellschaft – als das aufgedeckt werden, was es ist: ein 
ins Gigantische projizierter, antiquierter Ökonomismus, eine Erneuerung der 
Geschichtsmetaphysik, eine sich unpolitisch gebende Gesellschaftsrevolution von oben” 
(translation in English by the author). 
186 Ulrich Beck, ibid., p. 196.  
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origins and causes of Economism in its contemporary form of world-market 
metaphysic is nothing new. As with all sorts of metaphysics, Beck observed, 
also world-market metaphysics, i.e. globalism, are expressions of the quest for 
simplicity in an increasingly complex world.187 Summing up and following 
Beck’s considerations, globalism essentially consists in the application of 
reductionist, i.e. positivist economics on a global scale.  
 
The essentially metaphysical, i.e. ideological character of globalism was further 
analysed by Ankie Hoogvelt. Working out the difference between globalism and 
globalisation, Hoogvelt noted:  
 
“The distinction between globalization and globalism is all-
important. Whereas globalization is an objective, real historical 
process which marks, in a sentence, the ascendancy of real-time, 
trans-border economic activity over clock-time economic activity 
(whether domestic or trans-border), globalism is the reification of 
this process of globalization as some meta-historical force that 
develops outside the human agency, conditioning and limiting the 
scope for action of individuals and collectivities alike, be they 
nation-states or local groups. Globalism as an ideology adds a belief 
in the inescapability of the transnationalization of economic and 
financial flows to the existing credos of neo-liberalism, namely the 
belief in the efficiency of free competitive markets and the belief that 
this efficiency will maximize benefits for the greatest number of 
people in the long run”.188  
 
                                                 
187 Ulrich Beck, ibid., p. 196. In the German original, the whole paragraph reads as follows:  
“Globalismus reduziert die neue Komplexität von Globalität und Globalisierung 
auf eine – die wirtschaftliche – Dimension, die auch noch linear gedacht wird 
als ständige Ausdehnung der Abhängigkeiten vom Weltmarkt. Alle anderen 
Dimensionen – ökologische Globalisierung, kulturelle Globalisierung, 
polyzentrische Politik, die Entstehung transnationaler Räume und Identitäten – 
werden, wenn überhaupt, nur in der unterstellten Dominanz der wirtschaftlichen 
Globalisierung thematisiert. Weltgesellschaft wird so zur Weltmarktgesellschaft 
verkürzt und verfälscht. In diesem Sinne ist der neoliberale Globalismus eine 
Erscheinungsform des eindimensionalen Denkens und Handelns, eine Spielart 
monokausaler Weltsicht, also des Ökonomismus. Reiz und Gefahr dieser 
keineswegs neuen Geschichtsmetaphysik des Weltmarktes entstammen 
derselben Quelle: der Suche, der Sucht nach Einfachheit, um sich in der 
undurchschaubarer gewordenen Welt zurechtzufinden” (Ulrich Beck, ibid., pp. 
196-197; original emphases).  
188 Ankie Hoogvelt, Globalization and the Postcolonial World. The New Political Economy of 
Development. 2nd Edition (Palgrave MacMillan, 2001), pp. 154-155, original emphasis. With 
particular view on the essentially ideological, i.e. non-scientific character of Globalism, 
Hoogvelt added that “[t]hese beliefs are based on what Pierre Bourdieu has described as 
‘doxa’ – ‘an evidence not debated and undebatable’ “ (Ankie Hoogvelt, ibid.).  
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Ignacio Ramonet, director of the French newspaper Le Monde diplomatique 
from 1990 to 2008, encapsulated the ideological characteristics of globalism into 
the French term pensée unique.189 Pensée unique, Ramonet explained, is based 
on the doctrine of the prevalence of economics over politics. The doctrine of the 
primacy of economics, in turn, is an expression of a reductionist understanding 
of economics. Pensée unique, Ramonet noted, justifies the primacy of 
economics by the allegedly ‘natural’ and hence unalterable character of ‘market 
forces.’ In fact, pensée unique declared, asserting a ‘realist’ or ‘pragmatic’ point 
of view, that capitalism and ‘the market’ are the natural state of things.190 
However, the reliance on ‘market mechanisms’ such as the ‘invisible hand’ 
showed the mechanistic, yet atavistic and finally metaphysical character of the 
pensée unique approach. Because of its power to enforce conform thinking, 
Ramonet compared pensée unique with new forms of dogmatism and even 
catechism and criticised the resulting “new obscurantism”.191 
 
A summary of the story of positivism reads as a narrowing down of (a) holistic 
beginnings, initiated by Comte and encompassing both scientific and societal 
issues, to (b) a philosophy of science in the neopositivist era of the Vienna 
Circle, and finally to (c) the contemporary notion of positivism as a mere 
method, or instrument, in the hands of scientists and economists.  
 
The contemporary instrumental or functional notion of positivism can be 
characterised by the five features worked out above. In terms of a recall, these 
features are (i) scienticism (ii) the imitation of natural sciences by the social 
sciences, (iii) the belief in positivistic epistemology, (iv) anti-dialectics, (v) 
scientific/epistemological elitism, (vi) political ‘neutrality’ and the reduction of 
positivism to an epistemological method, i.e. the ‘positivist method’ or 
‘positivist approach,’ or empiriocriticism. Finally, the positivist approach or 
method got (vii) a particular spin through US American pragmatism. The 
                                                 
189 The French term pensée unique could be translated as uniform, unitary or standardised 
thinking, or the one-way thought, approximately. Ramonet was a founding father of the non-
governmental organisation ATTAC. Founded in France as an association in favour of the 
introduction of a Tobin tax against financial speculation, the Association for the Taxation of 
Financial Transactions for the Aid of Citizens (in French: Association pour une taxation des 
transactions financières pour l’aide aux citoyens) ATTAC has evolved into an NGO actively 
engaged in various issues related to the globalisation debate.  
190 Ignacio Ramonet, ‚La pensée unique’, in Le Monde diplomatique, January 1995, p. 1. In 
his seminal article, Ramonet also drew attention to a number of concrete policies resulting 
from the adoption of pensée unique, such as, inter alia, international competition with 
unrestricted movement of goods and the division of labour on the global scale, hard currency 
policies, deregulation, privatisation, and the call for less government in general.  
191 Ignacio Ramonet, ibid.  
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resulting positivist method was an effective and allegedly value-neutral tool 
particularly suitable for combining scientific rigour192 with economic purposes.  
 
B. Relativist Records  
 
As mentioned above, ‘classical’ Neopositivists have tried to improve human 
judgement by logical analysis. Thereby, scientific facts would have been made 
accessible through scientific methods, i.e., analytical considerations based on 
logic and mathematics. Contemporary Positivists, in contrast, are emphasising 
the requirement of improving the scientific pillar of knowledge, i.e., empirical 
fact-finding. Contemporary positivists seemingly have abandoned the 
enthusiasm for ‘rationalising’ human perception through unified science.193 
Instead, their calls have shrunken to a request for a strict separation of scientific 
fact-finding and human judgement, thus forsaking the goal of bridging facts and 
perception through a bridging and unifying exercise.  
 
                                                 
192 Starting with the establishment of the uncertainty principle by Werner Heisenberg in 1926, 
modern science increasingly turned to models of probability and randomness. In addition of 
being an effective analytical tool, certain scientists may have sought refuge in positivist 
Empiricism as a way to preserve a notion of certainty in an increasingly complex scientific 
enterprise.  
193 From time to time however, scientific progress gives rise to renewed hopes for achieving 
unified science in the literal sense of the world, that is, on material basis. One particular 
revival of the pursuit of unified science was triggered by the dawn of nanosciences and the 
possibility of converging promising technologies such as nanotechnology, biotechnology, 
information technology and cognitive (neuro-)science (NBIC). In a report on converging 
technologies, it was announced that “[t]he building blocks of matter that are fundamental to 
all sciences” have been detected:  
“Convergence of diverse technologies is based on material unity at the 
nanoscale and on technology integration from that scale. The building blocks of 
matter that are fundamental to all sciences originate at the nanoscale. 
Revolutionary advances at the interfaces between previously separate fields of 
science and technology are ready to create key transforming tools for NBIC 
technologies. Developments in systems approaches, mathematics, and 
computation in conjunction with NBIC allow us for the first time to understand 
the natural world, human society, and scientific research as closely coupled 
complex, hierarchical systems” (Mihail C. Roco and William Sims Bainbridg 
(eds.), Converging Technologies for Improving Human Performance. 
Nanotechnology, Biotechnology, Information Technology and Cognitive 
Science. Joint report of the National Science Foundation (NSF) and the 
Department of Commerce (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003), p. ix (original 
emphasis). Web access:  
http://www.wtec.org/ConvergingTechnologies/Report/NBIC_report.pdf, visited 
December 22, 2010). For more on NBIC, see footnotes no. 96 above and no. 265 
and 516 below.  
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The ‘pragmatic’ turn of contemporary positivists to limit their claims to a call 
for separating fact-finding and judgement-making operations may be seen as an 
answer to the critique of epistemologists of Neopositivism. Critics of the 
neopositivist approach, such as Willard Quine,194 rose the fundamental question 
whether findings from the empirical sciences do, in fact, depict the ‘real world’. 
Or are methods applied by empirical sciences themselves inevitably based on 
prior knowledge of scientists applying them? Harold Kincaid noted:  
 
“Quine, however, denied that we could sharply divide evidence this 
way, because testing is a holistic affair. Following Duhem (1954), 
Quine argued that hypotheses do not confront experience or evidence 
one by one. Rather, testing a single hypothesis requires a host of 
background theory about the experimental apparatus, measurement 
theory, what data are relevant, what must be controlled, and so on. 
So, when experiments fail, they only tell us something is wrong 
somewhere. We can save any hypothesis from doubt by changing our 
background assumptions. Theories face the test of evidence as 
wholes.” 195 
 
On these ground, one might well assume that knowledge is not only based on 
empirical science, but rather on a “web of belief”.196 Scientific activity and 
conceptual analysis are inevitably surrounded by this “web of belief”. Again 
Kincaid:  
 
“All parts of the web are indirectly relevant to all others. There is no 
absolute way to isolate the analytic, necessary truths from the merely 
empirical. In the end there are no a priori truths. By denying a sharp 
conceptual – empirical distinction and pointing out the holistic nature 
of testing, Quine provided the intellectual foundations for a broad 
change in the philosophy of science.” 197 
 
In the following, epistemological approaches questioning a priori truths are 
aggregated under the term ‘relativism’. 198  
                                                 
194 Willard Van Orman Quine (1908-2000) was a logician in the tradition of the Analytical 
Philosophy who questioned, and transcended, positions of logical Positivism.  
195 Harold Kincaid, Philosophical Foundations of the Social Sciences. Analyzing 
Controversies in Social Research (Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 20.  
196 Harold Kincaid, Philosophical Foundations of the Social Sciences. Analyzing 
Controversies in Social Research (Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 20, citing William 
Quine and J. S. Ullian, The Web of Belief (Random House, New York, 1970).  
197 Harold Kincaid, Philosophical Foundations of the Social Sciences. Analyzing 
Controversies in Social Research (Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 20 (original italics).  
198 Karl Popper defined – and criticised – Relativism as follows: “One of the components of 
modern irrationalism is relativism (the doctrine that truth is relative to our intellectual 
background, which is supposed to determine somehow the framework within which we are 
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Addressing notions of relativism, Shrader-Frechette referred to different schools 
of thought. On the one hand, Shrader-Frechette invoked epistemological 
anarchism, as expressed by Paul Feyerabend.199 On the other hand, Shrader-
Frechette extensively quoted from Mary Douglas’ and Aaron Wildavsky’s work 
Risk and Culture.200 In the following, the focus is on the latter aspect, i.e., 
cultural relativism.  
 
1. Cultural Relativism 
 
Summarising the credo of cultural relativism that “anything can be justified, 
given a particular culture”, Shrader-Frechette referred, for instance, to Melville 
Herskovits (1895 – 1963).201 Herskovits, though, was not working in isolation, 
but was part of a school of cultural anthropologists and historians with a 
tradition of similar historical dimension as the school of the positivists. 
Herskovits himself, for example, did his PhD under the guidance of Franz Boas 
(1858 – 1942). Boas, who grew up and studied in Germany before moving to the 
United States, was a pioneer of modern anthropology. Another proponent of the 
French tradition of anthropology and epistemological relativisms is Bruno 
Latour (* 1947).202 
 
Contemporary expressions of cultural relativism may appear as multiculturalism 
and interculturalism. Multiculturalism and interculturalism are both rather well-
established approaches, coming along with notions of cultural pluralism and 
                                                                                                                                                        
able to think: that truth may change from one framework to another), and, in particular, the 
doctrine of the impossibility of mutual understanding between different cultures, generations, 
or historical periods – even within science, even within physics” (Karl R. Popper, The Myth of 
the Framework. In defence of science and rationality. Edited by M.A. Notturno (Routledge, 
1994), p. 33; in similar ways: Karl R. Popper, ‘The Self, Rationality, and Freedom’, in 
Knowledge and the Body-Mind Problem. In defence of interaction. Edited by M.A. Notturno 
(Routledge, 1994), p. 137.  
199 Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, Risk and Rationality. Philosophical Foundations for Populist 
Reforms (University of California Press, 1991), p. 7. Considering the focus of the study at 
hand on the separation of science and policy in risk assessment, it may be of interest that 
Feyerabend suggested – in analogy to the separation of religion and state – a separation of 
science and state. Such a thorough separation of science and the state would enable alternative 
forms of science to flourish, thus increasing the variety of answers to the problems of society 
(see Eduard Kaeser, Pop Science. Essays zur Wissenschaftskultur (Schwabe Verlag, Basel 
2009), p. 46). Thinking Feyerabend’s approach through to the end might open the floor for 
alternative forms of risk assessment as well.  
200 Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, Risk and Rationality. Philosophical Foundations for Populist 
Reforms (University of California Press, 1991), in particular pp. 8, 29, 31.  
201 Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, ibid. p. 31, footnote no. 30.  
202 See Margaret C. Jacob, ’Reflections on Bruno Latour’s Version of the Seventeenth 
Century’, in Noretta Koertge (ed.), A House Built on Sand. Exposing Postmodernist Myths 
About Science (Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 240.  
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liberal tolerance. Interestingly, though, recent developments started to question 
these approaches from the perspective of deconstruction. Introducing a project 
examining tango dance as a trans-cultural practice in times of globalisation, 
Gabriele Klein observed that latest fields of study, such as translation studies 
and postcolonial studies, are undermining the positions of multiculturalism and 
interculturalism by questioning the notion of ‘cultural identity’ itself.203 
Criticism in particular from the perspective of postcolonial studies centres on the 
fact that both multiculturalism and interculturalism adhere to essentialist 
concepts of cultural identity. According to multiculturalism and interculturalism, 
each ‘culture’ is related to specific essentials, such as ethnicity, religion, skin 
colour, gender, and so forth, which are perceived as predetermined and 
invariable. Hence, by pretending cultural pluralism, multiculturalism and 
interculturalism, in fact, are amplifying cultural differences presumed as being 
set in stone. Following this line of thought, a deconstructivist analysis finds that 
multiculturalism and interculturalism are implicit bases for liberal states. By 
enabling the majority to define ‘other cultures’ and to protect their ‘own 
culture’, multiculturalism and interculturalism are understood as expressions of 
a state defining itself as a ‘nation’: hence, multiculturalism and interculturalism 
are perceived as instruments of liberal nation states for maintaining civil 
stability through the organisation of intercultural exchange.204  
 
Deconstruction, in contrast, undermines essentialist presuppositions of 
multiculturalism and interculturalism by decoding ‘culture’ as a system of 
signals. And those inter-related signals, through interaction and communication, 
are forming people. Klein, following the deconstructivist theory, noted that 
“being German, being black or being gay is hence just the product of a cultural 
activity (…)”.205 
 
The deconstruction of multiculturalism and interculturalism corresponds with a 
transitional phase in the formation of anthropological studies, namely the turn 
from a functionalist approach to the quest for ‘global conversation’. According 
to Anthony Giddens, anthropology passed through three phases; a first phase of 
taxonomy, a second phase of functionalism, and a third phase of cosmopolitan 
conversation.206 In the first phase of taxonomy, anthropologist and 
ethnographers in particular sought to classify and categorise ‘the other’ and ‘the 
                                                 
203 Gabriele Klein, ‘Bodies in Translation. Tango als kulturelle Übersetzung’. In Gabriele 
Klein (ed.), Tango in Translation. Tanz zwischen Medien, Kulturen, Kunst und Politik 
(transcript Verlag, 2009), in particular the chapter on cultural theories (‘Übersetzung als 
kulturtheoretisches Konzept’), pp. 24-28.  
204 Gabriele Klein, ibid. pp. 24-25.  
205 Gabriele Klein, ibid. pp. 24, translation from German into English by the author.  
206 Anthony Giddens, ‘Living in a Post-Traditional Society’, in Ulrich Beck, Anthony 
Giddens and Scott Lash, Reflexive Modernization. Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the 
Modern Social Order. Polity Press, 1994), p. 97.  
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alien’. Giddens noted that in the phase of taxonomy, “[t]he alien character of 
other traditions was a persistent source of compelling interest, puzzlement and 
generalized anxiety (…) the alienness of non-Western traditions was a real 
counterpart to the ‘given’ form of nature, an external environment of Western 
expansionism to be ‘understood’ and probably trampled over in much the same 
way”.207 
 
In the second phase of functionalism, anthropologists discovered that ‘the other’ 
is essentially as intelligent as they were themselves. However, the 
acknowledgement of intelligence and hence, equality of ‘the other’ was 
contained by functionalism. Giddens observed: 
 
“Functionalism recognizes the authenticity of other traditions, but 
relates that authenticity only to their inner cohesion, as situated 
cultural wholes. The integrity of [‘other’] traditions thus becomes 
acknowledged, but the ‘dialogic’ relation established is one that 
presumes the separateness of the alien. ‘Intelligence’ is entirely 
contextual; each culture is adapted to the milieu in which it is 
‘discovered’.” 208 
 
Referring to the anthropologist Nigel Barley, Giddens described the third phase 
of anthropological research as “the recovery of a narrative style”, bringing back 
the author into the plot. Comparing Barley’s approach with earlier 
anthropological attempts, Giddens remarked that “[t]he ‘absence of the author’ 
in most pre-existing anthropological studies is not a reflection of the fact that the 
texts speak for themselves; rather, the author is absent because such studies are 
not full dialogic engagements with ‘other cultures’.”209 Full dialogic 
engagement, in contrast, may provide the possibility “of a cosmopolitan 
conversation of humankind”.210 According to Giddens, self-involvement of 
anthropologists, following the example of Nigel Barley, might open possibilities 
for global dialog, but may come along with a price. Giddens noted:  
 
                                                 
207 Anthony Giddens, ‘Living in a Post-Traditional Society’, in Ulrich Beck, Anthony 
Giddens and Scott Lash, Reflexive Modernization. Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the 
Modern Social Order (Polity Press, 1994), p. 97.  
208 Anthony Giddens, ‘Living in a Post-Traditional Society’, in Ulrich Beck, Anthony 
Giddens and Scott Lash, Reflexive Modernization. Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the 
Modern Social Order. Polity Press, 1994), p. 97 (emphasis added).  
209 Anthony Giddens, ‘Living in a Post-Traditional Society’, in Ulrich Beck, Anthony 
Giddens and Scott Lash, Reflexive Modernization. Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the 
Modern Social Order. Polity Press, 1994), p. 97. 
210 Anthony Giddens, ‘Living in a Post-Traditional Society’, in Ulrich Beck, Anthony 
Giddens and Scott Lash, Reflexive Modernization. Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the 
Modern Social Order. Polity Press, 1994), p. 100, citing the philosopher Richard Rorty.  
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“Embarrassment and a certain diffuse anxiety, occasionally laced 
with an awareness of danger, emerge as the prime negative aspects 
of the anthropological encounter; on the positive side, along with 
self-illumination, there is humour and the pleasures of discovering a 
common humanity.” 211 
 
An example for conflicts between different approaches in anthropology is the 
dispute between Daniel Everett and Noam Chomsky. In a nutshell, the dispute 
between Everett and Chomsky centres on the question whether there are 
universal linguistic structures. Chomsky, on the one hand, insisted that there are 
basic elements constitutive for all languages, a theory called “universal 
grammar”. Everett, however, observed that the language of the Pirahã in Brazil’s 
Amazon region did not correspond to the theory of universal grammar. Instead, 
Everett found, the language of the Pirahã was formed according to their life 
situations and particular culture. Therefore, Everett renounced abstract theory 
and concluded, on the basis of long-time observations, that the language of the 
Pirahã was an expression of their way of life which was determined by 
immediate experiences (immediacy of experience).212 
 
2. Historical Relativism 
 
Cultural relativism, as expressed by Boas and fellow anthropologists and 
historians of these times, has common traits with historicism, a school of 
thought particularly connoted to Germany philosophers and historians in the 19th 
century.213  
 
A representative of historicism is Wilhelm Dilthey (1833 – 1911). Dilthey 
rejected the notion that reality in general and human life in particular can be 
                                                 
211 Anthony Giddens, ‘Living in a Post-Traditional Society’, in Ulrich Beck, Anthony 
Giddens and Scott Lash, Reflexive Modernization. Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the 
Modern Social Order. Polity Press, 1994), p. 98. 
212 Alexandra Kedves, ‘Er lebte mit den Indianern, sie stellten seine Welt auf den Kopf. 
Daniel Everett studierte die Sprache eines Indianervolkes und verlor den Glauben – an 
Chomsky und an Gott’, in Tages-Anzeiger, April 14, 2010, p. 31.  
213 In a nutshell, Historicism argues that due to historical relativity, laws developed in natural 
sciences are not applicable in social sciences (Karl Popper, Das Elend des Historizismus, 
authorised translation from the 2nd English edition The Poverty of Historicism, London, 
Routledge&Kegan Paul, 1960, translated by Dr. Leonhard Walentik, (J.C.B. Mohr (Paul 
Siebeck) 1965), p. 5. It has to be noted that Popper distinguished between ‘historicism’ as a 
label for theories of history he deemed inappropriate, and ‘historical relativism’ which he 
referred to as ‘historism’ (see (Karl R. Popper, ‘A Pluralist Approach to the Philosophy of 
History’, in The Myth of the Framework. In defence of science and rationality. Edited by 
M.A. Notturno (Routledge, 1994), p. 131.  
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fully apprehended by rational means alone.214 As a consequence, natural 
sciences are not appropriate for understanding all aspects of life. Therefore, 
human sciences215 have to be developed and acknowledged as independent and 
distinct from natural sciences.216 Störig observed that Dilthey’s thinking, in 
particular his view that history shall be the pre-eminent scientific discipline able 
to understand ‘irrational’ aspects of human existence, led him on the path 
towards relativism.217 The focus on ‘irrationalism’ of 19th century historians in 
Germany may have stemmed from overlaps between the ‘historical method’ and 
romanticism. Gadamer explained that it was Dilthey “who consciously [took] up 
romantic hermeneutics and expand[ed] it into a historical method, indeed, into 
an epistemology of the human sciences”.218 And Gadamer also provided some 
insight into the ‘historical method’, as applied by Dilthey:  
 
“Dilthey’s logical analysis of the concept of continuity in history is, 
in fact, the application to history of the [romantic] hermeneutical 
principle that we can understand a detail only in terms of the whole 
text, and the whole only in terms of the detail.” 219 
 
Dilthey, however, was not alone in considering natural sciences differently from 
human sciences. Wilhelm Windelband (1848-1915) conceived a dichotomy 
between nomothetic and idiographic sciences: whereas nomothetic sciences are 
appropriate for recognising general laws, particularly laws of nature (natural 
sciences), idiographic sciences are those appropriate for conceiving specific 
                                                 
214 Hans Joachim Störig, Kleine Weltgeschichte der Philosophie, vol. 2 (Fischer, 1980), p. 
240. With his focus on the “living environment” (in German: Lebenswelt), Dilthey added a 
particular and rather holistic spin to hermeneutics (see Thomas Nipperdey, Deutsche 
Geschichte 1866-1918. Volume I. Arbeitswelt und Bürgergeist (Verlag C.H. Beck, 1994), pp. 
684-686.  
215 In English: humanities; in German: Human-/Geisteswissenschaften.  
216 Hans Joachim Störig, Kleine Weltgeschichte der Philosophie, vol. 2 (Fischer, 1980), p. 
240. 
217 Hans Joachim Störig, ibid. p. 240. It may be added that the separation of natural sciences 
from human sciences, leading towards relativism, can be considered as an antipode to the 
positivist quest for unified science. Whereas Auguste Comte and the later Neo-positivists tried 
to unify science thorough paramount disciplines, i.e., sociology and logic respectively, 
historicists like Dilthey established history as leading and unique branch of science (Hans 
Joachim Störig, ibid., pp. 142 and 240). 
218 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, translated by William Glen-Doepel, edited by 
John Cumming and Garrett Barden, 2nd edition (Sheed and Ward Lt., 1979), p. 174 (emphasis 
added).  
219 Hans-Georg Gadamer, ibid. p. 174. From Gadamer’s observations, one may draw the 
conclusion that the ‘historical method’ consisted of a comprehensive approach towards text 
and context, apprehending both layers simultaneously. Looked at from this angle, one may 
well see the trend from the ‘historical method’ of 19th Century Germany to modern concepts 
of contextualism.  
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cultural traits (cultural sciences).220 In focusing on cultural peculiarities in 
particular in history, Windelband’s approach implied a precept for discerning 
and weighing among the unique and individual. Such a precept was the linkage 
of cultural characteristics and historical specificities to values.221 By centring 
cultural sciences on transcendent values, Windelband marked a counterpoint to 
empiricism and positivism.222 
 
The attempt for individualising the history of specific peoples – above all, 
Germans – was an intention widespread among historians and philosophers in 
Germany during the 19th century, in particular among conservatives and 
romantics.223 An example of a conservative historian was Leopold von Ranke 
(1795 – 1886). Ranke dissented with the then hegemonic Hegelian worldview 
that history is unfolding according to an abstract dialectical process (Hegel’s 
Weltgeist).224 In contrast, Ranke hold that “every epoch in history is similarly  
 
                                                 
220 Hans Joachim Störig, Kleine Weltgeschichte der Philosophie, vol. 2 (Fischer, 1980), p. 
217. The controversy over whether and how to discern between nomothetic and idiographic 
sciences is still open. In Poverty of Historicism, Karl Popper insisted on the thesis of unified 
scientific method against the historicist attempt to separate natural and cultural sciences and to 
put history into an exceptional position (Karl Popper, Das Elend des Historizismus, authorised 
translation from the 2nd English edition The Poverty of Historicism, London, 
Routledge&Kegan Paul, 1960, translated by Dr. Leonhard Walentik, (J.C.B. Mohr (Paul 
Siebeck), 1965), pp. 102-115; in similar ways, Karl R. Popper, ‘A Pluralist Approach to the 
Philosophy of History’, in The Myth of the Framework. In defence of science and rationality. 
Edited by M.A. Notturno (Routledge, 1994), pp. 137-153, in particular p. 139 where Popper 
reiterated his thesis that “all those historians [some lines above, Popper had explicitly 
mentioned, among others, Windelband and Dilthey] and philosophers of history who insist on 
the gulf between history and the natural sciences have a radically mistaken idea of the natural 
sciences”).  
221 Hans Joachim Störig, Kleine Weltgeschichte der Philosophie, vol. 2 (Fischer Taschenbuch 
Verlag, 1980, Frankfurt a.M.), p. 217. 
222 Hans Joachim Störig, ibid.  
223 The observation that Historicism emerged from German Romanticism was expressed, for 
example, by Hans-Georg Gadamer. Gadamer noted: “So we see that romantic hermeneutics 
and the background to it, the pantheistic metaphysics of individuality, was a decisive 
influence on the theory of historical research in the nineteenth century [in Germany]” (Hans-
Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, translated by William Glen-Doepel, edited by John 
Cumming and Garrett Barden, 2nd edition (Sheed and Ward Lt., 1979), p. 174.  
224 Hans Joachim Störig, Kleine Weltgeschichte der Philosophie, vol. 2 (Fischer Taschenbuch 
Verlag, 1980), pp. 157-158. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), in turn, was 
characterised by Karl Popper as “both a relativists and an absolutist”. Popper configured 
Hegel at the top of “a long chain of post-Kantian, that is, post-critical or post-rationalist 
philosophers – mainly German – who upheld the myth of the framework [i.e., the myth that 
frameworks of laws and customs cannot be rationally discussed]” (See Karl R. Popper, The 
Myth of the Framework. In defence of science and rationality. Edited by M.A. Notturno 
(Routledge, 1994), p. 47. Poppers allegation that Hegel was an “absolutist” sheds light on the 
distinction between philosophical approaches used either as ideology or as scientific method. 
With reference to the so-called positivism dispute (in German: Positivismusstreit), Popper 
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proximate to God”.225 
 
It shall be noted that expressions of historical relativism persisted over time. 
One might even say that the defeat of Germany in World War II and the rise of 
‘Anglo-Saxon scientific theories’ induced some kind of recollection of 
(German) romanticism. An example of a neo-romanticist philosopher was Hans-
Georg Gadamer (1990-2002) and his concept of philosophical hermeneutics.226 
In 1959, Gadamer worried whether his book Truth and Method might come too 
late, observing that ‘the signs of a new wave of technologic history-aversion 
were on the rise’.227 As the cause for the new wave of ‘technologic history-
                                                                                                                                                        
explained: “As it now stands, the main issue of the book [i.e., Der Positivismusstreit in der 
deutschen Soziologie] has become Adorno’s and Habermas’ accusation that a ‘positivist’ like 
Popper is bound by his methodology to defend the political status quo. It is an accusation 
which I myself raised in my Open Society against Hegel, whose identity philosophy (what is 
real is reasonable) I described as ’moral and legal positivism’. In my address I had said 
nothing about this issue, and I had no opportunity to reply. But I have often combated this 
form of ‘positivism’ along with other forms. And it is a fact that my social theory (which 
favours gradual and piecemeal reform, reform controlled by a critical comparison between 
expected and achieved results) contrasts with my theory of method, which happens to be a 
theory of scientific and intellectual revolution” (Karl R. Popper, ‘Reason or Revolution?’ in 
The Myth of the Framework. In defence of science and rationality. Edited by M.A. Notturno 
(Routledge, 1994), p. 68; original emphases).  
It has to be noted, though, that Hegel’s dialectical method and absolute idealism is usually 
associated with the idealistic strain of post-Kantian philosophy, rather than with romanticism 
(see Hans Joachim Störig, Kleine Weltgeschichte der Philosophie, vol. 2 (Fischer, 1980), pp. 
127-129. 
225 Hans Joachim Störig, ibid. p. 158 (German citation by Störig, translation by the author).  
226 Philosophical hermeneutics raised objections against “the ideal of objectivity” and the 
application of objectivistic methodological criteria in the human sciences. Osman Bilen 
explained: “Understanding in the human sciences is accomplished not from a free and 
distanced position but arises from immediate life concerns, prejudices and traditions that 
shape both the interpreting subject and the object of the research. Moreover, not only is the 
interpretation guided by fore-understanding, but also the objectivity of the result cannot be 
measured by the yardstick of method according the model of the natural sciences” (Osman 
Bilen, The Historicity of Understanding and The Problem of Relativism in Gadamer’s 
Philosophical Hermeneutics (The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 2000), p. 
150). 
227 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, 3rd Edition (J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) 
1972), p. 513. Because the epilogue of the 3rd German edition, published 1972, was not 
integrated in the 2nd English edition of 1979, the quotations are taken from the German 
version and translations by the author. Nevertheless and also because of its characteristic 
style, the respective paragraph shall be provided in German:  
<< Als ich Ende 1959 das vorliegend Buch beendete, war ich mir darüber sehr 
unsicher, ob es nicht “zu spät“ käme, d.h. ob die Bilanz traditionsgeschichtlichen 
Denkens, die in ihm gezogen wurde, nicht schon beinahe überflüssig sei. 
Zeichen einer neuen Welle technologischer Geschichtsfeindlichkeit mehrten 
sich. Ihr entsprach die steigende Rezeption der angelsächsischen 
Wissenschaftstheorie und analytischen Philosophie, und schlieβlich verhieβ 
auch der neue Aufschwung, den die Sozialwissenschaften, darunter vor allem 
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aversion’, Gadamer identified ‘a new positivist self-conception [of the historical 
sciences], fostered by the reception of American and English methods and 
problems, pushed forwards’.228 Essentially, Gadamer contrasted (implicitly 
German) romantic humanities on the one hand with Anglo-Saxon scientific 
research, applying new methods such as statistics, formalisation, scientific 
planning and technical organisation, on the other hand.229 In contrast to 
formalised and engineered Ango-Saxon research methods, Gadamer conceived 
‘historic human sciences’, as he called historical sciences, as rooted in German 
romanticism. Therefore, Gadamer was of the opinion that historical sciences 
‘maintained a humanistic heritage which distinguishes them from all other kinds 
of modern research and brings them close to other, quite different, extra-
scientific experiences, and especially those proper to art’.230 
 
Instead of a positivist approach, Gadamer established a hermeneutical method 
towards truth. Considering the hermeneutical method, Sungjoon Cho observed:  
 
“Gadamer was of the view that truth, including scientific truth, may 
be obtained only through “understanding” or “interpretation” 
(“hermeneutics”) which is a “dialogical-dialectical interchange 
between interpreter and interpretandum”. Importantly, understanding 
cannot be driven from a vacuum. Our attitude toward 
“interpretandum” (what is interpreted), such as a text, event or 
other’s behavior is pre-determined by pre-understandings of past 
interpreters to which we are inevitably inherited (linked) through a 
chain of interpretations (“interpretational lineage”). Interpretation is 
not “presuppositionless” because an interpreter cannot escape from 
his or her ontological premise, i.e., a “finite temporal situation as the 
                                                                                                                                                        
die Sozialpsychologie und die Soziolinguistik, nahmen, der humanistischen 
Tradition der romantischen Geisteswissenschaften keine Zukunft. Das aber war 
die Tradition, von der ich ausgegangen war. Sie stellte den Erfahrungsboden 
meiner theoretischen Arbeit dar – wenn auch keineswegs ihre Grenze oder gar 
ihr Ziel. Aber selbst innerhalb der klassischen geschichtlichen 
Geisteswissenschaften war ein Stilwandel in Richtung auf die neuen 
methodischen Mittel der Statistik, der Formalisierung, war der Drang zur 
Wissenschaftsplanung und technischen Organisation von Forschung 
unverkennbar. Ein neues “positivistisches” Selbstverständnis, das durch die 
Rezeption amerikanischer und englischer Methoden und Fragestellungen 
befördert wurde, drängte vorwärts. >> 
(Hans-Georg Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode, 3rd Edition (J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 
1972), p. 513, emphases added.  
228 Hans-Georg Gadamer, ibid.  
229 Hans-Georg Gadamer, ibid. 
230 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, translated by William Glen-Doepel, edited by 
John Cumming and Garrett Barden, 2nd edition (Sheed and Ward Lt., London 1979), p. xvii 
(foreword to the 2nd Edition). 
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horizon within which the beings he understands have their initial 
meaning for him.” 231 
 
It is Gadamer’s emphasis of ‘belongingness’ (in German: Zugehörigkeit) and the 
‘fusion of horizons’ as preconditions for ‘true understandings’ which put him 
into opposition to positivist claims for universalism. Sungjoon Cho noted that 
Gadamer’s emphasis of presupposition is intentional:  
 
“Note that this pre-understanding is not a mere bias which, in 
association with enlightenment, is purged by the power of reason, 
but rather a “belongingness” (Zugehörigkeit) to the tradition. This 
innate historical distance (“alienation”) between the interpretandum 
and the interpreter can be overcome only by the “consciousness of 
effective history.” Only then, the interpretandum’s horizon and the 
interpreter’s own horizon are fused (“fusion of horizons”), and an 
authentic understanding of the interpretandum is achieved. The 
“universal praxis” of human reason or rationality can no longer 
monopolize the language of science.” 232  
 
Historical relativism was, however, not unique to Germany. In the Anglo-Saxon 
hemisphere, historical relativism reappeared in the form of historical 
constructivism. A mentor of historical constructivism in the United States was 
Thomas Samuel Kuhn (1922-1996). In his momentous work The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions (1996), Kuhn “argued that the history of science exhibits 
certain ruptures of development, so-called scientific revolutions, such that 
between successor theories there obtain conceptual incommensurabilities which 
render an algorithmic choice and claims to straightforward continuity between 
them impossible”.233 In contrast, Kuhn was of the view that “much of normal, 
non-revolutionary science proceeds by puzzle-solving within a so-called 
paradigm (a disciplinary matrix of conceptual frame, experimental procedures 
and exemplary solutions) whose basic assumptions remain unquestioned except 
in periods of crisis”.234 For such views, Kuhn became “the historian of science 
most closely associated with the rejection of positivist philosophy of science and 
the turn to a socio-historical approach in its place”.235 
                                                 
231 Sungjoon Cho, ‘From Control to Communication: Science, Philosophy and World Trade 
Law’ (2010). Cornell International Law Journal, forthcoming. Available at SSRN:  
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1583023 (visited December 5, 2010). 
232 Sungjoon Cho, ibid. (footnotes omitted).  
233 Thomas Uebel, ‚The Poverty of ‘Constructivist’ History (and Policy Advice)’, in Michael 
Heidelberger, Friedrich Stadler (eds.), History of Philosophy of Science. New Trends and 
Perspectives (Kluwer, 2002), p. 379.  
234 Thomas Uebel, ibid. pp. 379-380. 
235 Thomas Uebel, ibid. p. 379. By reviewing works of another constructivist author, Steve 
Fuller, who wrote about Kuhn (Thomas Kuhn. A Philosophical History for Our Time, and The 
Governance of Science), Uebel consented to the view expressed in Noretta Koertge (ed.), A 
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3. Romanticism 
 
Emphasising singular periods and peoples in history is a rather common trait in 
German historiography, dating back to the philosopher, Johann Gottfried von 
Herder (1744–1803). Herder, a historian and philologists, amongst other things, 
was particularly interested in individual expressions of cultures and peoples, 
calling it Volksgeist.236 The novelty of Herder’s thinking was, according to 
Störig, that every age and every people embodies a unique purpose on its own, 
not adjacent to another age and other peoples living before or afterwards.237 In 
other words, Herders’ perception of history is not one of evolutionary 
development from one stage to another, but that of a multiplicity of cultural 
expressions stemming from one single, transcendent origin.238 Thereby, 
Herder’s metaphysics run counter to Kantian philosophy.239 As Störig observed, 
a predominant aspect of the philosophy of Immanuel Kant (1724 – 1804) is the 
dualistic differentiation between the world of sensations and the world of reason, 
a dichotomy which Herder rejected.240 
                                                                                                                                                        
House Built on Sand. Exposing Postmodernist Myths About Science (Oxford University Press, 
1998) that “some of the social constructivist literature on science tends to owe its 
revolutionary appeal to subtle elisions in argument and not so subtle confusions of related 
concepts” (Thomas Uebel, ibid. p. 388).  
236 Volksgeist, an intricate German term, may be translated as “national character”, although 
the Germanism “Volk” and the English term “nation” are not synonymic; the Germanism 
‘Volk’ seems to be closer to the similarly ambiguous English term “cultural nation”.  
237 Hans Joachim Störig, Kleine Weltgeschichte der Philosophie, vol. 2 (Fischer, 1980), p. 
110.  
238 Hans Joachim Störig, ibid. 
239 Hans Joachim Störig, ibid. 
240 Hans Joachim Störig, ibid. pp. 110-111. A concise account of Kant’s theory of knowledge 
was provided by Karl Popper. Using Kant’s terminology, whereby “knowledge a priori 
means knowledge that we possess prior to sense-observation; and knowledge a posteriori 
means knowledge we possess posterior to sense-observation”, Popper explained Kant’s 
reasoning as follows: [citation start] 
(A) Most knowledge of detail, of the momentary state of our surroundings, is a 
posteriori.  
(B) But such a posteriori knowledge is impossible without a priori knowledge that 
we somehow must possess before we can acquire observational or a posteriori 
knowledge: without it, what our senses tell us can make no sense. We must 
establish an overall frame of reference, or else there will be no context available 
to make sense of our sensations.  
(C) This a priori knowledge contains, especially, knowledge of the structure of 
space and time (of space and time relations), and of causality (of causal 
relations). [citation end] 
See Karl R. Popper, ‘Towards an Evolutionary Theory of Knowledge’, in Karl R. Popper, A 
World of Propensities (Thoemmes Antiquarian Books Ltd., 1990), pp. 45-46 (italics in 
original). In his epistemological theory, Popper goes even further than Kant, noting that “all 
observations are theory-impregnated, and that their main function is to check and refute, 
rather than to prove, our theories” (see Karl R. Popper, ‘Reason or Revolution?’ in The Myth 
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However, Herder’s opposition to Kant and the reference to Kantian philosophy 
provide insight into basic features of both relativism and positivism. According 
to Störig, the dualistic philosophy of Kant subsequently transposed into two 
contrarian philosophical strands, namely idealism, on the one hand, and 
positivism and materialism on the other hand.241 It has to be noted that, although 
contrarian in their worldviews, both philosophical strands, i.e., idealism and 
positivism/materialism, were stemming from the Kantian source. But were to 
put relativism and historicism? Störig explained that, as a reaction against 
Kantian rationalism, a protest movement emerged, called romanticism.242 Störig 
found that relativism and historicism are expressions of the romantic protest 
movement against Kantian rationalism.243 
 
Scott Lash, analysing features of modernity and reflections about modernity, 
came to similar conclusions. Lash observed that romanticism was basically a 
reflection of the tradition of scientism: 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
of the Framework. In defence of science and rationality. Edited by M.A. Notturno (Routledge, 
1994), p. 75.  
241 Hans Joachim Störig, Kleine Weltgeschichte der Philosophie. Vol. 2 (Fischer, 1980), p. 
106. As mentioned above, Positivism is not tantamount to Materialism. Well to the contrary, 
positivists disapprove the materialist notion that virtually everything is physical as 
unverifiable metaphysics.  
242 Hans Joachim Störig, ibid. p. 106. 
243 Hans Joachim Störig, ibid. pp. 106-107. However, in terms of a caveat, it has to be noted 
that the traditional classification of philosophical schools of thought, as provided by Störig, 
for example, is not beyond question. In particular – and perhaps surprisingly – the attribution 
of Positivism to Materialism, although rather hegemonic these days, remained not always 
undisputed. In Materialism and Empiriocriticism, an intellectual controversy with the ideas of 
Ernst Mach, Vladimir Iilyich Lenin depicted a more dialectical view on philosophy, 
discerning only between two major schools of thought, namely Materialism and Idealism. 
With reference to Marx and Engels, Lenin denied philosophical attempts other than 
Materialism any intellectual autonomy, subsuming them under a broad notion of Idealism (see 
V. I. Lenin, ‘Materialismus und Empiriokritizismus. Kritische Bemerkungen über eine 
reaktionäre Philosophie’, in W. I. Lenin. Sämtliche Werke. Vol. XIII. Translated into German 
from the 2nd revised Russian Edition, published in 1909 (Verlag für Literatur und Politik, 
Wien-Berlin, 1927), in particular pp. 342-355). Interestingly, though, Lenin also recognised 
Positivism as a form of disguised Idealism. Lenin’s respective arguments seem noteworthy. 
Lenin started with a definition of Positivism as a school of thought based on “positive” 
knowledge, that is, ‘empiricism’ in the first instance. However, Lenin observed that 
Positivists were interpreting ‘empiricism’ not as an approach towards the material world 
independent from man, but as man’s very perception. Lenin further observed that Positivists 
are leaving it open, at best, whether or not human perception is a reflection of a material 
world existing independently from that perception. Lenin found that the idealism of Positivists 
was most clearly expressed in the field of the social sciences. Positivists, Lenin noted, were 
making societal developments contingent upon the development of ideas and sciences, etc., 
instead of the other way round, i.e., instead of drawing ideas from developments in society 
(see V. I. Lenin, ibid., p. 394, note one on Positivism).  
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“In this sense there are paradigmatically not one but two modernities, 
the first with scientific assumptions traversing a genealogy including 
Galileo, Hobbes, Descartes, Locke, the Enlightenment, (the mature) 
Marx, Corbusier, sociological positivism, analytic philosophy and 
Habermas. The other modernity is aesthetic. Apart from brief 
surfacings in the baroque, in some Dutch landscapes, it appears with 
vigour as a critique of the first modernity in nineteenth-century 
Romanticism and aesthetic modernism. If we are to understand 
reflexivity in the sense of the sociologists of science (and partly Beck 
ni this book) as the self-reflection of a paradigm, then late nineteen-
century literary and artistic modernism was the first time that 
modernity became properly reflexive. The lineage of this second 
modernity, which grew through reflection on and as a reflex in 
regard to the first is Romanticism, the young Hegel, Baudelaire, 
Nietzsche, Simmel, surrealism, Benjamin, Adorno, Heidegger, 
Schultz, Gadamer, Foucault, Derrida, and (in contemporary 
sociology) Baumann.” 244 
 
4. From Scientific Relativity to Relativism  
 
Interestingly, certain theories developed by natural sciences themselves turned 
out as gateways for modern expressions of relativism. Most important in this 
regard were Albert Einstein’s theory of relativity published in 1905,245 the 
formulation of the uncertainty principle by Werner Heisenberg in 1926, and the 
establishment of quantum theories by Heisenberg, Erwin Schrödinger and Paul 
Dirac in the 1920ies.246 
 
                                                 
244 Scott Lash, ‘Expert-Systems or Situated Interpretation? Culture and Institutions in 
Disorganized Capitalism’, in Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens and Scott Lash, Reflexive 
Modernization. Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order. Polity Press, 
1994), p. 212.  
245 Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen illustrated implications of the notion of relativity in physics 
on epistemology by putting forward the example of two voyagers in space observing the same 
incident as two different facts: “[O]ne observer may see ‘a flash of yellow light’ while the 
other may only feel ‘a glow of heat on his finger’. How can they be sure then that they have 
reported the same event since they cannot turn to simultaneity in the absence of absolute 
time?” asked Georgescu-Roegen (Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, Analytical Economics. Issues 
and Problems (Harvard University Press, 1967, Massachusetts), p. 37, with reference to Percy 
Williams Bridgman (The Nature of Physical Theory, Princeton University Press, 1936) from 
whom Georgescu-Roegen took the example).  
246 Stephen Hawking, A Brief History of Time. From the Big Bang to Black Holes (Bantam 
Books, 1989), pp. 20-21 and 58-59.  
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The reception of these modern theories of science showed some paradoxical 
effects. On the one hand, modern scientific theories virtually annihilated 
Laplace’s doctrine of scientific determinism.247 Stephen Hawking noted:  
 
“The uncertainty principle had profound implications for the way in 
which we view the world. Even after more than fifty years they have 
not been fully appreciated by many philosophers, and are still the 
object of much controversy. The uncertainty principle signaled an 
end to Laplace’s dream of a theory of science, a model of the 
universe that would be completely deterministic: one certainly 
cannot predict future events exactly if one cannot even measure the 
present state of the universe precisely!” 248 
 
Albeit the end of scientific determinism destroyed the illusion of scientific 
predictability and positiveness, it paradoxically (re-)opened a gateway for new 
kinds of metaphysics. Hawking observed:  
 
“In general, quantum mechanics does not predict a single definite 
result for an observation. Instead, it predicts a number of different 
possible outcomes and tells us how likely each of these is. (…) 
Quantum mechanics therefore introduces an unavoidable element of 
unpredictability or randomness into science. Einstein objected to this 
very strongly, despite the important role he had played in the 
development of these ideas. (…) Einstein never accepted that the 
universe was governed by chance; his feelings were summed up in 
his famous statement ‘God does not play dice’. Most other scientists, 
however, were willing to accept quantum mechanics because it 
agreed perfectly with experiment.” 249 
 
Using the example of the theory of relativity, John Desmond Bernal showed 
how scientific theories may become instrumental for the (re-)establishment of 
“mystical subjectivism”.250 In this regard, Bernal emphasised the key role 
scientists, in particular physicists and mathematicians, are playing in 
popularising science. Bernal observed that for popularising scientific findings, 
                                                 
247 Stephen Hawking, ibid. p. 59. Pierre-Simon Marquis the Laplace (1749-1827) assumed 
that the universe was governed by universal laws – similar to mechanical laws – whose 
knowledge would enable accurate predictions. Hawking provided the following example: “[I]f 
we knew the positions and speeds of the sun and the planets at one time, then we could use 
Newton’s laws to calculate the state of the Solar System at any other time. Determinism 
seems fairly obvious in this case, but Laplace went further to assume that there were similar 
laws governing everything else, including human behaviour” (Stephen Hawking, ibid., p. 57).  
248 Stephen Hawking, ibid. p. 59.  
249 Stephen Hawking, ibid. p. 60.  
250 John Desmond Bernal, The Freedom of Necessity, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1949), p. 100. 
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“eminent scientists who from time to time write about their own science in 
relation to wider problems”, such as philosophical, political or religious issues, 
are taking centre stage.251 Bernal noted:  
 
“More particularly, one of the most notable factors is the 
preponderance of physicists and mathematicians among those who 
speak for general science. (…) Now the theoretical physicists, from 
their primary concern with mathematical formulae, are apt to pass 
over very easily into metaphysics, and cone that boundary is passed 
it is very difficult to put a stop to loose thinking. The mathematician 
is not critical of the actuality of things: the most absurd statement 
can be readily accepted as long as they make a formal logical whole. 
Nature itself is for the physicist simply a set of observations to be 
reduced to mathematical formulae – to reduce the most extravagant 
theologies to other formulae gives them equal satisfaction – witness 
the great Hindu mathematicians and even Newton, one of the most 
concrete-minded of great physicists. This lack of a sense of reality, 
coupled almost invariably with an absence of psychological 
criticism, leads to an almost mystical subjectivism once the 
boundaries of strict science are crossed.”252 
 
Turning to the theory of relativity in particular, Bernal observed that this theory 
was welcomed for, at first glance, astounding reasons:  
 
“The idea of the theory of relativity as a destruction of absolutes was 
(…) successful because it formed a bridge between the tendencies of 
science and philosophico-religious speculation. The religious-
minded thinker, finding that an absolute religious dogmatism was 
impossible to maintain in face of science and that is was equally 
impossible for him to accept a dogmatic science, seized on such 
ideas as the dependence of the truth of the observer’s point of view 
and the formal subjective explanation of the “force” of gravitation as 
ways of reconciling himself without inconsistency to both 
worlds.”253 
                                                 
251 John Desmond Bernal, ibid. p. 99.  
252 John Desmond Bernal, ibid. pp. 99-100.  
253 John Desmond Bernal, ibid. p. 98. Bernal explained that the popularity of the theory of 
relativity was heightened by the fact that particular segments of the scientific community also 
seized the opportunity to reconcile with metaphysic beliefs. Bernal noted: “The scientists, on 
the other hand, were able to see that it was not necessary to attach themselves to a rigid 
framework of matter and ether in order to explain the data of observation, and that in fact it 
was better to abandon it, and that made them more inclined to include in their personal beliefs 
metaphysical elements which before they would have been ashamed to admit” (John 
Desmond Bernal, ibid.).  
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Bernal, however, went further and suggested a Marxist framework for 
understanding the remarkable re-mystification of science in the early 20th 
century. Bernal’s analysis is displayed not only because of its explanatory value, 
but also for reiterating the point that scientific theories, for example concepts of 
risk, are based upon philosophical foundations, such as positivism and relativism 
respectively, which in turn are influenced by political considerations. Bernal 
explained:  
 
“The temporary stabilisation of capitalism between 1921 and 1929 
was an opportunity for reviewing the relations of science and 
religion in the light of the new discoveries, and of the recent political 
events. The need for a reconciliation between science and religion 
was greater than ever, because for the first time in history there 
existed not only a body of men but a powerful and growing state in 
which religion had been openly proclaimed unnecessary and 
harmful, while science was to be the basis of the reconstruction of 
material and social life. The fear and the portent of the Russian 
Revolution overshadows all popular scientific writing of the time. It 
was not difficult to find opportunities for a new reconciliation in the 
recent advances of science. The first great opportunity was Einstein’s 
relativity theory which has given rise to as much popular nonsense as 
it has to intricate mathematics. Because, owing to the presence of 
matter, we cannot see quite straight, or as scientists prefer to put it, 
space is curved, philosophers argue that nobody really knows 
anything about anything, and that it all depends on your point of 
view. Even the much more important quantum theory, which has 
given us an immensely extended understanding and control over 
chemical and electrical processes, is made in the hands of [James] 
Jeans254 an opportunity for similar mysticism.”255 
                                                 
254 James Hopwood Jeans (1877-1946) was a physicist and cosmologist. Bernal summarised 
the “mysticism” of scientists such as James Jeans as follows:  
“The changes in the appearances of the properties of things that we call 
chemistry are the results of movements which occur on a scale altogether too 
small for our senses to appreciate them directly. To handle them conveniently 
we have recourse to certain arguments which for convenience are put into 
mathematical symbols. The things with which these symbols deal are not the 
ordinary objects of our senses, though those objects are made out of them. But, 
argues [James] Jeans, if we cannot say what the things are, they cannot be 
ordinary things; they must be purely mathematical themselves, and since the 
universe is made out of them and God made the universe, God himself must be a 
mathematician. The argument is not a new one. Plato put it forward in ancient 
Greece, and it is probably three thousand ears older than that. But when it was 
first put forward it was an honest attempt of the people who had just evolved the 
basic trades – the smiths, the carpenters, the potters – to explain the making of 
the world in terms of the things they themselves were making for the first time. 
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Interestingly, some of these scientists who are sharing their views with the 
public, as mentioned by Bernal, are seemingly merging features of positivism, 
i.e., the quest for a unified scientific theory, with characteristics of relativist 
metaphysics, namely the regress to some supernatural entity.256 Stephen 
Hawking, probably the most prominent of today’s physicists, observed that the 
search for a unified scientific theory has a long tradition of followers, among 
others and most prominent, Albert Einstein.257 And Hawking himself endorsed 
the objective of “unified science”, noting that “[t]he eventual goal of science is 
to provide a single theory that describes the whole universe”.258 Hawking 
himself, by drawing the following parameters for a unified theory of science, 
provided an example of merging the positivist objective of “unified science” 
with metaphysical religious ideas:  
 
“When we combine quantum mechanics with general relativity, there 
seems to be a new possibility that did not arise before: that space and 
time together might form a finite, four-dimensional space without 
singularities or boundaries, like the surface of the earth but with 
more dimensions. (…) But if the universe is completely self-
                                                                                                                                                        
Now it is the last apologetic attempt to preserve a tottering social order” (John 
Desmond Bernal, The Freedom of Necessity, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London 
1949), p. 107).  
255 John Desmond Bernal, ibid. p. 107.  
256 Any convergency between Positivism and Idealism seems to be at odds with a traditional 
mindset depicting the two philosophical strands as antithetic on principle. However, from 
other perspectives, other interpretations may unfold. Hypothesising a Marxist perspective, for 
instance, implies the recognition of Positivism – as well as Realism – as a disguised form of 
Idealism (V. I. Lenin, ‘Materialismus und Empiriokritizismus. Kritische Bemerkungen über 
eine reaktionäre Philosophie’, in W. I. Lenin. Sämtliche Werke. Vol. XIII. Translated into 
German from the 2nd revised Russian Edition, published in 1909 (Verlag für Literatur und 
Politik, 1927), p. 348). From a Marxist perspective, Vladimir Iilyich Lenin observed that the 
majority of scientists were taking a clear stance for Materialism. However, Lenin noted that a 
minority of physicists, under the impression of collapsing theories and relativity, was sliding 
via Relativism into Idealism. On these grounds, Lenin concluded that “the fashionable 
physical Idealism of our days is a similarly reactionary and ephemeral straw fire as it was the 
physiological Idealism in the recent past” (V. I. Lenin, ibid. pp. 366-367; translation from 
German into English by the author). 
257 Stephen Hawking, A Brief History of Time. From the Big Bang to Black Holes (Bantam 
Books, 1989), pp. 11-14 and 163.  
258 Stephen Hawking, ibid. p. 11. It seems, however, that Hawking related the objective of a 
unified scientific theory to a rather metaphysical reason. By determining the “ultimate 
triumph of human reason” as an understanding of “the mind of God”, Hawking implicitly 
limited human reason by a metaphysical framework. Hawing wrote:  
“However, if we do discover a complete theory, (…) [t]hen we shall all, 
philosophers, scientists, and just ordinary people, be able to take part in the 
discussion of the question of why it is that we and the universe exist. If we find 
the answer to that, it would be the ultimate triumph of human reason – for then 
we would know the mind of God” (Stephen Hawking, ibid. p. 185). 
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contained, with no singularities or boundaries, and completely 
described by a unified theory, that has profound implications of the 
role of God as Creator.” 259 
 
The merging of features of positivism, in particular its quest for a holistic 
scientific theory, with characteristics of relativist metaphysics became 
particularly popular among the New Age movement. New Age thinkers tried to 
link up modern physics with various elements of mysticism, religion and other 
forms of metaphysics. New Age representative Fritjof Capra, for example, drew 
analogies between Heisenberg’s wave-particle duality and Chinese Taoism 
(Yin-Yang complementarity).260 Interestingly, though, Capra also included 
economics into his analysis and called for its renewal in line with a new and 
holistic awareness. In particular, Capra argued that a post-mechanistic economic 
theory must take into account not only ecological, sociologic, political and 
psychological data, but should “clearly bear a relation to cultural 
phenomena”.261 On the whole, Capra’s and other New Age philosophers’ work 
                                                 
259 Stephen Hawking, ibid. p. 184. In defence of (neo-)Positivism, it has to be noted that 
logical empiricists had found a way to address challenges posed by the theory of relativity by 
rational arguments rather than by relying on metaphysical ideas. The rational approach of 
logical empiricists to challenges posed by the theory of relativity consisted in “a radically new 
conception of the [Kantian] a priori” (Michael Friedman, ‘Kant, Kuhn, and the Rationality of 
Science’. In: Michael Heidelberger, Friedrich Stadler (eds.), History of Philosophy of Science. 
New Trends and Perspectives (Kluwer, 2002), p. 27. Friedman noted:  
“Perhaps the clearest articulation of the logical empiricists’s new view was 
provided by Hans Reichenbach in his first book, The Theory of Relativity and A 
Priori Knowledge, published in 1920. Reichenbach distinguishes two meanings 
of the Kantian a priori: necessary and unrevisable, fixed for all time, on the one 
hand, and ‘constitutive of the concept of the object of [scientific] knowledge’, on 
the other. Reichenbach argues, on this basis, that the great lesson of the theory of 
relativity is that the former meaning must be dropped while the latter must be 
retained. Relativity theory involves a priori constitutive principles as necessary 
presuppositions of its properly empirical claims, just as much as did Newtonian 
physics, but these principles have essentially changed in the transition from the 
latter theory to the former: whereas Euclidean geometry is indeed constitutively 
a priori in the context of Newtonian physics, for example, only infinitesimally 
Euclidean geometry is constitutively a priori in the context of general relativity. 
What we end up with, in this tradition, is thus a relativized and dynamical 
conception of a priori mathematical-physical principles, which change and 
develop along with the development of the mathematical and physical sciences 
themselves, but which nevertheless retain the characteristically Kantian 
constitutive function of making the empirical natural knowledge thereby 
structured and framed by such principles first possible” (Michael Friedman, ibid. 
p. 27; original emphasis, footnote omitted). 
260 Fritjof Capra, Wendezeit. Bausteine für ein neues Weltbild. Original English title: The 
Turning Point (1982) (Ex Libris, 1984), p. 82.  
261 Fritjof Capra, ibid. p. 256. An interesting example for new economic approaches provided 
Capra himself by pointing at the fact that, on a new calculative basis of energy input per 
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can be considered as attempts to overcome the dualistic worldview established 
by Descartes, namely the mind – body dichotomy (res cogitans/res extensa).262 
 
Certain scientific disciplines seem to be particularly prone to religious allusions. 
Beside astrophysics and environmental sciences, religious arguments have been 
aired clearly audible by evolutionary biologists and genetic engineers. In 
evolutionary biology, an increasing trend can be observed ascribing evolution to 
metaphysical forces by purporting the theory of ‘intelligent design (ID)’. A 
proponent of ‘intelligent design’ is, for example, biochemist Michael Behe, 
author of the book Darwin’s Black Box (1996).263 In genetics, Dr. Richard Seed 
is an example of a physicist and genetic engineer justifying his call for human 
cloning with religious arguments.264 In particular novel technologies such as 
space sciences, robotics, computer sciences, genetic engineering and 
nanotechnology are often laden with a certain promise for transcendency. 265 
                                                                                                                                                        
calorie produced, the US agroindustry is the least productive agricultural production system 
worldwide (Fritjof Capra, ibid. p. 252).  
262 Fritjof Capra, ibid. pp. 58-59. René Descartes (1596-1650) was an eminent philosopher 
and mathematician pioneering analytical scientific thinking (see, for example, Hans Joachim 
Störig, Kleine Weltgeschichte der Philosophie, vol. 1 (Fischer, 1980), pp. 318-326. Before 
this philosophical background, attempts of contemporary Positivism for establishing a rigid 
separation of values and facts in risk assessment may be considered in the continuum of the 
Cartesian mind - body dichotomy – and attempts of contemporary Relativism for integrating 
value considerations into risk assessment in the tradition of holistic approaches. 
263 Eduard Kaeser, Pop Science. Essays zur Wissenschaftskultur (Schwabe Verlag, 2009), p. 
143.  
264 Eduard Kaeser, ibid. pp. 109-110. 
265 Eduard Kaeser, ibid. pp.114-115. On these ground, Kaeser called such novel technologies 
‘transcendence technologies’ (in German: Transzendenztechnologien). The convergence of 
various ‘transcendence technologies’ such as nanotechnology, biotechnology, information 
technology and cognitive science (NBIC) has aroused a revival of promises for redeeming 
mankind with scientific means. In a report entitled Converging Technologies for Improving 
Human Performance, Mihail C. Roco and William Sims Bainbridg announced:  
“At this unique moment in the history of technical achievement, improvement of 
human performance becomes possible. Caught in the grip of social, political, 
and economic conflicts, the world hovers between optimism and pessimism. 
NBIC convergence can give us the means to deal successfully with these 
challenges by substantially enhancing human mental, physical, and social 
abilities. Better understanding of the human body and development of tools for 
direct human-machine interaction have opened completely new opportunities. 
Efforts must center on individual and collective human advancement, in terms of 
an enlightened conception of human benefit that embraces change while 
preserving fundamental values” (Mihail C. Roco and William Sims Bainbridg 
(eds.), Converging Technologies for Improving Human Performance. 
Nanotechnology, Biotechnology, Information Technology and Cognitive 
Science. Joint report of the National Science Foundation (NSF) and the 
Department of Commerce (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003), p. 3 (original 
emphasis). See also Stefan L. Gammel, ’Visionen der Nano(bio)technologie’, in 
Kristian Köchy, Martin Norwig, Georg Hofmeister (eds.), Nanobiotechnologien. 
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5. Postmodernism  
 
In A House Built on Sand (1998), Noretta Koertge addressed what she called 
“Postmodernists”, i.e. Relativists, as proponents of “interdisciplinary endeavors 
called Science, Technology, and Society Studies (STS) or Science and Culture 
Studies”.266 Under the term STS or Science and Culture Studies, Koertge 
subsumed a wide array of disciplines and approaches: “Within their veritable 
carnival of approaches and methodologies we find feminists and Marxists of 
every stripe, ethnomethodologists, deconstructionists, sociologists of knowledge 
and critical theorists – those who find significance in rhetoric and others who 
emphasize the role of patronage and the power of empire”.267 Koertge went on 
to summarise precepts she considered “to be widely shared” by proponents of 
STS or Science and Culture Studies, i.e. Relativists, in the following, rather 
polemic, language:  
 
• Every aspect of that complex set of enterprises that we call science, 
including, above all, its content and results, is shaped by and can be 
understood only in its local historical and cultural context.  
• In particular, the products of scientific inquiry, the so-called laws of 
nature, must always be viewed as social constructs. Their validity 
depends on the consensus of “experts” in just the same way as the 
legitimacy of a pope depends on a council of cardinals.  
• Although scientists typically succeed in arrogating special epistemic 
authority to themselves, scientific knowledge is just “one story 
among many”. The more epistemological authority that science has 
in a given society, the more important it is to unmask its pretensions 
to be an enterprise dedicated to the pursuit of objective knowledge. 
Science must be “humbled”.  
• Since the quest for objective knowledge is a quixotic one, the best 
way to appraise scientific claims is through a process of political 
evaluation. Since the “evidence” for a scientific claim is never 
conclusive and is always open to negotiation, the best way to 
evaluate scientific results is to ask who stands to benefit if the claim 
is taken to be true. Thus, for the citizen the key question about 
scientific result should not be how well tested the claim is but, rather, 
Cui bono?  
                                                                                                                                                        
Philosophische, anthropologische und ethische Fragen (Verlag Karl Alber, 
2008), [pp. 203-228], in particular pp. 206-214). For more on NBIC, see 
footnotes no. 96 and 193 above, and no. 516 below.  
The latest candidate for becoming a new ‘transcendence technology’ may be astrobiology, the 
study and prospection of life forms in the universe.  
266 Noretta Koertge, ‘Scrutinizing Science Studies’, in Noretta Koertge (ed.), A House Built on 
Sand. Exposing Postmodernist Myths about Science (Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 3. 
267 Noretta Koertge, ibid.  
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• “Science is politics by other means”: the results of scientific inquiry 
are profoundly and importantly shaped by the ideological agendas of 
powerful elites.  
• There is no univocal sense in which the science of one society is 
better than that of another. In particular, Euroscience is not 
objectively superior to the various ethnosciences and shamanisms 
described by anthropologists or invented by Afrocentrists.  
• Neither is there any clear sense in which we can talk about scientific 
progress within the European tradition. On the contrary, science is 
characterized chiefly by its complicity in all the most negative and 
oppressive aspects of modern history: increasingly destructive 
warfare, environmental disaster, racism, sexism, eugenics, 
exploitation, alienation, and imperialism.  
• Given the impossibility of scientific objectivity, it is futile to exhort 
scientists and policymakers to try harder to remove ideological bias 
from the practice of science. Instead, what we need to do is 
deliberately introduce “corrective biases” and “progressive political 
values” into science. There is a call for “emancipatory science” and 
“advocacy research”.268 
 
Leading over to the focus on trade disputes, certain particular expressions of 
relativism shall be introduced at this point, namely relativism with respect to 
gender, animal rights and the environment. These topics are exemplifying 
problems of separating facts and values.  
 
From a theoretical perspective, feminism and gender studies may also be seen in 
the tradition of deconstruction. In this respect, feminism may be perceived as a 
particular form of relativism because it deconstructed, inter alia, alleged 
universalism implied in words such as “man”, “human” and “mankind”. 
Focusing on economic aspects and gender studies in particular, Kathi von 
Daeniken and Brigitte Schnegg defined the use of gender as an analytical 
category to challenge “the assumption that markets, trade policies and trade 
agreements are gender neutral”.269 Well to the contrary, Alessandro Nicita and 
Simonetta Zarrilli observed that trade effects are different across gender:  
 
“Due to cultural, economic and social factors, the effects of trade 
policies on economic and social activities tend to be different across 
gender. Women and men may have different skills, different 
                                                 
268 Cited from Noretta Koertge, ‘Scrutinizing Science Studies’, in Noretta Koertge (ed.), A 
House Built on Sand. Exposing Postmodernist Myths about Science (Oxford University Press, 
1998), pp. 3-4.  
269 Kathi von Daeniken and Brigitte Schnegg, ‘Gender as a Horizontal Issue within NCCR 
Trade Regulation’. Handout to the presentation provided at the Annual Conference 2010 of 
NCCR Trade Regulation, on June 29, 2010, at the World Trade Institute in Bern, p. 2.  
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economic and social roles, and different access to resources. The 
main issue relating trade and gender is that to reap the full benefit 
from trade integration, economies and workers have to adapt. This 
adaptation problem is more relevant for countries with rigid labour 
and capital markets, and for women, who in general are, in an 
economic sense, less able to adjust. This handicap originates because 
of women relative disadvantages in term of education, command 
over resources and in gaining access to credit, new technologies, 
training, and marketing networks.” 270 
 
As an analytical category, gender may also provide useful insights with regard 
to epistemology. In Coming to Understand. Orgasm and the Epistemology of 
Ignorance (2008), Nancy Tuana came to the following interesting conclusions, 
inter alia:  
 
• Any complete epistemology must include a study of ignorance, not 
just knowledge.  
• Ignorance – far from being a simple, innocent lack of knowledge – is 
a complex phenomenon, which, like knowledge, is interrelated with 
power. For example, ignorance is frequently constructed, and it is 
linked to issues of cognitive authority, trust, doubt, silencing, and so 
forth.  
• While many feminist science studies theorists have embraced the 
interrelationship of knowledge and values, we must also see the ways 
in which ignorance, too, is so interrelated.  
• (…) 271 
 
Furthermore, feminism seems to be a good example for showing the persistence 
of philosophical traditions in modern schools of thought. In his book The new 
ecological order (1995), Luc Ferry discerned between an ‘existentialist’ or 
‘republican’ feminism of a Simone de Beauvoir in The Second Sex (1949),272 
and a distinct expression of feminism called ecofeminism. Luc Ferry 
summarised characterising features of the early existentialist or republican 
feminism as follows: “The result is a feminism that is humanist (refusing to 
confuse humanity and animality), egalitarian (women are no more bound than 
men to the determinations of nature), and republican (it is by breaking away 
from the sphere of the particular determinations of nature in general that one 
                                                 
270 Alessandro Nicita and Simonetta Zarrilli, ‘Trade Policy and Gender – Unfolding the 
Links’ (2010), 44 Journal of World Trade [203-222], 205.  
271 Nancy Tuana, ‘Coming to Understand. Orgasm and the Epistemology of Ignorance,’ in 
Robert N. Proctor and Londa Schiebinger (eds.), Agnotology. The Making and Unmaking of 
Ignorance (Stanford University Press, 2008), p. 140.  
272 French original title: Le Deuxième Sexe. 
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rises to the universality of culture and ethics)”. 273 Ecofeminism, in contrast, 
relates the oppression of women to the oppression of nature, both enforced by 
men. From an ecofeminist perspective, “the only truly relevant question [is]: 
How can the ties uniting the domination of women and that of nature by males 
be described? The deconstruction of the humanist tradition, which is of course 
called for in both cases, cannot be fully accomplished if one fails to perceive 
that the critique of anthropocentrism must be replaced by that of 
androcentrism.” 274 As a result, ecofeminism takes a rather different stance 
compared to early existentialist feminism “by affirming her difference from 
‘males,’ by insisting instead on her specific proximity to nature, that the women, 
like the proletariat in day past, incarnates the redemptive portion of 
humanity”.275 Looking at the root of the emphasis on difference by ecofeminism 
and its ecological component, Luc Ferry observed:  
 
“… [T]he origin of and link between the exploitation of women and 
that of nature can be explained by three at times divergent 
philosophical positions. The first traces this double oppression to the 
appearance of dualism, the second to that of mechanistic science, 
while the third bases it directly on difference, on sexually 
differentiated personality formation or consciousness.”276 
 
Vandana Shiva, for example, observed a dualism in economic approaches. 
Whereas she related growth-oriented economics to patriarchy, Shiva conceived a 
sustenance economy based on women:  
 
“In the sustenance economy, people work to directly provide the 
conditions necessary to maintain their lives. This is the economy 
through which human production and reproduction is primarily 
possible. It is the women’s economy where, because of the 
patriarchal division of labor, societal reproduction takes place. 
Women’s work provides sustenance and support to all human 
activities – including the visible activities of the marked dominated 
economy. The sustenance economy is the economy of the two-thirds 
of humanity engaged in craft production, peasant agriculture, 
artisanal fishing, and indigenous forest economies. The sustenance 
economy includes all spheres in which humans produce in balance 
                                                 
273 Luc Ferry, The new ecological order. Original title: Le nouvel ordre écologique: L’arbre, 
l’animal et l’homme (Bernard Grasset, 1992), translated by Carol Volk (The University of 
Chicago Press, 1995), p. 116.  
274 Luc Ferry, ibid. p. 117 (original emphases).  
275 Luc Ferry, ibid. p. 125 (original emphases).  
276 Luc Ferry, ibid. p. 118 (original emphases).  
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with nature and reproduce society through partnerships, mutuality, 
and reciprocity.” 277 
 
Based on such findings, Luc Ferry located ecofeminism close to the deep 
ecology movement.278 Considering the human-nature relationship, Luc Ferry 
distinguished between three different approaches; the first is anthropocentric, the 
second is ‘utilitarian’, and the third is ecocentric or deep ecology. Ferry 
explained:  
 
“The first is no doubt the most ordinary, but it is also the least 
doctrinaire and, therefore, the least dogmatic; it is based on the idea 
that, by protecting nature, man is still first and foremost protecting 
himself, even if it is from himself in his capacity as mad scientist. 
The environment is endowed with no intrinsic value here. Rather this 
scenario stems from an awareness that by destroying the milieu that 
surrounds him, man may be endangering his own existence or, at the 
very least, depriving himself of the conditions for a good life on this 
earth. Thus nature is taken only indirectly into consideration, based 
on a position that may be classified as ‘humanist,’ even 
anthropocentrist; it is considered merely to be the human 
environment, literally that which surrounds him – the periphery, 
then, and not the center. As such, it cannot be considered a legal 
subject, an entity possessing absolute value in and of itself.  
The second current takes a step in the direction of attributing moral 
significance to certain nonhuman beings. It consists in giving serious 
consideration to the ‘utilitarian’ principle according to which one 
must not only look out for man’s best interests, but, more generally, 
try to both diminish the total suffering in the world as much as 
possible and increase the quantity of well-being. From this 
perspective, which is quite common in the Anglo-Saxon world, 
where it is the basis for the enormous animal liberation movement, 
all beings capable of feeling pleasure and pain must be considered 
legal subjects and treated as such. (…)  
The third tendency is the one we have seen at work in the call for the 
rights of trees, which is to say of nature in and of itself, including in 
its vegetable and mineral forms. (…) For this is the primary issue in 
this third version of ecology – that the old ‘social contract’ devised 
by political thinkers must give way to a ‘natural contract,’ in which 
the entire universe becomes a subject of law: it is no longer a matter 
                                                 
277 Vandana Shiva, Earth Democracy. Justice, Sustainability, and Peace. Zed Books, 2005), 
p. 17.  
278 Luc Ferry, The new ecological order (The University of Chicago Press, 1995), in particular 
pp. 116-117. However, Ferry stressed the point that the focus of ecofeminist critique is on 
androcentrism, not on anthropocentrism.  
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of defending man, considered as the center of the world, from 
himself, but rather of defending the cosmos from him. The 
ecosystem or ‘biosphere’ is endowed with an intrinsic value far 
superior to that of this species – this generally quite destructive 
species that is the human race.” 279 
 
With respect to the third tendency observed by Luc Ferry, i.e. ecocentrism, 
attention has to be drawn to Arne Naess (1912-2009). Naess, the founder of the 
deep ecology movement, argued in favour of a value-oriented approach and 
normative evaluations of environmental risks. With view on environmental 
questions, Naess held that “[o]bjective science cannot provide principles for 
action”.280 Naess observed:  
 
“In the early days of the growth of ecological consciousness, 
ecologists sometimes said things like ‘knowledge about what should 
not be done … is derived from the sciences and particularly from 
ecology.’ (K. Cadwell, quoted in Darling [1965]). Statements like 
this encourage the untenable belief that, if only the grants to 
ecological and other scientific studies were large enough, the experts 
could derive a conclusion about what we can do. But we cannot act 
without norms! If, because of waterway pollution, we decide that a 
factory must be shut down or moved, we accept, in addition to the 
more or less scientific hypotheses about the effects of waterway 
pollution, a long string of evaluations which are not part of any 
science: ‘waterways ought not be poisoned!’, ‘the employees of the 
factory ought not to go without work’.” 281 
 
Based on his relativist point of view, Naess consistently rejected any 
generalisation of environmental studies. By so doing, Naess also refuted 
attempts for enhancing ecology to some kind of paramount, yet universal 
science as Ecologism: 
 
“Many of those who emphasise the tremendous breadth of ecology 
tend, simultaneously, to limit it somewhat. They conceive of it as a 
natural science or use primarily examples characteristic of natural 
science. (…) Ecology may comprise a great deal, but is should never 
be considered a universal science. When concentrating on the 
relations between things, of course many aspects of their limited 
separateness are ignored. Ecologism is excessive universalisation or 
generalisation of ecological concepts and theories. The attempt to 
                                                 
279 Luc Ferry, ibid. pp. XXIII-XXIV (original emphases).  
280 Arne Naess, Ecology, Community and Lifestyle. Outline for an Ecosophy. Translated and 
revised by David Rothenberg (Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 40. 
281 Arne Naess, ibid. p. 41 (original emphases).  
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fully replace the theory of knowledge with certain ecological theories 
about behaviour and survival leads to very great difficulties 
(‘labyrinthine epistemology’) or, more correctly, one encounters 
great inconsistency and paradox (Naess, 1939)”.282 
 
Turning to the relationship between science and policy, Naess pointed at the fact 
that objectivistic scientific approaches are often used as pretexts for political 
procrastination: “The general attitude among politicians has been that if a major 
type of interference in the ecosystem cannot be proven to be bad then it is 
justifiable to continue with business as usual”.283 In other words, positivist, i.e., 
value-free approaches in science may translate into similarly value-neutral 
political positions, which, however, may often be used as disguised dilatory 
tactics.  
 
In contrast, Naess put forward a concept called Ecosophy. As Naess explained, 
the term Ecosophy is partially drawn from the world philosophy which can mean 
either a particular field of study or “one’s own personal code of values and a 
view of the world which guides one’s own decisions (insofar as one does 
fullheartedly fell and think they are the right decisions)”.284 Using philosophy in 
that latter sense, Naess described the relativist component of Ecosophy as 
follows:  
 
“We study ecophilosophy, but to approach practical situations 
involving ourselves, we aim to develop our own ecosophies. In this 
book, I introduce one ecosophy (…) You are not expected to agree 
with all of its values and paths of derivation, but to learn the means 
for developing your own systems or guides (…) Saying ‘your own’ 
does not imply that the ecosophy is in any way an original creation 
by yourself. It is enough that it is a kind of total view which you feel 
at home with, ‘where you philosophically belong’. Along with one’s 
own life, it is always changing.” 285 
 
The brief survey on the three ecological approaches showed an increasing 
degree of relativism: The first approach was associated with the philosophical 
concept of Rationalism, as developed by philosopher René Descartes, denying 
                                                 
282 Arne Naess, ibid. pp. 39-40 (emphases added). However, Naess extended his observation 
beyond ecology, noting that “[i]n debate, to label a standpoint an ‘ism’ often means it 
generalises the concepts of science too much. For example, sociologism, historicism, etc.” 
(Arne Naess, ibid. p. 39). Thus, taken out of the specific context of Ecologism, Naess’ critique 
of attempts for establishing a paramount scientific discipline by creating a new “ism” might 
equally apply on, for instance, economism.  
283 Arne Naess, ibid. p. 211 (original emphasis).  
284 Arne Naess, ibid. p. 36.  
285 Arne Naess, ibid. p. 37. 
 93 
any claim for rights for non-human beings. The second approach was related to 
utilitarianism, attributing some sorts of rights at least to animals. Whereas the 
first and second approach is sticking to anthropocentrism, the third approach, 
i.e., deep ecology, virtually transcends to new forms of ecocentrism or 
biocentrism. Thereby, deep ecology challenges dominant worldviews of 
Cartesianism and utilitarianism. With respect to the antagonism between 
anthropocentric and ecocentric worldviews, Luc Ferry observed that “the theses 
at war in the conflict between ecocentrism and anthropocentrism ultimately 
never manage to define the basic facts of the problem. One accords too much to 
nature, the other too little, each side finding solace, as in any opposition, in the 
adversary’s weaknesses”.286 In search of philosophical roots of 
anthropocentrism and ecocentrism respectively, it is easy to associate Cartesian 
and utilitarian approaches to ‘rational’ schools of thought rooted in the 
Enlightenment, Humanism and the French Revolution. Again Luc Ferry:  
 
“[B]eginning with Cartesianism and its struggle against medieval 
animism, the idea took form that true nature is not the nature we 
perceive directly through our senses but the nature we grasp through 
an effort of the intellect. According to Descartes, it is through reason 
that we apprehend the essence of things. And what the French 
classics would call ‘nature’ is precisely this essential reality, which is 
opposed to the appearances that are readily able to be perceived.” 287 
 
If Cartesianism is at the origin of anthropocentric concepts of nature, what then 
are the philosophical roots of ecocentrism? Luc Ferry identified sentimentalism 
and romanticism as the bases for ecocentric concepts. Luc Ferry observed:  
 
“It was against this classical vision of beauty that the aesthetics of 
sentiment revolted. Far from being mathematical, crafted, and 
human, here true nature is associated with original authenticity, the 
feeling for which we have lost, as Rousseau would have it, due to the 
culture of sciences and the arts. Thus what is natural is not at issue 
here, as it was among the classics, but rather what is not yet 
denatured, what is in its ‘primitive state’. Forests, mountains, and 
oceans reassert their place against the artifice of geometry.” 288 
 
                                                 
286 Luc Ferry, The new ecological order (The University of Chicago Press, 1995), p. 129 
(original emphases). 
287 Luc Ferry, ibid. p. 95 (original emphases). A famous expression of the ‘rational’ concept 
of nature is the French-style garden, “which is based entirely on the idea that, to arrive at 
nature’s true essence or, rather, at ‘nature’s nature’, it is necessary to employ artifice, to 
‘geometrize’ it. For it is through mathematics, by use of the most abstract reasoning, that one 
grasps the truth of reality” (Luc Ferry, ibid. p. 95). 
288 Luc Ferry, ibid. p. 96 (original emphases). 
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In contrast to Cartesianism, sentimentalism recognised intrinsic value in nature 
and considered humans as part and parcel of it. However, it took romanticism to 
reverse the value balance in favour of nature and to the detriment of men. 
According to the romantic conception, “[n]ature is defined as ‘Life’, as the 
‘divine’ union of body and soul, of sensibility and reason”.289 Thereby, 
romanticism honoured ‘nature’ by associating it with the lost golden age, 
apprehensible only by sentiment, not by reason.290 According to Luc Ferry, it 
was the veneration of ‘authentic nature’ and its apprehension through sentiment 
which made romantic conceptions of nature prone to Nazi ideology. Ferry 
wrote:  
 
“It was essentially these two themes that Nazi ecology would retain, 
opposing French, rationalist, humanist classicism, full of artifice, and 
the ‘German’ image of an original nature – primitive, pure, virgin, 
authentic, and irrational, because accessible only thorough the paths 
of sentiment.” 291 
 
In his attempt to demonstrate links from Nazi ecology to contemporary 
expressions of environmentalism, in particular deep ecology, Luc Ferry 
observed increasing intrinsic value attributed to ‘nature’ by National Socialists. 
The baseline was marked by attempts for Germanising (verdeutschen) the word 
‘nature’ into Urlandschaft, ‘earth’ or ‘original land’. But at the horizon emerged 
the contours of modern forms of animism. With particular reference to Walther 
Schoenichen292 and Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl,293 Ferry observed a 
“deconstruction of the primacy of individual interests” and an early call for 
rights to non-human beings:  
 
“With such a definition, Nazi ecology essentially preestablishes a 
link between the aesthetics of sentiment and what would later 
become the central theme of deep ecology: the idea that the natural 
                                                 
289 Luc Ferry, ibid. p. 97.  
290 Luc Ferry, ibid. p. 97. 
291 Luc Ferry, ibid. p. 97. 
292 Luc Ferry introduced Walther Schoenichen (1876-1956) as follows: “A committed 
National Socialist himself, holder of the Chair of the Protection of Nature at the University of 
Berlin, he was writing a series of works until the late 1950s on Germany’s mission in the 
matter, including two essays on the contribution of Hitler’s regime: Naturschutz im dritten 
Reich (Berlin, 1934), and Naturschutz als Völkische und internationale Kulturaufgabe (Iena, 
1942), which no doubt constitutes one of the best commentaries one can read on the 
significance of Nazi ecology in the eyes of those who were involved in developing it. In it, 
notably, the legislations are situated within the intellectual history of German romanticism” 
(Luc Ferry, ibid. p. 92n (emphasis added)  
293 Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl (1823-1897) was a German journalist and novelist focused on 
German folklore. He is considered of having established cultural anthropology 
(‘Volkskunde’) as an academic discipline in Germany. 
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world is worthy of respect in and of itself, independent of all human 
considerations. Thus Schoenichen particularly emphasizes the texts 
of Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl, which foreshadow the ‘environmentalist’ 
critique of utilitarian – hence anthropocentric – justifications for 
ecology: ‘(…) We must protect the forest, not only so that the stove 
will not go cold in winter, but to that the pulse of the people may 
continue to beat in joyous, vital warmth, so that Germany will 
remain German. … For centuries, we have been bombarded with the 
ideas that it is progress to defend the rights of cultivated lands. But 
now we are saying that it is progress to demand the rights of the wild 
nature next to these lands. And not only the rights of the wooded 
lands, but also of the sand dunes, swamps, garigues, reefs, and 
glaciers!’ ”294  
 
With respect to the human – animal relationship in particular, Hans-Peter 
Breβler identified several philosophical responses to the anthropocentrism of 
René Descartes. From a humanist perspective, Michel de Montaigne and David 
Hume called for benevolence and compassion also for animals.295 Immanuel 
Kant considered animals as beings without consciousness. Therefore, Kant 
conceived the prohibition of animal abuse primarily as a protection against 
brutalising impacts on humans.296 However, Breβler retraced effective 
beginnings of equalising humans and animals with works of Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau (1712-1778) and the utilitarian Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832).297 And 
Hermann Samuel Reimarus (1694-1768) and Georg Friedrich Meier (1718-
1777) already developed an antithesis to Descartes’ view of animals as 
machines, depicting the Creation as a unity to which all beings belong.298 
However, according to Breβler it was Henry Salt (1851-1993) who invented the 
term “animal rights”, relying on Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution and the 
                                                 
294 Luc Ferry, The new ecological order (The University of Chicago Press, 1995), pp. 98-99.  
295 Hans-Peter Breβler, Ethische Probleme der Mensch-Tier-Beziehung. Eine Untersuchung 
philosophischer Positionen des 20. Jahrhunderts zum Tierschutz (Peter Lang, Europäischer 
Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1997), p. 17.  
296 Hans-Peter Breβler, ibid. p. 17. Immanuel Kant considered:  
“But so far as animals are concerned, we have no direct duties. Animals are not 
self-conscious and are there merely as a means to an end. That end is man. … 
Our duties towards animals are merely indirect duties towards humanity. Animal 
nature has analogies to human nature, and by doing our duties to animals in 
respect of manifestations of human nature, we indirectly do our duty towards 
humanity” (Immanuel Kant, ‘We have Only Indirect Duties to Animals,’ in 
Kerry S. Walters and Lisa Portmess (eds.), Ethical Vegetarianism. From 
Pythagoras to Peter Singer (State University of New York Press, Albany, 1999), 
p. 269.  
297 Hans-Peter Breβler, ibid. pp. 17-18. 
298 Hans-Peter Breβler, ibid. p. 18. 
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affinity of sensitive beings.299 Finally, Breβler also mentioned Arthur 
Schopenhauer (1788-1860) and his advocacy for animal welfare.300 The 
overview on the human- animal relationship provided by Breβler confirms 
observations made by Luc Ferry with regard to the evolving nature of 
philosophical approaches towards nature and animals in particular. Whereas first 
critics of the Cartesian view on animals as machines applied anthropocentric or 
utilitarian considerations, later and more fundamental anti-Cartesian criticism 
displayed a romanticist mindset.  
 
Eduard Kaeser explained this duality as two traditions in biology, each applying 
a different ethos in scientific research. The first tradition is the one of René 
Descartes and Francis Bacon, establishing dissecare naturam, meaning to 
dissect nature, as scientific method. Kaeser termed this first approach to 
scientific research as the ‘ethos of objectivity’. Based on the objectivism of such 
a ‘philosophy of dissection’, animals became virtually res extensa, i.e., extended 
objects.301 The second tradition covers approaches which perceive living beings 
as fellow creatures, “maybe even as fellow subjects”, as Kaeser observed. 
                                                 
299 Hans-Peter Breβler, ibid. p. 18. In the scope of the study at hand, it may be interesting to 
note how Salt invoked ‘rationalism’ for his claim for vegetarianism:  
“I advance no exaggerated or fanciful claim for Vegetarianism. It is not, as some 
have asserted, a ‘panacea’ for human ill; it is something much more rational – 
an essential part of the modern humanitarian movement, which can make no true 
progress without it. Vegetarianism is the diet of the future, as flesh-food is the 
diet of the past” (Henry S. Salt, ‘The Humanities of Diet,’ in Kerry S. Walters 
and Lisa Portmess (eds.), Ethical Vegetarianism. From Pythagoras to Peter 
Singer (State University of New York Press, Albany, 1999), p. 125 (emphasis 
added).  
300 Hans-Peter Breβler, Ethische Probleme der Mensch-Tier-Beziehung. Eine Untersuchung 
philosophischer Positionen des 20. Jahrhunderts zum Tierschutz (Peter Lang, Europäischer 
Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1997), p. 18. Schopenhauer’s equalisation of animals and 
humans, basing on his philosophy of the will (Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung (1819), may 
be reconsidered in light of Luc Ferry’s studies on links between the animal liberation 
movement and totalitarianism. In the same breath, other famous advocates for animal rights 
and vegetarianism affiliated with totalitarianism could be mentioned; for instance, German 
composer Richard Wagner (1813-1883) (see Richard Wagner, ‘Human Beasts of Prey and 
Fellow-Suffering,’ in Kerry S. Walters and Lisa Portmess (eds.), Ethical Vegetarianism. From 
Pythagoras to Peter Singer (State University of New York Press, Albany, 1999), pp. 89-95; 
and, of course, vegetarian Adolf Hitler himself (see, for instance, Colin Spencer, The 
Heretic’s Feast. A History of Vegetarianism (University Press of New England, Hanover, 
1995), pp. 304-309. 
301 Eduard Kaeser, Pop Science. Essays zur Wissenschaftskultur (Schwabe Verlag, 2009), pp. 
153-155. Kaeser perceived genetic engineering as standing in the continuity of the philosophy 
of dissection, reducing animals and other living organisms to mere ‘biofacts’ (Eduard Kaeser, 
ibid., p. 155.  
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Kaeser called this second approach to scientific research the ‘ethos of 
solidarity’.302 
 
Luc Ferry summarised the dualism between Cartesian and romanticist 
worldviews and their continuing ramifications till today in the following words:  
 
“Our entire democratic culture, our entire economic, industrial, 
intellectual, and artistic history since the French Revolution has been 
marked, for basic philosophical reasons, by the glorification of 
uprootedness, or innovation, which amounts to the same thing – a 
glorification which romanticism, followed by fascism and Nazism, 
have continually denounced as ruinous to national identity, even to 
local particularities and customs. The antihumanism of these 
movements, which was explicit on a cultural level, was accompanied 
by a concern for rootedness that lent itself to the development of a 
great attraction to ecology.”303 
 
As a conclusion, one may observe that studies conducted by Luc Ferry and 
others established links between the philosophical tradition of romanticism and 
certain manifestations of modern environmentalism, in particular the deep 
ecology movement. For doing so, it was inevitable pointing at interlinks between 
romanticism and deep ecology, in particular Nazi ecology. In the scope of the 
thesis at hand, the objective was not to associate, or inculpate, deep ecology and 
other limbs of modern environmentalism with Nazism or other forms of 
totalitarianism.304 The sole objective of making reference to historical and 
                                                 
302 Eduard Kaeser, ibid. pp. 155-156. However, differences between the two approaches are 
not merely philosophical: from an epistemological point of view, the second approach, the 
‘ethos of solidarity’, takes account of the fact that any observer is inevitably personally 
involved in carrying out scientific activities such as observations and experimentations. 
Hence, Kaeser noted that essentially, scientific observation can never focus on the animal as 
an object of investigation alone, but inevitably involves the relationship between the animal 
and the observer (Eduard Kaeser, ibid. p. 156, citing behavioural scientist Otto Köhler.  
303 Luc Ferry, The new ecological order (The University of Chicago Press, 1995), pp. XXI-
XXII (original emphases). 
304 This remark was necessary to distinguish the attempt of the thesis at hand from the key 
message of The new ecological order of Luc Ferry. Ferry, by showing “how deep ecology 
casts aside all the gains of human autonomy since the Enlightenment”, put forward “a bracing 
caution – against the dangers of environmental claims and, more important, against the threat 
to democracy contained in the deep ecology doctrine when pushed to its extreme” (Luc Ferry, 
The new ecological order (The University of Chicago Press, 1995), back cover. The 
arguments of Luc Ferry should be taken seriously. However, reminiscences to Nazi ecology 
alone seems to be an insufficient argument for discrediting contemporary forms of 
environmentalism altogether. Or, taking it the other way round, it would similarly not hold 
water to discredit contemporary expressions of legal Positivism by simply making reference 
to Carl Schmitt, or making scientific Positivism responsible for every expressions of racism 
and colonialism based on ‘scientific’ arguments. Rather, the attempt of Luc Ferry to caution 
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philosophical origins of nature conservancy, the animal rights movement, 
ecofeminism and environmentalism at large was to shed light on philosophical 
traditions extending to contemporary disputes. From the narrow perspective of 
the study at hand, the capacity to understand opposing philosophical and 
epistemological roots underpinning different positions in international trade 
disputes, such as disputes over livestock cloning, hormone treatment of cattle 
and the use of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in agriculture, is 
considered to be a necessary condition for any agreement upon thorny issues.305 
 
Thus, understanding opposing worldviews is considered a precondition for 
overcoming the rational – irrational dualism frivolously applied in risk disputes. 
Understanding philosophical roots of different risk concepts may foreclose the 
easy resort of accusing the opponent of being ‘rationalist’ or ‘irrational’. 
Understanding the broader worldview within which the opponent is assessing 
risks may even challenge traditional understandings of ‘rationality’. In fact, risk 
assessments may provide variable outcomes depending on the point of 
reference: whether I consider a risk from my individual perspective of profit 
maximisation, or whether I consider a risk from the perspective of my family, 
my kinship, my nation, my gender, my denomination, or from the perspective of 
the entire globe or even the whole cosmos, may provide different, but equally 
‘rational’ outcomes.  
 
To demonstrate effects on risk and risk assessment contingent upon whether a 
positivist or a relativist perspective is adopted, the example of agriculture is 
invoked in the following chapter. However, to conclude the chapter at hand, an 
overview over opposing worldviews, in particular positivism and relativism, is 
provided.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
against new forms of totalitarianism has to be understood in the political context of the 1980s. 
As Daniel Binswanger noted, a new generation of post-Marxian philosophers especially in 
France rediscovered liberal principles established by political thinkers such as Alexis de 
Tocqueville (1805-1859) and Hannah Arendt (1906-1975). In the 1980s and assembled under 
the umbrella of the Parisian journal Le Débat, Luc Ferry, Alexandre Adler, Alain 
Finkielkraut, Blandine Kriegel and others embarked on a crusade against totalitarianism and 
in defence of the liberal constitutional state (Daniel Binswanger, ‘Was soll man heute 
Denken?’ In Das Magazin, issue 29/2010 (Tamedia AG, 30 July 2010), p. 6.  
305 Hans-Peter Breβler, for example, argued that the application of genetic engineering on 
animals is tantamount to their instrumentalisation and abasement. On these grounds, Breβler 
concluded that under a regime of actionable animal rights, genetic engineering of animals 
would inflict penalties (Hans-Peter Breβler, Ethische Probleme der Mensch-Tier-Beziehung. 
Eine Untersuchung philosophischer Positionen des 20. Jahrhunderts zum Tierschutz (Peter 
Lang, Europäischer Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1997), pp. 198-199).  
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C. Globalism vs. Alter-globalisation 
 
Summing up, one can arrange positivism and relativism into the following 
broader picture: From Kantian philosophy, two contrarian strands of 
philosophical thought evolved, namely idealism on the one hand and 
materialism/positivism, on the other hand. Additionally, as a reaction against 
Kantian rationalism, romanticism emerged as a protest movement, from which 
derived historicism and relativism. Another protest movement was anarchism, 
rebelling against capitalist exploitation in the emerging industrial society.306 
Although close to Marxism at first glance, anarchism is rooted in a different 
philosophical tradition, namely the libertarian tradition.307 Libertarian traditions 
can be observed long before Pierre-Joseph Proudhon (1809-1865), in particular 
in the philosophical school of the Stoics, established by Zeno of Citium.308 
Marxism, in turn, is located between materialism and idealism. The reason for 
this is that, albeit claiming to be solely based on materialist considerations,309 
the dialectical component in Marxism refers back to Hegelian thinking.  
                                                 
306 This is the guiding idea of Pierre-Joseph Proudhon’s groundbreaking work What is 
Property? (1840). See Horst Stowasser, Anarchie! Idee, Geschichte, Perspektiven. Edition 
Nautilus (Verlag Lutz Schulenburg, 2007), pp.221-223. Proudhon himself is often 
characterised as “founder” or “father” of Anarchism (Horst Stowasser, ibid., p. 223).  
307 Horst Stowasser, ibid. pp. 19-21 and 45-49.  
308 Horst Stowasser, ibid. pp.187-189.  
309 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels coined the famous phrase that “[i]t is not the 
consciousness of men that determines their being, but, on the contrary, their social being that 
determines their consciousness” (see Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, ’Feuerbach, Gegensatz 
von materialistischer und idealistischer Anschauung (Einleitung)’, in Iring Fetscher (ed.), 
Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Studienausgabe in 4 Bänden, vol. I (Fischer, 1982), p. 92. For 
emphasising the difference between German idealist philosophy and their notion of 
Materialism, Marx and Engels developed their basic argument as follows [in German]:  
“Ganz im Gegensatz zur deutschen Philosophie, welche vom Himmel auf die 
Erde herabsteigt, wird hier [d.h. gemäss materialistischer Anschauung] von der 
Erde zum Himmel gestiegen. D.h., es wird nicht ausgegangen von dem, was die 
Menschen sagen, sich einbilden, sich vorstellen, auch nicht von den gesagten, 
gedachten, eingebildeten, vorgestellten Menschen, um davon aus bei den 
leibhaftigen Menschen anzukommen; es wird von den wirklich tätigen 
Menschen ausgegangen und aus ihrem wirklichen Lebensprozeβ auch die 
Entwicklung der ideologischen Reflexe und Echos dieses Lebensprozesses 
dargestellt. Auch die Nebelbildungen im Gehirn der Menschen sind notwendige 
Sublimate ihres materiellen, empirisch konstatierbaren und an materielle 
Voraussetzungen geknüpften Lebensprozesses. Die Moral, Religion, Metaphysik 
und sonstige Ideologie und die ihnen entsprechenden Bewuβtseinsformen 
behalten hiermit nicht länger den Schein der Selbständigkeit. Sie haben keine 
Geschichte, sie haben keine Entwicklung, sondern die ihre materielle Produktion 
und ihren materiellen Verkehr entwickelnden Menschen ändern mit dieser ihrer 
Wirklichkeit auch ihr Denken und die Produkte ihres Denkens. Nicht das 
Bewuβtsein bestimmt das Leben, sondern das Leben bestimmt das Bewuβtsein. 
In der ersten Betrachtungsweise geht man von dem Bewuβtsein als dem 
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Over time, the scientific world-conception narrowed down to a mere method, 
sometimes called empiriocriticism or positivist approach. Features 
characterising the positivist approach have been established as (i) scienticism (ii) 
the imitation of natural sciences by the social sciences, (iii) the belief in 
positivistic epistemology, (iv) anti-dialectics, (v) scientific/epistemological 
elitism, (vi) political ‘neutrality’ and the reduction of positivism to an 
epistemological method called “positivist approach”. Finally, the positivist 
approach (vii) received a business-oriented spin through US American 
Pragmatism. As a result, contemporary expressions of the positivist approach are 
allegedly value-neutral but, in fact, effective tools for the pursuit of economic 
ends by scientific means. Unsurprisingly, though, positivist approaches in 
various disciplines, particularly in economics, have become influential tools 
advocating for market expansion and economic universalism, i.e., globalisation.  
 
Positivist attempts, however, are challenged by expressions of relativism. With 
particular respect for the implications of the globalisation debate on prospects 
for WTO law, the following expressions of relativism are emphasised. First, 
there are the descendants of romanticism, i.e., contemporary expressions of 
historicism and postmodernism. With view on the globalisation debate, the 
following specific strains of Postmodernism deserve closer attention: 
environmentalism, ‘third-world approaches,’ feminism and animal rights groups. 
Secondly, there are the remnants of anarchism. Third, there are successors of 
Marxism/dialectical materialism.310 These three strains of relativism are 
constitutive elements of alter-globalisation movements such as ATTAC, the 
Word Social Forum (WSF), and Altermondialisme.311 
                                                                                                                                                        
lebendigen Individuum aus, in der zweiten, dem wirklichen Leben 
entsprechenden, von den wirklich lebendigen Individuen selbst und betrachtet 
das Bewuβtsein nur als ihr Bewuβtsein” (Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, ibid., 
pp. 91-92; original emphasis). 
310 Differences between particular strands of postmodernism on the one hand and 
Marxism/dialectical Materialism on the other hand are vibrant till this day. For instance, Alex 
Callinicos observed real paradigm shifts between the two approaches: “The re-emergence of 
anti-capitalist discourses and movements therefore marks the breakdown of the hegemony 
that postmodernism has exerted over avant-garde thinking over much of the past two decades. 
One sign of this intellectual shift is a decline in the almost obsessive concern with cultural 
questions that came to dominate the radical academy in the 1990s and a renewed 
preoccupation with the material” (Alex Callinicos, An Anti-Capitalist Manifesto (Polity Press, 
2003), p. 11.  
311 The term ‘alter-globalisation’ stems from the French word ‘Altermondialisme’ and is used 
because some exponents of the anti-globalisation movement dismiss the common term ‘anti-
globalisation’. Noam Chomsky, for example, criticised the term anti-globalisation as follows:  
"The dominant propaganda systems have appropriated the term "globalization" 
to refer to the specific version of international economic integration that they 
favor, which privileges the rights of investors and lenders, those of people being 
incidental. In accord with this usage, those who favor a different form of 
international integration, which privileges the rights of human beings, become 
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In terms of a summary, the philosophical schools of thought aforementioned, 
their respective origins and the zone of contemporary conflict are visualised in 
the following chart on philosophical world-conceptions: 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
"anti-globalist." This is simply vulgar propaganda, like the term "anti-Soviet" 
used by the most disgusting commissars to refer to dissidents. It is not only 
vulgar, but idiotic. Take the World Social Forum, called "anti-globalization" in 
the propaganda system -- which happens to include the media, the educated 
classes, etc., with rare exceptions. The WSF is a paradigm example of 
globalization. It is a gathering of huge numbers of people from all over the 
world, from just about every corner of life one can think of, apart from the 
extremely narrow highly privileged elites who meet at the competing World 
Economic Forum, and are called "pro-globalization" by the propaganda system. 
(…)." (Interview with Noam Chomsky by Sniježana Matejčić, June 2005, cited 
in Webster’s Online Dictionary, web access:  
http://www.websters-online-dictionary.org/definitions/globalization?cx=partner-
pub-0939450753529744%3Av0qd01-tdlq&cof=FORID%3A9&ie=UTF-
8&q=globalization&sa=Search#922; visited October 24, 2010).  
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CHAPTER 3 TWO CONCEPTS OF RISK 
 
There are basically two concepts of risk. One is rooted in the individualistic and 
rational philosophy of the Enlightenment and early Capitalism. The other stems 
from anti-modernist movements associated with romanticism and the alienation 
of man from nature.  
 
A. A Concept for Entrepreneurs 
 
The first notion of risk stems from an individualistic concept designed for 
economic actors. Entrepreneurs, shareholders and speculators required tools for 
mastering risks and chances of their investments. In economic terms, ‘risk’ can 
be understood as counterpart to ‘chance.’ ‘Risk’ indicates the probability 
whether a certain investment turns out to be a profit or a loss. According to 
economic theory, risk increases with profits expected. Thus, risk may be 
understood as the price for profit expectation. An economic notion of risk is 
expressed, for example, by the Dictionary of Economics (2003) defining risk as 
follows:  
 
“A state in which the number of possible future events exceeds the 
number of events that will actually occur, and some measure of > 
probability can be attached to them. This definition distinguishes risk 
from > uncertainty, in which the probabilities are unknown. A 
gambler, for example, face risk because he/she could either be very 
much richer tomorrow or (more likely) slightly poorer, depending on 
whether a roulette wheel spins the ball into the right hole – and the 
odds of the roulette wheel are known. >> Bernoulli’s hypothesis; 
probability.  
It is normally assumed that economic agents dislike risk (>> risk 
aversion) and in the market for financial assets the riskier an asset, 
the higher the expected return investors will require of it (> expected 
utility; portfolio theory). (…)” 312 
 
Therefore, the individualistic concept of risk can best be understood as a tool for 
deciding upon economic activity, in particular investment. Hence, in economics, 
risk is essentially a management tool and is primarily addressed as a risk 
management problem. Peter L. Bernstein explained the economic rationale 
underlying the concept of risk management as follows:  
 
                                                 
312 Graham Bannock, Ron Baxter and Evan Davis, Dictionary of Economics, (Profile Books, 
2003), p. 338. 
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“The essence of risk management lies in maximizing the areas where 
we have some control over the outcome while minimizing the areas 
where we have absolutely no control over the outcome and the 
linkage between effect and cause is hidden from us.” 313 
 
Usually, the origins of risk are related to Humanism, the Renaissance and 
Enlightenment philosophy. In Against the Gods (1998), Peter L. Bernstein, for 
example, told “the story of a group of thinkers whose remarkable vision 
revealed how to put the future at the service of the present”.314 According to that 
popular legend, risk was some kind of a ‘revolutionary idea’ which, out of a 
sudden enlightenment, transformed Western society: “Like Prometheus, they 
defied the gods and probed the darkness in search of the light that converted the 
future from an enemy into an opportunity.” 315 Popular narratives about risk are 
relating contemporary economy to Enlightenment philosophy and Rationalism. 
Thereby, today’s economy is presented as the result of rational developments 
triggered by Enlightenment philosophy and science. Again Bernstein:  
 
“By defining a rational process of risk-taking, these innovators 
provided the missing ingredient that has propelled science and 
enterprise into the world of speed, power, instant communication, 
and sophisticated finance that marks our own age. Their discoveries 
about the nature of risk, and the art and science of choice, lie at the 
core of our modern market economy that nations around the world 
are hastening to join. Given all its problems and pitfalls, the free 
economy, with choice at its center, has brought humanity 
unparalleled access to the good things of life.” 316 
 
In light of critical research, however, common narratives about risk have to be 
questioned. For instance, Pierre-Charles Pradier observed that widespread 
beliefs about the origins of risk are stemming from two particularly popular 
legends. In La notion de risqué en économie (2006), Pierre-Charles Pradier 
found that both legends are incongruent with recent research findings.317 
Following Pradier, these two narratives are called the modernist thesis and the 
nautical novel respectively.318 The modernist thesis about the origins of risk can 
                                                 
313 Peter L. Bernstein, Against the Gods. The Remarkable Story of Risk (John Wiley & Sons, 
1998), p. 197.  
314 Peter L. Bernstein, ibid. p. 1.  
315 Peter L. Bernstein, ibid 
316 Peter L. Bernstein, ibid. p. 2.  
317 Pierre-Charles Pradier, La notion de risqué en économie, (Éditions La Découverte, 2006), 
in particular pp. 8-15. 
318 Classification, terminology and the critical approach to popular narratives about the origins 
of risk are taken from Pierre-Charles Pradier, La notion de risqué en économie (Éditions La 
Découverte, 2006), pp. 8-15.  
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be read as an appendix to the history of capitalism, as written by the historical 
school and Max Weber in particular. The nautical novel, on the other hand, 
emerged from works of earlier philologists who themselves might have been 
influenced by the historical school. Thus, popular legend has it that the concept 
of risk came along with European seafaring which, in turn, is portrayed as an 
expression of a novel, enlightened “spirit of capitalism.”  
 
1. The Modernist Thesis 
 
The modernist thesis about the origins of risk stands in the tradition of a certain 
group of historians perceiving modern times as a specific European 
phenomenon. According to scholars such as Werner Sombart, Max Weber and 
Niklas Luhmann, the rise of the risk concept fell into a period in European 
history distinguished by grand discoveries, religious reformation and the event 
of capitalism.319 In The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Max 
Weber argued for an affinity between religious reformation and Protestantism, 
on the one hand, and the development of capitalism, on the other hand.320  
 
The modernist thesis of risk can also be illustrated by the approach of Niklas 
Luhmann. Luhmann observed that at the time when the word ‘risk’ emerged in 
the Late Middle Ages in Europe, existing  European languages already provided 
“words for danger, venture, chance, luck, courage, fear (angst), adventure 
(aventuyre)”.321 Therefore, Luhmann assumed “that a new term comes into use 
to indicate a problem situation that cannot be expressed precisely enough with 
the vocabulary available”. 322 Given the fact that the Late Middle Ages (14th – 
15th century) marked the beginnings of European overseas expansion, religious 
turmoil and early stages of capitalism, Luhmann connoted ‘risk’ with a turning 
point in European history. By doing so, Luhmann carries on the German 
historiographic tradition of scholars like Werner Sombart, Max Weber and many 
                                                 
319 Pierre-Charles Pradier, ibid. p. 8. 
320 Pierre-Charles Pradier, ibid., pp. 8-9. Max Weber developed the thesis of a decisive role of 
Protestantism, in particular Calvinism, for the formation of Capitalism in two essays first 
published in 1904/1905 under the title encapsulating his argument as The Protestant Ethic 
and the Spirit of Capitalism. 
321 Niklas Luhmann, Risk: A Sociological Theory, translated from the German origin by 
Rhodes Barrett (Walter de Gruyter, 1993), p. 10. In footnote no. 25, Luhmann referred to 
Bruno Kuske who had pointed at the proximity of the German words “Angst” (fear) and 
“Abenteuer” (adventure) with today’s common perceptions of the term “risk”.  
322 Niklas Luhmann, ibid. p. 10. In the same sense also Bernstein who noted that “[t]he word 
‘risk’ derives from the early Italian risicare, which means ‘to dare’. In this sense, risk is a 
choice rather than a fate. The actions we dare to take, which depend on how free we are to 
make choices, are what the story of risk is all about. And that story helps define what it means 
to be a human being” (Peter L. Bernstein, Against the Gods. The Remarkable Story of Risk 
(John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1998), p. 8.  
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others. In effect, the modernist conception perceives the spreading of the word 
‘risk’ as “a consequence (or an aspect) of the development of Capitalism”.323 
And the development of capitalism, in turn, is perceived by the modernist 
conception as the result of a unique historical coincidence, merging religious, 
technical and economic elements at a certain point of time and exclusively on 
European soil.  
 
Pradier pointed out that the modernist thesis about the emergence of risk thus 
amounts to an “illustration of the seductive intellectual construction”324 
established by Weber and other adepts of the historical school: the development 
of commerce, insurance and innovative financial instruments coincided with the 
emergence of capitalism, both following religious reformation. Pradier noted 
that therefore, in perspective of the modernist thesis, the proliferation of the 
word risk appeared as a consequence (or as an aspect) of the development of 
capitalism.325  
 
Pradier observed a particular expression of the modernist thesis emphasising 
sociological rather than religious features. This specification of the modernist 
thesis, called the bourgeois legend,326 connoted the development of capitalism 
with the rise of a new social class, namely the bourgeoisie or the middle classes. 
According to such a reading, that new social class, i.e., the bourgeoisie, 
developed and applied new economic and political practices unsettling 
traditional regimes. Pradier observed that followers of the bourgeois legend, 
such as Robert Pirenne, were of the view that the new merchant class was made 
out of adventurers without any rootage into local environment, resembling to 
masses of vagabonds roaming around the world.327 From such a perspective, i.e., 
the notion of a sudden rise of a new social class, the concept of risk was one of 
the novel management tools developed and applied by the new bourgeoisie for 
pursuing their economic objectives.  
 
 
 
                                                 
323 Pierre-Charles Pradier, La notion de risqué en économie, (Éditions La Découverte, 2006), 
p. 9. 
324 Pierre-Charles Pradier, ibid. p. 9. 
325 Pierre-Charles Pradier, ibid. 
326 Pradier mentioned François Fourquet who introduced the term bourgeois legend (légende 
bourgeoise in French) for (dis-)qualifying a historiography pretending that merchant 
capitalism was a ‘foreign body’ emerging from feudalism on its own volition (Pierre-Charles 
Pradier, ibid. p. 10, with reference to Francois Fourquet, Richesse et puissance: une 
généalogie de la valeur (La Découverte, 1989).  
327 Pierre-Charles Pradier, ibid. p. 9; with reference to Robert Pirenne, but without indicating 
a specific source of information.  
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2. The Nautical Novel  
 
The nautical novel is based on etymological explanations for the word risk. 
Albeit etymological dictionaries are presenting various hypotheses for 
explaining origins of the word risk, most of them are finally arriving at some 
nautical connotation.328 Pradier observed that a popular explanation has it that 
the word risk stems from the Latin word resecare, reseco, meaning to clip, cut 
off, abscise (réséquer in French). As an intermediary, the vulgarised Latin word 
resecum is invoked, meaning “something which cuts”, that is, a cliff or a reef. 
Eventually, the etymological explanation for the word risk is presented as “the 
condition undergone by merchandise at sea”.329  
 
Proponents of the nautical novel further pointed at morphologic proximities 
between words meaning reef and danger in Castilian, a language stemming from 
Latin. In Castilian, the riesgo can be translated as meaning either reef or 
danger.330 Other scholars noted that the word risque succeeded the earlier word 
rixe.331 However, Pradier observed that this shift of meaning took place only in 
Castile and in Langue d’Oc and did not occur before the end of mediaeval 
times.332 
 
Focusing on etymology rather than on nautical imprints, Pradier noted another 
trace followed by philologists Arbogast Schmitt and Walther von Wartburg 
looking for Byzantine roots of the word risk. However, Pradier interposed that 
Byzantine roots of the word risk cannot be traced before the 13th century, when 
amalgamations with Italian words were already notorious.333 
                                                 
328 The Standard Dictionary of the English Language, for example, explains that the term 
‘risk’ is derived from the French word risque and the Italian words rischio and risicare, 
meaning to dare. Ultimately, the word risk is traced back to the Greek word rhiza, meaning 
cliff, root (Funk & Wagnalls Standard Dictionary of the English Language, International 
Edition, Volume Two, (Funk & Wagnalls, New York, 1969) p. 1087). The Concise Oxford 
English Dictionary explains that the origins of the word risk are the French words risqué and 
risquer which, in turn, are stemming from the Italian words risco, meaning ‘danger’, and 
rischiare, meaning ‘run into danger’ (Concise Oxford English Dictionary. 11th Edition, 
revised (Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 1241. 
329 Pierre-Charles Pradier, La notion de risqué en économie, (Éditions La Découverte, 2006), 
p. 9. With references to Friedrich Christian Diez, Etymologisches Wörterbuch der 
Romanischen Sprachen, (Adolph Marens, Bonn, 1853); and Alain Rey, Dictionnaire 
historique de la langue française (Le Robert, 1992).  
330 Pierre-Charles Pradier, ibid. p. 9. 
331 Pierre-Charles Pradier, ibid. p. 9, with reference to Pierre Guiraud, Dictionnaire des 
étymologies obscures (Payot, 1982, reedited 1994).  
332 Pierre-Charles Pradier, ibid. p. 9. 
333 Pierre-Charles Pradier, ibid., pp. 9-10. Before the 13th Century, a hapax legomenon, that is 
a word which only appears once in written records of a particular language, was dated 1156. 
But its unclear nature and arguable translation impaired the significance of the hapax in 
question (Pierre-Charles Pradier, ibid., p. 10).  
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Though, at least until recently, most etymological traces of the word “risk” 
seemed to disappear in historical nebulae. This finding led Niklas Luhmann to 
conclude that “[t]he etymology of the word [risk] is unknown.” Nevertheless, 
Luhmann added the allusion that “[s]ome suspect it to be Arabic in origin.”334 
 
In fact, more recent research hypotheses – yet fully to explore – are pointing at 
Arabic origins of the word risk. Once only an anecdote in a supplement to the 
French Dictionnaire de la langue française, the new hypothesis has gained 
ground among scholars and is now considered the most likely.335 According to 
this hypothesis, the word risk is derived from the Arabic word rizq, which is 
translated as “provision, part of the goods which God allocates to every man”.336 
 
In an etymological dictionary of words of Arabic origins used in the German 
language, Nabil Osman provided the following explanation for the word ‘risk’:  
 
“(…) [arab. rizq: that part of livelihood which is dependent on God’s 
grace or fortune]: venture, peril, (running the) risk of losing.”337 
 
Osman explained that the word ‘risk’ was borrowed from the Arabic word rizq 
by Italian commercial language in the middle of the 16th century and turned into 
the Italian words risico, and risco.338 Osman noted that the Arabic word rizq 
lives on in the Spanish words arrisco and riesgo, meaning ‘danger’, and the 
Portuguese word risco, standing for venture, the Italian words risico and risco, 
the French word risque, and the Rumanian word rizic.339  
 
The hypothesis of Arabic origins of the word ‘risk’ is all the more plausible 
because there are hundreds of words of Arabic origin in European languages. 
For the German language alone, Nabil Osman counted and commented around 
500 words of Arabic origin. The word ‘hazard’, for example, is also of Arab 
                                                 
334 Niklas Luhmann, Risk: A Sociological Theory, translated from the German origin by 
Rhodes Barrett (Walter de Gruyter, 1993), p. 9.  
335 Pierre-Charles Pradier, La notion de risqué en économie, (Éditions La Découverte, 2006), 
p. 10. Pradier referred to the Dictionnaire de la langue française simply as “the Littré”, a 
common token alluding to its principal author, Émile Littré.  
336 Pierre-Charles Pradier, ibid. p. 10. (In French: riszq: “provision, part de biens que Dieu 
attribue à chaque homme”; translation by the author).  
337 Nabil Osman (ed.), Kleines Lexikon deutscher Wörter arabischer Herkunft (Verlag C.H. 
Beck, 2007), p. 102. The German word ‘Geschick’ can be translated either in the sense of fate 
and destiny, or in the sense of dexterity, adroitness, aptitude and skills, or in the sense of 
fortune and luck. The German words ‘Wagnis’, ‘Gefahr’, and ‘Verlustgefahr’ have been 
translated by ‘venture’, ‘peril’, and the expression “(running the) risk of losing”, respectively 
(translation by the author).  
338 Nabil Osman, ibid. p. 102. 
339 Nabil Osman, ibid. p. 102. 
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origin. Osman explained that the word ‘hazard’ stems from the Arabic az-zahr, 
meaning dice or gamble.340  
 
However, other experts warned that the understanding of the Arabic word rizq 
may have changed over time and may be different from modern concepts of 
‘risk.’ Professor Reinhard Schulze from the Institute for Islamic Studies and 
Oriental Philology of the University of Bern pointed at the requirement for 
distinguishing between normative and historical approaches towards the Arabic 
word rizq. With view on normative interpretations, Schulze observed that the 
Arabic word rizq has ‘practically nothing to do’ with contemporary concepts of 
‘risk.’341 According to Professor Schulze, a theological approach towards the 
Arabic word rizq might be taken into account. Thus, rizq could be understood as 
‘that provided by God’ and ‘God as the provider’ (razzaq). In light of Sufi texts 
on the faith in God, rizq could hence be understood as ‘that determined by God’, 
meaning ‘that which cannot be influenced by man’. In semantic terms, Schulze 
further noted that the Arabic word rizq is usually connoted with something 
beneficial (in terms of a beneficium).342 Imponderables implied in contemporary 
risk concepts might thus stem from the initial ignorance of man regarding God’s 
will. Theological reasoning centred around the question whether God would 
grant beneficence or not. Today, in contrast, economic risk concepts rather focus 
on the question whether losses may occur or not.  
 
Shifts in the meaning of words are usually reflections of changes on the ground. 
With view on the origins of the word ‘risk,’ one has to consider significant 
changes in northern Italy between the 11th and the 14th century. With respect to 
risks related to long-distance trade in particular, forms of risk perception and 
risk management changed dramatically. In 11th century Italy, Pradier observed, 
merchants were, at the same time, combatants accompanying their merchandise 
                                                 
340 Nabil Osman, ibid. p. 59. After the sack of Baghdad by the Mongols in 1258 and the 
conquest of Constantinople by the Ottomans in 1453, the Ottoman Empire with the new 
capital Istanbul took virtually over the leading role from the Arab empire. Thereafter, many 
words adapted from the Turkish language found their way to Europe. A particular word was 
tulip (from the Persian word dülbend, meaning ‘turban’). In this respect, Klaus Kreiser 
recounted the story of Ogier Ghiselain von Busbecq (1520/1521-1592) who visited the Court 
of Sultan Suleiman I the Magnificent (1494-1566). From his visits to Istanbul in 1555 and 
1556-1562, von Busbecq brought the tulip flower to Europe which eventually led to the tulip 
mania or tulipomania in the Netherlands (Klaus Kreiser, Geschichte Istanbuls. Von der Antike 
bis zur Gegenwart (Verlag C.H. Beck, 2010), p. 57). After the tulip bulb had been adapted in 
the Dutch climate, the tulipomania enfolded as a speculative bubble in the 1630s. See also the 
Hortus Bulborum website on  
http://www.hortus-bulborum.nl/eng/tulpomanie-eng.html, (visited October 17, 2010) and 
footnotes 130 above and 421 below.  
341 Reinhard Schulze, Institute for Islamic Studies and Oriental Philology of the University of 
Bern, E-mail of July 22, 2008 (on file with the author).  
342 Reinhard Schulze, ibid. 
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in order to protect it against pirates.343 In 14th century Italy, however, modern 
techniques of risk control, in particular underwriting schemes and early forms of 
insurance, replaced armed convoys.344 Taking into account these changes on the 
ground, shifts in the meaning of the word ‘risk’ reflecting these factual changes 
are plausible. In the 11th century, the danger of pirate ships appearing on the 
horizon was perceived rather as a question of fate than as an issue of risk 
management. However, coming along with the development of financial risk 
control techniques such as underwriting and insurance, risks became 
increasingly manageable. Shifts of meaning from the Arabic rizq to mediaeval 
and finally contemporary concepts of risk may well be reflections of such 
changes on the ground.  
 
A simple but striking argument for Arabic origins of the word ‘risk’ is provided 
by general history. Overcoming the modernist thesis, contemporary 
historiography acknowledges the superiority and the power of attraction which 
emanated from the Arab empire during the Islamic Golden Age (mid-8th to the 
mid-13th century).345. As Emilio Ferrín, professor for Arabic studies in Sevilla, 
explained, the Arab empire was the dominant culture of its time. According to 
Ferrín, the Dar al-Islam, the ‘House of Islam’, was comparable to ‘the West’ of 
today.346 With view on trade in particular, Ferrín explained that the 
Mediterranean was ‘the highway of the Middle Ages,’ dominated by Arab 
seafarers and traders in similar ways as was most of the landmass around it.347 
Hence, Arabic was the predominant business language for long-distance trade 
and of maritime trade in particular during the Islamic Golden Age. Taking into 
account that Arabic was the lingua franca of maritime trade and the eminent 
                                                 
343 Pierre-Charles Pradier, La notion de risqué en économie (Éditions La Découverte, 2006), 
p. 12.  
344 Pierre-Charles Pradier, ibid. p. 13 
345 The term Islamic Golden Age usually describes the rule of the Abbasids, beginning with 
the shift of the capital of the caliphate from Damascus to Baghdad in 762 to the sack of 
Baghdad by the Mongols in 1258.  
346 Annette Bruhns, Ein Traum von Atlantis, in SPIEGEL GESCHICHTE, issue 5, 2010 [pp. 
79-85], p. 81. Whereas the Dar al-Islam, the ‘House of Islam’, referred to the Arab empire as 
hegemonic power, the ‘House of Wisdom’ (Dar al-Hikmah) was the leading scientific 
institution of its time in Baghdad. The ‘House of Wisdom’ attracted the most inventive brains 
of its time:  
“These medieval brains met every day for translation, reading, writing, 
discourse, dialogue and discussion. The place was a cosmopolitan melting pot 
and the languages that were spoken and written included Arabic, the lingua 
franca, Farsi, Hebrew, Syriac, Aramaic, Greek, Latin and Sanskrit, which was 
used to translate the ancient Indian mathematics manuscripts” (Salim T S Al-
Hassani (ed.), 1001 Inventions: Muslim Heritage in Our World. 2nd edition 
published by Foundation of Science, Technology and Civilisation (FSTC, 2007), 
pp. 46-49). 
347 Annette Bruhns, Ein Traum von Atlantis, in SPIEGEL GESCHICHTE, issue 5, 2010 [pp. 
79-85], p. 81.  
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role of risk considerations in long-distance transactions, the hypothesis of 
Arabic origins of the word ‘risk’ seems rather plausible.348 
 
In any case, Pradier arrived at the conclusion that the use of the world risk can 
be traced back much farther than to the outgoing mediaeval ages. That finding is 
important because it disproves popular allusions of risk with seafaring and 
modern capitalism, i.e., the nautical novel and the modernist thesis.349 Whereas 
he simply disqualified the nautical novel as an ‘amusing story,’ Pradier urged 
that the modernist thesis must be disproved.350 Pradier based his request on the 
following arguments. First, the merchants were not a distinct class since the 11th 
century. Hence, it is quite possible that the term “risk” was a word used by 
warriors. Second, the modernist thesis was entirely disproved by evidence that 
the spirit of capitalism was already very vivid in the Italy of the trecento, i.e. the 
14th century in Italy.351 
 
B. Response from the Risk Society  
 
Maybe the nautical novel and the modernist thesis are so persuasive because 
they are able to depict an essential feature of risk, that is, its expansive character. 
Thus, albeit inappropriate for explaining historical origins of risk, it has to be 
acknowledged that the nautical novel and the modernist thesis are facilitating an 
intuitive understand why the word ‘risk’ spread rapidly in a certain period of 
European history. Pradier distinguished two periods of the propagation of the 
word “risk”; the historical epoch called ‘modern’ where uses and meanings of 
the word ‘risk’ expanded rapidly, and the contemporary epoch were the word 
‘risk’ got an abstract sense.352  
 
                                                 
348 Recent research seems to indicate that already in the 12th century, Italian merchants started 
to adapt the word resicum from the Arab word rizq and that the former became rapidly a 
standard term of the commercial vocabulary in the western Mediterranean (see, for instance, 
Sylvain Piron, ‘L’apparition du resicum en Méditerranée occidentale, XIIe - XIIIe siècles’, in 
Emmanuelle Collas-Heddeland et. al. (eds.), Pour une Histoire culturelle du risque. Genèse, 
évolution, actualité du concept dans les sociétés occidentales (Editions Histoire et 
Anthropologie, 2004), [pp. 59-76], p. 13.  
349 Pierre-Charles Pradier, La notion de risqué en économie (Éditions La Découverte, 2006), 
p. 10. In his own words, Pradier wrote: “Malgré l’incertitude qui les entoure, ces recherches 
étymologiques conduisent à tenir pour certain que l’usage du mot ‘risqué’ est de loin antérieur 
à la fin du Moyen Âge, ce qui contredit la thèse moderniste” (Pierre-Charles Pradier, ibid.).  
350 Pierre-Charles Pradier, ibid. p. 12. In French, Pradier called the nautical novel “une 
histoire plaisante”.  
351 Pierre-Charles Pradier, ibid. p. 12. Recent research refutes the modernist thesis for many 
reasons. Emilio Ferrín, for example, came to the conclusion that the city states of al-Andalus 
in Moorish Spain were, in fact, “precursors of the Renaissance” (Annette Bruhns, Ein Traum 
von Atlantis, in SPIEGEL GESCHICHTE, issue 5, 2010 [pp. 79-85], p. 84).  
352 Pierre-Charles Pradier, ibid. pp. 12-13.  
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Starting with the ‘modern’ epoch and the 17th century in particular, Pradier 
observed that the word ‘risk’ permeated from specific maritime applications353 
into figures of commercial speech and general business language. But the word 
‘risk’ was not yet a common term in the 17th century.354 For the 18th century, 
Pradier noted a “linguistic evolution” coming along with transformations in 
society. The 17th century was characterised by financial booms and busts such as 
the famous Dutch tulip bubble,355 voyages (for example the voyages ventured by 
James Cook and Jean-François de La Pérouse), and a general fascination for 
                                                 
353 Pradier distinguished between the use of the word risk and its etymological and historical 
origins. The use of the word risk, in fact, seems of having first appeared on European 
seashores in the context of maritime trade. However, instead of taking this finding as proof 
for the nautical novel, Pradier opened the floor for considering fact-based alternatives. A 
probable alternative seems to suggest an Arabic origin of the word risk, which can be 
supported with various interfaces between European powers, on the one hand, and Arab and 
Ottoman powers on the other hand. In this regard, points of culmination were the Arab rule in 
Spain (8th-13th centuries) and Sicily (10th-11th centuries) and the series of crusades (11th-13th 
centuries) in which European powers were involved with both mercantile and belligerent 
interests. This amalgamation of commercial and strategic interests was highlighted by Pradier 
as a source of ‘risky’ ventures by maritime entrepreneurs (imprenditori), chivalric 
entrepreneurs (chevaliers) and belligerent entrepreneurs (condottiere and mercenaries) (see 
Pierre-Charles Pradier, ibid. pp. 12-13). Venice, for example, made profitable use of the 
crusades both economically and strategically. Enrico Dandolo, the Doge of Venice from 1195 
to 1205, seized the opportunity of the 4th crusade (1202-1204) – which he misdirected – for 
eliminating Venice’s major competitor in the east, that was, Byzantium (see, for instance, 
Klaus Kreiser, Geschichte Istanbuls. Von der Antike bis zur Gegenwart (Verlag C.H. Beck, 
2010), pp. 39-41. Kreiser observed that famous objects commonly associates with Venice, 
e.g., the Tetrarchi, the Pilastri Acritani, and the Quadriga of San Marco, are booty from 
Constantinople (Klaus Kreiser, ibid., p. 41). Karam Khella went a step further, arguing that 
the elimination of Byzantium as a competitor was actually the main strategic objective of 
Venice’s involvement in the crusades (see Karam Khella, Geschichte der arabischen Völker. 
2nd Edition (Theorie und Praxis Verlag, 1991), pp. 132-140). From a meta-perspective, 
finally, Ernest Mandel brought “the plundering of Byzantium” in line with, firstly, the 
colonisation of Baltic and north-eastern territories in Europe (which will again be mentioned 
below), and secondly, with the origins of merchant capitalism itself. Mandel noted:  
“[A]ll historical evidence confirms that the sudden appearance of large amounts 
of ‘capital’ (in the form of a stock of precious metals and other treasure) in a 
society previously confined almost exclusively to natural economy (to the output 
of goods possessing only use-value) was the result not of ‘frugality’ and ‘thrift’ 
but of large-scale piracy, robbery, violence, theft, enslavement of men and trade 
in slaves. The history of the origins of West European usury and merchant 
capital between the tenth and the thirteenth centuries, from the piracy in the 
Mediterranean through the plundering of Byzantium by the Fourth Crusade to 
the regular plundering razzias into the Slav territories of Central and Eastern 
Europe, is very eloquent in this respect” Ernest Mandel, ‘Introduction’ to Karl 
Marx, Capital. A Critique of Political Economy. Vol. 1, translated by Ben 
Fowkes (Penguin Books, 1990), p. 62).  
354 Pierre-Charles Pradier, La notion de risqué en économie, (Éditions La Découverte, 2006), 
pp. 13-14.  
355 See footnotes no. 130 and 340 above and no. 421 below.  
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adventure.356 It was the 17th century in which a “vocabulary of gambling” was 
developed: centring on the notion of adventure, words like chance and fortune, 
on the one hand, and danger and peril, on the other hand, became popular for 
expressing the spirit of the time.357 During the 18th century, however, the use of 
the word ‘risk’ started to recede. Between 1750 and 1800, Pradier observer, the 
frequency of the word ‘risk’ in literature decrease by half.358  
 
Turning to the contemporary epoch which brought along the Risk Society, 
Pradier noted, at first, a linguistic phenomenon. On the one hand, Pradier noted, 
the word ‘risk’ is used in the sense of a “probable danger”. However, in 
insurance providers’ tongue, ‘risk’ also took the meaning of the probability of 
that danger to manifest, that is, the mathematical expectation of the liability 
case.359 Hence, ‘risk’ started of becoming confounded with its assessment and 
with those embodying it, the insured. Insurers began to characterise their clients 
as ‘risks’; speeding motorists as “bad risks”, and cautious motorists as “good 
risks”.360 Indeed, the Black’s Law Dictionary provided the following 
explanation of terms used in insurance business:  
 
“… 5. Insurance. A person or thing that an insurer considers as 
hazard; someone or something that might be covered by an insurance 
policy < she’s a poor risk for health insurance > …” 361 
 
Pradier concluded that such transpositions of meanings, of terms and content, 
subject and object, opened up a wide range of new applications for the term 
‘risk’.362 Thus, in the contemporary epoch, risk lost its earlier connotation with 
entrepreneurial activity or gambling at the stock exchange.363 In other words, 
risk evolved into a common term, reflecting the self-conception of the Risk 
Society of today.  
 
                                                 
356 Pierre-Charles Pradier, La notion de risqué en économie, (Éditions La Découverte, 2006), 
p. 14.  
357 Pierre-Charles Pradier, ibid. pp. 13-14. Pradier used the French term “vocabulaire de 
l’aléatoire” which I tried to translate as “vocabulary of gambling”.  
358 Pierre-Charles Pradier, ibid. pp. 14-15. Looking at this astounding regression, Pradier 
asked rhetorically whether the “century of science”, i.e., the 18th century, was not able to 
stand the doubt (in French: “Est-ce à dire que le ‘siècle de la science’ ne supporte pas le 
doute?” See Pierre-Charles Pradier, ibid. p. 15).  
359 Pierre-Charles Pradier, ibid. p. 15.  
360 Pierre-Charles Pradier, ibid. p. 15.  
361 Bryan A. Garner (ed.), Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th Edition (Thomson Reuters, 2009), p. 
1442. 
362 Pierre-Charles Pradier, La notion de risqué en économie, (Éditions La Découverte, 2006), 
p. 15. Pradier denoted the linguistic phenomenon of shifting meanings of words as metonymy. 
363 Pierre-Charles Pradier, ibid. p. 15. 
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In the 1980s, social sciences joined the risk discourse. Social sciences and 
sociology in particular analysed the relationship of societies and risks from a 
different angle, adding a new perspective to the economic and scientific theories 
of risk. Ulrich Beck, for example, encapsulated the zeitgeist when he established 
the term ‘risk society’. In his groundbreaking work Risk Society, first published 
in 1986, Beck showed that in contemporary societies, conflicts over wealth 
distribution were increasingly overlaid by conflicts over the allocation of 
risks.364 
 
In Risk: A Sociological Theory, first published in 1991, Niklas Luhmann worked 
out differences between ‘risk’ and ‘danger’. According to Luhmann, risk is as a 
mode of action adopted voluntarily in the pursuit of profit; danger, on the other 
hand, denotes the status of people negatively affected by decisions over risks 
taken by others. Luhmann noted that  
 
“… we will give the concept of risk another form with the help of the 
distinction of risk and danger. The distinction presupposes (thus 
differing from other distinctions) that uncertainty exists in relation to 
future loss. There are then two possibilities. The potential loss is 
either regarded as a consequence of the decision, that is to say, it is 
attributed to the decision. We then speak of risk – to be more exact 
of the risk of decision. Or the possible loss is considered to have 
been caused externally, that is to say, it is attributed to the 
environment. In this case, we speak of danger.” 365 
 
Hence, sociologists worked out that imbalances between those deciding over 
risks and those affected by them are characterising features of Risk societies. In 
contrast to financial risks taken by individuals as entrepreneurs or shareholders 
in early capitalist societies, environmental risks in particular are borne by 
society as a whole.  
 
Much in line with Luhmann’s observations, the New Shorter Oxford English 
Dictionary defined risk as follows:  
 
- “Danger; (exposure to) the possibility of loss, injury, or other 
adverse circumstance. (…) 
                                                 
364 Ulrich Beck, Risikogesellschaft. Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne. 1st edition 1986 
(Suhrkamp, 1996), p. 25. In 1999, Beck published the book World Risk Society where he 
transposed the idea of the Risk Society” to the global level. In fact, the question “Who bears 
the risks and who reaps the profits?” is even more critical at international levels than at 
national levels were constitutions may balance conflicting interests among winners and losers 
in risk conflicts.  
365 Niklas Luhmann, Risk: A Sociological Theory, translated from the German origin by 
Rhodes Barrett (Walter de Gruyter, 1993), pp. 21-22.  
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- (Exposure to) the possibility of commercial loss (…) (a) in the case 
of insured property or goods, (b) as part of economic enterprise and 
the source of entrepreneurial profit. (…) 
- A chance or possibility of danger, commercial loss, or other risk. 
(…) 
- A person considered a liability or danger; a person exposed to risk. 
(…)” 366 
 
And Webster’s Third New International Dictionary provides the following 
definition of risk:  
 
- “the possibility of loss, injury, disadvantage, or destruction : 
[contingency, danger, peril, threat] (…) 
- the chance of loss or the perils to the subject matter of insurance 
covered by a contract  
- the degree of probability of such loss (…)” 367 
 
In technical language, risk is typically defined as “the product of the degree of 
harm a given event would cause, and its probability of occurrence”, providing 
the following formula:368 
 
R = P x C 
 
In the formula provided, R stands for risk, P for probability, and C for the 
consequence. Hence, “the essence of risk consists of the probability of an 
adverse event and the magnitude of its consequences”.369 
 
The notion of risk by the Risk Society is concisely expressed by the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission, defining risk as  
 
                                                 
366 Lesley Brown (ed.), The New Shorter Oxford Dictionary, Vol. 2 (Clarendon Press, 1993), 
p. 2609. Notes about etymological sources of risk refer to the French word risque and the 
Italian words risco, rischio, and rischiare, meaning “run into danger”. Furthermore, for risk as 
a verb, the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary provides, among others, for the following 
descriptions: “Venture on; accept the chance of (a thing, doing)” (Lesley Brown et. al., ibid.). 
367 Philip Babcock Gove (ed.), Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English 
Language Unabridged (Könemann, 1993), p. 1961. 
368 Brian Wynne, ‘Risk Assessment of Technological Systems – Dimensions of Uncertainty’, 
in Brian Wynne (ed.), Risk Management and Hazardous Waste. Implementation and the 
Dialectics of Credibility (Springer, 1987).  
369 Steve Rayner, ‘Learning from the Blind Men and the Elephant, or Seeing Things Whole in 
Risk Management’, in Vincent T. Covello, Lester B. Lave, Alan Moghissi, and V.R.R. 
Uppuluri, Uncertainty in Risk Assessment, Risk Management and Decision Making (Plenum 
Press, 1987), p. 208.  
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a “function of the probability of an adverse health effect and the 
severity of that effect, consequential to a hazard(s) [in food].”370  
 
Whereas risk management is the preserve of economic sciences, risk assessment 
typically requires the assistance of natural sciences, in particular the so-called 
quarantine sciences371 and environmental sciences.  
 
Risk societies perceive risk from the perspective of possible adverse effects, 
rather than making a weighing between probable losses and profits. From a 
citizen’s perspective, risks decided by others materialise as societal ‘dangers,’ 
whereas eventual profits are reaped elsewhere, by anonymous corporations 
eventually. On these grounds, there is public discomfort with technical 
approaches trying to balance ‘potential gains and losses’ in risk evaluation. 
Technical approaches for ‘rationally’ assessing gains and losses related to 
technology applications are typically despised as ‘technocratic.’ Expressions of 
technocratic attempts are, for instance, classifications and categorisations of risk 
suggested by Mandl and Lathrop:  
 
“(i)  risk of multiple fatalities: probability of exceeding specific 
numbers of fatalities per year;  
(i) societal risk: total expected fatalities per year;  
(ii) group risk: probability of an individual in a specific exposed 
group becoming a fatality per year;  
(iii) individual risk: probability of an exposed individual becoming a 
fatality per year.” 372 
 
It is hence unsurprising that those who may be affected by ‘dangers’ are 
requiring a thorough assessment, i.e., quantification, of risk. Among risk 
experts, there seems to be widespread consensus that the term risk “refers to a 
situation in which it is possible confidently to quantify both the magnitude of 
and the probabilities for a defined range of outcomes (such as forms or degrees 
                                                 
370 ‘Definitions of Risk Analysis Term Related to Food Safety’, at the end of the Working 
Principles for Risk Analysis for Application in the Framework of the Codex Alimentarius”, 
Section IV of the Procedural Manual of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, 19th edition, 
2010, p. 92. 
371 The term quarantine sciences refers to sciences originally used for establishing risks to 
human, animal and plant health at border controls, for example toxicology, biochemistry, 
veterinary sciences and plant sciences. Nowadays, the term quarantine sciences commonly 
refer more generally to sciences applied in food safety inspections and the control of 
epizootics and plant diseases. 
372 Christoph Mandl and John Lathrop, ‘Comparing Risk Assessments for Liquefied Energy 
Gas Terminals – Some Results’, in Howard C. Kunreuther and Eryl V. Ley (eds.), The Risk 
Analysis Controversy. An Institutional Perspective (Springer, 1982), p. 43.  
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of harm in food safety)”.373 With respect to ‘dangers’ occurring in Risk societies, 
public concern is focusing on ways and means to assess and quantify risks. At 
least in democratic Risk societies, citizens are able to make their voices heard in 
case a danger has been established. But the assessment of risks deriving from the 
application of modern technologies typically requires similarly sophisticated 
equipment as for its fabrication; hence citizens are calling for unbiased risk 
assessment.  
 
In terms of a summary, one can observe at least two meanings of the term ‘risk’: 
on the one hand, there is the individualistic notion of risk, particularly in vogue 
in 17th century Europe. The individualistic notion of risk is essentially a tool for 
expanding the room for manoeuvre for individual entrepreneurs, willing to take 
risks for anticipated chances. It was that very first meaning of risk which 
became, in the European context, one of the guiding principles of classical 
liberalism. Pat O’Malley observed:  
 
“In 19th century liberalism, entrepreneurs were those who had 
amassed sufficient capital to bear the loss of failure without 
becoming a burden on others – without subjecting their families to 
hardship, or the state of maintenance. (…) Notwithstanding more 
pressing concerns with poverty and pauperism, the state did much to 
foster this practice of freedom. Innovations such as limited liability 
encouraged risk-taking by protecting the financial security of 
capitalist adventurers. Stock exchanges were allowed considerable 
powers of self-government. … [t]he argument that capitalist risk-
taking provided fundamental benefits to society was a trump card 
that could usually be played to forestall intervention. Entrepreneurs 
were thus a privileged and exceptional class, given special licence 
and protection in order to engage in the creative uncertainty that 
effectively was inaccessible to most.” 374 
 
With industrialisation, however, individual ventures of entrepreneurs became 
socially relevant; large-scale plants, for example for the chemical and synthetic 
industry, and mass production raised question with regard to labour conditions, 
human health and the environment. In other words, the individualistic notion of 
risk was overlaid by a societal notion of risk, expressing feelings of exposure 
and subjection to extrinsic forces – or Luhmann’s ‘dangers’. The shift from an 
individualistic notion of risk to a societal notion of risk was reflected by a 
transformation of the hegemonic political doctrine of the time, i.e. liberalism. 
                                                 
373 Ely, Adrian, Stierling, Andy, Dreyer Marion, Renn Ortwin, Vos Ellen, and Wendler, 
Frank, ‘The Need for Change’, in Marion Dreyer and Ortwin Renn (eds.) Food Safety 
Governance. Integrating Science, Precaution and Public Involvement (Springer, 2009), p, 15.  
374 Pat O’Malley, Risk, Uncertainty and Government. 1st edition 2004 (Routledge-Cavendish, 
2006), pp. 33-34 (footnotes omitted).  
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Whereas the individualistic notion of risk was a guiding principle of classical 
liberalism, a more ‘social’ notion of risk became a characterising feature of 
‘social liberalism’. Pat O’Malley explained that problems with sanitation and 
public hygiene in particular led to the insight “that it was often easier to solve 
social problems by changing the laws and physical environment in which people 
lived and worked, than it was to change the people themselves”.375 On the basis 
of such findings, liberalism became more open to compulsory policies 
intervening into previously inviolable private spheres. Or, in the words of 
Patrick Atiyah: “Poverty itself was more easily controlled when many of its 
causes – sickness, unemployment, old age – were directly tackled by the 
state”.376 This ‘social’ form of liberalism combined the classical liberal doctrine 
with utilitarianism and positivism. O’Malley noted:  
 
“The justification for such intervention, scarcely challenged in the 
19th century, was that the compulsions of sanitation were for the 
good of all. This was a utilitarian ‘fact’ demonstrable through the 
objectivity of statistical demonstration and rendered intelligible 
through scientific knowledge. In turn, the scale and costs of the 
enterprises meant that, for the most part, only the state could 
undertake them. Hence, these were rightly a state project. By the 
middle of the 19th century, this imagery of the social body as an 
organic whole made visible through statistics, governable in terms of 
positivistic science, and for which the state took responsibility, was 
already appearing from within the (utilitarian) rationality of classical 
liberalism. The example also suggests that the discovery of the social 
was not simply a self-generating quirk of liberalism. Equally it 
reflected the ascendancy of science and a faith in scientific expertise, 
in which probability and risk were imbricated. The ‘invention’ of the 
social thus binds together liberalism and modernism in an uneasy 
melange in which issues of freedom and compulsion are never far 
from the surface.” 377 
 
For these reasons, it is important to bear in mind that actually two notions of risk 
exist and are used concurrently. The ambiguity of the term ‘risk’, characterising 
its contemporary use, is of particular relevance in public risk debates where the 
two understandings of risk may intermingle, depending on one’s personal 
standpoint. The one perceives a certain venture in light of eventual profits and 
losses, whereas the other experiences the same venture as an uninfluenceable 
                                                 
375 Pat O’Malley, ibid., p. 40, citing Patrick Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract 
(1979, Oxford: Clarendon), p. 628.  
376 Pat O’Malley, ibid., p. 40, citing Patrick Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract 
(1979, Oxford: Clarendon), p. 628.  
377 Pat O’Malley, Risk, Uncertainty and Government. 1st edition 2004 (Routledge-Cavendish, 
2006), p. 41 (original emphasis, footnotes omitted). 
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‘danger’ impending in the future without corresponding gains. Whereas an 
entrepreneurial understanding of risk is a guiding principle of classical 
liberalism and neo-liberalism, a more social interpretation of risk is a 
characterising feature of social liberalism. Whether the one or the other 
perspective is adopted, the understanding of the word ‘risk’ – as well as its 
implications – will change.  
 
The antagonistic perspectives of entrepreneurial risk-takers, on the one hand, 
and risk-averse citizens, on the other hand, can be well described by the model 
of the homo aleatorius, and the homo prudens, respectively.  Homo aleatorius, 
the risk-taker, John Adams noted, lives according to aphorisms such as ‘nothing 
ventured nothing gained’ and ‘no risk, no reward’.378 Homo prudens, in contrast, 
is the zero-risk man. According to Adams, ‘[h]e personifies prudence, rationality 
and responsibility’.379 To attribute rationality solely to prudence, however, is a 
contested approach. Economic theories and finance in particular are relating risk 
and risk management to rational behaviour. A merger of risk-taking and 
rationality can be recognised in Walras’ model of homo oeconomicus; homo 
oeconomicus always acts ‘rational’ and rational behaviour is considered 
tantamount to profit maximisation.380 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 TWO FUNCTIONS OF RISK  
 
In the previous chapter, the dual notion of risk, i.e., individualistic and societal, 
was established. It was shown that the different notions of risk are related to 
different philosophical approaches, in particular positivism and relativism. In the 
following, it will be shown how impacts caused by the two antagonistic notions 
of risk established above, i.e. entrepreneurial and social notions of risk 
respectively, can be observed on the ground.  
 
The example selected for demonstrating the two functions of risk are 
agricultural food production, one of the oldest fields of economic activity, 381 
and food consumption as a basic human necessity.  
                                                 
378 John Adams, Risk. First published in 1995 (Routledge, 2009), pp. 16-17. Adams cited 
William Blake as quoting: ‘Prudence is a rich, ugly old maid courted by Incapacity’ (John 
Adams, ibid., p. 17).  
379 John Adams, ibid., p. 16. 
380 The fictitious character of the homo oeconomicus was invented by economist Léon Walras 
(1834-1910) for applying mathematical formulae and models on economic sciences. 
381 Mazoyer and Roudart, for example, dated the beginnings of agricultural cultivation, 
marked by the “change from predation to agriculture”, to the Neolithic, that is, between 
10,000 and 5,000 years before the present. The evolution from predation to agriculture is 
known as the “Neolithic Agricultural Revolution” (see Marcel Mazoyer and Laurence 
Roudart, A History of World Agriculture. From the Neolithic Age to the Current Crisis. 
 120 
The function of risk in agriculture is analysed at both ends of production, i.e., at 
the supply side and at the demand side. Approached from two sides, from the 
perspective of agricultural entrepreneurs (producers) as well as from the 
standpoint of food consumers (society), risk shows its Janus face: risk estimates 
are turning out to be different depending on whether the perspective of 
agricultural producers or the one of food consumers is taken up. In other words, 
risk estimates are relative, contingent upon the viewpoint of the observer. From 
the perspective of farmers acting in economically rational ways, limits to risk-
taking in output rises are set by economic considerations only, e.g., profitability. 
From a consumers’ perspective, however, there is little reason for risk-taking in 
food safety issues, leaving aside eventual price incentives. From a consumers’ 
perspective, it seems rational to call for prudence and precaution. 
 
From an economic perspective, the reason for the antagonism between food 
producers and food consumers are the ‘credence’ characteristics of food. With 
respect to food, ‘credence’ means “that consumers are unable to determine food 
safety characteristics themselves, often even after consumption”.382 In this 
respect, Lee Ann Jackson and Marion Jansen observed:  
 
“In markets for credence goods, producers cannot be expected to 
give consumers all the information they require to evaluate the 
quality or the characteristics of a good, because producer and 
consumer interests do not coincide. In particular, when deciding on 
optimal product characteristics, producers will take into account 
production costs, the probability that low product safety has negative 
health effects and the cost health damage will generate for producers. 
Consumers, instead, are interested [in] the probability of health 
effects and the actual damage those health effects may cause to them. 
In the case of credence goods, where the origin of eventual health 
problems is hardy traceable the damage claims producers can be 
expected to face are likely to be significantly lower than the actual 
health damage incurred. As a consequence, credence good markets 
are markets where producers are tempted to take higher risks than 
consumers would consider desirable.”383 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Translated from the French original by James H. Membrez (Monthly Review Press, 2006, 
New York), in particular pp. 45-46 and 71-75).  
382 Lee Ann Jackson and Marion Jansen, ‘Risk assessment in the international food safety 
policy arena. Can the multilateral institutions encourage unbiased outcomes?’ (2010) 35 Food 
Policy [538-547] 539 (footnote omitted).  
383 Lee Ann Jackson and Marion Jansen, ‘Risk assessment in the international food safety 
policy arena. Can the multilateral institutions encourage unbiased outcomes?’ (2010) 35 Food 
Policy [538-547] 539. 
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From the perspective of sociology, the antagonism between food producers and 
consumers was conceived as the result of the juridification of food handling 
previously regulated by cultural values. Eva Barlösius explained transitions from 
culturally framed food traditions to food regulation based on abstract laws by 
reference to Max Weber’s sociology of law.384 As soon as food production and 
food processing became issues of conflicting economic interests, Barlösius 
explained, juridification started to replace traditional norms. Because traditional 
norms and culture seemed unable to arbitrate between the interests of 
commercial food producers, on the one hand, and safety-oriented food 
consumers, on the other hand, food had to be regulated by law. The legitimacy 
of food safety regulation could no longer be based on cultural values, but had to 
be based on a new and common denominator; that was, empirical rationality and 
rational procedures.385 With view on the scope of the study at hand, Barlösius’ 
observation that levels of abstraction and generalisation of food regulations are 
increasing proportionally to increases in market size is of particular relevance. 
Barlösius’ observation means that food safety regulation at regional or 
international levels, for example food safety regulation by the European Union 
or by the Codex Alimentarius Commission, may increase tensions between food 
traditions based on cultural values and food regulation based on empirical 
rationality.386 
 
A. Liberalisation 
 
In this paragraph, it will be shown that farmers’ response to risk is not 
fundamentally different than the risk response of entrepreneurs in other 
                                                 
384 Eva Barlösius, Soziologie des Essens. Eine sozial- und kulturwissenschaftliche Einführung 
in die Ernährungsforschung (Juventa Verlag, 1999), p. 206.  
385 Eva Barlösius, ibid. pp. 205-207.  
386 Eva Barlösius, ibid. pp. 205-207. Emphasising international implications of food 
regulation, a paragraph of Barlösius’ analysis shall be provided in full (in German):  
„Insbesondere politische, ökonomische und technische Neuorientierungen 
bewirken den Geltungsverlust von Küchentraditionen. Die Schaffung der EU 
und die Internationalisierung des Lebensmittelhandels sind Beispiele für 
politische und wirtschaftliche Neuorientierungen, auf die jeweils mit 
Herausbildung und Weiterentwicklung lebensmittelrechtlicher Regelungen 
reagiert wird, wie dem Europäischen Lebensmittelrecht und dem Codex 
Alimentarius, der unter Leitung der FAO und der WHO entwickelt wird und in 
dem internationale Verfahrensleitsätze zusammengefaβt sind. Die Anpassung 
lebensmittelrechtlicher Regelungen an das vergröβerte Geltungsgebiet führt 
zumeist zu einer höheren Abstraktion der Vorschriften, die sich immer weiter 
von der konkreten Rezeptur entfernen und statt dessen Verfahrensstandards 
normieren. Insofern drängt die Entwicklung des Lebensmittelrechts in die von 
Niklas Luhmann identifizierte Richtung einer zunehmenden Formalisierung, bei 
der die Legitimation immer häufiger durch Verfahren hergestellt wird“ (Eva 
Barlösius, ibid., p. 207).  
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economic sectors. Responses of farmers towards risks seem to be rather similar 
across cultures and continents. The behaviour of individual farmers at 
microeconomic levels is best conceived by applying rational economic theories 
rather than by relying on the hypothesis of cultural relativism. Remaining 
differences will be identified as differences with regard to concrete living 
conditions. In the following, the behaviour of farmers under conditions of risk 
will be analysed at three stages of agricultural development; these are 
subsistence farming, diversified farming, and finally commercial farming.  
 
1. Risk Prevention in Subsistence Farming 
 
In Economic Development, Michael Todaro and Stephen Smith provided an 
analytical framework for looking at farmers’ behaviour in situations of risk.387 
Thereby, Todaro and Smith focused in particular on farming conditions in 
developing countries (DCs) and least-developed countries (LDCs).  
 
To begin with, an important statement of Todaro and Smith shall be mentioned. 
Todaro and Smith noted that the resistance of peasant farmers in DCs and LDCs 
to innovation in agriculture is often attributed “as a sign of incompetence or 
irrationality”.388 However, Todaro and Smith rebutted that depreciation of 
peasant farming as “misguided convictions of some foreigners”.389 On the 
contrary, Todaro and Smith pointed at the economic rationale guiding peasant 
farmers:  
 
“… [G]iven the nature of the peasants’ environment, the 
uncertainties that surround them, the need to meet minimum survival 
levels of output, and the rigid social institutions into which they are 
locked, most peasants behave in an economically rational manner 
when confronted with alternative opportunities.” 390 
 
Along with persisting (neo-)colonial stereotypes, Todaro and Smith identified 
shortcomings of neoclassical economic approaches as responsible for problems 
                                                 
387 Michael P. Todaro, and Stephen C. Smith, Economic Development. 10th Edition (Addison-
Wesley, 2009), in particular the chapter on Subsistence Farming: Risk Aversion, Uncertainty, 
and Survival, pp. 454-460. 
388 Michael P. Todaro, and Stephen C. Smith, ibid. p. 454.  
389 Michael P. Todaro, and Stephen C. Smith, ibid. p. 454. In fact, such “misguided 
convictions of some foreigners” are updates of narratives from the colonial epoch. Todaro and 
Smith observed: “An understanding of the major role that risk and uncertainty play in the 
economics of subsistence agriculture would have prevented early and unfortunate 
characterizations of subsistence or traditional farmers as technologically backward, irrational 
producers with limited aspirations or just plain ‘lazy natives’ as in the colonial stereotype” 
(Michael P. Todaro, and Stephen C. Smith, ibid. p. 457).  
390 Michael P. Todaro, and Stephen C. Smith, ibid. p. 454.  
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in understanding subsistence farming. Todaro and Smith acknowledged that “the 
traditional two-factor neoclassical theory of production” provided “[s]ome 
insight into the economics of subsistence agriculture”.391 In particular, Todaro 
and Smith admitted that the neoclassical theory “provides an economic rationale 
for the observed low productivity of traditional agriculture in the form of the law 
of diminishing marginal productivity”.392 However, Todaro and Smith observed 
that the neoclassical theory “does not satisfactorily explain why small-scale 
farmers are often resistant to technological innovation in farming techniques or 
to the introduction of new seeds or different cash crops”.393 Todaro and Smith 
summarised the failure of the neoclassical theory to explain the behaviour of 
peasant farmers as follows:  
 
“According to the standard theory, a rational income or profit-
maximizing farm or firm will always choose a method of production 
that will increase output for a given cost (in this case, the available 
labor time) or lower costs for a given output level. But the theory is 
based on the crucial assumption that farmers possess ‘perfect 
knowledge’ of all technological input-output relationships as well as 
current information about prevailing factor and product prices. This 
is the point at which the theory loses a good deal of its validity when 
applied to the environment of subsistence agriculture. Furthermore, 
when access to information is highly imperfect, transaction costs of 
obtaining this information are usually high. Given price uncertainty, 
peasant farmers often face price bands (often wide ranges) rather 
than a single input price. Along with limited access to credit and 
insurance, such an environment is not conducive to the type of 
behavior posited by neoclassical theory and goes a long way toward 
explaining the actual risk-averse behavior of peasant farmers, 
including their caution in the use of purchased inputs such as 
fertilizer.” 394 
 
As an alternative to neoclassical theory, Todaro and Smith have developed an 
approach for the better understanding of small-scale farmers’ behaviour in 
situations of risk. Todaro and Smith established the parameters of their 
alternative approach towards subsistence farming as follows:  
 
                                                 
391 Michael P. Todaro, and Stephen C. Smith, ibid. p. 454. Todaro and Smith described the 
two-factor neoclassical theory of production as an approach “in which land (and perhaps 
capital) is fixed, labor is the only variable input, and profit is maximized” (Michael P. Todaro, 
and Stephen C. Smith, ibid. p. 454).  
392 Michael P. Todaro, and Stephen C. Smith, ibid. p. 454.  
393 Michael P. Todaro, and Stephen C. Smith, ibid. p. 454. 
394 Michael P. Todaro, and Stephen C. Smith, ibid. pp. 454-455 (emphasis and footnote 
omitted). As examples for purchased inputs, one may add genetically modified (GM) seeds.  
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“Subsistence agriculture is thus a highly risky and uncertain venture. 
It is made even more so by the fact that human lives are at stake. In 
regions where farms are extremely small and cultivation is dependent 
on the uncertainties of variable rainfall, average output will be low, 
and in poor years, the peasant and his family will be exposed to the 
very real danger of starvation. In such circumstances, the main 
motivating force in the peasant’s life may be the maximization not of 
income but of his family’s chances of survival. Accordingly, when 
risk and uncertainty are high, a small farmer may be very reluctant to 
shift from a traditional technology and crop pattern that over the 
years he has come to know and understand to a new one that 
promises higher yields but may entail greater risks of crop failure. 
When sheer survival is at stake, it is more important to avoid a bad 
year (total crop failure) than to maximize the output in better years. 
Risk-avoiding peasant farmers are likely to prefer a technology of 
food production that combines a low mean per-hectare yield with 
low variance (fluctuations around the average) to alternative 
technologies and crops that promise a higher mean yield but also 
present the risk of a greater variance.” 395 
 
Todaro and Smith provided two microeconomic derivations for their findings. 
Illustrated by a first figure, Todaro and Smith compared two farmers, farmer A 
and farmer B. Farmer A’s productivity is near the minimum consumption 
requirement (MCR). The MCR may be taken as the minimum necessary for the 
sheer physical survival of Farmer A and his family, yet some sort of starvation 
minimum. Any output below the MCR would have drastic consequences. The 
productivity of farmer B, on the other hand, is near the minimum desired 
consumption level (MDCL). The MDCL indicates the minimum level of 
consumption under given conditions, in that case the production patterns of 
farmer B. For obvious reasons, farmer A, labouring at the brink of starvation, 
will try to avoid risk by any means. Farmer B, on the other hand, is producing 
well above subsistence levels and is therefore more disposed to change and 
innovate. As a result, farmer B may increase productivity even further, whereas 
farmer A may remain “in a self-perpetuating poverty trap”.396  
 
The second figure provided by Todaro and Smith compared two situations, 
technique A and technique B, representing different probabilities for crop yields, 
but also different levels of variance (fluctuations around the average). The two 
graphs illustrating the comparison show that technique A leads to a lower mean 
crop yield than technique B. But on the other hand, technique A also comes 
along with lower levels of variance, in that case fluctuations around the mean 
                                                 
395 Michael P. Todaro, and Stephen C. Smith, ibid. p. 455 (original emphases). 
396 Michael P. Todaro, and Stephen C. Smith, ibid. pp. 455-456 and figure 9.5. 
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yield, than technique B. In such a situation, small-scale farmers with 
productivities barely higher than subsistence levels would most reasonably opt 
for technique A, thus paying for a lower level of variance with a lower mean 
yield. Todaro and Smith concluded: “Evidence is clear that farmers pay for 
‘self-insurance’ of this type with much lower returns”. 397 
 
As a major cause for disappointing results delivered by programmes aimed at 
increasing agricultural productivity especially among small-scale farmers in 
Africa, Todaro and Smith identified the “failure to provide adequate insurance 
(both financial credit and physical ‘buffer’ stocks) against the risk of crop 
shortfalls, whether these risks are real or imagined”.398 Based on the above 
findings, Todaro and Smith concluded that peasant farmers’ behaviour is based 
on rational economic principles:  
 
“We may conclude that peasant farmers do act rationally and are 
responsive to economic incentives and opportunities. Where 
innovation and change fails to occur, we should not assume that 
peasants are stupid, irrational, or conservative; instead, we should 
examine carefully the environment in which the small farmer 
operates to search for the particular institutional or commercial 
obstacles that may be blocking or frustrating constructive change. 
Efforts to minimize risk and remove commercial and institutional 
obstacles to small-farmer innovation are therefore essential 
requirements of agricultural and rural development.”399 
 
In sum, the extension of the neoclassical theory of production by Todaro and 
Smith provided the following insights: 400 
                                                 
397 Michael P. Todaro, and Stephen C. Smith, ibid. p. 456 and figure 9.6. 
398 Michael P. Todaro, and Stephen C. Smith, ibid .p. 457. The lack of physical buffer stocks 
was reflected by food riots in several developing and least-developed countries during the 
food crisis in 2008.  
399 Michael P. Todaro, and Stephen C. Smith, ibid. p. 457 (footnote omitted).  
400 The purpose of this paragraph is not to give a full account of Todaro’s and Smith’s 
considerations of rural transformation and agricultural development. Rather, the paragraph is 
meant to shed light on the question whether there are general principles and objective criteria 
governing agricultural activity. It was shown that the general principle underlying farmers’ 
choice is the same which is leading other entrepreneurs, viz. the economic rational of 
production increase. Nevertheless, a comment on the extension of the neoclassical theory by 
Todaro and Smith is required. The remark relates to an issue going without saying at the 
microeconomic level of individual farmers, namely the precondition of an existing and 
accessible market for farmers’ produce. Hurdles for accessing markets are already a problem 
at local and regional levels of many developing and least-developed countries. For example, 
problems of transport, such as poor roads, endemic roadblocks, and absent public transport 
combined with high fuel prices may impair farmer’s access to regional markets. Such factual 
hurdles are, of course, implicitly covered by the reference to institutional and commercial 
obstacles, as mentioned by Todaro and Smith. In an international context, however, problems 
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1. Peasant farmers “do act rationally and are responsive to economic 
incentives and opportunities”. Thus, in principle, economic theory 
applies to peasant farmers in the same way as to other farmers and to 
economic agents in general.  
2. However, the applicability of economic theory in an individual case 
is contingent upon “the environment in which the small farmer 
operates” and “the particular institutional or commercial obstacles 
that may be blocking or frustrating constructive change”.401 
3. Along with the removal of institutional and commercial obstacles, 
“efforts to minimize risk” have been identified as additional 
conditions for constructive change. Risk factors have been identified 
at three levels:  
(i) at the ‘soft’ or knowledge level as data gaps and imperfect 
market information;  
(ii) (ii) at the financial level as limited access to credit and 
insurance facilities; and  
                                                                                                                                                        
of market access are not only factual in nature, but may appear in the form of regulatory 
hurdles. Therefore, in the context of international trade, it has to be explicitly added that the 
responsiveness of agricultural producers to economic incentives is contingent upon a fourth 
criterion, i.e., market access.  
401 Typically, the call for “removing commercial and institutional obstacles” is associated 
with liberalisation policies. However, there are examples showing that the removal of 
commercial and institutional obstacles to small-farmers may well translate into a re-regulation 
of certain sectors. An example of a vulnerable sector further weakened by hastily 
implemented liberalisation policies is the milk industry in Uganda. Although acknowledging 
that the liberalisation of the milk sector had led to an initial boom, a study by Pamela Mbabazi 
showed that the liberalisation policies brought along a range of new problems to Uganda’s 
milk industry. Mbabazi observed that the milk industry in Ankole, an area in south-western 
Uganda, “has recently faced a lot of challenges including oversupply, low producer prices, 
lack of markets, quality problems and poor regulations” (Pamela Mbabazi, Supply Chain and 
Liberalisation of the Milk Industry in Uganda (Fountain Publishers, 2005), p. 108). With view 
on regulatory requirements, Mbabazi concluded:  
“In an increasing globalised world, governments in developing countries, in 
collaboration with non-state actors need to support fragile and infant enterprises 
like the dairy industry in Ankole to survive. This calls for among other things, 
effective government regulation of the industry and the implementation of 
conducive policies that will promote and rejuvenate the sector. A major 
conclusion from the study therefore, is that liberalisation per se is not conducive 
for the fragile milk industry in Ankole. Although scholars such as Halit 
Yanikkaya (2003), have argued that open economies foster industrial 
development, the experience of the milk industry in Ankole seems to suggest the 
opposite. Unbridled competition coupled with the lack of regulation has hurt the 
milk industry. The lack of an effective regulatory mechanism in the era of 
liberalisation has increasingly led to limited profitability and hampered the 
growth of the industry” (Pamela Mbabazi, ibid., pp. 108-109, footnote omitted, 
emphasis added).  
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(iii) (iii) at the physical level as missing buffer stocks against 
crop failure. 
 
As soon as a peasant is able to increase production above the minimum 
consumption requirement (MCR) and to overcome the “self-perpetuation 
poverty trap” of producing near subsistence levels, he has the chance of 
approaching the stages of diversified and specialised farming, respectively.402  
 
2. Risk Mitigation in Diversified Farming 
 
In many cases, peasant farmers are doomed of labouring around the minimum 
consumption requirement (MCR) level. However, as soon as a peasant farmer 
manages to approach the higher minimum desirable consumption level (MDCL), 
he will likely enter the stage of mixed or diversified farming. Todaro and Smith 
characterised diversified farming as “a logical intermediate step in the transition 
from subsistence to specialized production”.403 Specifically, diversified farming 
is characterised by the supplementation of staple crop cultivation by new cash 
                                                 
402 Evolutionary stages of agricultural production are specified in different manners. From an 
economic perspective, Todaro and Smith identified “three broad stages in the evolution of 
agricultural production. The first is the pure, low-productivity, mostly subsistence-level 
peasant farm, still prevalent in Africa. The second stage is what might be called diversified or 
mixed family agriculture, where a small part of the production is grown for consumption and 
a signification part for sale to the commercial sector, as in much of Asia. The third stage 
represents the modern farm, exclusively engaged in high-productivity specialised agriculture 
geared to the commercial market, as in developed countries and often found in the highly 
urbanized developing countries” (Michael P. Todaro, and Stephen C. Smith, Economic 
Development. 10th Edition (Addison-Wesley, 2009), p. 453 (footnote omitted, emphases 
added). From a cultural-historical perspective, Marsha Echols identified four prototypes of 
agricultural production systems, namely (i) traditional farming, (ii) production agriculture, 
(iii) agricultural production applying novel technologies, in particular biotechnology, and (iv) 
hybrid systems combining elements of the other stages (Marsha A. Echols, Food Safety and 
the WTO. The Interplay of Culture, Science and Technology (Kluwer Law International, 
2001), pp. 29-40, emphases added). From the perspective of agricultural history, Mazoyer and 
Roudart, in contrast, put forward a concept of agricultural systems. Agricultural systems are, 
for instance, slash-and-burn agricultural systems in forest environments, hydraulic agrarian 
systems in the Nile valley, the mountain agrarian systems of the Inca Empire, agrarian 
systems based on fallowing or based on mechanised labour, etc. Furthermore, Mazoyer and 
Roudart identified epoch-making periods between one agricultural system and another as 
agricultural revolutions or agricultural crises, e.g. the Neolithic agricultural revolution, the 
agricultural Revolution of the Middle Ages, the crisis of agricultural systems based on 
fallowing, the first and the second agricultural revolution of modern times, and the 
contemporary agrarian crisis (see Marcel Mazoyer and Laurence Roudart, A History of World 
Agriculture. From the Neolithic Age to the Current Crisis (Monthly Review Press, 2006), in 
particular pp. 46-52 on the concept of agrarian systems (emphases added).  
403 Michael P. Todaro, and Stephen C. Smith, Economic Development. 10th Edition (Addison-
Wesley, 2009), p. 460.  
 128 
crops, such as fruits, vegetables, coffee, tea, pyrethrum, and animal 
husbandry.404 Looking from a perspective of contemporary agricultural 
development, Todaro and Smith identified two particular factors which are 
limiting agricultural output under conditions of subsistence farming, but may be 
addressed by means of investment and innovation.405 These limiting factors are 
labour and land, respectively. 406 
 
With regard to labour shortages, Todaro and Smith observed: “… [W]here labor 
is in short supply during peak planting seasons, as in many parts of Africa, 
simple laborsaving devices (such as small tractors, mechanical seeders, or 
animal-operated steel plows) can be introduced to free labor for other farm 
activities”.407 In cases of land shortages, on the other hand, Todaro and Smith 
noted:  
 
“… [T]he use of better seeds, fertilizers, and simple irrigation to 
increase the yields of staple crops like wheat, maize, and rice can 
free part of the land for cash crop cultivation while ensuring an 
adequate supply of the staple food. The farm operator can thus have 
a marketable surplus, which he can sell to raise his family’s 
consumption standards or invest in farm improvements. Diversified 
farming can also minimize the impact of staple crop failure and 
provide a security of income previously unavailable.” 408 
 
In the above phrases, basic elements for agricultural transformation are 
expressed. By addressing the problem of limited factors of productions, i.e., 
labour and land, by technical and financial means, overall productivity can be 
increased. The surplus obtained may then be reinvested, thus setting in motion a 
perpetual motion machine for profit generation. This beneficial circle is the 
exact opposite of the self-perpetuating poverty trap observed under conditions of 
subsistence farming. Besides the two characteristic features of the capability to 
overcome limiting production factors and the ability for reinvestments, there is a 
third distinct feature of diversified farming. As mentioned above by Todaro and 
Smith, diversified farming also provides a security against the risks of crop 
failure. Addressing the risk of crop failure through diversification is not an 
                                                 
404 Michael P. Todaro, and Stephen C. Smith, ibid. p. 460.  
405 As Todaro and Smith have explained earlier, the neoclassical two-factor theory of 
production is based on the assumption that land (and perhaps capital) is a fixed parameter, 
whereas “labour is the only variable input” (Michael P. Todaro, and Stephen C. Smith, ibid. p. 
454). 
406) In rural reality particularly in least-developed countries, both conditions are likely to 
apply simultaneously, worsened by the absence of any capital even for the smallest 
investment, thus lowering peasants’ living condition virtually to a “self-perpetuating poverty 
trap”.  
407 Michael P. Todaro, and Stephen C. Smith, ibid. p. 460.  
408 Michael P. Todaro, and Stephen C. Smith, ibid. p. 460 (emphases added).  
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invention of diversified farming. Peasant farmers are commonly mitigating risks 
of crop failure by applying methods of crop rotation. One may call this 
prototype of agricultural security “hedging by crop diversification”. Diversified 
farming, in contrast, enables diversification not only horizontally, across 
different (staple) crops, but also vertically, by using monetary gains from earlier 
sales of cash crops as superior forms of security. By combining traditional 
methods of hedging, i.e., rotation and diversification across staple crops for self-
consumption, with new methods of ‘financial hedging’, i.e., savings, 
communities of diversified family farms achieved high levels of self-sufficiency 
and food security.  
 
In diversified farming, all elements characterising modern risk concepts can be 
observed, yet in an embryonic stage:  
 
(i) technical innovation; 
(ii) entrepreneurial motivation for production increase, capital 
accumulation and reinvestment;  
(iii) financial instruments for hedging generated surpluses.  
 
However, diversified farming is not only the “logical intermediate step in the 
transition from subsistence to specialized production” in agricultural 
development at microeconomic levels, but also in the broader historical 
perspective. From a historical point of view, Mazoyer and Roudart showed that 
the three characteristic features distinguishing diversified farming from earlier 
stages of agricultural production appeared concomitantly at a particular period 
of time in the cold temperate regions of northwestern Europe.409 
 
Beginning with technical innovation, Mazoyer and Roudart noted that technical 
innovations in agricultural production, in particular the shift from the scratch 
plough or ard to the mouldboard plough, enabled significant production 
increases. In combination with the use of the scythe, the harrow and the roller, 
the introduction of the mouldboard plough gave rise to a new agricultural 
production system based on ploughing, draft animals and fallowing. Mazoyer 
and Roudart observed:  
 
“In the cold temperate regions, this new equipment made it possible 
to expand the previously limited practices of cultivation and animal 
rising by using hay, stabling livestock during the dead season, and 
using manure. The development of these practices gave rise to a new 
cultivated ecosystem, which from then on included hay meadows 
                                                 
409 Marcel Mazoyer and Laurence Roudart, A History of World Agriculture. From the 
Neolithic Age to the Current Crisis. (Monthly Review Press, 2006), chapter 7 on the 
agricultural revolution of the Middle Ages in northwestern Europe, pp. 259-311. 
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and extended arable lands. The latter were better manured, better 
plowed, and generally cultivated in a triennial rotation. Thus a new 
agrarian system appeared which, despite the high costs of the 
necessary equipment, spread widely throughout the cold, temperate 
regions, where it facilitated a considerable growth in production and 
agricultural activity. (…) The agricultural revolution of the Middle 
Ages carried the rural economy in the West to the threshold of 
modern times” 410 
 
However, as Mazoyer and Roudart noted, improvements in agricultural 
infrastructure, in particular in mouldboard ploughs, scythes, carts and harrows, 
required investment capital. Investment capital, on the other hand, can only be 
mobilised if there is a prospect of return of such investment. Where this double 
condition was met, agricultural production expanded significantly. Mazoyer and 
Roudart observed:  
 
“… [A] system based on cultivation using the [mouldboard] plow 
requires large investments in equipment, buildings, livestock, and 
labor. Such a system can develop only on condition of leading to 
gains in productivity, which allow a return to these investments and 
gains in production, which make it possible to feed larger numbers of 
livestock and people. (…) [T]his double condition … was fulfilled in 
the cold temperate regions of middle Europe (…)”.411 
                                                 
410 Marcel Mazoyer and Laurence Roudart, ibid. p. 260.  
411 Marcel Mazoyer and Laurence Roudart, ibid. p. 281. However, agricultural transformation 
in the Middle Ages happened gradually, thus confirming the microeconomic analysis of 
Todaro and Smith historically. That gradual rural transformation was depicted by Mazoyer 
and Roudart in the following way:  
„One or two scythes, a cart, a plow, a harrow, a roller, and relatively large farm 
buildings to shelter the hay, litter, and increased numbers of livestock are, 
essentially, the working capital of the new farmer of the thirteenth century, not 
counting the small tools, sickles, hoes, and spades that from then on have 
working parts made of iron. All of that represents, in the end, ten times the value 
of the equipment, buildings, and livestock of its much smaller homologue of the 
tenth century, which hardly possessed more than an ard, a packsaddle, small 
tools, often entirely made of wood, a simple house for the farmer and family, 
and far fewer animals. It is then quite improbable that a relatively unproductive 
farm practicing cultivation with an ard could all at once increase its working 
capital tenfold by acquiring the whole set of means for implementing the new 
system based on the plow. Even on the largest estates, this costly accumulation 
of equipment had to be gradual. Among the peasants in villages undergoing 
transformation, mutual aid operated for a long time between those who owed a 
plow and those who owed a cart or a harrow. Undoubtedly, it necessarily took 
several generations for the majority of farms in a region to be outfitted with a 
nearly complete set of equipment” (Marcel Mazoyer and Laurence Roudart, ibid. 
p. 270).  
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New technical equipments, in particular the mouldboard plough, enabled the 
valorisation of hitherto unprofitable areas. Mazoyer and Roudart noted:  
 
“In the northern half of Europe, the potential of the new system of 
cultivation was immense. In already populated regions, the transition 
from the ard [i.e. scratch plough] to the [mouldboard] plow made 
possible the doubling or tripling of production and population. 
Moreover, use of the plow could also develop in vast areas that had 
remained until then unexploited because they could not be cultivated 
under the old ard system. The new areas included forests and moors 
that existed either on permeable and leached soils that were not 
fertile for cultivation without manure or on soils that were too heavy 
to be cultivated without the plow”.412 
 
The clearing of land, usually starting near existing villages and areas already 
under cultivation, became a more and more systematized operation: “[I]t was a 
question of moving as quickly as possible to establish hay meadows, pastures, 
and arable lands that were cleared, stumped, and drained for long-term use, and 
making profitable use of the recently acquired new equipment associated with 
the animal-drawn plow”.413 
 
At this point, the second feature of the risk concept applied on agriculture, i.e., 
entrepreneurial motivation, comes into play. Entrepreneurial spirit was 
awakened because the new lands which were formerly inaccessible by the old 
scratch ard technique and which now became exploitable by new methods of 
mouldboard ploughing, were, in fact, not unclaimed. Becoming aware of the 
prospects, various authorities were quick to claim lordship over these new 
territories. Mazoyer and Roudart commented on these particular sorts of rural 
entrepreneurs as follows:  
 
“Naturally, this clearing of nearby lands hardly passed unnoticed by 
the local nobility. They quickly recognized the additional revenues 
that they could draw from the cleared lands and encouraged such 
clearing by imposing relatively small taxes on those performing the 
work. Thus, little by little, the unexploited lands around each village 
disappeared. (…) [W]hen these new lands were clearly isolated, the 
new villages were established on a sort of pioneer front that 
gradually advanced onto new colonized lands. In this way, lords, 
abbots, and other entrepreneurs of clearing were learning methods 
                                                 
412 Marcel Mazoyer and Laurence Roudart, ibid. pp. 286-287. 
413 Marcel Mazoyer and Laurence Roudart, ibid. p. 287 (emphasis added).  
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that they then made the most of in launching larger and more distant 
colonization enterprises”.414 
 
However, when it came to the colonization of distant virgin lands, the local 
nobility’s financial capacity was often not sufficient. Hence, they had to join 
forces with peers, or, interestingly, with bourgeois of the cities. Mazoyer and 
Roudart described the joint efforts of landed gentry and urban bourgeoisie for 
colonising distant territories as follows:  
 
“In order to undertake such enterprises [i.e. the colonisation of 
distant virgin lands] successfully, these lords, as powerful as they 
were, had to seek out partners among those who were able to 
contribute to the financing and implementation of the necessary 
work. Thus there developed contracts of feudal property between 
two lords, or between a lord and a religious establishment.415 (…) All 
these [colonising] efforts were organized and directed by 
entrepreneurs, who, for the most part, were bourgeois of the cities, 
or even the youngest sons of noble families, wealthy farmers, or 
servants who were confided this task by their masters. In exchange 
for their services and possible advances in money, these 
entrepreneurs received part of the profits from the operation, either 
in the form of lands to exploit on their own account or in the form of 
a fraction of the taxes due from the newly settled peasants”.416 
 
Along with the titleholders, i.e., the gentry, and the bourgeoisie chipping in 
financial means and entrepreneurial know-how, a third group was obviously 
needed, namely those doing the effective clearing on the ground. Mazoyer and 
Roudart provided two examples for illustrating how the labour force required for 
colonising new lands was recruited. The first example related to the German 
conquest of northeastern and Baltic territories, the second to the construction of 
polders in Flanders.  
 
With regard to the first example, the German conquest of northeastern and 
Baltic territories, Mazoyer and Roudart provided the following account:  
 
                                                 
414 Marcel Mazoyer and Laurence Roudart, ibid. pp. 287-288 (emphasis added). 
415 As an example of a religious establishment particularly active in rural valorisation, 
Mazoyer and Roudart singled out the Order of Cistercians. In context of improvements in iron 
and steel processing accompanying the agricultural revolution of the Middle Ages, Mazoyer 
and Roudart observed that “[t]he network of Cistercian monasteries, a vast empire of 
agricultural enterprises and iron factories spread across Europe, played an important role in 
the diffusion of these new processes [i.e. iron and steel processing]” (Marcel Mazoyer and 
Laurence Roudart, ibid. p. 295. 
416 Marcel Mazoyer and Laurence Roudart, ibid. p. 288 (emphases added). 
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“The great plains of northeastern Europe, for example, still largely 
covered with a mixed forest of broadleaf and conifer trees, were 
occupied by relatively spares Slavic or Baltic populations who still 
practiced slash-and-burn agriculture. The colonization of these 
regions took place after their military conquest and the conqueror’s 
consolidation of power. These preliminary tasks were entrusted by 
German princes to orders that were both military and religious, such 
as the order of the Teutonic Knights (Chevaliers Teutoniques) who 
conquered Eastern Prussia and the Baltic countries or the order of the 
Knights of the Sword (Chevaliers Porte-Glaive), who besieged 
Courland. These expeditions, presented as crusades aimed at 
evangelizing the pagan populations of the East, frequently ended up 
by subjugating them or even exterminating and replacing them with 
German colonists. The latter were attracted by the favorable 
conditions of settlement promised by the entrepreneurs. In the end, 
the exploitation of these regions with the powerful means provided 
by the equipment associated with the new agrarian system based on 
the [mouldboard] plow led to the formation of a new and vast cereal-
growing basin, well served by a network of rivers flowing into the 
Baltic. Over the centuries, the grain production of this basin was 
collected by the large merchants of the Hanseatic cities and exported 
to Scandinavia, England, the Netherlands, etc.” 417 
 
In the case of German colonisation of northeastern Europe and the Baltic, the 
third group, along with the gentry and bourgeois financiers and entrepreneurs, 
were German colonists. But who were these colonists? Mazoyer and Roudart 
portrayed these new settler-colonists in the following way:  
 
“… [T]hese territories also attracted masses of peasants who were 
fleeing serfdom, abuses of power, lack of land and poverty, all of 
which were rife in overpopulated regions dominated by the older ard 
[i.e. scratch plough] system of cultivation. During the whole period 
of the clearings, the powerful had to meet the needs of these peasants 
and assist them by providing seeds, equipment, and livestock. They 
also had to allow them a share in the profits of the operation by 
granting them perpetual title to a rather large tenure through payment 
of a moderate fixed tax called ‘quitrent’ (le cens). Otherwise, free to 
come and go, these peasants were going to offer their services on 
other clearing sites where the conditions offered were more 
favorable.” 418 
 
                                                 
417 Marcel Mazoyer and Laurence Roudart, ibid. pp. 289-290 (original italics).  
418 Marcel Mazoyer and Laurence Roudart, ibid. p. 290 (original italics).  
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The example of the valorisation of coastal marshlands in Flanders shows how 
not only members of the gentry and wealthy bourgeois and entrepreneurs, but 
also members of the third group, i.e., peasants and commoners joined forces for 
colonising new lands. Mazoyer and Roudart described the reasons for the 
draining and the process of building associations as follows:  
 
“The lower valleys of the Rhine, the Yser, and the Aa were 
overpopulated and frequently submerged by marine encroachments. 
In the eleventh century, responding to pressures from the local 
populations and lords, the counts of Flanders, ultimately masters of 
this “low country”, undertook to dry it out. They had large dikes 
constructed and entrusted the exploitation of the contained lands to 
the monasteries. At first, the dried-out but still saline marshes were 
transformed into meadows for sheep, then into meadows for cows, 
with scattered sheep pens and cowsheds. In the twelfth century, 
when the lands were sufficiently desalinated, plowing began and 
cereals were planted. Villages of farmers were then established. In 
the thirteenth century, the maintenance of the installations and the 
management of water were taken over by local association of users, 
the draining syndicates (or wateringues), which operated under the 
control of agents of the counts of Flanders. In two centuries, the 
Netherlands became a prosperous agricultural country (…)”.419  
 
Therefore, it was not by coincidence that the Netherlands became forerunners of 
what Roudart and Mazoyer called the first agricultural revolution of modern 
times. Because of land scarcities, agricultural production was intensified by 
introducing new agrarian systems without using fallowing.420 
 
The entrepreneurial attitude which ‘modern’ farmers began to express in the 16th 
century in the Netherlands may be illustrated in comparison with a 
contemporary land consolidation project, the Dutch ‘Zuiderzee Reclamation 
Project’. The farmers settling on new lands created behind polders expressed 
particular motivation. Charles Takes observed:  
                                                 
419 Marcel Mazoyer and Laurence Roudart, ibid. p. 289 (footnote omitted, original italics).  
420 Marcel Mazoyer and Laurence Roudart, ibid., pp. 309 and 313-331, and Reay Tannahill, 
Kulturgeschichte des Essens. Von der letzten Eiszeit bis heute. Original title: Food in History, 
translated by Joachim A. Frank, published by Eyre Methuen Ltd., London (Paul Neff Verlag, 
1973), p. 331. From a development perspective, the Netherlands provide an interesting 
example for economic development spurred by the expansion and intensification of 
agricultural production. In fact, in the Dutch Golden Age, rationalism was not only applied in 
philosophy (Cartesianism), but also in trade (Dutch East India Company) and in agriculture, 
leading to the commodification of agricultural products through commodity exchanges. Till 
today, Flora Holland, the flower auction in Aalsmeer, next to Amsterdam-Schiphol, is the 
biggest flower market of the world (Andres Wysling, ‚Aalsmeer – Welthandelsplatz für 
Blumen’, in Neue Zürcher Zeitung, September 28, 2010, p. 31).  
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“As a result of the careful selection, the group of farmers in the new 
land is, more than anywhere else, composed of people who have a 
modern outlook on life. Being modern became a norm here. The 
people in the polders keep an eye open for all kinds of innovations 
and experiments; they are, in general, more dynamic than the 
average farmer in the old land.”421 
 
These examples show that the ‘entrepreneurial spirit’ did not only materialise in 
members of the gentry and the bourgeoisie, but also among the peasantry given 
that chances were within reach. On these grounds, Mazoyer and Roudart came 
to the following conclusion:  
 
“Thus, at the periphery of the ancient world in which diverse forms 
of servitude still existed, a new world began to be formed. This 
world included independent peasants, whether quitrent farmers, 
tenant farmers, or sharecroppers, as well as entrepreneurs and wage 
earners – a modern world, in fact.” 422 
 
A characterising feature of this “modern world” was the increase in commercial 
activity, in particular commodity trade. As a result of production growth, 
“[peasants sold ¨their increased surplus, the nobility sold a large part of the 
products from their reserves and from the taxes in kind which they continued to 
receive (…) and newly cultivated regions exported their surplus”.423 As a 
consequence, the business of merchants and traders became increasingly 
important, and markets and fairs emerged in formerly remote villages, linking 
them together in a growing commercial network.424 However, long-distance 
trade, be it by land or by sea, was always a risk. At this point, it shall be looked 
at the third criterion of a risk concept applied on agriculture, that is, financial 
                                                 
421 Charles A. P. Takes, ‘New Settlement and Land Consolidation in The Netherlands,’ in 
Raanan Weitz (ed.), Rural Development in a Changing World, (The MIT Press, 1971), p. 450. 
The focus on agricultural innovation extended to tulips which were imported from the 
Ottoman Empire. The enthusiasm about tulip cultivation finally resulted in the tulip bubble at 
the Amsterdam Stock exchange in the 1630s, thus providing an early example of relationships 
between agriculture and speculation. André Kostolany, for instance, noted that tulip bulbs at 
the Amsterdam Stock exchange were no longer flowers but became mere objects of 
speculation. And according to Kostolany, basic mechanisms of booms and busts at the stock 
exchange remained rather unchanged over time (André Kostolany, Die Kunst über Geld 
nachzudenken (Econ Ullstein List Verlag, 2000), pp. 146-149). Similarities can be seen, for 
instance, between the tulip bubble and the food crisis of 2008. In both cases, financial 
instruments originally developed for hedging farmers’ risks against price volatility, e.g. 
futures, became sources of new risks in the hand of speculators (see also footnotes no. 130 
and 340 above).  
422 Marcel Mazoyer and Laurence Roudart, A History of World Agriculture. From the 
Neolithic Age to the Current Crisis (Monthly Review Press, 2006), p. 290.  
423 Marcel Mazoyer and Laurence Roudart, ibid. p. 297. 
424 Marcel Mazoyer and Laurence Roudart, ibid. p. 297. 
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hedging. By looking at the agricultural landscape of the late Middle Ages from a 
risk perspective, one can observe three particular situations were risk 
considerations come into play in agricultural production: 
 
The first risk situation appears at the production stage, thus it is called 
producers’ or farmers’ risk. However, in contrast of subsistence farmers, the 
main concern is no longer variance, i.e. fluctuations around average yields. 
Farmers producing for markets are facing a risk which subsistence farmers do 
not, namely fluctuations around average prices, that is, volatility.  
 
In his work Against the God – The Remarkable Story of Risk (1998), Peter L. 
Bernstein worked out the important link between volatility and farmers’ 
indebtedness:  
 
“The particulars may have changed over time, but the farmer’s 
fundamental need for controlling risk has not. Farmers cannot 
tolerate volatility, because they are perennially in debt. Their huge 
investments in land and equipment and in inventories of seed and 
fertilizer make bank financing unavoidable. Before the farmer sees 
any money coming his way, he has to pay for his inputs, plant his 
crop, and then, constantly fearful of flood, drought, and blight, wait 
months until harvest time. His great uncertainty is what the price will 
be when he is finally in a position to deliver his crop to the market. If 
the price he receives is below his cost of production, he might be 
unable to pay his debts and might lose everything.” 425 
                                                 
425 Peter L. Bernstein, Against the Gods. The Remarkable Story of Risk (John Wiley & Sons, 
1998), pp. 305-306. The indebtedness of farmers provides an instructive example of the way 
(financial) risks and profits are allocated in commercial farming systems. In the 1980s, Fritjof 
Capra observed that the use of petrochemicals, combined with rising energy prices, were 
pushing farmers into the dept trap. After 1945, at the beginning of the Green Revolution, oil 
was relatively cheap, thus farmers became easily dependent on new petrochemical products 
such as fertilizers and pesticides. However, as oil prices started to rise, farmers suffered from 
escalating downstream product prices imposed by petrochemical companies. Therefore, 
despite rising productivity, debts of farmers increased. And at the end of the production chain, 
rising energy prices were reflected in increasing percentages of total food costs; in his 1982 
book The Turning Point, Capra assessed that percentage at 60%, meaning that the oil costs 
accounted for 60% of total food prices in those days (Fritjof Capra, Wendezeit. Bausteine für 
ein neues Weltbild. Original English title: The Turning Point (1982) (Ex Libris, 1984), p. 
284). The scheme for allocating risks and profits known from the Green Revolution seems to 
be replayed by the Biotech Revolution. For instance, it was reported that suicide rates are 
massively increasing among Indian farmers cultivating genetically modified cotton varieties. 
Major reasons for this worrying development have been identified as increasing indebtedness, 
decreasing earnings and rising dependency on costly irrigation systems, fertilisers and 
pesticides. Joseph Keve provided the following report on effects of genetically modified 
‘miracle seeds’ in India:  
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However, farmers operating within a market system are usually in the position 
to hedge themselves against commercial risks. The oldest hedging instrument 
developed in agriculture is the selling in advance of an expected harvest at an 
anticipated price. Bernstein described the requirement for contracts for future 
crop delivery as hedging instruments and their mode of operation as follows:  
 
“The farmer is helpless before the risk of weather and insects, but he 
can at least escape the uncertainty of what his selling price will be. 
He can do that by selling his crop when he plants it, promising future 
delivery to the buyer at a prearranged price. He may miss out on 
some profit if the price rise, but the futures contract will protect him 
from catastrophe if prices fall. He has passed along the risk of lower 
prices to someone else.” 426 
 
From frugal origins based on farmers’ needs, pre-selling has evolved in the 
course of time into elaborate financial instruments today known as futures, a 
                                                                                                                                                        
“During the three days from 9th to 11th of March 2010, 10 farmers committed 
suicide in Vidarbha region of Maharashtra, one of the richest states in India. 
Since 1998, Vidarbha witnessed over 40,000 farmer suicides. Indebtedness is the 
single most reason that drives these people to their deaths. Prices of seeds, 
chemical fertilizers and pesticides went up by 300 per cent during the last 10 
years. Laxman Wankhede of Ijani village in Yavatmal district committed suicide 
in October 2009. ‘For generations we had managed with traditional seeds, home-
made organic fertilizers and herbal pest-repellants. Agricultural scientists and 
agents of seed-fertilizer-pesticide companies advised us and we changed over to 
the miracle seeds, fertilizers and pesticides. When he couldn’t bear the 
harassment by those who had given him loans, my husband consumed the bottle 
of the pesticide that he had bought with the last loan’ (…)” (Joseph Keve, 
contribution to the Global Forum on Food Security and Nutrition, Proceedings 
of Discussion No. 53 on Livestock Keepers’ Rights – An Important Concept for 
Food Security? 8 March to 6 April 2010, p. 28; and Joseph Keve, ‘Selbstmord 
wegen Baumwolle’, in Die Wochenzeitung, January 21, 2010, p. 11). 
Thus, changes from conventional to genetically modified ‘miracle seeds’ are mainly 
motivated by promises for higher economic profits. With view on the example of Bt brinjal, 
an eggplant (Indian: brinjal) genetically modified with a gene from the bacillus thuringiensis 
(Bt), Rina Chandran observed: “Even though the genetically modified seeds for eggplant 
would be likely to cost three times as much as regular seeds and farmers would need to 
purchase seeds for every sowing rather than reusing crop seeds, proponents say the extra 
expenses would beo compensated by lower pesticide costs and less devastating crop losses” 
(Rina Chandran, ‘India balks at genetically modified crops’, International Herald Tribune, 
February 17, 2010, p. 18). On relationships between profit prospects, magic and deceit see 
also footnote no.511 below.  
426 Peter L. Bernstein, Against the Gods. The Remarkable Story of Risk (John Wiley & Sons, 
1998), p. 306 (emphasis added).  
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particular form of derivatives.427 Bernstein observed that “[s]ophisticated as they 
may appear in the fancy dress in which we see them today, their role in the 
management of risk probably originated centuries ago down on the farm”.428 
Continuing his retrospect, Bernstein provided the following overview of the 
evolution of futures contracts:  
 
“In the twelfth century, sellers at medieval trade fairs signed 
contracts, called lettres de faire, promising future delivery of the 
items they sold. In the 1600s, Japanese feudal lords sold their rice for 
future delivery in a market called cho-ai-mai under contracts that 
protected them from bad weather or warfare. For many years, in 
markets such as metals, foreign exchange, agricultural products, and, 
more recently, stocks and bonds, the use of contracts for future 
delivery has been a common means of protection against the risk of 
volatile prices. Futures contracts for commodities like wheat, pork 
bellies, and copper have been trading on the Chicago Board of Trade 
since 1865.” 429 
 
                                                 
427 Derivatives appear in two forms: as futures they take the form of contracts promising 
future delivery at prearranged prices, and as options, providing the opportunity of selling to or 
buying from the counterpart at prearranged prices (see Peter L. Bernstein, ibid. p. 305.  
428 Peter L. Bernstein, ibid. p. 305.  
429 Peter L. Bernstein, ibid., pp. 306-307 (original emphasis). Bernstein introduced the history 
of contracts for future delivery in a chapter on derivatives (‘The Fantastic System of Side 
Bets’, pp. 304-328) rather at the end, and not at the beginning of his book where the origins of 
risk were discussed. Bernstein seemed of having followed the popular combination of the 
modernist thesis with the nautical novel, the latter renewed by a trade component. As an 
exemplification, the following excerpt of Bernstein’s account of the beginnings of risk shall 
be displayed:  
“The concept of thrift and abstinence that characterized the Protestant ethic 
evidenced the growing importance of the future relative to the present. With this 
opening up of choices and decisions, people gradually recognized that the future 
offered opportunities as well as danger, that it was open-ended and full of 
promise. The 1500 and 1600s were a time of geographical exploration, 
confrontation with new lands and new societies, and experimentation in art, 
poetic forms, science, architecture, and mathematics. The new sense of 
opportunity led to a dramatic acceleration in the growth of trade and commerce, 
which served as a powerful stimulus to change and exploration. Columbus was 
not conducting a Caribbean cruise: he was seeking a new trade route to the 
Indies. The prospect of getting rich is highly motivating, and few people get rich 
without taking a gamble” (Peter L. Bernstein, ibid. p. 21).  
The difficulty of integrating century-old traditions of financial hedging developed in 
agriculture into a consistent history of risk confirms the inappropriateness of popular 
narratives about the origins of risk, in particular the modernist thesis and the nautical novel; as 
noted by Pradier (see Pierre-Charles Pradier, La notion de risqué en économie, (Éditions La 
Découverte, 2006), in particular pp. 11-12, where Pradier called the nautical novel an 
amusing story, at best, and noted that the modernist thesis was disproved completely).  
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Thus, one may note that producers’ or farmers’ risks were hedged by means of 
lettres de faire, i.e., sorts of futures contracts designed for advanced sales of 
expected harvest at anticipated prices, already in the twelfth century.  
 
A second risk situation appears at the trading stage, thus it is called traders’ or 
merchants’ risk. In this respect, Mazoyer and Roudart observed:  
 
“The merchant trade was very lucrative, but also very risky. Convoys 
of merchandise were at the mercy of bandits along the main roads 
and pirates at sea, of accidents and bad weather, all of which caused 
numerous losses. To guard against these occurrences, merchants 
traveled in caravans and financed commercial expeditions with 
several people in order to share the risks.” 430 
 
Thus, along with physical equipment, merchants addressed trade risks by cost-
sharing arrangements. Additionally, merchants also “invested a part of their 
capital in less risky businesses: industrial workshops, mines, mills, property 
investment, loans against security, but also (…) in large land-clearing 
enterprises and agricultural and animal breeding estates”.431 Because alternative 
investments in “less risky businesses” are tantamount to classical risk 
management techniques called diversification, one may consider that traders’ or 
merchants’ risks were hedged, inter alia, by means of investment 
diversification. However, a more innovative instrument for hedging goods in 
transit emerged in the thirteenth century, namely the trade bill. As Jacques Le 
Goff noted, trade bills enabled merchants not only to reduce the risk of 
transport, but also to mitigate exchange problems and to profit from different 
exchange rates, eventually.432 
 
A third risk situation appears at the stage of wholesale, manufacturing and 
processing, short entrepreneurial risks. A major risk of entrepreneurs consists in 
the risk of loosing the means of production, i.e., their investment goods such as 
mills, bakehouses, manufactories, winepresses, etc. These entrepreneurial risks 
are of particular interest because the way they were addressed was, in fact, 
groundbreaking. The new agricultural entrepreneurs, regardless whether 
aristocratic, cleric, or bourgeois, directed respective investments to the most 
                                                 
430 Marcel Mazoyer and Laurence Roudart, A History of World Agriculture. From the 
Neolithic Age to the Current Crisis (Monthly Review Press, 2006), p. 299 (emphasis added).  
431 Marcel Mazoyer and Laurence Roudart, ibid. p. 299 (emphasis added).  
432 Jacques Le Goff, Marchands et banquiers du Moyen Âge. 9th Edition (Presses 
Universitaires de France, 2001), pp. 27-32. Le Goff noted that, along with commercial 
markets, parallel markets for trade bills emerged which induced heavy speculation already in 
the fourteenth and fifteenth century (Jacques Le Goff, ibid. p. 32).  
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profitable ventures.433 In a paragraph entitled The Birth of Capitalism, Mazoyer 
and Roudart traced the origins of stock companies back to the establishment and 
operating of mills. According to Mazoyer and Roudart, the new agricultural 
entrepreneurs, for the purpose of profit maximisation, called on wage labourers:  
 
“They [i.e. the agricultural entrepreneurs] employed wage laborers 
who did not generally contribute to the financing of means of 
production. This was so for the mills in the Toulouse region (…). 
These mills gave rise to the formation of the first known joint stock 
companies in the twelfth century. In the following century, these 
stocks yielded an interest on capital ranging from 19 to 25 percent 
per year, and there was no longer a single miller among the 
shareholders. These were already true capitalist enterprises in which 
the search for profit motivated the investment of capital and where 
the wage laborers did not share in the capital.” 434 
 
The historical arguments established by Mazoyer and Roudart indicate that 
beginnings of agricultural commercialisation are dating back to the Middle 
Ages.435 Such clusters of commercial agriculture coincided with hot spots of 
early forms of capitalism (proto-capitalism). Modern forms of agricultural 
production, trade and commerce required, in turn, new forms of risk 
management. As instruments for risk management were developed, specifically, 
early forms of futures contracts, commercial bills of exchange, and prequels of 
stock companies. 436 
                                                 
433 Marcel Mazoyer and Laurence Roudart, A History of World Agriculture. From the 
Neolithic Age to the Current Crisis (Monthly Review Press, 2006), p. 299.  
434 Marcel Mazoyer and Laurence Roudart, ibid. p. 299 (emphasis added).  
435 Whether Mazoyer’s and Roudart’s finding that (Proto-)capitalism emerged from 
agricultural origins in the Middle Ages might have implications on the history of risk must 
remain an open question at this point.  
436 In today’s perspective, the focus is not on specific situations of actors at different positions 
in the chain of agricultural production, but rather on different perspectives of various actors 
on the market as a whole. Rolf Kappel, Reinhard Pfeiffer and Jutta Werner distinguished 
between tree main actors on the food commodity market:  
“The first group of actors are hedgers or commercials. Commercials trade 
commodities physically on cash markets, either as producers, processors, or 
merchants. They usually offset their positions in cash markets with opposite 
positions in future markets, the standard procedure of hedging against prices 
risks. The second group are speculators or non-commercials, which generally 
trade in short term, based on views about price developments. Their motivation 
is not to hedge against price risks, but to make a profit from expected price 
movements on which they bet. It is important to understand that the speculators 
are necessary counterparts for hedgers, whose positions usually don’t cancel 
each other out. The third group are investors who regard commodities as assets, 
like equities, bonds, estates, etc. They usually take long positions through 
commodity index certificates or swaps, which are provided by banks and other 
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Bringing the microeconomic observations of Todaro and Smith together with the 
historical findings of Mazoyer and Roudart, one may perceive diversified 
farming as an intermediate step between subsistence and commercial farming in 
two respects; from a historical perspective and with regard to contemporary 
agricultural development. On the one hand, diversified farming can be 
associated with technical innovation, entrepreneurial motivation and 
sophisticated risk management instruments. On the other hand, the fact remains 
that in the stage of diversified farming, a solid stock of staple crops is still 
necessary for satisfying basic food requirements of farming families. In other 
words, in the stage of diversified farming, certain quotas of land and labour are 
still absorbed by cultivating staple crops for direct consumption by the 
producers themselves. These persisting quotas of land and labour, ensuring high 
degrees of self-sufficiency among farming communities, are capitalised and 
mobilised in the third stage of agricultural development, that is, commercial or 
highly-specialised agriculture.  
 
3. Risk Management in Commercial Farming 
 
From an economic perspective, commercial farming is characterised by the 
application of purely economic criteria, such as profit maximisation and cost 
minimisation. Production is increased through the application of petrochemical 
inputs, such as fertilisers, pesticides and fungicides, hybrid or genetically 
modified sees, and the application of hormones for growth promotion purposes. 
Todaro and Smith summarised the characteristics of commercial farming as 
follows:  
 
“In specialised farming, the provision of food for the family with 
some marketable surplus is no longer the basic goal [as was the case 
in diversified farming]. Instead, pure commercial profit becomes the 
criterion of success, and maximum per-hectare yields derived from 
synthetic (irrigation, fertilizer, pesticides, hybrid seeds, etc.) and 
natural resources become the object of farm activity. Production, in 
                                                                                                                                                        
financial institutions. Contrary to short-term-oriented speculators investors hold 
positions in the longer run, but of course they are also speculators (and 
counterparts of hedgers) as they bet on future price developments. This is the 
class of actors whose involvement in commodity markets has grown 
dramatically over the last years and who are suspected by some observers as the 
main drivers of the price boom” (Rolf Kappel, Reinhard Pfeiffer and Jutta 
Werner, ‘What became of the Food Price Crisis in 2008?’ (2010) 65 
Aussenwirtschaft, 1 (Verlag Rüegger, 2010), p. 30. But whether or not 
speculation is to blame for world famine is, in turn, another matter (see, for 
instance, Benjamin Triebe, ‘Das Märchen vom bösen Weizen-Zocker – Der 
spekulative Handel mit Agrar-Futures ist nicht verantwortlich für den 
Welthunger’, in Neue Zürcher Zeitung, October 16, 2010, p. 33).  
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short, is entirely for the market. Economic concepts such as fixed 
and variable costs, saving, investment and rates of return, optimal 
factor combinations, maximum production possibilities, market 
prices, and price supports take on quantitative and qualitative 
significance. The emphasis in resource utilization is no longer on 
land, water, and labor as in subsistence and often mixed farming. 
Instead, capital formation, technological progress, and scientific 
research and development play major roles in stimulating higher 
levels of output and productivity.” 437 
 
The most characteristic feature of commercial agriculture is, however, 
specialisation on a single crop or livestock which is selected according to 
profitability considerations. The focus on one major crop or animal species is a 
prerequisite for most efficient applications of machinery and the utilisation of 
economies of scale. With respect to specialisation, Todaro and Smith observed:  
 
“The common features of all specialized farms, therefore, are their 
emphasis on the cultivation of one particular crop, their use of 
capital-intensive and in many cases laborsaving techniques of 
production, and their reliance on economies of scale to reduce unit 
costs and maximize profits. In some ways, specialised farming is no 
different in concept or operation from large industrial enterprises. In 
fact, some of the largest specialized farming operations in both the 
developed and especially the less developed nations are owned and 
managed by large agribusiness multinational corporate enterprises.“ 
438 
 
In commercial agriculture, not only agricultural production, but also associated 
risks are considered in purely economic terms. Under conditions of commercial 
farming, risk has lost to be an existential threat to the farming family but became 
a mere question of economic success or failure. Therefore, commercial farming, 
in similar ways as other commercial enterprises, can be characterised as willing 
to take risks, in principle. Expressions of the risk-seeking attitude of commercial 
farming can be seen in the willingness to introduce new technologies in 
agricultural production. In this regard, most prominent was the introduction of 
synthetic fertilizers and pesticides in the second half or the 20th century (1st 
Green Revolution) and the contemporary proliferation of genetically modified 
seeds (2nd Green Revolution).  
 
                                                 
437 Michael P. Todaro, and Stephen C. Smith, Economic Development. 10th Edition (Addison-
Wesley, 2009), p. 461.  
438 Michael P. Todaro, and Stephen C. Smith, ibid., pp. 461-462. 
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A common feature of risks associated with commercial farming is that risks 
related to production increase, such as pesticides, hormones, and genetically 
modified organisms (GMOs), are taken consciously by agricultural producers. 
Hence, in contrast to the occurrence of risk factors in the form of undesired 
weeds and animal diseases, for instance, pesticides, hormones and genetically 
modified (GM) seeds are used purposefully. The purposeful introduction of risks 
under conditions of, at least, partial knowledge is an issue which Ulrich Beck 
referred to as manufactured uncertainty. In World Risk Society (2005), Beck 
noted with regard to the concept of manufactured uncertainty:  
 
“So the contemporary concept of risk associated with risk society 
and manufactured uncertainty refers to a peculiar synthesis of 
knowledge and unawareness. To be precise, two meanings, namely 
risk assessment based on empirical knowledge (automobile 
accidents, for instance), on the one hand, and making decisions and 
acting on risk in indefinite uncertainty, that is, indeterminacy, on the 
other, are being conflated here. In this sense, the concept of 
‘manufactured uncertainty’ has a double reference. First, more and 
better knowledge, which most people assess in unreservedly positive 
terms, is becoming the source of new risks. (…) Second, however, 
the opposite is also true: risks come from and consist of unawareness 
(non-knowledge).” 439 
 
Turning to genetically modified organism (GMOs) specifically, Beck considered 
GMOs as examples of manufactured uncertainties. Beck observed:  
 
“[The controversy about genetically modified food] is first of all 
actually a good example of what Anthony Giddens and I are calling 
manufactured uncertainties: nobody, neither the experts nor the 
layperson, knows what the consequences will be. The victory of 
science once again imposes on us the burden of making crucial 
decisions which may affect our very survival without any proper 
foundations in knowledge. Thus this is a matter not of risk but of 
uncertainty. There is a pragmatic indication of this. If you ask ‘Are 
                                                 
439 Ulrich Beck, World Risk Society (Polity Press, 1999/2005), p. 140 (original emphasis). 
Elsewhere, Beck defined manufactured uncertainty as “a mélange of risk, more knowledge, 
more unawareness and reflexivity, and therefore a new type of risk” (Ulrich Beck, ibid. p. 
112, original emphasis). It has to be noted that the term manufactured uncertainty, as used by 
Beck, shall not be confused with the term manufacturing uncertainty. The term manufacturing 
uncertainty was used by David Michaels for characterising disinformation campaigns, in 
particular disinformation by the tobacco industry (see David Michaels, ‘Manufactured 
Uncertainty. Contested Science and the Protection of the Public’s Health and Environment,’ 
in Robert N. Proctor and Londa Schiebinger (eds.), Agnotology. The Making and Unmaking 
of Ignorance (Stanford University Press, 2008), p. 91.  
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genetically modified food industries privately (adequately) insured?’ 
the answer is ‘No’. Thus the industries and their experts say ‘no 
risk’, but the private insurance businesses say ‘too risky, no (cheap) 
insurance’.”440 
 
The view of Beck is underscored by Colin Tudge. In his book So Shall we Reap 
(2004), Tudge noted:  
 
“Most alarming of all, though, is that much of the danger of modern 
food is caused by modern practice. It clearly results directly from the 
modern, obsessive attempt to cut the cost of production; and above 
all (since labour is generally the most expensive input) to replace 
traditional husbandry, and the people who practise that husbandry, 
with machinery and industrial chemistry. Yet the cutting of costs is 
not intended to produce cheap food, as is often sanctimoniously 
claimed, but to maximize the margin between the cost of production 
and the sale price. The same industry that goes to such length to cut 
costs, dedicates the rest of its energy to ‘adding value’. In short, the 
greatest hazards of modern food are not those of nature, or of bad 
luck. They follow, as night follows day, from policy.” 441 
 
The economic rationale underlying agricultural production is evident in 
commercial agriculture. But it was shown that economic theory is, in principle 
and under the said conditions, applicable to farmers and to agricultural 
production as a whole. Obviously, though, this finding implies some degree of 
generalisation and objectivity because it is based on the assumption that the 
same economic rationale applies to farmers everywhere. What makes the 
difference, though, is the specific condition under which a particular farmer is 
producing. Hence, in applying economic theories to agricultural production, the 
specific environment in which the farmer operates has to be taken into account. 
In other words, the economic conditions under which a particular farmer 
                                                 
440 Ulrich Beck, World Risk Society, (Polity Press, 1999/2005), p. 105. 
441 Colin Tudge, So Shall we Reap. What’s Gone Wrong With the World’s Food – and How to 
Fix It (Penguin Books, 2004), p. 150 (original emphasis). Among other things, Tudge invoked 
hazards caused by continued mass-use of antibiotics (Colin Tudge, ibid. p. 151). However, the 
thesis that factory farming is a source of new hazards did not remain uncontested. At a brown-
bag lecture entitled Animal disease and the global community: the role of sustainable 
livestock production and other factors, held the World Trade Institute in Bern, Switzerland, 
September 7, 2009, Manon Schuppers, epidemiologist and consultant at Safe Food Solutions 
(SAFOSO), explained the two main arguments coming along with industrialised livestock 
production: On the one hand, increased livestock density was blamed for increasing risks 
related to epizootic diseases such as avian influenza and swine flu. On the other hand, 
backyard rearing of chicken and other livestock was also accused of being responsible for the 
spread and persistence of epizootics (Daniel Goldstein, ‘Züchtet der Mensch Krankheiten?’ in 
Der Bund, September 19, 2009, p. 40).  
 145 
operates and the political environment within which agricultural production 
takes place are relative. In contrast, the economic rationale of farmers, following 
economic theories of production increase, is a common, i.e. general feature 
among ‘rational’ economic actors throughout. Thus, in principle, Walras’ model 
of the homo oeconomicus is considered applicable to farming as well, leading to 
an agricola oeconomicus. 442  
 
Summing up, it was shown that at the microeconomic level, individual farmers 
do not behave different than other economic subjects facing risks. In other 
words, farmers’ response to risk is not fundamentally different than the risk 
response of entrepreneurs in other economic sectors. Furthermore, it can be 
shown that risk responses of farmers are similar across cultures and continents. 
Hence, the behaviour of individual farmers at microeconomic levels is well 
conceived by applying general economic theories, rather than by referring to 
cultural relativism.  
 
B. Regulation 
 
In the previous paragraph, it was shown that agricultural producers, i.e., farmers, 
are predominantly following an economic rationale. In contrast, the demand 
side, i.e., consumers, seems to be more complex. In fact, it is the demand side 
where a multitude of considerations, such as cultural and religious beliefs, 
ethical values and environmental considerations, have to be taken into account. 
In this paragraph, consumers’ attitude towards food safety risks and the resulting 
relativism in food safety regulation shall be outlined.  
 
As outlined in the previous paragraph, the main issue of farmers is production 
increase. Consumers’ main concern, on the other hand, is the reliability of the 
purchased food. From an economic point of view, there is no direct incentive for 
food producers to pursue another objective than profitability, for instance food 
safety. It is only the potential negative reaction of consumes which prompts food 
producers to take into account food safety requirements. In other words, the 
                                                 
442 I am aware that this statement is an oversimplification. The statement is used in a systemic 
way, considering agriculture as an economic system relying on specific production factors, 
i.e., land, labour and eventually capital. Thus, the ‘rational farmer’ (agricola oeconomicus) is 
an adaptation of the homo oeconomicus in other economic models and similarly abstract. In 
particular, I am aware that there are numerous farmers who are voluntarily foregoing 
production increases despite the opportunity to reap higher profits. Instead, their focus is on 
the (re-)development of a “holistic production management system which promotes and 
enhances agroecosystem health, including biodiversity, biological cycles, and soil biological 
activity”; this is part of the definition of organic agriculture, as provided by the Guidelines for 
the Production, Processing, Labelling and Marketing of Organically Produced Foods of the 
Codex Alimentarius Commission (GL 32-1999), adopted 1999 and published in Organically 
Produced Foods, 3rd edition (WHO/FAO, 2007), p. 2.  
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degree of food safety in a given society depends on the ability of consumers, 
sometimes together with retailers, to enforce the safety requirements deemed 
necessary. 
 
Different societies have developed different systems for enforcing food safety 
requirements. On small village markets where consumers and producers met 
face to face, food safety was mainly, and at certain places still is, an issue of 
empirical testing, i.e. physical examination by looking, smelling, and testing. At 
bigger markets, food control needs to be organised. Historically, the task of food 
safety control was assigned to towns’ guilds or other municipal authorities. In 
industrialised societies, food safety became an issue of scientific analysis and 
indirect control systems through standardisation requirements. These three 
phases of food- safety approaches shall be further examined in the following 
three paragraphs.  
 
1. Food Testing on Local Markets 
 
At basic stages of agricultural development, surplus production was, and in 
many places still is, the exception rather than the rule. Under conditions of basic 
agricultural production, the bulk of production, mainly consisting of staple 
crops, is used for the daily consumption needs of the farming family. Occasional 
surpluses, though, are sold at nearest market places, usually at the local village 
or at the closest town.443 Farmers selling their surplus produce on local markets 
themselves have to deal with respective customers personally. Some authors 
emphasise the important role personal contact between food producers and food 
consumers is playing with respect to food safety in particular. In his book So 
Shall We Reap (2004), Colin Tudge noted that it was “very difficult for 
traditional growers and processors to cheat people who lived in the same village, 
or the same street”.444 In her book “Not on the Label” (2004), Felicity Lawrence 
compared situations where personal producer-consumer contact takes place with 
situation without such contact. Her findings, although referring to the beginnings 
of the industrial revolution and to an urban context, are viable in general. 
Lawrence observed: “Whereas before, an unscrupulous butcher or baker might 
have been restrained by the knowledge that any shortcuts he chose could poison 
his neighbours and friends, now he could hide in the anonymity of distance and 
                                                 
443 Naturally, there is no clear distinction between occasionally occurring surpluses and 
regular ones. At basic stages of agricultural production, surplus occurrence is, first of all, 
contingent upon favourable weather conditions and the absence of adverse effects, e.g., plant 
pests and animal diseases.  
444 Colin Tudge, So Shall We Reap. What’s Gone Wrong With the World’s Food – and How to 
Fix It (Penguin Books, 2004), p. 154, referring to John Burnett, Plenty and Want (Penguin 
Books, Harmondsworth, 1966).  
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the city”.445 Additionally, one might add that within social networks, personal 
experience enables clients to detect food adulteration themselves and to come 
back to incriminated vendors at any given opportunity.  
 
In Food Safety and the WTO (2001), Marsha Echols gave the following account 
of food testing on local markets:  
 
“People determine whether a food is safe through personal 
experience with it or through the personal experience of others – a 
sort of experiential empiricism. There is little need for food safety 
regulation, because foods and food production are linked to daily 
life. People are familiar with the provenance of what they eat and 
know which local foods can be harmful and under which 
circumstances.” 446 
 
2. Corporate Food Control by Municipal Authorities 
 
The need for food control emerged when food production and food consumption 
became more and more separated, the former taking place in rural areas, 
whereas a growing urban population required organised food supply.447 
However, as soon as food supply became an organised business, food 
adulteration emerged as a problem, too. In ancient and medieval times, food 
adulteration was predominantly an issue of replacing costly ingredients with 
cheaper ones.448 Insofar, increasing risks to human health was the unintended 
side-effect of adulteration, not its primary intent. Accordingly, food regulation 
usually covered both aspects; i.e. safety aspects and health protection, as well as 
purity aspects, the prevention of fraud and consumer protection.  
                                                 
445 Felicity Lawrence, Not on the Label. What Really Goes into the Food on Your Plate 
(Penguin Books, 2004), pp. 201-202.  
446 Marsha A. Echols, Food Safety and the WTO. The Interplay of Culture, Science and 
Technology (Kluwer Law International, 2001), p. 30 (emphasis added, footnotes omitted). In 
a footnote, Echols relied experiential learning to the precautionary principle, noting that 
“[m]uch empirical evidence is developed over time, such as the experiences in some cultures 
that teach from experience which foods are safe. This experiential aspect of learning, which 
leads to eventual comfort, is akin to the reassurance derived through the precautionary 
principle” (Marsha A. Echols, ibid. p. 30, footnote no. 9.  
447 The relationship between urbanisation and food policies was analysed, among others, by 
Eva Barlösius in her work about the sociology of food. In particular, Barlösius highlighted the 
relationship between abandoning subsistence farming and market dependency (Eva Barlösius, 
Soziologie des Essens. Eine sozial- und kulturwissenschaftliche Einführung in die 
Ernährungsforschung (Juventa Verlag, 1999), p. 202.  
448 Using the adulteration of pepper with gravel and twigs in 15th century England, Felicity 
Lawrence noted that “[f]ood manufacturers have always cut corners and substituted cheap 
alternatives for expensive ingredients” (Felicity Lawrence, Not on the Label. What Really 
Goes into the Food on Your Plate (Penguin Books, 2004), p. 201).  
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As Echols noted, food regulation dates back to ancient times:  
 
“The structure for regulating foods during the traditional farming 
stage449 often focuses on consumer protection, economic adulteration 
and food purity. There is evidence of regulations and enforcement 
mechanisms dating to ancient times. The Assyrians established 
weights and measures for grains. As early as 200 BC India punished 
the economic adulteration of grains and oils. During the same era 
Chinese officials tried to prevent consumer fraud. Egypt had food 
labeling rules. The ancient Athenians issued purity standards for beer 
and wine, wile the Romans instituted a system to control frau and 
bad produce. Ancient religious and sectoral laws also were directed 
at food purity such as the pre-Christian era Egyptian, Hebrew and 
Islamic laws regarding the handling of meat.”450 
 
Reay Tannahill observed that already the Codex Hammurabi, a law code enacted 
by king Hammurabi of Babylon around 1750 BC, contained prescriptions 
regarding the quality of, inter alia, beer. 451 
 
In medieval towns particularly in Europe, guilds and crafts played important 
roles in food control. Some tales of food adulteration from medieval times are 
                                                 
449 As already noted, Marsha Echols, looking from a cultural-historical perspective, 
differentiated between four prototypes of agricultural production systems, namely (i) 
traditional farming, (ii) production agriculture, (iii) agricultural production applying novel 
technologies, in particular biotechnology, and (iv) hybrid systems combining elements of the 
other stages (Marsha A. Echols, Food Safety and the WTO. The Interplay of Culture, Science 
and Technology (Kluwer Law International, 2001), pp. 29-40). In the study at hand, the 
microeconomic approach developed by Todaro and Smith is followed, discerning between 
three broad stages of agricultural production, namely (i) subsistence or peasant farming, (ii) 
diversified or mixed farming, and (iii) specialised or commercial farming (see Michael P. 
Todaro, and Stephen C. Smith, Economic Development. 10th Edition (Addison-Wesley, 2009), 
p. 453). The Todaro/Smith approach is chosen because of its multi-dimensionality: first, at the 
microeconomic level, the Todaro/Smith approach helps to explain contemporary problems of 
agriculture from a development perspective. Second, in historical perspective, the 
Todaro/Smith approach enables to follow developments of agricultural production systems 
through historical time periods. Because of its economical background, the Todaro/Smith 
model reveals structural similarities across different cultures and time periods rather than to 
focus on such differences. Third, from a methodological point of view, the Todaro/Smith 
approach enables to relate the three stages of agricultural production, i.e. subsistence, 
diversified and commercial farming, with the three stages of food safety control, i.e. personal 
empiricism, municipal control, and science-based food standards.  
450 Marsha A. Echols, Food Safety and the WTO. The Interplay of Culture, Science and 
Technology (Kluwer Law International, 2001), p. 31 (footnotes omitted).  
451 Reay Tannahill, Kulturgeschichte des Essens. Von der letzten Eiszeit bis heute (Paul Neff 
Verlag, 1973), p. 66. Other sources provide different dates for the Codex Hammurabi, ranging 
1750-1790 BC.  
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rather pictorial, as well as certain stories of draconian sanctions issued by 
municipal or other authorities to contain such malpractice. Echols observed:  
 
“Countries in Europe protected the safety and quality of eggs, 
sausages, cheese, beer, wine and bread, often through guilds. For 
example, during the middle ages in England, the guild of the spice 
traders – the Pepperers – obtained a King’s Charter as the Grocers’ 
Company, which established a code to protect the quality and 
integrity of the foods under their authority and a body of inspectors 
to enforce it.” 452 
 
Other examples were meat inspectors in France called langueyeurs because they 
particularly inspected hog languets in search for ulcers.453 
 
Certain staple foods were of outstanding importance. The purity of bread, for 
instance, was of such concern that it became an issue of royal authorities. Echols 
told that the “Assize of Bread of King John in England in 1202 authorized 
punishments, including eventual pillorying and banishment, for a baker if ‘any 
default be found in [his]bread’.”454  
 
Interestingly, models of food regulation established in the motherland were 
sometimes used in colonial territories as well. In the case of bread market 
regulation in the United States of America, William Patrick observed:  
 
“In the colonies, local food laws were passed to regulate the weight 
of loaves of bread baked commercially. These laws, called ‘assizes 
of bread’, established a standard weight for loaves that was in 
relation to the current price of wheat and flour. Essentially, these 
laws fixed prices by regulating the profit of the middleman and 
baker, but leaving the price of grain open to fluctuate with the 
market. In 1646, the Massachusetts Bay Colony ordered every baker 
                                                 
452 Marsha A. Echols, Food Safety and the WTO. The Interplay of Culture, Science and 
Technology (Kluwer Law International, 2001), p. 31 (footnote omitted). The main concern of 
the Guild of Pepperers was the adulteration of pepper with gravel and twigs, especially, a 
malpractice they hoped to prevent with the King’s Charter acquired in 1429 (see Felicity 
Lawrence, Not on the Label. What Really Goes into the Food on Your Plate (Penguin Books, 
2004), p. 201. Other sources indicate that the Pepperers acquired the King’s Charter already 
in 1428). 
453 Reay Tannahill, Kulturgeschichte des Essens. Von der letzten Eiszeit bis heute (Paul Neff 
Verlag, 1973), p. 204.  
454 Marsha A. Echols, Food Safety and the WTO. The Interplay of Culture, Science and 
Technology (Kluwer Law International, 2001), p. 31 (footnote omitted). The Assizes were a 
system of local courts established by royal or parliamentary edict and assigned for regulating 
bread and ale markets in England (see Colin Tudge, So Shall We Reap. What’s Gone Wrong 
With the World’s Food – and How to Fix It (Penguin Books, 2004), p. 154).  
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to use a distinct mark for his bread and keep the assize of the loaves 
as had been established by law. Inspectors were chosen and given 
authority to enter bakeries and weigh bread to assure that the law 
was being obeyed. Bakers who were found to be cheating the public 
were required to surrender their goods to the inspector, who would 
keep a third of the bread for himself – as payment for his time – and 
give the rest to the poor.” 455 
 
Generally, it was upon local authorities, in conjunction with guilds and crafts, to 
assure the purity of foods and to protect the health and good faith of consumers 
in European towns during the Middle Ages. Echols observed:  
 
“In addition to the regulation by the guilds, local authorities also 
exercised authority over the safety of food sold by butchers, bakers 
and fish merchants, among others, during the Middle Ages. The 
responsibility of the local magistrate was to assure the population of 
a ‘bonne et loyale’ food supply in sufficient quantity. ‘From one end 
of Christian Europe to another, the basic principles were the same.’ 
Food and beverages sold must be ‘worthy of entering the human 
body,’ have a good aroma and flavor, be neither filthy nor smelly, 
and be without substitute ingredients or additives, which were often 
used to disguise product defects. The manipulation of food was 
denounced because, as stated by Berthold de Ratisbonne, the fraud of 
the shoemaker, the tailor, the blacksmith or the merchant ‘affects 
only property’, while that of the butcher who puffs up his old meat to 
make it look better or of the tavern keeper who adds flavor to his 
wines or beer that have gone bad ‘endangers life’, transforming them 
into murderers and making them lose their soul. The punishments 
included the destruction of the merchandise, fines and the denial of 
the right to exercise the profession.”456 
 
On the ground, however, food control in pre-modern times was not very 
different than that by consumers on village markets: using experiential 
empiricism, e.g. visual impression, observation of weight and volume, smelling 
and tasting, as well as the vast experience accumulated in respective guilds and 
crafts, were the main tools for ensuring food safety and the detection of 
adulteration in pre-scientific times.  
 
With view on later developments, it is noteworthy that in federal states, food 
safety regulation was not only assigned to local guilds and crafts and enforced 
                                                 
455 William Patrick, The Food and Drug Administration (Chelsea House Publishers, 1988), p. 
19.  
456 Marsha A. Echols, Food Safety and the WTO. The Interplay of Culture, Science and 
Technology (Kluwer Law International, 2001), p. 32 (footnotes omitted). 
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by local authorities, but was the constitutional prerogative of member states. 
With regard to the situation in the United States of America in the 19th century, 
Pollack and Shaffer noted that “[t]he regulation of food and environmental 
safety in the US were traditionally matters for state and local governments. They 
took primary responsibility, for example, for the inspection of slaughterhouses 
in the nineteenth century”.457 
 
In another federal state, Switzerland, food adulteration was of similar concern in 
the late 19th and early 20th century. Although many member states had already 
established food safety regulation within their respective jurisdiction, in 1897 
the Swiss amended their federal constitution, allowing federal authorities to 
introduce food safety regulation at the federal level. Reasons provided for this 
move were, inter alia, the following:458 
 
• differences in member states’ food safety regulation;  
• differences in the way member states’ regulation defined the fact of 
food adulteration, and the penalties prescribed therefore;  
• the lack of member states’ competence to enforce controls at the 
border.  
 
The latter point, the divergence between federal authorities responsible for 
border control, and member states’ authorities mandated with food safety 
regulation and enforcement, seemed of having been an argument of particular 
weight. In fact, Ernst Laur of the Swiss Farmers’ Union observed that a large 
proportion of adulterated merchandise was imported. But because the Swiss 
                                                 
457 Mark A. Pollack, and Gregory C. Shaffer, When Cooperation Fails. The International Law 
and Politics of Genetically Modified Foods (Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 43. However, 
local authorities were seemingly overstrained by the task of supervising large-scale food 
manufacturers. Factory-like slaughterhouses and meatpackers in the United States in 
particular gave cause for repeated food safety concerns. For example, General Nelson Miles 
termed the canned meat, provided by a syndicate in Chicago to the US Army for the Spanish-
American War of 1898, as “embalmed beef” (Ernst Laur, Die Bekämpfung der 
Lebensmittelfälschung in der Schweiz durch ein eidgenössisches Lebensmittelgesetz. 
Leitfaden für die Referenten und Vertrauensmänner des schweizerischen Bauernverbandes 
(Swiss Farmers’ Union, Brugg, 1906), p. 66, with reference to the newspaper ‘Bund’, issue 
68, 1899). The deplorably insanitary and unhygienic conditions in meat packing plants 
especially in Chicago were also highlighted by Upton Sinclair’s novel The Jungle, published 
in 1905. The publication of The Jungle expedited the enactment of the first federal Pure Food 
and Drugs Act of the United States which was passed by Congress in 1906 (William Patrick, 
The Food and Drug Administration (Chelsea House Publishers, 1988), pp. 26-27. 
458 The reasons were taken from a manual issued by the Swiss Farmers’ Union in 1906 to 
brief their representatives for the debates preceding the referendum on the federal food law, 
entitled (in German): Die Bekämpfung der Lebensmittelfälschung in der Schweiz durch ein 
eidgenössisches Lebensmittelgesetz. Leitfaden für die Referenten und Vertrauensmänner des 
schweizerischen Bauernverbandes, pp. 5-6. It was edited by Ernst Laur, secretary (and later 
director) of the Swiss Farmers’ Union.  
 152 
member states were not entitled to conduct control measures at national 
frontiers, adulterated goods could enter the Swiss market unchecked.459 
 
3. Food Safety Legislation at National Levels 
 
Most authors agree that food adulteration as a mass phenomenon coincided with 
the beginnings of the Industrial Revolution.460 For instance, Felicity Lawrence 
observed that “the first mass adulterations came with the Industrial Revolution, 
and as with labour conditions, the historic parallels are instructive”.461 Lawrence 
provided the following explanation for this coincidence:  
 
“Feeding cities with their newly urbanized populations required new 
supply systems. Whereas previously most people would have grown 
their own food or bought from their immediate neighbours, city 
dwellers were dependent on much longer chains462 and soon became 
                                                 
459 Ernst Laur, ibid. p. 6.  
460 See, for example, the chapter on food adulteration by Reay Tannahill, Kulturgeschichte 
des Essens. Von der letzten Eiszeit bis heute (Paul Neff Verlag, 1973), pp. 349-352. 
461 Felicity Lawrence, Not on the Label. What Really Goes into the Food on Your Plate 
(Penguin Books, 2004), p. 201.  
462 The problem of prolonged food chains may occur in two different forms. The common 
form is the one mentioned above, i.e., urbanisation and international trade separating food 
producers from food consumers. However, a second and most important aspect with respect 
to contemporary questions about food safety and food security alike has to be highlighted, 
that is, the actual extension of food chains particularly in developing countries through 
increasing costs of transport. Factors such as poor roads (potholes!), inexistent public 
transport and increasing fuel prices are virtually extending food chains because they require 
the establishment of informal transportation systems. Informal transportation systems, 
operated by middlemen, are partaking of the proceeds, thus decreasing the earnings of farmers 
and increasing the retail price for urban consumers. A case study of an informal distribution 
system is the plantain market in Uganda. In central Uganda, plantain (musa paradisiaca) is 
the traditional staple crop, called Matooke. The particularities of the Matooke market in 
Uganda, which is characterised by, inter alia, the weightiness of the plantain, the risk of rapid 
deterioration combined with demanding customers, bad roads and expensive or inaccessible 
means of transport, provide a favourable environment for the edging in of middlemen. In the 
particular case of Uganda, typical middlemen have access to means of transport, e.g. a 
bicycle, a motorcycle, or a pickup truck. However, depending on the remoteness of the area 
and other factors, several middlemen may step in. Therefore, it might well be that at first, a 
middlemen with a bicycle gets the Matooke from the farmer in the hinterland and pushes it to 
a collecting point at the nearest tarmac road. At collecting points, secondly, the Matooke is 
collected by other middlemen with motorcycles or pickup trucks, carrying the plantain to 
trading centres on the outskirts of the capital city, Kampala, or directly to certain wholesalers 
with whom they are collaborating. Unsurprisingly, though, the retail price for Matooke is far 
higher than the prices paid to producing farmers. On the other hand, in Uganda many people 
can make a living from the Matooke business. (My observations particularly with the problem 
of transporting Matooke are corroborated by findings made by Pamela Mbabazi with regard to 
transportation problems related to milk. Mbabazi noted that “[t]hree methods of transportation 
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ignorant of how their food was made. With no legal obstacles and 
fierce competition, adulteration became commonplace.” 463 
 
No surprise, though, that “some of the worst and most blatant examples of 
adulteration come from early-nineteenth-century Britain, where the 
industrialization of the world truly began”.464 In the following, it shall be shown 
that the Industrial Revolution brought along essential features for large-scale 
food adulteration.465 These essential features were, firstly, the existence of an 
                                                                                                                                                        
were indicated for transporting/delivering milk from the farm to the collecting centres. These 
include by pick-up/car, in containers carried on the head and by bicycle” (Pamela Mbabazi, 
Supply Chain and Liberalisation of the Milk Industry in Uganda (Fountain Publishers, 2005), 
pp. 88). 
463 Felicity Lawrence, Not on the Label. What Really Goes into the Food on Your Plate 
(Penguin Books, 2004), p. 201. Whereas the above mentioned developments took place in 
early 19th century Britain, similar developments, and similarly induced by industrialisation, 
occurred in the United States of America in the second half of the 19th century. As William 
Patrick observed:  
“Unfortunately, in the United States, the last half of the 19th century saw an 
increasing amount of domestic goods being manufactured and sold under less 
than honest and sanitary conditions. This was particularly true for food products 
such as meat, butter, and milk. There were several reasons for the deterioration 
of goods. The United States at this time was increasingly becoming an industrial 
rather than an agrarian society. As more and more people lived congested in 
towns and cities and were thus unable to grow their own food, the reliance on 
distant markets for food supplies grew. New railroads and other improvements 
in transportation facilities, along with packaging and manufacturing 
advancements, permitted larger amounts of food to be distributed over wider 
areas. Competition in sales often became intense and tempted some companies 
to adulterate (make impure) or mislabel their products to increase profits or to 
stay in business” (William Patrick, The Food and Drug Administration (Chelsea 
House Publishers, 1988), pp. 21-22).  
464 Colin Tudge, So Shall We Reap. What’s Gone Wrong With the World’s Food – and How to 
Fix It (Penguin Books, 2004), p. 152. A major driver of urbanisation in England was the 
enclosure movement, whereby the gentry enclosed lands formerly open for common use. 
What started in the 16th century, accelerated in the 18th century, inducing rural-urban 
migration. Mazoyer and Roudart noted:  
“This enclosure movement continued even more in the eighteenth century, at the 
height of the agricultural and industrial revolution, this time with the support of 
Parliament, the majority of whose members were landowners. From 1700 to 
1845, no less than 4,000 acts of enclosure authorizing the lords to divide the 
commons, consolidate their lands, and enclose them were enacted by Parliament. 
(…) Thus the majority of the English peasantry disappeared (the yeomen), were 
forced to become agricultural wage laborers, beg, migrate towards the cities, 
become industrial wage laborers, or emigrate to settler colonies” (Marcel 
Mazoyer and Laurence Roudart, A History of World Agriculture. From the 
Neolithic Age to the Current Crisis (Monthly Review Press, 2006), p. 340).  
465 According to John Burnett, “food adulteration virtually became organized crime” before 
effective legislation was established (cited from Colin Tudge, So Shall We Reap. What’s 
Gone Wrong With the World’s Food – and How to Fix It (Penguin Books, 2004), p. 153). 
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impoverished segment of the population. This segment, the poor city dwellers, 
was relying on cheap food supply and thus had to accept adulterated food 
despite knowing about potential hazards. Secondly, food providers had been 
subjected to fierce competition through the liberalisation of previously tightly 
regulated local markets.466 
 
Addressing the abolishing of traditional food regulation, a case study of the 
bread market in Victorian England may be instructive. Colin Tudge provided the 
following insights into the liberalisation of the traditional system for regulating 
bread:  
 
“[F]rom 1266 until 1815 the quality and price of bread and ale in 
England had been fixed by a system of Assizes (local courts), 
following royal and later parliamentary edict. Local inspectors 
watched over foods apart from bread and ale, and whoever drifted 
from the straight and narrow was punished (not least in the pillory). 
But the early nineteenth century was the first golden age of free 
trade. (…) The committee that abolished the Assize of Bread 
declared: ‘Your Committee are distinctly of the opinion that more 
benefit is likely to result from the effects of a free competition … 
than can be expected to result from any regulations under which [the 
bakers] could possibly be placed’. (…) In the days of the Bread 
Assizes, bakers simply did the job that was statutorily required of 
them. When free trade ruled, more and more bakers came into the 
market, and they fought each other like dogs for custom. By 1850, 
there were 50,000 bakers and three-quarters of them were 
‘undersellers’: they sold their bread effectively for less than the cost 
of production. They could achieve this, as one disaffected employee 
                                                                                                                                                        
Therefore, from a historical perspective, the heyday of food adulteration was the period 
between the abolition of traditional systems of food regulation, e.g., the Assizes in Britain, 
and the introduction of effective modern legislation (in Britain in the 1870s). And because 
different countries entered into that period, i.e., the Industrial Revolution, at different points in 
time, each case requires an individual analysis relative to respective circumstances.  
466 On the other hand, increasing feelings of alienation resulting from vanished rootedness in 
local contexts were encountered by rising nationalism. A particular expression of nationalism 
was the so-called ‘national dish.’ Conceived as an emotional element for nation building – by 
glorifying ‘own’ foods and jeering consumers of ‘other’ foods as ‘Krauts’ (for Germans), 
‘Frogs’ (for Frenchmen), etc. – ‘national dishes’ also had a specific economic function, 
namely to privilege national produce. An example for such ‘mental protectionism’ is the 
Swiss national dish, the cheese fondue. Established in the world economic crisis of 1929, the 
cheese fondue required different cheese varieties from different regions in Switzerland. In 
fact, the purpose of this particular recipe was to strengthen Swiss cheese producers against 
foreign competition, particularly against cheese produced in Holland already on an industrial 
scale (Eva Barlösius, Soziologie des Essens. Eine sozial- und kulturwissenschaftliche 
Einführung in die Ernährungsforschung (Juventa Verlag, 1999), p. 148.  
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put the matter, ‘only by first defrauding the public, and next getting 
eighteen hours’ work out of the men for twelve hours’ wages’.” 467 
 
The example of bread and the appearance of “undersellers” prepare the ground 
for asking about the reasons why the bread market failed at the beginning of the 
19th century in England. Tudge observed that commentators have offered 
“totally opposite explanations” for this market failure: on the one hand, there 
were those blaming “the newly emerging big companies, like the new brewers, 
with their near or actual monopolies: for they were so powerful they could call 
the shots, and get away with whatever they wanted”.468 Other commentators, on 
the other hand, pointed out that, in fact, the big companies had the higher 
standards: “[i]t was the smaller traders who cheated more”, because “small 
traders in particular were forced to cut corners”.469 
 
Along with effects resulting from the liberalisation of the bread market through 
the abolishment of the Assize of Bread, the bread example further shows the 
increasing role of labour costs in food processing and food adulteration alike. It 
is therefore not a coincidence that one of the most critical analysts of the 
Industrial Revolution in England, Karl Marx, also bore witness to the worrying 
conditions under which bread was manufactured. With regard to adulterations in 
the baking trade in particular, Marx observed:  
 
“The incredible adulteration of bread, especially in London, was first 
revealed by the Committee of the House of Commons ‘on the 
adulteration of articles of food’ (1855-6), and by Dr. Hassall’s work 
Adulterations Detected. The consequence of these revelations was 
the Act of 6 August 1860, ‘for preventing the adulteration of articles 
of food and drink’, an inoperative law, as it naturally shows the 
tenderest consideration for every ‘freetrader’ who decides to turn an 
honest penny’ by buying and selling adulterated commodities. The 
Committee itself more or less naïvely formulated its conviction that 
free trade essentially meant trade with adulterated, or as the English 
ingeniously put it, ‘sophisticated’ goods. In fact, this kind of 
‘sophistry’ understands better than Protagoras how to make white 
                                                 
467 Colin Tudge, So Shall We Reap. What’s Gone Wrong With the World’s Food – and How to 
Fix It (Penguin Books, 2004), p. 154.  
468 Colin Tudge, ibid. p. 154. 
469 Colin Tudge, ibid. p. 154. Tudge draw an analogy between the baking trade in Victorian 
England and the present-day situation under conditions of globalisation: ”Under the present, 
spreading rules of globalization, farmers worldwide will again be obliged to fight like dogs 
and undercut each other, just like Victorian England’s bakers” (Colin Tudge, ibid. p. 155).  
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black, and black white, and better than the Eleatics∗ how to 
demonstrate before your very eyes that everything real is merely 
apparent.”470 
 
Marx had already singled out the dubious role played by “undersellers” in the 
baking trade, an observation corroborated by Colin Tudge (see above). Marx 
noted that there were two branches of bakers involved in the baking trade:  
 
“In London there are two sorts of bakers, the ‘full priced’, who sell 
bread at its full value, and the ‘undersellers’, who sell it at less than 
its value. The latter class comprises more than three-quarters of the 
total numbers of bakers (…) The undersellers, almost without 
exception, sell bread adulterated with alum,471 soap, pearl-ash, chalk, 
Derbyshire stone-dust, and other similar agreeable, nourishing and 
wholesome ingredients. (…) Sir John Gordon stated before the 
committee of 1855 [i.e. the Committee of the House of Commons 
‘on the adulteration of articles of food’] that ‘in consequence of these 
adulterations, the poor man, who lives on two pounds of bread a day, 
does not now get one-fourth part of nourishing matter,472 let alone 
the deleterious effects on his health’. Tremenheere [H. S 
Tremenheere was the commissioner appointed to examine ‘the 
grievances complained of by the journeymen bakers’] states … as 
the reason why a ‘very large part of the working class’, although well 
aware of this adulteration, nevertheless accept the alum, stone-dust, 
etc. as part of their purchase, that it is for them ‘a matter of necessity 
to take from their baker or from the chandler’s shop such bread as 
they choose to supply’. As they are not paid their wages before the 
end of the week, they in their turn are unable ‘to pay for the bread 
                                                 
∗ The Eleatics were Greek philosophers of the sixth and fifth centuries B.C., who held that 
Being alone was true, and that everything outside the one fixed Being was merely apparent 
(original asterisk, original explanation).  
470 Karl Marx, Capital. A Critique of Political Economy, vol. 1, translated by Ben Fowkes 
(Penguin Books, 1990), p. 358 (footnotes omitted, original asterisk).  
471 Alum (potassium aluminium sulphate) was applied for whitening inferior flour and for 
bulking it out. An inquiry of 1848 (A Treatise on the Falsifications of Food) considered that 
the fraudulent use of alum was common practice (Colin Tudge, So Shall We Reap. What’s 
Gone Wrong With the World’s Food – and How to Fix It (Penguin Books, 2004), p. 152).  
472 Colin Tudge noted that some of the added ingredients, albeit not directly hazardous, could 
nevertheless affect human health. In this respect, Tudge pointed at the example of oatmeal 
which “was commonly bulked out with barley meal, which is not only cheaper but also less 
nutritious”. Tudge further observed that “[t]he high mortality among the pauper children in 
Drouitt’s institution in 1850 was ascribed to oatmeal tricked out with barley, which reduced 
their intake of energy and essential fats even further, and gave them diarrhoea for good 
measure (which in the modern world, particularly in poor countries, often precipitates 
malnutrition)” (Colin Tudge, ibid. p. 152).  
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consumed by their families during the week, before the end of the 
week’, and Tremenheere adds on the evidence of witnesses, ‘it is 
notorious that bread composed of those mixtures is made expressly 
for sale in this manner’. (…) ”473 
 
The example of the baking trade demonstrated some of the conditions abetting 
food adulteration, such as the existence of impoverished segments of the 
population, the economic need to save labour costs, and the lack of regulation, 
or, the lack of implementation of, and compliance to, that regulation. With 
regard to the latter point, i.e., regulation and control of food safety and food 
quality, legislative procedures take centre stage. The point is made here that 
food producers, in this case the “undersellers”, were not willing to adjust their 
profitable methods of production in ways which are more acceptable to society 
of their own accord. In other words, the increase of food production methods 
which are hazardous to human health (or to other values) required restrictions 
imposed by society.  
 
In economic terms, the requirement for third-party regulation of food markets 
was addressed as the problem of ‘credence’ goods markets, i.e. markets with 
information asymmetries. With respect to food, ‘credence’ characteristics mean 
that consumers are usually unable to evaluate food safety characteristics 
themselves, in particular those of processed foods. With respect to the 
requirement for societal intervention in credence goods markets, Lee Ann 
Jackson and Marion Jansen noted:  
 
“Regulatory intervention of a third party, typically a government 
agency, can therefore be justified on efficiency grounds in markets 
characterized by credence goods characteristics. Government 
regulatory interventions in these markets aim at providing consumers 
with the information they need to take appropriate consumption 
decisions.” 474 
 
Typically, societal response to hazardous commercial activity is triggered by 
some sort of scandal. Again, the example of the bread market in 19th century 
England can be used as a teaching play for many more food scandals yet to 
come in history. It was the today well-known sequence of a first round of public 
inquiries coming to rather reserved recommendations, which, however, induced 
public outcry which, in turn, was compelling policymakers to adopt sturdier 
positions vis-à-vis the incriminated economic sector; in that case the baking 
                                                 
473 Karl Marx, Capital. A Critique of Political Economy, vol. 1 (Penguin Books, 1990), p. 
278, footnote no. 14.  
474 Lee Ann Jackson and Marion Jansen, ‘Risk assessment in the international food safety 
policy arena. Can the multilateral institutions encourage unbiased outcomes?’ (2010) 35 Food 
Policy [538-547] 539. 
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trade. With his peculiar sardonic words, Marx described the awakening of the 
public, realising the magnitude of the bread scandal, as follows:  
 
“At all events the Committee [i.e., the Committee of the House of 
Commons ‘on the adulteration of articles of food’ (1855-6)] had 
directed the attention of the public to its ‘daily bread’, and therefore 
to the baking trade. At the same time the cry of the London 
journeymen bakers against their over-work rose in public meetings 
and petitions to Parliament. The cry was so urgent that Mr H. S. 
Tremenheere, also a member of the above-mentioned Commission of 
1863, was appointed a Royal Commissioner of Inquiry. His report, 
together with the evidence given, moved the public not in its heart 
but in its stomach. Englishmen, with their good command of the 
Bible, knew well enough that man, unless by elective grace a 
capitalist, or a landlord, or the holder of a sinecure, is destined to eat 
his bread in the sweat of his brow, but they did not know that he had 
to eat daily in his bread a certain quantity of human perspiration 
mixed with the discharge of abscesses, cobwebs, dead cockroaches 
and putrid German yeast, not to mention alum, sand and other 
agreeable mineral ingredients. Without any regard for His Holiness 
‘Free Trade’, the hitherto ‘free’ baking trade was therefore placed 
under the supervision of state-appointed inspectors (at the close of 
the Parliamentary session of 1863), and by the same Act of 
Parliament work from 9 in the evening to 5 in the morning was 
forbidden for journeymen bakers under 18. The last clause speaks 
volumes as to the over-work in this old-fashioned, homely line of 
business.” 475 
 
The fact that public outcry is required for introducing legislative procedures for 
the restriction of hazardous business conduct became a common feature in the 
history of food safety regulation. As mentioned above, countries experience 
challenges induced by industrialisation at different points in time. A scandal 
comparable to the public outcry following inquiries of the baking business in 
England was the public outrage following the publication of Upton Sinclair’s 
novel “The Jungle” in 1906 in the United States of America.476 William Patrick 
                                                 
475 Karl Marx, Capital. A Critique of Political Economy, vol. 1 (Penguin Books, 1990), p. 359 
(footnote omitted).  
476 The following excerpt from The Jungle may put across the public repercussion caused by 
Sinclair’s book: 
“There was never the least attention paid to what was cut up for the sausage; 
there would come all the way back from Europe old sausage that had been 
rejected, and that was moldy and white – it would be doused with borax and 
glycerine, and dumped into the hoppers, and made over again for home 
consumption. There would be meat that had tumbled out on the floor in the dirt 
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gave the following account of the effects of Sinclair’s publication on public 
opinion:  
 
“The American public was rightfully disgusted after reading 
Sinclair’s graphic but realistic disclosures. In fact, almost overnight, 
sales of meat and meat products declined by 50 percent. Added 
pressure was put on Congress to take action. Even the wounded meat 
industry recognized that government regulation could mean renewed 
sales. In this message to Congress on December 5, 1905, President 
Theodore Roosevelt strongly urged passage of new food and drug 
laws.  
Finally, on June 30, 1906, Congress passed the first federal Pure 
Food and Drugs Act, according to which it became a federal crime to 
mislabel or adulterate foods, drinks, and drugs intended for interstate 
commerce.  
The provisions of the law were to be enforced by the Bureau of 
Chemistry in the Department of Agriculture. Wiley477 was appointed 
by Secretary of Agriculture James Wilson to administer and enforce 
the landmark legislation – the cornerstone of the future Food and 
Drug Administration.” 478 
                                                                                                                                                        
and sawdust, where the workers had tramped and spit uncounted billions of 
consumption germs. There would be meat stored in great piles and thousands of 
rats would race over it. It was too dark in those storage areas for a man to see 
well, but a man could run his hand over these piles of meat and sweep off 
handfuls of the dried dung of rats. These rats were nuisances, and the packers 
would put poisoned bread out for them; they would die, and then rats, bread, and 
meat would go into the hoppers together” (William Patrick, The Food and Drug 
Administration (Chelsea House Publishers, 1988), p. 26, citing from Upton 
Sinclair’s The Jungle).  
477 Harvey Wiley was the chief chemist of the US Department of Agriculture from 1883 to 
1912.  
478 William Patrick, The Food and Drug Administration (Chelsea House Publishers, 1988), 
pp. 26-27 (emphases added). Emphasis was put on the interests of the meat industry and the 
scope of the first federal Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906 because it shows the function of 
food safety regulation as a scheme for consolidating a single market within common national 
borders. As noted by Colin Tudge with regard to the situation in Victorian England, the big 
corporations were usually more receptive to stricter food safety legislation than smaller 
businesses, because national food laws not only imposed restrictions, but also offered new 
opportunities for companies aiming at operating at the national level and able to comply with 
higher standards. This observation seems to be particularly applicable to federal states where 
food safety regulation previously remained a constitutional prerogative of member states. 
With regard to the situation in the United States of America, Pollack and Shaffer noted that 
“[b]y the beginning of the twentieth century, however, the growth of interstate trade in the US 
meant that, in order to be effective, food safety regulation would also have to reach across 
state lines. The US Congress responded to this challenge in 1906 and 1907 by using its 
powers under the Interstate Commerce clause of the Constitution to adopt the first 
comprehensive federal food safety legislation, namely the Pure Food and Drugs Act and the 
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Of particular importance for the shaping of public opinion in food quality and 
food safety matters are women activists. For example, William Patrick 
highlighted the fact that women’s groups were pivotal for the adoption of the 
U.S. Pure Food and Drugs Act in 1906, and again for the U.S. Federal Food, 
Drug, and Cosmetic (FDC) Act in 1938. Patrick noted that women activists in 
the United States “had been lobbying for a federal food and drug law” during the 
last quarter of the 19th century: “Although women could not vote at that time, 
their outraged demands were being increasingly heeded by politicians”.479  
 
Food safety, however, requires more than legislation. The maintenance of food 
safety levels deemed appropriate is a constant task, requiring, inter alia, 
effective compliance and control mechanisms. Effective compliance and control 
is usually assigned to specific authorities, such as the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) of the United States. But the effectiveness of authorities 
is dependent on various factors which may vary from country to country. 
Especially in developing countries, scarce resources and impoverished segments 
of urban dwellers, dependent on cheap food supply in rather similar ways as 
were their fellow sufferers in Victorian England, may provide fertile grounds for 
food adulteration.  
 
A case study of the milk industry in Uganda may shed some light on food safety 
problems in a developing country (DC) in general and problems of compliance 
and enforcement of regulation in DCs in particular. In her study Supply Chain 
and Liberalisation of the Milk Industry in Uganda (2005), Pamela Mbabazi 
examined effects of the liberalisation of the milk industry which took place in 
Uganda in the 1990s. A direct effect of liberalisation was the mushrooming of 
the informal sector. Mbabazi observed:  
 
“The dramatic increase in the number of informal milk traders is a 
recent phenomenon prompted by the liberalisation of the milk sector 
in Uganda. This informal channel sells raw milk and undercuts the 
formal supply chain by selling it at low prices because they add no 
value to the milk, in most cases do not pay any taxes and do not 
bother with quality control. As mentioned before, this informal 
channel controls about 80 per cent of the market and as such the two 
existing processing factories in Ankole [a south-western area of 
                                                                                                                                                        
Federal Meat Inspection Act” (Mark A. Pollack, and Gregory C. Shaffer, When Cooperation 
Fails. The International Law and Politics of Genetically Modified Foods (Oxford University 
Press, 2009), p. 43; footnote omitted).  
479 William Patrick, The Food and Drug Administration (Chelsea House Publishers, 1988), p. 
26. 
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Uganda] now operate at less than 50 per cent of their installed 
capacity.” 480 
 
Though, the liberalised milk market in Uganda witnessed a deterioration of 
quality and safety levels. Mbabazi, listening to different players in the milk 
sector, noted the following statements:  
 
“Some farmers alleged that some traders add chemicals to the milk 
while testing it at the village level as many obviously do not mind 
about the quality of milk sold as long as they get their profits.  
Some of the customers interviewed in both Mbarara and Kampala 
noted that at times the milk tastes rather different and that they often 
notice that it is adulterated but have no option and end up still buying 
it because it is all they can afford. According to Mr. Isha, quality 
control officer, at DDA [Dairy Development Authority], many 
traders have in the past added hydrogen peroxide, sodium 
bicarbonate or potassium dichromate (starch) to increase the 
viscosity. He noted that most milk buyers and vendors add water as 
well which, in most cases is very dirty, to increase the volumes and 
profits. He explained that tests carried on some samples by the DDA 
have found milk to contain residues of other chemicals like formalin, 
sodium carbonate and boric acid in order to make the milk look fresh 
appearance for several days after milking, traders illegally introduce 
these chemicals into the milk to arrest bacterial or viral growth and 
lower the acidity of milk.”481 
 
However, food safety is more than an issue of hygiene and scientific assessment. 
As Eva Barlösius observed, food safety regulation is tensely connoted to cultural 
                                                 
480 Pamela Mbabazi, Supply Chain and Liberalisation of the Milk Industry in Uganda 
(Fountain Publishers, 2005), p. 93. 
481 Pamela Mbabazi, Supply Chain and Liberalisation of the Milk Industry in Uganda 
(Fountain Publishers, 2005), p. 94 (footnote omitted). In Mbabazi’s case study on the milk 
market in Uganda, one may recognise main features of the distorted bread market in Victorian 
England. First, there is an impoverished segment of the population which, despite knowing 
about potential hazards, continues to purchase adulterated products because it is relying on 
cheap foods. Second, there is fierce competition caused by the liberalisation of previously 
regulated markets. Whereas in 19th century England, it was the ‘undersellers’ trading in 
adulterated bread, in today’s Uganda, it is the ‘informal sector’ trading in adulterated milk. 
However, whereas the 19th century England was able to absorb informal labour in the formal 
sector, by providing jobs in the booming industry in particular, the status of the informal 
sector in Uganda seems to be rather different. In Uganda, as in many part of Africa, policies 
implemented pursuant to the Washington Consensus have effected in a virtual de-
industrialisation. Many infant industries, such as the textile industry, have collapsed. As a 
result, the informal sector remains, beside the public sector, an important provider of income 
and services. Therefore, a crackdown on the informal sector would, most likely, not increase 
food safety, but endanger entire food distribution systems and food security as a whole. 
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values.482 Observations by Lydia Petránová with regard to milk processing in 
Bohemia and Moravia in the early 20th century not only provided insight in food 
safety issues, but also in cultural aspects and the relationship between food and 
gender. Petránová reported:  
 
“The war [World War I] situation led not only to the stagnation of 
industrial dairies, but also to a forced return of traditional methods of 
milk preparation. All centrifuges in households were sealed by the 
authorities so that the government could not be cheated on the fat 
content of expropriated milk. And so the age-old latka [an 
earthenware vessel with an outlet at the bottom, used for separating 
cream from milk] again took the place of the centrifuge. It appears 
that the return to primitive equipment and techniques was not simply 
a necessary evil, but also a means of self-realization. At the 
beginning of the twentieth century ethnologists also recorded a 
renewal of superstitions, especially in relation to domestic churning. 
The traditional taboos about the place and time for successful 
churning, the prohibition on food and borrowing objects outside of 
the house during churning, laying objects with a great semiotic status 
under the churn (such as blessed objects, a comb, a man’s shirt) and 
other practices bear traces of apotropic and mimicry magic from the 
realm of the ancient culture of agrarian societies. Milk processing, 
which can be considered one of the most archaic activities in the 
household, retained the use of magical objects the longest.”483 
 
Thus, an important finding seems to be that economic conditions are not the 
only factors determining the degree of industrialisation of food production and 
food safety levels. Rather, Lydia Petránová stated:  
 
“It is my opinion that non-economic and psychological factors also 
played a definite negative role in this process. Their causes can be 
sought in the following:  
1. The strong traditions connected with one of the most archaic 
activities act as a stabilizing factor and a brake on progress.  
2. Traditional processing of milk was almost exclusively in the 
hands of women, who remained longer than men outside the 
reach of specialist education. At the same time, in the spirit of 
their anthropological differences and their mission as the 
                                                 
482 Eva Barlösius, Soziologie des Essens. Eine sozial- und kulturwissenschaftliche Einführung 
in die Ernährungsforschung (Juventa Verlag, 1999), in particular pp.  205-207. 
483 Lydia Petránová, ‘From traditional to industrial milk processing’, in Martin R. Schärer and 
Alexander Fenton (eds.), Food and Material Culture. Proceedings of the Fourth Symposium 
of the International Commission for Research into European Food History (Tuckwell Press, 
1998), p. 276.  
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guardian of life, they always favoured the tested, and treated the 
new with distrust.  
3. Consumption again was largely in the hands of women. 
Consumers from overcrowded worker quarters, as the first or 
second generation to be living in the city, were susceptible to the 
myth of ‘healthy fresh milk from the country’ from distributors 
and of ‘artificial’ pasteurized milk from dairies.”484 
 
Examples provide so far seem to indicate that food safety laws were commonly 
the result of political processes at respective national levels. Political processes 
at national levels were typically involving the public, policymakers and affected 
or interested economic sectors. And food laws resulting from such political 
processes were, in turn, reflecting prevailing interests at respective national 
levels. The political as well as the deliberative character of food laws – quite 
similar to laws in general – is not a new phenomenon. With regard to food laws 
in British colonies in North America, William Patrick observed:  
 
“The colonies enacted numerous food inspection laws to establish 
standard weights and measures, including the sizes of casks and 
barrels used to store and ship foods such as fish, pork, beef, and four. 
These laws often reflected the significance of a particular industry to 
each colony’s economy: Massachusetts had strict laws governing 
fishing, its foremost industry; New York hat though regulations for 
the beef industry; and Virginia and Maryland regulated their tobacco 
industry carefully.” 485 
 
As a conclusion one may note that food laws essentially were the outcome of 
political procedures at respective national levels. Accordingly, latent conflicts 
between consumers and food manufacturers over appropriate levels of food 
safety protection were resolved by means of political deliberation at respective 
national levels. And different levels of protection set forth by respective national 
legislation translated into different border controls and food safety requirements 
for imported agricultural products.  
                                                 
484 Lydia Petránová, ibid., pp. 284-285. With special regard to women’s attitude to 
pasteurisation, Petránová observed: “The housewife from the country, living in the city for the 
first or second generation, preferred ‘guaranteed fresh country milk’ over processed milk from 
dairies. There was particular distrust of pasteurization. Pasteurized milk in bottles was 
considered a ‘city fabrication,’ ‘artificial milk,’ and so on. It is emblematic that the main 
consumers of processed milk were hospitals, charity institutions and schools. Middle-class 
urban households usually had regular certified suppliers. At the same time it is typical how 
grudgingly women accepted the principles of modern milk processing, principles which 
resulted in relieving unnecessary effort, saved them time and reduced the health risk to the 
entire family” (Lydia Petránová, ibid., pp. 276-277). 
485 William Patrick, The Food and Drug Administration (Chelsea House Publishers, 1988), 
pp. 19-20 (emphasis added).  
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With regard to underlying philosophical questions, food safety risk regulation at 
national markets, i.e., at macroeconomic levels, is considered as an example 
where cultural relativism comes into play. In other words, the regulation of risk 
is not something absolute, for instance based on ‘objective’ science. Rather, risk 
regulation in modern Risk societies is relative, based on the specific needs 
established through deliberative procedures in a particular society.  
 
The deliberative, yet political character of food safety legislation can be 
exemplified by different approaches of different political ideologies. In this 
respect, Pat O’Malley distinguished between classical liberalism and social 
liberalism. In classical liberalism, O’Malley observed, “[s]ubjects were to be 
exposed to uncertainties”.486 Accordingly, O’Malley noted, “[t]he heroic status 
of the entrepreneur as the creator of social good through risk to his own capital 
served to protect this class from regulation aimed at protecting consumers from 
adulterated food and drugs”.487 In perspective of social liberalism, in contrast, 
“science and risk were to tame uncertainty, to magnify its powers and minimise 
its harms”.488 Thus, science-based administrative regulation had to be put in 
place in order to minimise harms resulting from uncertainty.489  
 
 
CHAPTER 5 THE BATTLE FOR AGRICULTURE 
 
Agriculture provides an example par excellence for showing how the two 
opposing worldviews, i.e., positivism and relativism, are approaching the same 
issue from different perspectives. Based on the two opposing worldviews, two 
approaches to the agrarian question came in conflict. That conflict was 
especially intense in the 19th century, were the contours of what Mazoyer and 
Roudart called ‘the second agricultural revolutions of modern times’ emerged.490 
For bridging the previous chapter on philosophical and epistemological concepts 
with conflicting approaches towards agriculture in the 19th century, the terms 
used in that conflict shall be reviewed and reutilised in the following.  
 
                                                 
486 Pat O’Malley, Risk, Uncertainty and Government. 1st edition 2004 (Routledge-Cavendish, 
2006), p. 30. 
487 Pat O’Malley, ibid., pp. 33-34. In The Search for Pure Food (1975), Ingeborg Paulus 
could even provide evidence for “the sense of moral outrage that was generated by efforts to 
criminalise manufacturers’ adulteration of food and drugs – even where this resulted in the 
poisoning of many consumers” (Pat O’Malley, ibid., p. 34, footnote no. 4). 
488 Pat O’Malley, ibid., p. 30. 
489 Pat O’Malley, ibid., p. 34, footnote no. 4. 
490 Marcel Mazoyer and Laurence Roudart, A History of World Agriculture. From the 
Neolithic Age to the Current Crisis (Monthly Review Press, 2006), pp. 375 et seq.  
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A. Empirical vs. Rational Agriculture 
 
For geographical reasons, the separation of farmland and emerging cities such as 
New York was of particular concern in the United States of America. A major 
reason for raising criticism of agricultural systems based on the separation of 
production and consumption were insights made by the then new soil sciences. 
In short, soil sciences established that the disruption of soil nutrient cycles due 
to the separation of production and consumption lead to a decline in natural soil 
fertility. On these grounds, the 19th century witnessed rising criticism against an 
agricultural system benefiting traders to the detriment of farmland and farmers 
deprived from soil fertility and income. Interestingly, though, the accused 
‘spoliation system’ was coined ‘empirical agriculture’, i.e., a system “in which 
the conditions of the reproduction of the soil were violated”.491 On the other 
hand, a ‘rational agriculture’ was conceived, which would “give back to the 
fields the conditions of their fertility”.492 
 
The term ‘empirical agriculture’, reminding of logical empiricism and 
empiriocriticism, was used by Justus von Liebig (1803-1873), a chemist 
particularly influential in organic chemistry and the development of soil science. 
Liebig contrasted ‘empirical agriculture’ with ‘rational agriculture; whereas the 
former was spurred by increasing separations of farmland and town, i.e., 
agricultural production and food consumption, the latter focused on the 
maintenance of soil nutrient cycles. Considering Liebig’s critique of ‘empirical 
agriculture’, Foster and Magdoff noted:  
 
“In his Letters on Modern Agriculture (1859), Liebig argued that the 
‘empirical agriculture’ of the trader gave rise to a ‘spoliation system’ 
in which the ‘conditions of the reproduction‘ of the soil were 
violated. Soil nutrients were ‘carried away in produce year after year, 
rotation after rotation.’ Both the open system of exploitation of 
American farming and the so-called ‘high farming’ of European 
agriculture were thus forms of ‘robbery.’ ‘Rational agriculture,’ in 
contrast, would give ‘back to the fields the conditions of their 
fertility.’ ” 493 
 
Because of his contribution to the development of synthetic fertilisers based on 
nitrogen, Liebig is nowadays usually solely considered the pioneer of soil 
                                                 
491 John Bellamy Foster and Fred Magdoff, ‘Liebig, Marx, and the Depletion of Soil Fertility: 
Relevance for Today’s Agriculture,’ in Fred Magdoff, John Bellamy Foster, and Frederick H. 
Buttel (eds.), Hungry for Profit. The Agribusiness Threat to Farmers, Food, and the 
Environment (Monthly Review Press, 2000), p. 46.  
492 John Bellamy Foster and Fred Magdoff, ibid. p. 47 (footnote omitted).  
493 John Bellamy Foster and Fred Magdoff, ibid., pp. 46-47, with reference to Justus von 
Liebig’s Letters on Modern Agriculture.  
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enhancement by using fertilisers. In his days, however, Liebig campaigned for 
economic fertiliser use and the recycling of nutritive elements, turning him into 
a “precursor of today’s ecologists”.494 Because of its continued, yet increasing 
relevance, Liebig’s fundamental insight shall be further outlined. In this regard, 
Foster and Magdoff observed:  
 
“In his Letters on the Subject of the Utilization of the Municipal 
Sewage Addressed to the Lord Mayor of London (1865) Liebig 
argued – based on the condition of the Thames – that the two 
problems of the pollution of the cities with human and animal 
excrement and the depletion of the natural fertility of the soil were 
connected, and that organic recycling that would return nutrients to 
the soil was indispensable part of a rational urban-agricultural 
system.” 495 
 
From an economic perspective, empirical agriculture was criticised by Henry 
Charles Carey (1793-1879), a US economist “who throughout the 1850s laid 
stress on the fact that long distance trade arising from the separation from town 
and country was a major factor in the net loss of soil nutrients and the growing 
crisis in agriculture.”496 In his Principles of Social Science (1858), Carey wrote: 
“[A]s the whole energies of the country are given to the enlargement of the 
trader’s power, it is no matter of surprise that its people are everywhere seen 
employed in ‘robbing the earth of its capital stock’. ” 497 Hence, from an 
economic perspective, the different approaches of ‘empirical agriculture’ and 
‘rational agriculture’ were mirrored in different outcomes regarding winners and 
losers: whereas ‘empirical agriculture’ benefited traders, ‘rational agriculture’ 
was meant to maintain soil fertility and thus the intrinsic wealth of farmers.  
 
In the following, the terms ‘empirical agriculture’ and ‘rational agriculture’ are 
used for characterising conflicting approaches towards agriculture. Whereas the 
former is relying on the input of synthetic fertilisers for increasing productivity, 
the latter aims at maintaining soil nutrient cycles. Thus, ‘empirical agriculture’ 
stands for agricultural systems where the production and the consumption of 
food are detached to the benefit of trade. ‘Rational agriculture’, in contrast, 
stands for attempts to rejoin agricultural production and food consumption by 
closing nutrient cycles for the maintenance of soil fertility.  
 
In the following, the differences between the two approaches in agriculture shall 
be worked out in more detail.  
                                                 
494 John Bellamy Foster and Fred Magdoff, ibid. p. 47 (footnote omitted).  
495 John Bellamy Foster and Fred Magdoff, ibid. p. 47 (emphasis added).  
496 John Bellamy Foster and Fred Magdoff, ibid. p. 46.  
497 John Bellamy Foster and Fred Magdoff, ibid., p. 46, with reference to Henry Carey’s 
Principles of Social Science.  
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B. Dissenting Objectives  
 
As mentioned above, agriculture provides an example par excellence for 
showing how the two opposing worldviews, i.e., positivism and relativism, 
approaches the same issue from different perspectives. In the following, these 
differences are worked out at three levels, namely (1) where objectives are 
defined, (2) where methods are applied, and (3) where restrictions on production 
and levels of protection are determined. To begin with, the question how 
respective objectives are defined shall be addressed.  
 
1. Growth 
 
It was shown above that, in principle, microeconomic theory can be applied also 
to farming. In particular, it was shown that the rationale behind farming 
activities is basically the same economic rationale driving other economic 
actors: as any other economic actor, farmers aim at maximising production, 
income and profit. In other words, the ‘rational’ approach of the homo 
oeconomicus is applied on farmers, resulting in an agricola oeconomicus. 
Applying new technologies, improved seeds and fertilisers, yields are increased. 
In simple terms, the growth-approach can be summarised by the following 
formula:  
 
Improved seeds + nitrogen + water – > increased yields498 
 
In the textbook Introduction to Agricultural Economics (2002), John Penson et. 
al. explained the economic rationale governing activities of ‘rational’ farmers as 
follows:  
 
“Like any business, farms, input manufacturers, food processors, 
fiber manufacturers, and others involved with the transportation and 
trade of food and fiber products at the wholesale and retail levels are 
in the business to make a profit. The same can be said of the nation’s 
farmers and ranchers. Throughout this textbook, we will assume 
businesses are motivated by the goal of maximising profits. The 
economic objective helps us to understand the economic decisions 
businesses make in the short run and the long run. We are not 
suggesting that these businesses ignore other meaningful objectives, 
                                                 
498 Adapted from John H. Perkins, Geopolitics and the Green Revolution. Wheat, Genes, and 
the Cold War (Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 256.  
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such as personal, social, or environmental objectives. However, 
businesses’ main concerns will always be with economic profits.” 499 
 
The scientific or ‘rational’ world-conception extends the paramount economic 
objective from the micro- to macro-levels and in particular to international trade. 
Conceiving states in similar manners as the ‘rational’ homo oeconomicus, the 
economistic approach assumes that economic gains are the sole objective of 
‘rational’ states trading among themselves. In a nutshell, Penson et. al. 
summarised the economic rationale underlying the theory of international trade 
as follows:  
 
“The basis for trade is differing opportunity costs among nations. To 
receive gains from trade, nations must specialize in the production of 
goods for which they are most efficient and exchange those goods 
with other nations. Through increased specialization and exchange, 
all nations can benefit from trade, and world economic welfare will 
be increased.” 500 
 
Core to the perception of international trade in agricultural products is the theory 
of comparative advantage, first developed by David Ricardo in 1817.501 Melaku 
Geboye Desta noted:  
 
“Stated in policy terms, the theory teaches that international trade 
based on the comparative advantage of countries, and not on the 
artificial incentives resulting from protective trade barriers (such as 
quotas or tariffs) or stimulants (such as export subsidies), enhances 
global welfare in the interest of all trading nations. In line with the 
laissez faire philosophy of Adam Smith, the theory of comparative 
advantage makes a compelling case in favour of the least possible 
level of government intervention on the flow of international trade. 
As summarized by Nobel Laureate Paul Samuelson, ‘there is 
essentially only one argument for free trade or freer trade, but it is an 
exceedingly powerful one, namely: Free trade promotes a mutually 
profitable division of labor, greatly enhances the potential real 
                                                 
499 John B. Penson, Oral Capps, and C. Parr Rosson III, Introduction to Agricultural 
Economics. 3rd Edition (Prentice Hall, 2002), p. 137.  
500 John B. Penson, Oral Capps, and C. Parr Rosson III, ibid. p. 522. 
501 The law of comparative advantage, first presented by David Ricardo (1772-1823) in his 
book On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation published in 1817, essentially 
purports that even states which are less efficient than others may reap gains from trade by 
exporting goods where their relative or comparative advantage is greatest and import goods 
where their relative or comparative advantage is least (John B. Penson, Oral Capps, and C. 
Parr Rosson III, ibid. p. 514).  
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national product of all nations, and makes possible higher standards 
of living all over the globe.” 502 
 
Hence, the prospect of “higher standards of living all over the globe” is the 
promise underlying attempts for liberalising international trade in agricultural 
products.  
 
Albeit trade liberalisation in agricultural products remained a particularly thorny 
issue, the objective of integrating agriculture fully into the world trading system 
is widely being upheld. Desta observed:  
 
“And the result of all those developments is, at least from the legal 
perspective, definitively encouraging. A separate Agreement on 
Agriculture has emerged out of it. Although its practical impact 
might be modest in the short-run, the existence of a detailed set of 
legal rules governing the sector is hoped to furnish a reasonable 
degree of certainty, predictability, and rule of law in international 
relations involving the agricultural sector. The groundwork has now 
been laid for a rules-governed and operationally effective GATT 
discipline on agriculture. (…) Negotiations are already underway to 
push the agricultural reform process further. However, full 
integration of agriculture into the system still appears to be a long 
distance away.” 503 
 
The economistic objective of creating a market-oriented agricultural trading 
system at the international scale was initiated by ministers at the Punta del Este 
meeting in 1986, launching the Uruguay Round. Considering agriculture, the 
Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round stated:  
 
“The CONTRACTING PARTIES agree that there is an urgent need 
to bring more discipline and predictability to world agricultural trade 
by correcting and preventing restrictions and distortions (…). 
                                                 
502 Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products. From 
GATT 1947 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture (Kluwer Law International, 2002), p. 2 
(footnotes omitted).  
503 Melaku Geboye Desta, ibid. p. 9 (original italics). However, more nuanced voices can also 
be heard. Cottier and Oesch, for example, pointed out that trade liberalisation of agricultural 
products alone is not enough: “Trade liberalisation on its own, and without appropriate 
flanking policies, merely serves a small number of efficient producer countries but does little 
or nothing for the subsistence of the millions of farmers in a majority of developing countries. 
The present tools and instruments available in the WTO will need further development much 
beyond the reduction of tariffs and subsidies to which the rules of the present Agreement on 
Agriculture are essentially dedicated to” (Thomas Cottier, Matthias Oesch, International 
Trade Regulation. Law and Policy in the WTO, the European Union and Switzerland. Cases, 
Materials and Comments (Staempfli Publishers, 2005), p. 714). 
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Negotiations shall aim to achieve greater liberalization of trade in 
agriculture and bring all measures affecting import access and export 
competition under strengthened and more operationally effective 
GATT rules and disciplines, taking into account the general 
principles governing the negotiations, by:  
 
(i) improving market access through, inter alia, the reduction of 
import barriers;  
(ii) …  
(iii) minimizing the adverse effects that sanitary and phytosanitary 
regulations and barriers can have on trade in agriculture, taking 
into account the relevant international agreements.”504 
 
The Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), part and parcel of the Uruguay Round 
and entered into force in 1995, referred to the Punta del Este Declaration in the 
preamble as follows:  
 
“Members,  
having decided to establish a basis for initiating a process of reform 
of trade in agriculture in line with the objectives of the negotiations 
as set out in the Punta del Este Declaration;  
Recalling that their long-term objective as agreed at in the Mid-Term 
Review of the Uruguay Round ‘is to establish a fair and market-
oriented agricultural trading system and that a reform process should 
be initiated through the negotiation of commitments on support and 
protection and through the establishment of strengthened and more 
operationally effective GATT rules and disciplines’ (…)”  
 
A distinct feature characterising ‘empirical agriculture,’ that is, growth- and 
market-oriented agriculture, is the application of scientific method at all levels 
of agricultural production. First and paramount, economic sciences are setting 
the objective of agricultural production, that is, production increase, return on 
investment and growth. Second, latest innovations of applied sciences are 
providing most efficient means for agricultural production, e.g., genetic 
engineering and nanotechnology. Third, restrictions on agricultural production 
for protecting consumers are objectively determined, by applying physical 
sciences and quarantine sciences505 in particular. By focusing on paramount 
                                                 
504 Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, (Punta del Este Declaration), cited from 
John Croome, Reshaping the World Trading System. A history of the Uruguay Round (World 
Trade Organization Publication Services, Geneva 1995), Annex, pp. 382-392, in particular p. 
387.  
505 As already mentioned, the term quarantine sciences refers to sciences originally used for 
establishing risks to human, animal and plant health at border controls, for example 
toxicology, biochemistry, veterinary sciences and plant sciences. Nowadays, the term 
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economic objectives, the ‘empirical’, i.e., economistic conception of agriculture 
is essentially anthropocentric. The economistic conception of food production is 
also short-time oriented, because return on investment is a key objective.  
 
The scientific or ‘empirical’ approach towards food production could be 
illustrated by a linear curve upwards, from the lower left corner to the upper 
right corner of the chart, expressing the one-dimensional economic objective of 
production increase and growth. 
 
2. Equilibrium 
 
As mentioned above, ‘rational agriculture’ implies the maintenance of soil 
nutrient cycles. Thus, the objective of production is somewhat relativised by the 
objective of sustenance. The objective of sustenance and requirements for 
maintaining nutrient circles are leading to a circular understanding of agriculture 
and a long-term perspective. Farming activities are centring on the preservation 
of equilibrium between input and output, production and recovery in the long 
run. Preservation of equilibrium requires the circulation rather than the 
exhaustion of nutrients by recycling of manure and other nutritious components. 
By acknowledging the dependency on micro-organisms, farm animals, plants, 
water, the sun, yet the whole environment within which it is taking place, 
‘rational agriculture’ or, in contemporary language, sustenance farming is 
potentially ecocentric. Sustenance farming could be depicted by a circular figure 
rather than by a linear growth curve.  
 
The concept of ‘rational agriculture,’ i.e., sustenance farming, is intrinsically 
multi-dimensional. The objective of production is balanced by the objective of 
sustenance. The objective of sustenance is achieved by the maintenance of 
nutrient circles.  
 
In the scope of the study at hand, it has to be emphasised that the basis of 
relativist calls for sustaining nutrient circles is no less scientific than the 
economistic foundation of growth-oriented agriculture. Whereas growth-
oriented agriculture is based on laws developed by economic sciences, 
sustenance agriculture is based on principles established by natural sciences, in 
particular biology and environmental sciences. The basic principles are related 
to the production and destruction of the biomass. The basic principles 
determining production and destruction of biomass are called photosynthesis, on 
                                                                                                                                                        
quarantine sciences commonly refers more generally to sciences applied in food safety 
inspections and the control of epizootics and plant diseases.  
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the one hand, and respiration, on the other hand. The process of photosynthesis 
is expressed by the following equation:506 
 
Carbon dioxide + water + photons –> sugar + oxygen (if chlorophyll is present) 
 
As a formula: C02 + H20 (+light + chlorophyll) – > (HCH0) + 02 
 
Thus, plants living basically on water and carbon dioxide, produce various 
forms of sugars, which, in turn, are the basis for the formation of many other 
organic substance, such as nucleic acids, protein and lipids. The organic matter 
produced by plants forms, directly or indirectly, the diet for animals and 
humans. Thus, direct or indirect consumption of plants provides animals and 
humans with organic material and energy. With respect to the latter, energy is 
produced through a process inverse to that of photosynthesis, namely 
respiration. Respiration is expressed by the following equation:507 
 
Sugar + oxygen – > carbon dioxide + water + energy 
 
Or, as a formula: (HCH0) + 02 – > C02 + H20 + energy 
 
The two fundamental scientific processes of photosynthesis and respiration are 
the basis for balanced ecological systems. The tool enabling ecological systems 
to stay balanced is the process of recycling. Mazoyer and Roudart summarised 
the principles governing ecological equilibria and recycling as follows:  
 
“When an ecosystem is in equilibrium, i.e., when the quantity of 
organic matter produced each year by photosynthesis is equal to the 
quantity of organic matter destroyed by respiration and 
decomposition of the litter, then the quantities of carbon dioxide, 
water, nitrogen, and various mineral salts, which are absorbed and 
stabilized in organic matter, are in principal equal to those released 
by respiration and decomposition. In the same way, the quantities of 
oxygen released by photosynthesis are compensated by those used by 
respiration and decomposition. A stable ecosystem neither ‘creates’ 
nor ‘loses’ anything; it recycles everything.” 508 
 
                                                 
506 Relevant information was taken from Marcel Mazoyer and Laurence Roudart, A History of 
World Agriculture. From the Neolithic Age to the Current Crisis (Monthly Review Press, 
2006), p. 53.  
507 Relevant information was taken from Marcel Mazoyer and Laurence Roudart, A History of 
World Agriculture. From the Neolithic Age to the Current Crisis (Monthly Review Press, 
2006), p. 54. 
508 Marcel Mazoyer and Laurence Roudart, ibid. p. 54.  
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Political thinkers such as Vandana Shiva applied and extended scientific 
principles of ecological equilibria to a theory of sustenance economy. By the 
same token, stable societies are not only defended, but taken as examples for 
achieving sustenance in today’s context. Vandana Shiva explained:  
 
“Sustainable societies move in a stable state – with, not against, the 
cycles of life. To be in stable state is not to be motionless; it involves 
movement and progression within an orbit, like an electron around 
the atom or the moon around the earth. The ecological consciousness 
of ancient civilizations allowed them to progress in an ecologically 
stable way. But just as classical physics is incapable of explaining or 
understanding the motion of the electron, conventional market 
economics interpret stability as stagnation and not as movement at 
all. Indigenous cultures of the Amazon, of the Andes, or the 
Himalayas are examples of living cultures that have been sustainable 
over millennia and, where not destroyed by the globalized economy, 
are sustainable even today.” 509 
 
Modern concepts of ‘rational agriculture,’ i.e., sustenance farming, are going 
beyond the objective of maintaining nutrient cycles. Contemporary calls for 
‘rational agriculture’ and sustenance farming respectively, emphasise social, 
cultural and political dimensions of agriculture. In a contemporary 
understanding, sustenance farming implies that the tasks of defining objectives, 
of choosing appropriate methods of production and of determining levels of 
protection are assigned to the people involved and concerned, i.e., farming 
communities and consumers respectively. It is thus the emphasis of social, 
cultural, historical and political dimensions which associated the concept of 
‘rational agriculture’ to relativist positions. In contrast to ‘empirical agriculture,’ 
‘rational agriculture’ always implies a balance between several objectives. First 
and foremost, the objectives of production increase, on the one hand, and the 
maintenance of nutrient cycles on the other hand have to be balanced. Thus, 
‘rational agriculture’ and modern expressions thereof, such as sustenance 
farming, are intrinsically multi-dimensional.510  
 
Basic principles of ‘rational’ or sustenance farming are the objective of 
sustenance and requirements for maintaining nutrient circles. Thus, ‘rational’ or 
                                                 
509 Vandana Shiva, Earth Democracy. Justice, Sustainability, and Peace (Zed Books, 2005), 
p. 51.  
510 The term ‘multifunctionality’ is only expressing one particular notion of agriculture in a 
relativist framework. The functionalism implied in the word ‘multifunctionality’ shows that 
the approach of multifunctionality conceives agriculture as performing certain functions in the 
service of man. This instrumental or anthropocentric view on agriculture differs from 
ecocentric approaches ascribing intrinsic values to nature, for example the deep ecology 
approach.  
 174 
sustenance agriculture can be depicted by a circular move and a long-term 
perspective. Farming activities are centring on the preservation of equilibria 
between input and output, production and recovery in the long run. Preservation 
of the equilibrium requires the circulation rather than the exhaustion of nutrients 
by recycling of manure and other nutritious components. By acknowledging the 
dependency on micro-organisms, farm animals, plants, water, the sun, yet the 
whole environment within which it is taking place, sustenance farming is 
potentially ecocentric. Sustenance farming could be depicted by a circular figure 
rather than by a linear growth curve.  
 
Considering the contrasting objectives of ‘empirical,’ i.e., growth-oriented 
agriculture on the one hand, and ‘rational,’ i.e., equilibrium-centred agriculture 
on the other hand, one may see that both are ‘based on science’: whereas the 
growth-oriented approach towards agriculture is based on economic sciences, 
the equilibrium-centred approach is based on natural sciences, in particular 
biology and soil science. In light of that finding, currently popular descriptions 
of distinct forms of agricultural systems seem to be unfounded, yet confused. 
Nowadays, growth- or market-oriented food production, formerly known as 
‘empirical agriculture,’ is frequently characterised as ‘rational.’ On the other 
hand, sustenance agriculture, formerly known as ‘rational agriculture,’ is 
regularly called ‘non-scientific’, ‘romantic,’ or even ‘irrational’ these days.511 
Nowadays, the term ‘rational’ is commonly used synonymic for ‘efficient’ and 
not for denoting a particular intellectual orientation.512 
                                                 
511 It shall not be denied that, in fact, segments of the ‘rational,’ i.e. organic farming 
movement are inclined to metaphysics. In this respect, one could mention biodynamic 
agriculture based on the anthroposophical world-conception of Rudolf Steiner (1861-1925), 
for instance. On the other hand, however, growth-orientation may be far from a ‘rational’ 
concept either. Economist Hans Christoph Binswanger, for instance, interpreted modern 
finance as a contemporary version of the legendary quest for the philosopher’s stone. But 
instead of transforming materials into gold, monetary capital transforms natural resources into 
more money, thus transcending time and mortality in eternal growth (Hans Christoph 
Binswanger, Geld und Magie. Eine ökonomische Deutung von Goethes Faust (Murmann 
Verlag, 2005), in particular pp. 120-122. In the real world, however, marvellous capital 
expansion rather resembles to deception than to magic. Looking at the recent US subprime 
mortage crisis, for instance, the TIME magazine reported:  
“As a trader, what you needed was to take a market in which bonds were thinly 
traded and magically fill it with more-tradeable highly rated AAA material. By 
the magic of CDOs [i.e. collateralised debt obligations] you could do just that. 
CDOs are often created out of the lowest-rated, seldom-traded portions of other 
bond offerings. And by the mid-2000s most of those bonds were backed by 
home loans to borrowers with poor credit ratings – toxic waste, in the parlance. 
Subprime-mortage bonds went into the CDO blender BBB and came out AAA. 
All of a sudden, traders were making big money” (Stephen Gandel, ‘The Case 
Against Goldman Sachs’, in TIME, May 3, 2010, p. 24 (emphasis added).  
512 In German, there is a distinction between rational, meaning ‘rational’ in the philosophical 
or epistemological sense, and rationell, meaning economically efficient. In fact, one may 
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José Lutzenberger considered that the contemporary confusion of terminology 
mirrors an underlying confusion between science and technology. According to 
Lutzenberger, technology has gained supremacy over science, virtually taking 
the latter into the service of technical progress. According to Lutzenberger, the 
‘empirical development of technologies,’ mostly patentable products, is aimed at 
making ‘big deals’. Thus, knowledge as the aim of science was replaced by the 
pursuit of patents and registered trademarks through ‘empirical research’. 513 
 
C. Different Methods 
 
As mentioned above, agriculture provides an example par excellence for 
showing how the two opposing worldviews, i.e., positivism and relativism, 
approaches the same issue from different perspectives. In the following, these 
differences are worked out by looking on what sort of methods are applied for 
achieving the respective objectives. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
observe that the term ‘rational’ has not only lost its role for denoting a particular intellectual 
orientation, but has reversed its meaning. Today, the term ‘rational’ usually comes along with 
an implicit pretence of an ‘objective’ or ‘neutral’ stance, thus virtually an intellectual non-
position. In the WTO context, the term ‘rational’ is often used for characterising positions in 
line with the paramount economic rationale of trade liberalisation and market expansion. In 
particular, scientific positions in line with the economic rationale are usually those taken up 
by short-term oriented quarantine sciences and applied sciences. On the other hand, scientific 
positions which are not corresponding with paramount economic objectives are denounced as 
being ‘non-scientific’ or even ‘irrational.’ Hence, upon closer examination, contemporary 
uses of the term ‘rational’ seem to be far from ‘objective’ or ‘neutral’; rather, the word 
‘rational’ carries along economic value judgements. It is precisely the preponderance of an 
economic rationale which is in the centre of the relativist critique. Relativists do not question 
risk analysis as a method, but the (mis-)use of risk as an economic paradigm. A critique of the 
usurpation of risk as an economic paradigm points at the ideology inherent to the economistic 
risk concept. As shown above, the risk paradigm presumes economic growth as the 
paramount objective of human activity. In this sense, relativist approaches in risk theory can 
be understood as a response to objectivist and positivist approaches presuming a ‘given’ 
objective to risk and risk analysis, namely expansion of ‘rational’ activity and economic 
growth. Because alternative approaches beyond the economistic risk paradigm are criticising 
the implicit objective of the latter, that is, economic expansion, they are sometimes called 
‘radical’ or ‘fundamentalist.’ However, from a naïve perspective, one might question the 
meaning of ‘radical.’ Is an approach focusing on genuine human values, i.e. common and 
sustained survival, really ‘radical’? Or is the term ‘radical’ more suitable for characterising 
allegedly ‘objective’ and ‘rational’ approaches presuming that all humans are just one-
dimensional homines oeconomici? 
513 José Lutzenberger, Die selbstmörderische Sinnlosigkeit der modernen Landwirtschaft, in 
Jerry Mander, Edward Goldsmith (eds.), Schwarzbuch Globalisierung. Eine fatale 
Entwicklung mit vielen Verlierern und wenigen Gewinnern (Riemann Verlag, 2002), pp. 344-
345. 
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1. Labour  
 
The ‘rational’ objective of profit maximisation through specialisation and the 
division of labour was mirrored in agriculture in two major ways. A first 
specialisation established a specialisation between farmers, establishing farms 
specialised in the cultivation of a single crop or the production of a single animal 
product. This specialisation of production was due to the introduction of cheap 
nitrogen fertilizers, enabling farmers to give up intercropping and specialise in 
most profitable crops or animal production. John Foster and Fred Madgoff 
commented:  
 
“With the widespread availability of nitrogen fertilizers, there was no 
longer a need to rely on legume crops, which convert atmospheric 
nitrogen into a form that plants can use, to supply non-legumes with 
sufficient fertility. The legume clover and alfalfa hay crops had 
previously been fed to ruminant animals such as beef and dairy cows 
and sheep. Once there was no need to grow those crops to supply 
nitrogen for non-legume crops (wheat, corn, barley, tomatoes), farms 
could more easily specialize as either crop or livestock operations.” 
514 
 
A second specialisation took place with regard to the human-animal 
relationship. The rearing of animals was successively detached from farming 
and concentrated near the emerging large-scale processing plants, thus 
separating cropland cultivation from animal production. John Foster and Fred 
Madgoff observed:  
 
                                                 
514 John Bellamy Foster and Fred Magdoff, ‘Liebig, Marx, and the Depletion of Soil Fertility: 
Relevance for Today’s Agriculture,’ in Fred Magdoff, John Bellamy Foster, and Frederick H. 
Buttel (eds.), Hungry for Profit. The Agribusiness Threat to Farmers, Food, and the 
Environment (Monthly Review Press, 2000), p. 52. In similar ways, also mineral elements are 
recycled. Mazoyer and Roudart even spoke of a ‘balance sheet’ with regard to the (re-)cycling 
of minerals:  
“All things considered, over the course of a given period, the fluctuations in the 
inflow and outflow of minerals in the soil solution are equilibrated according to 
a sort of balance sheet. On one side are the additions of minerals from several 
sources (solubility of the parent rock, fixation of atmospheric nitrogen, 
decomposition of the humus and organic manure, additions of chemical 
fertilizers) to which it is necessary to add the stock of preexisting minerals. On 
the other side are the losses of minerals during the period under consideration 
(drainage, denitrification, recrystallization, removal of minerals through harvests 
of plant and animal products, and, if need be, the gathering up of animal 
excrement) and the residual mineral stock” (Marcel Mazoyer and Laurence 
Roudart, A History of World Agriculture. From the Neolithic Age to the Current 
Crisis (Monthly Review Press, 2006), p. 59). 
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“… [C]orporations began to encourage production of animals near 
the few large processing facilities that they operated. They selected 
locations that offered certain advantages such as lax environmental 
laws, negligible threat of union activity, and low wages. The large 
processors were also increasingly marketing their products under 
brand names and, to have a uniform and predictable product, needed 
to control as much of the entire process as possible – either by 
producing the animals on their own corporate farms or under 
production contracts where the farmer might not even own the 
animals and had to follow strict instructions form their corporate 
employer. Thus animal production became concentrated in certain 
regions (…)”.515 
 
Specialisation in agricultural production was contingent upon technical 
innovation. In fact, cornerstones of what Mazoyer and Roudart called ‘the 
second agricultural revolutions of modern times’ were a series of technological 
innovations in applied sciences. In particular, sciences related to agricultural 
machinery (mechanisation and processing), agricultural chemistry (synthetic 
fertilisers, pesticides, fungicides and herbicides), agricultural biology (seed 
selection and animal breeding) and veterinary sciences (vaccines, antibiotics) 
were mentioned.516  
                                                 
515 John Bellamy Foster and Fred Magdoff, ibid. pp. 52-53.  
516 Marcel Mazoyer and Laurence Roudart, A History of World Agriculture. From the 
Neolithic Age to the Current Crisis (Monthly Review Press, 2006), in particular pp. 375-391. 
With view on recent developments, such as applications of biotechnology (seed modification 
and animal cloning), nanotechnology and computer sciences in food production, one could 
speak of a ‘third agricultural revolution’. In a report on the integration of nanotechnology, 
biotechnology, information technology and cognitive science (NBIC), entitled Converging 
Technologies for Improving Human Performance, prospects for ‘empirical’ agriculture were 
envisioned as follows:  
“Farmers have long appreciated the advantages of science and technology; the 
convergence of nanotechnology, biotechnology, and information technology 
could significantly improve their effectiveness. For example, nanoscale genetics 
may help preserve and control food production. In expensive nano-enabled 
biosensors could monitor the health and nutrition of cattle, transmitting the data 
into the farmer’s personal computer that advises him about the care the animals 
need. In the same way, sensors distributed across farmland could advise the 
farmer about the need for water and fertilizer, thus avoiding wastage and 
achieving the most profitable acreage crop yield (National Research Council 
1997). Bio-nano convergence can provide new ways of actually applying the 
treatment to the crops, increasing the efficiency of fertilizers and pesticides” 
(Mihail C. Roco and William Sims Bainbridg (eds.), Converging Technologies 
for Improving Human Performance. Nanotechnology, Biotechnology, 
Information Technology and Cognitive Science. Joint report of the National 
Science Foundation (NSF) and the Department of Commerce (Kluwer, 2003), p. 
20. For more detail, see Norman Scott and Hongda Chen, Nanoscale Science 
and Engineering for Agriculture and Food Systems. A Report submitted to 
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One may thus say that modern agriculture is based on a twofold separation: at 
first, industrialisation separated townspeople from farmland, and specialisation 
separated and differentiated animal production from crop production, secondly.  
 
From an economic point of view, this twofold separation was the basis for 
establishing divisions of labour and regional and international specialisation of 
production. The first separation induced by industrialisation, i.e. separation of 
townspeople from farmland, was the precondition for vertical division of labour. 
Upstream, a “network of extractive industries and industries manufacturing new 
means of production (fertilizers, treatment products such as pesticides and 
antibiotics, motors, machines, fuel, and other supplies) takes the place of the old 
activities that supplied agriculture, be they artisanal (cartwrights, smiths, 
saddlers, builders) or agricultural (production of draft animals and manure, 
manufacture of farm implements).”517 Downstream, processing industries are 
supplied with agricultural raw materials. The processing industry consist of food 
producers, e.g., flour millers, dairy processing industries, sugar refineries, 
breweries, oil factories, etc., and of non-food producers, such as the textile 
industry. Most of these industrial manufactures “were replacing manufactures 
formerly carried out on farms and in small artisanal units.”518 
 
The second separation mentioned, that between animal production and crop 
production and further differentiations within respective modes of production, 
was the precondition for implementing horizontal division of labour. Because it 
refers back to the underlying economic rationale of comparative advantage, the 
horizontal division of labour is explained by citing Mazoyer and Roudart in full:  
 
“The specialisation of farms and regions has led to the separation and 
regional grouping of different branches of plant and animal 
production that formerly were found together at the farm or village 
level. Specialization has given birth to regional agrarian systems, 
which contribute, each in their own way, to supplying the same 
national or international market. These specialised regional systems 
are complementary, interdependent subsystems, in which the 
landscape itself conveys the horizontal division of labor 
                                                                                                                                                        
Cooperative State Research, Education and Extension Service, based on a 
National Planning Workshop held from November 18-19, 2002, in Washington, 
DC. (USDA, 2003), in particular pp. 8-11. On philosophical notions of NBIC, 
see footnotes no. 96, 193 and 265 above.  
517 Marcel Mazoyer and Laurence Roudart, A History of World Agriculture. From the 
Neolithic Age to the Current Crisis (Monthly Review Press, 2006), p. 396. Of increasing 
importance in this respect are the livestock feed industries.  
518 Marcel Mazoyer and Laurence Roudart, ibid. p. 396. For example, Mazoyer and Roudart 
mentioned the manufacturing of salted meats, butter, canned foods, beers, etc., a tendency 
extending to winemaking, candy, baking, and ready-made meals recently (Marcel Mazoyer 
and Laurence Roudart, ibid.).  
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characteristics of the new multiregional agricultural and food system 
that has developed.” 519 
 
One may conclude that market-oriented agriculture follows the basic rules of 
industrial production, i.e., mechanisation, division of labour, and specialisation. 
 
However, separation between townspeople and farmlands, differentiations 
within modes of agricultural production and resulting labour divisions and 
regional and international specialisation caused various concerns, in particular 
among early agronomists and contemporary sociologists and environmentalists.  
 
2. Resources 
 
Critics of growth-oriented agriculture observed that the tremendous production 
increases achieved by the ‘second agricultural revolution’ are contingent upon 
continued supply with external resources which are mainly exhaustible, in 
particular oil. Fuel is the premise for mechanisation, whereas the production of 
fertilisers requires significant energy inputs. With regard to the latter, Mazoyer 
and Roudart observed that the “considerable increase in output per hectare of 
crops in the course of the last few decades results principally from increasing 
use of fertilizers, even if the improvement from treatments and from the 
mechanical work of preparing and maintaining cultivated lands also played a 
role in this increase.” 520 The production of nitrogen fertilisers is particularly 
energy intensive. Foster and Magdoff, examining energy efficiency in growth-
oriented farming, observed that “[o]f all the energy used to produce an acre of 
corn in the Unites States cornbelt – including fuel, wear and tear on machinery, 
seeds, and pesticides – nitrogen fertilizer accounts for the largest amount 
(double the next largest category), approximately 40 percent”.521 Considering 
required fossil energy inputs for intensive agricultural production all in all, some 
authors concluded that “the amount of energy invested to produce a desired 
yield surpasses the energy harvested”.522 In other words, the tremendous 
                                                 
519 Marcel Mazoyer and Laurence Roudart, ibid. p. 396. 
520 Marcel Mazoyer and Laurence Roudart, ibid. p. 386.  
521 John Bellamy Foster and Fred Magdoff, ‘Liebig, Marx, and the Depletion of Soil Fertility: 
Relevance for Today’s Agriculture,’ in Fred Magdoff, John Bellamy Foster, and Frederick H. 
Buttel (eds.), Hungry for Profit. The Agribusiness Threat to Farmers, Food, and the 
Environment (Monthly Review Press, 2000), p, 54.  
522 See, for instance, Miguel A. Altieri, ‘Ecological Impacts of Industrial Agriculture and the 
Possibilities for Truly Sustainable Farming,’ in Fred Magdoff, John Bellamy Foster, and 
Frederick H. Buttel (eds.), Hungry for Profit. The Agribusiness Threat to Farmers, Food, and 
the Environment (Monthly Review Press, 2000), 81. Similar conclusions were reached by 
Ladan Sobhani and Simon Retallack in their study on the role of agriculture in climate change 
(see Ladan Sobhani and Simon Retallack, Der Weg in die ‘Klimakatastrophe,’ in Jerry 
Mander, Edward Goldsmith (eds.), Schwarzbuch Globalisierung. Eine fatale Entwicklung mit 
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increase in agricultural production achieved by growth-oriented agriculture is 
virtually fuelled by fuel.  
 
However, also other fossil components indispensable for growth-oriented 
agricultural production are exhaustible. Particularly critical in this regard is 
phosphate. Estimates are indicating that stocks of phosphates will be exhausted 
even before oil reserves.523 
 
Based on the recognition of the long-term instability of an agricultural system 
based on exhaustible resources, contemporary ecologist called for a reorientation 
towards stable agricultural production methods based on renewable resources. 
Vandana Shiva noted: “Contemporary ecology movements represent a renewed 
attempt to establish that steadiness and stability are not stagnation, and that 
balance with nature’s essential ecological processes is not scientific and 
technological backwardness, but rather a sophistication toward which the world 
must strive if planet earth and her children are to survive.”524 The emphasis on 
the sophistication of stable and balanced agricultural systems shows the close 
link between ecological agriculture and traditional knowledge. Susette Biber-
                                                                                                                                                        
vielen Verlierern und wenigen Gewinnern (Riemann Verlag, 2002), p. 371. Vandana Shiva 
provided a productivity analysis showing that “a polyculture system can produce 100 units of 
food from 5 units of inputs, whereas an industrial system requires 300 units of input to 
produce the same 100 units. The 295 units of wasted inputs could have provided 5,900 units 
of food” (Vandana Shiva, Earth Democracy. Justice, Sustainability, and Peace (Zed Books, 
2005), pp. 104-105). Based on findings from productivity analyses, Shiva countered the 
argument that industrial agriculture is the only way for feeding a growing world population:  
“Industrial agriculture as been promoted, financed, and subsidized in spite of the 
high cost to the environment. The argument used is that these ecological costs 
are a necessary part of increasing productivity. However, the productivity of 
industrial agriculture is actually negative. More resources are used as inputs than 
are produced as outputs. Usually productivity is increased by the implementation 
of labor displacing machinery and chemicals. However, labor is not the scarce 
input. Land and water are. If, instead of focusing on labor costs, we take energy, 
natural resources, and external inputs into account, then industrial agriculture 
does not have higher productivity than ecological alternatives. Over the last 50 
years, the shift from internal input to high external input agriculture has resulted 
in a sixty six fold decrease in productivity. (…) [S]ince resources, not labor, are 
the limiting actor in food production, it is resource productivity, which is the 
relevant measure. What is needed is more efficient resource use so that the same 
resources can feed more people. A 66-fold decrease of food producing capacity 
in the context of resources use is not an efficient strategy for using limited land, 
water, and biodiversity to feed the world” (Vandana Shiva, ibid., pp. 104-105).  
523 On this note, see, for instance, José Lutzenberger, Die selbstmörderische Sinnlosigkeit der 
modernen Landwirtschaft, in Jerry Mander, Edward Goldsmith (eds.), Schwarzbuch 
Globalisierung. Eine fatale Entwicklung mit vielen Verlierern und wenigen Gewinnern 
(Riemann Verlag, 2002), pp. 335-336.  
524 Vandana Shiva, Earth Democracy. Justice, Sustainability, and Peace (Zed Books, 2005), 
pp. 51-52.  
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Klemm underscored the important role of traditional knowledge not only for 
local food security, but also “for humanity and its long-term survival as a 
whole.” In particular, Biber-Klemm noted that “[s]ophisticated crop rotation 
systems lead to sustainable and durable production and resource use.”525 
 
As an alternative to instable market-oriented agricultural production relying on 
exhaustible natural resources, authors such as Vandana Shiva were calling for 
“an ecological transition to produce more food using fewer resources.”526 
Drawing from examples provided by traditional agricultural systems, ecological 
agriculture and organic farming are depicted as models “based on mixed and 
rotational cropping, and the production of a diversity of crops.”527 Attempts for 
an ecological transition of agricultural production are based on the recognition 
that polycultures are providing higher yields than monocultures. The reason for 
this is the land equivalent ratio which can be explained by the following 
example:  
 
“For example, by planting sorghum and pigeon pea mixtures, one 
hectare will produce the same yield as 0.94 hectares of sorghum 
monoculture and 0.68 hectares of pigeon pea monoculture. Thus, one 
hectare of polyculture produces what 1.62 hectares of monoculture 
can produce. This is called the land equivalent ratio.”528 
 
Miguel Altieri explains that the reduction and finally elimination of 
agrochemical use requires “major changes in management to assure adequate 
plant nutrients and to control crop pests.”529 Benefits from agrobiodiversity can 
be maximised “when livestock, crops, animals, and other farm resources are 
used (including good rotational designs) to optimize production efficiency, 
nutrient cycling, and crop protection.” 530 
 
                                                 
525 Susette Biber-Klemm and Danuta Szymura Berglas, ‘Problems and Goals,’ in Susette 
Biber-Klemm and Thomas Cottier (eds.), Rights to Plant Genetic Resources and Traditional 
Knowledge. Basic Issues and Perspectives (World Trade Institute/CABI, 2006), p. 22. 
526 Vandana Shiva, Earth Democracy. Justice, Sustainability, and Peace (Zed Books Ltd., 
London 2005), p. 104.  
527 Vandana Shiva, ibid. p. 105.  
528 Vandana Shiva, ibid. p. 105. Shiva extended her analysis to farm income, noting that 
“[s]mall farms in West Bengal growing 55 different crops gave incomes of 227,312 rupees 
per acre; a farm with 14 crops gave 94,596 rupees while a monoculture farm brought in only 
32,098 rupees per acre” (Vandana Shiva, ibid.).  
529 Miguel A. Altieri, ‘Ecological Impacts of Industrial Agriculture and the Possibilities for 
Truly Sustainable Farming,’ in Fred Magdoff, John Bellamy Foster, and Frederick H. Buttel 
(eds.), Hungry for Profit. The Agribusiness Threat to Farmers, Food, and the Environment 
(Monthly Review Press, 2000), p. 87.  
530 Miguel A. Altieri, ibid.   
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Hence, some characterising features of ecological alternatives to growth-
oriented agriculture may be summarised as the maintenance of nutrient cycles, 
crop rotation and the production of a diversity of crops.  
 
At macro-levels, attempts for an ecological transition of agricultural production 
translate into a call for self-determination at local levels. Cornerstones of 
agricultural self-determination at local levels are the concepts of food 
sovereignty and seed sovereignty.531 In particular with view on the latter, i.e. 
seed sovereignty, close links between ecological agriculture, functioning local 
communities and the oral tradition of knowledge has to be emphasised. In this 
regard, Biber-Klemm observed:  
 
“The use and improvement by farmers of landraces in the production 
and development of food and agriculture remains essential for many 
people. In many instances seed production relies on the informal 
sector, being based on the knowledge about seed selection and 
storage (often held by women) and the exchange of seeds between 
farmers and farms.” 532 
 
Miguel Altieri emphasised that attempts for ecological changes in agriculture 
must not stop at addressing forms of agricultural production, but address the 
structures of industrialised agriculture, in particular farm size and land tenure. 
On these grounds, Altieri criticised some trends in organic farming only 
changing forms of production, e.g., the substation of synthetic insecticides by 
biological ones, but not addressing structural requirements, such as land 
reform.533 
 
From a geopolitical viewpoint, John H. Perkins’ arguments went even further. 
Albeit admitting that according to economic theory, free trade will increase 
welfare among all parties involved, Perkins expressed the following 
reservations:  
 
“The problem with the free-trade mantra is not that it contains no 
reasonable ideas but that it directs our attention away from issues 
                                                 
531 Vandana Shiva, Earth Democracy. Justice, Sustainability, and Peace (Zed Books, 2005), 
p. 152. Shiva presented the terms Bija swaraj for seed sovereignty and Anna swaraj for food 
sovereignty.  
532 Susette Biber-Klemm and Danuta Szymura Berglas, ‘Problems and Goals,’ in Susette 
Biber-Klemm and Thomas Cottier (eds.), Rights to Plant Genetic Resources and Traditional 
Knowledge. Basic Issues and Perspectives (World Trade Institute/CABI, 2006), p. 22. 
533 Miguel A. Altieri, ‘Ecological Impacts of Industrial Agriculture and the Possibilities for 
Truly Sustainable Farming,’ in Fred Magdoff, John Bellamy Foster, and Frederick H. Buttel 
(eds.), Hungry for Profit. The Agribusiness Threat to Farmers, Food, and the Environment 
(Monthly Review Press, 2000), pp. 88-89.  
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shown in this book [i.e. Geopolitics and the Green Revolution] to be 
of deep and abiding importance. For example, free-trade ideas 
neglect to inquire into the links among biological productivity 
(agricultural harvest), economic value, and the acquisition of 
political power. The physiological necessity for food means that any 
person not in possession of food can be subjected to enormous 
coercion as they attempt to trade whatever they have produced for 
food. This is a relationship that is all but invisible in the ideas 
justifying free trade as a guide to agricultural policy.” 534 
 
On these grounds, one can conclude that ecological transition of agricultural 
production does not stop with a change in production processes, such as the 
preservation of soil nutrient cycles. Instead, today’s interdependence of 
agricultural markets is making it impossible to conceive an ecological transition 
of agricultural production without flanking policy measures, in particular 
measures protecting food and seed sovereignty.  
 
In the next chapter, it is shown how the different concepts of agriculture are 
translating into conflicting scopes of protection.  
 
D. Incongruent Scopes of Protection  
 
As mentioned above, agriculture provides an example par excellence for 
showing how the two opposing worldviews, i.e., positivism and relativism, 
approaches the same issue from different perspectives. In the following, these 
differences are worked out by focusing on the question how respective levels of 
protection are determined, based upon different objectives and different 
underlying rationales. In conclusion, it is argued that it is not as much as 
different levels of protection, but different scopes of protection characterising 
conflicting understandings of agriculture, for the main part.  
 
 
 
                                                 
534 John H. Perkins, Geopolitics and the Green Revolution. Wheat, Genes, and the Cold War 
(Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 266-267. In the scope of the study at hand, Perkins’ 
observations regarding countries adopting policies for achieving food self-sufficiency are 
particularly interesting. With reference to case studies considering India, Mexico and the 
United Kingdom, Perkins noted that countries adopting policies for food self-sufficiency 
“may continue to do so in the future, despite the ideological assertion that free trade is a better 
way to go” (John H. Perkins, ibid., p. 267). It may be added that in the wake of the food crisis 
of 2008, more countries might follow the path towards food self-sufficiency.  
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1. Anthropocentric 
 
It was shown above that industrialised food production tends to expand unless it 
is stopped by constraints established by society, in particular food safety laws. In 
other words, the economic rationale of growth is spurring increased production 
unless external limitations are reached. Such limitations may be natural 
limitations, e.g. the depletion of natural resources, or restrictions implemented 
by society, e.g. food safety laws. From a positivist point of view, the only 
restrictions which reasonably can be justified are restrictions based on 
‘objective’ science and scientific risk assessment.535 It is up to science, in 
particular the so-called quarantine sciences, to assess whether protective 
measures are necessary to protect humans, animals or plants. The spirit of the 
science-based approach for limiting agricultural production is expressed by 
Article 2.2 of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures (SPS Agreement) which reads as follows:  
 
“Members shall ensure that any sanitary or phytosanitary measure is 
applied only to the extent necessary to protect human, animal or 
plant life or health, is based on scientific principles and is not 
maintained without sufficient scientific evidence (…).”  
 
The SPS Agreement further prescribes that scientific assessments have to 
evaluate “the potential for adverse effects to human or animal health” and “the 
likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of pests or diseases”, respectively 
(Article 4 of Annex A of the SPS Agreement).  
 
The limits for agricultural production are thus determined by requirements of 
human health at first, and the need for protecting animals and crops from 
diseases and pests thereafter. However, a further look into the SPS Agreement 
shows that its approach towards animal and plant safety is, in fact, focused on 
the protection of investment. The economic perspective of the SPS Agreement 
can be demonstrated, for instance, by looking at the factors which can be taken 
into account in assessing the risk to animal and plant life or health. With regard 
to risks to animal and plant life or health, it is first and foremost economic 
factors which can be taken into account. Article 5.3 of the SPS Agreement 
reads:  
 
“In assessing the risk to animal or plant life of health and 
determining the measure to be applied for achieving the appropriate 
level of sanitary and phytosanitary protection from such risk, 
Members shall take into account as relevant economic factors: the 
                                                 
535 However, remnants of food restrictions based on cultural or religious considerations may 
still persist here and there, for example restrictions with regard to alcohol or porcine products.  
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potential damage in terms of loss of production or sales in the event 
of the entry, establishment or spread of a pest or disease; the costs of 
control or eradication in the territory of the importing Member; and 
the relative cost-effectiveness of alternative approaches to limiting 
risks” (emphasis added).  
 
In other words, animals and plants are protected primarily in light of economic 
considerations. With regard to animal protection in commercial farming, 
Mazoyer and Roudart observed:  
 
“However, such carefully selected and richly fed animals represent 
substantial fixed capital as well as such a significant potential 
product heavily burdened with costs that losses of animals resulting 
from diseases or accidents are less and less tolerable. The risks from 
diseases are much stronger since the animals are concentrated in 
large numbers in huge buildings. That explains why rigorous sanitary 
precautions are taken in order to reduce losses and why, despite their 
high costs, a panoply of preventive treatments (vaccines) and 
curative treatments (serums, antibiotics), and even surgery in case of 
necessity (caesarians, settings of fractures), are called upon.” 536 
 
Protection of investments is also the rationale underlying phytosanitary 
measures. With respect to crop protection, Mazoyer and Roudart noted:  
 
“Annual crops certainly represent less significant fixed capital than 
animals or perennial plants. However, as a crop develops the 
expenses of seeds, fertilizers, labor, and fuel accumulate and often 
end up representing more than half of the expected revenue from the 
harvest. The margin between this revenue and these costs must then 
cover a portion of the fixed costs of the farm (amortization of the 
equipment and buildings, etc.). No losses of even an insignificant 
part of the harvest can be permitted. In order to limit the losses that 
could result from abundance of weeds, from the proliferation of 
insects, from infestations of fungus, bacteria, or harmful viruses, 
large quantities of herbicides, insecticides, and other pesticides have 
to be used.” 537 
 
Hence, as far as animals and plants are concerned, sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures (SPS measures) are also investment protection measures. It seems thus 
justified to conclude that approaches relying on quarantine sciences are standing 
                                                 
536 Marcel Mazoyer and Laurence Roudart, A History of World Agriculture. From the 
Neolithic Age to the Current Crisis (Monthly Review Press, 2006), p. 391.  
537 Marcel Mazoyer and Laurence Roudart, ibid. p. 391.  
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in the tradition of anthropocentric philosophical concepts: the principal 
objective is the protection of human health. The protection of animals and 
plants, on the other hand, is contingent upon their respective economic value.  
 
Beside their anthropocentric scope, approaches relying on quarantine sciences 
for determining appropriate levels of protection are also universalistic insofar 
common validity of science-based levels of protection is presumed.  
 
2. Ecocentric 
 
In contrast to anthropocentric concepts for determining appropriate levels of 
protection (ALOP), alternative approaches for determining ALOP can usually be 
characterised as utilitarian, ecocentric, or holistic. Utilitarian, ecocentric and 
holistic approaches have in common an extension of the scope of protection. 
Whereas anthropocentric concepts for determining ALOP are focused on the 
well-being of humans (and related protection of investments made in animals 
and crops), ecocentric approaches in particular are extending the scope of 
protection beyond human well-being. Ecocentric approaches in particular are 
based on the belief that humans in general and farmers in particular shall live in 
symbiosis with animals and plants. Marie-Hélène Léon, for instance, discerned 
between two notions of the human-nature relationship; the notion of symbiosis 
applied by agro-ecologists, and the exploitative approach adopted by agro-
industrialists.538 The latter, Léon observed, are exploiting natural resources till 
exhaustion. Agro-ecologists, in contrast, are following the basic principle of 
attributing value to all things and creatures, regardless whether or not they have 
been produced by man.539 Hence, ecocentric approaches can be characterised as 
assigning intrinsic value to animals and plants, biodiversity and natural 
resources, as well as to nature as a whole.  
 
Unsurprisingly though, ecocentric proposals for the determination of appropriate 
levels of protection (ALOP) are in stark contrast to the definition of ALOP 
established by the SPS Agreement. Mazoyer and Roudart, for instance, based 
their proposals for the determination of ALOP upon the analysis of principles 
governing ‘empirical’, i.e., efficient food production. They identified these 
principles as profit maximisation and production increase:  
 
                                                 
538 Marie-Hélène Léon, Grippe Aviaire, ESB… Le Délire Sanitaire. Plaidoyer pour une 
civilisation de la vie (L’Harmattan, Paris 2007), p. 90. 
539 Marie-Hélène Léon, ibid. p. 90. In French, the paragraph describing the model of agro-
ecology reads as follows: “Pour se placer dans cette perspective idéal-typique, il convient 
d’adopter un postulat de base, celui d’accorder de la valeur aux objets, aux êtres, aux 
éléments, non créés par l’humanité, sur lesquels elle n’a pas eu d’influence directe quant à 
leur genèse” (Marie-Hélène Léon, ibid.).  
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“Without curbing their use, fertilizers, pesticides, and animal 
pharmaceuticals continue to be employed up to their profitability 
levels, i.e., sometimes well beyond their level of harm. Without strict 
bans, dangerous but profitable products will be used. Lacking an 
absolute ban, questionable raw materials will be used by the animal 
feed industry. The most irreplaceable sites will be cultivated. The 
rarest species will be destroyed.” 540 
 
In similar ways, Mazoyer and Roudart traced back excesses of modern food 
production to the economic rationale underlying it, namely regional and 
international specialisation of production, on the one hand, and resulting 
competition, on the other hand: 
 
“Where do such outcomes come from if not from the mechanisms of 
competitive development, mechanisms that turn out to be so 
effective in pushing the means, methods, and organizations of 
production to abundance, but can also end up just as effectively 
carrying them beyond the well-understood bounds of usefulness to 
excess?” 541 
 
On these grounds, Mazoyer and Roudart found “little sense in believing that it 
would be possible without risk to do without prohibitions, rules of production, 
and draconian controls…” 542 Thus, according to Mazoyer and Roudart, 
‘draconian controls,’ not deregulation, are the building blocks for achieving 
appropriate levels of protection (ALOP) for ecological agriculture.  
 
Ecocentric or holistic concepts for determining appropriate levels of protection 
(ALOP) are usually coming along with a certain notion of relativism. 
Alternative concepts of ALOP typically consider that the setting of limits to 
agricultural production is essentially a task assigned to the people concerned, not 
to scientists. In a relativist conception, it is up to respective societies, i.e., 
producers and consumers, to define appropriate levels of protection (ALOP).  
 
From a grass roots perspective, Vandana Shiva considered that food sovereignty 
and seed sovereignty cannot be (re-)established without political measures. 
Thus, in contrast to the market-oriented approach, ecological agriculture implies 
regulation. According to Vandana Shiva, it would be “an error” to leave 
“decisions on the distribution of goods and services and on environmental 
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Neolithic Age to the Current Crisis (Monthly Review Press, 2006), p. 440.  
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impact to unregulated and nonaccountable market forces.”543 However, the 
regulation required should not be delegated to some centralised power, but 
should be effected according to people’s needs. Calling it localisation of power, 
Vandana Shiva explains how an ecological transition of agriculture is contingent 
upon political change:  
 
“Localization does not imply autarky or insularity. It involves 
subjecting the logic of globalization to the test of sustainability, 
democracy, and justice in each concrete instance of foreign or large-
scale investment. (…) Social regulation of the market requires strong 
community rights and social policies – and this is not the same as 
individual consumer choice. The contest between the transnational 
corporations, the force behind globalization, and the citizens and 
local communities, the force behind localization, spins off into a 
contest over what kind of state will regulate corporations while 
recognizing and enhancing freedom for people.” 544 
 
Calling it ‘people’s protectionism’, Vandana Shiva argued for a shift of 
centralised powers to self-governing structures at the local levels for making 
decisions with regard to food and seed sovereignty and the environment.545 
Shiva explained that uniform food laws introduced by central governments are 
running counter to peoples’ interests. To this purpose, Shiva presented the 
example of an Indian food safety law introduced in 1998 banning indigenous 
mustard oil and other unpacked edible oils. On the other hand, previously 
existing import restrictions were removed. According to Shiva, the effects of 
these new safety and packaging regulations and import liberalisation were 
devastating:  
 
“India has used the coconut, groundnut, linseed, mustard, sunflower, 
and sesame for edible oil. The main consequence of eliminating 
import restrictions was the destruction of our oilseed biodiversity and 
the diversity of our edible oils and food cultures. It is also a 
destruction of economic democracy and economic freedom to 
produce oils locally, according to locally available resources, and 
locally appropriate food culture. Since indigenous oilseeds are high 
in oil content, they can be processed at the household or community 
level, with eco-friendly, decentralized, and democratic 
technologies.” 546 
 
                                                 
543 Vandana Shiva, Earth Democracy. Justice, Sustainability, and Peace (Zed Books, 2005), 
p. 89.  
544 Vandana Shiva, ibid.  
545 Vandana Shiva, ibid. p. 90. 
546 Vandana Shiva, ibid. pp. 153-154.  
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Based on that and other examples, Vandana Shiva concluded that different food 
systems require different food laws because uniform regulation tends to 
discriminate small producers and local produce. Shiva observed:  
 
“The response of government to the mustard oil contamination in 
1998 was to demand that every ghani (oil mill) have a lab, a chemist, 
and must package its oil. This response was inappropriate for the 
scale and method of production. One million ghanis were shut down, 
20,000 small and tiny oil processors were criminalized by an 
inappropriate law that opened the flood gates for import of soy oil.” 
547 
 
Furthermore, Shiva recognised that “[d]ifferent foods have different safety risks 
and need different safety laws and different systems of management.”548 The 
alternative concept of Vandana Shiva for protecting food and feed sovereignty is 
inspired by the multi-level food safety regulation of the European Union. In 
Europe, Shiva found, “there are different standards for organic, for industrial, 
and for genetically engineered foods. Organic standards are set by organic 
movements, while the standards for genetic engineering are set at the European 
level through the novel food laws. There is, in addition, the movement to protect 
the cultural diversity of food, through ‘unique’ and ‘typical’ food standards.” 549 
 
Because modes of production are taken into account, ecocentric approaches for 
determining ALOP can be characterised as process-based. Because this point 
refers back to the biotech dispute, it shall be further explained with the help of 
arguments put forward by Vandana Shiva:  
 
“Different food systems need different levels of management for 
safety. It is inappropriate to lump together all kinds of food – 
organic, industrial, GMOs – into one category. How food is 
processed determines its quality, nutrition, and safety. Home-
processed bread is not the same as industrial bread. They are not 
‘like products’ to use WTO terminology. They are different products 
in terms of their ecological content and public health impact. A 
factory-raised chicken is not the same as a free-range chicken, both 
in terms of animal welfare and in terms of food quality and safety. 
GM corn is not the same as organic corn. The former contains 
antibiotic resistance markers, viruses used as promoters, and genes 
for producing toxins. Regulating Bt corn for safety needs different 
                                                 
547 Vandana Shiva, ibid. p. 158.  
548 Vandana Shiva, ibid. p. 156. 
549 Vandana Shiva, ibid. pp. 156-157. 
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systems than regulating organic corn, just as factory farming needs 
different regulatory processes than free-range chicken.” 550 
 
On these grounds, Vandana Shiva developed a food safety system for India, 
applying different regulation at different levels for different risks established by 
different scientific approaches:  
 
• At local levels, an “organic processing law” applies “for local, 
natural, small-scale food processing” which is governed by local and 
village communities, residents’ associations or local municipalities. 
Shiva argued that “[c]ommunity control through citizen participation 
is the real guarantee for safety.”551 However, community control is 
not exercised by quarantine sciences, but by traditional knowledge. 
Shiva declared: “Our science of food is based on Ayurveda, not the 
reductionist science that has treated unhealthy food as safe.”552 
• At national levels, an “industrial-processing law” to address 
adulterations and food hazards in industrial foods.  
• A “GM food law” addressing imports, labelling, segregation and 
traceability of foods deriving from the application of biotechnology. 
Shiva noted that the “GM food law” should be “drafted by the 
central government, but states and local communities should be free 
to introduce stricter standards. If regions want to be GMO-free, this 
should be allowed under the principles of decentralized 
democracy.”553 
 
The multi-level food safety concept suggested by Vandana Shiva runs counter to 
unified food regulation. India, Shiva explained, “must craft her laws for her 
conditions. These laws must be appropriate to the level and content they address. 
A law for all food systems is a law that privileges large-scale industrial and 
commercial establishments and discriminates and criminalizes the small, the 
local, the diverse.”554 
 
The concept of Vandana Shiva, by taking into account diverse conditions and by 
calling for variable regulation, may be characterised as ‘relativistic.’ 
Additionally, it has to be noted that Shiva’s concept also implies a rejection of 
the universal applicability of ‘reductionist science’, referring to Ayurveda as an 
alternative at local levels.  
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Considering the global picture, Mazoyer and Roudart found that the ‘draconian 
controls’ necessary‘ for preventing unsustainable excesses and for assuring 
ecological agriculture require implementation and enforcement at the 
international scale:  
 
“There is then, very little sense in believing that it would be possible 
without risk to do without prohibitions, rules of production, and 
draconian controls (…). Moreover, in an open world economy, rules 
of use, prohibitions, and codes of good conduct must be shared and 
strictly applied by the producers of all countries, without which those 
who respect them will be penalized by the unfair competition of the 
others. A well planned, ecological agriculture and quality food will 
exist at this price. It is illusory to pretend that generalized 
deregulation leads to the best of all possible worlds and that the free 
market is capable of avoiding disequilibria, the fluctuating actions 
and reactions of the conjuncture, excesses, waste, poverty, and 
abandonments, which are in fact the counterpart of the impetuous 
competitive development of the agricultural revolution itself.” 555 
 
In a nutshell, ecocentric approaches towards agriculture are requiring 
‘draconian’ regulations in particular at the international level, by leaving room 
for manoeuvre for divergent rules at local levels at the same time. Hence, due to 
such differentiation, ecological alternatives to anthropocentric approaches for 
determining appropriate levels of protection (ALOP) can be considered 
‘relativistic.’  
 
E. GMOs, the Last Frontier 
 
The example of biotech regulation in the United States and in the European 
Union, respectively, provides an instructive example for showing how allegedly 
science-based regulation is actually ‘political.’  
 
1. Product-based Regulation in the United States  
 
Commonly, the regulatory approach of the United States towards GMO 
regulation is appraised as being ‘based on science.’ However, it can be observed 
that the U.S regulation of biotechnology applications in agriculture was driven 
by political considerations to a similar extent as in the European Union. The 
following selected milestones may shed light on the issue:  
                                                 
555 Marcel Mazoyer and Laurence Roudart, A History of World Agriculture. From the 
Neolithic Age to the Current Crisis (Monthly Review Press, 2006), p. 440. 
 192 
The first milestone was a conference which took place in 1975 in Asilomar, 
California. The Asilomar conference brought together leading scientists working 
in the new field of genetic engineering. As observed by Ulrich Beck in World 
Risk Society (1999), at that time the debate about pros and cons of biotechnology 
was not only driven, but also more or less confined to scientists working in the 
field. Following Beck, it was this confinement of the debate to the scientific 
community and the absence of political and economic pressure which enabled a 
‘reflexive consensus’, as Beck termed it:  
 
“It is indeed very interesting to notice that at first there was a 
reflexive consensus among the leading scientists in the field about 
these uncertainties and potential threats. As a result of a conference 
at Asilomar, California, in 1975, American scientists effectively 
called a halt to their work. There were fears of a biological weapon 
more terrible than the atomic bomb and of rogue organisms escaping 
from the laboratory to infect humans or crops.” 556 
 
In the aftermath of the Asilomar conference, “it was unclear which way the US 
would go – whether toward greater precautionary regulation of the technology’s 
use or toward its promotion”.557 The second milestone consists in the 
observation that the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was inclined 
to the former, i.e. to a rather precautionary approach, initially. In their work 
When Cooperation Fails, Mark Pollack and Gregory Shaffer noted:  
 
“The EPA in particular supported a ‘process-based’ approach to 
regulate GMOs, noting that ‘the most appropriate way to distinguish 
between ‘new’ and ‘naturally occurring’ microorganisms is by the 
methods or processes by which they are produced’. Some EPA 
officials maintained that the agency held existing authority under the 
Toxic Substances Control Act to regulate GMOs as ‘new’ chemical 
substances. Since the criterion for the EPA authority was based on 
‘newness,’ it was in EPA’s interest to find that GM varieties were 
fundamentally novel based on the genetic-engineering process.” 558 
 
The third milestone consisted in the fierce pro-industry stance of the Reagan 
Administration, entering the White House in January 1981. The Reagan 
                                                 
556 Ulrich Beck, World Risk Society (Polity Press, 2005), p. 106. It is interesting to note that 
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Administration started by setting up a Biotechnology Science Coordinating 
Committee (BSCC) with the task to reshuffle the institutional and regulatory 
setup as yet established for addressing biotechnology questions. Therefore, on 
institutional grounds, the BSCC transferred powers from the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) to the United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). The transfer of 
institutional powers away from the EPA opened the floor for a regulatory 
change from a process-based to a product-based approach.559 Pollack and 
Shaffer summarised the institutional and regulatory changes implemented by the 
Reagan Administration as follows:  
 
“The result [of institutional and regulatory changes] was a 
curtailment of EPA’s role and an elevation of those of the USDA and 
FDA. In 1986, after public notice and comment, the Office of 
Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) in the Reagan 
Administration issued a ‘Coordinated Framework for the Regulation 
of Biotechnology’ that continues to shape US biotech regulation 
today. Crucially, the OSTP concluded that the techniques of 
biotechnology are not inherently risky and that biotechnology could 
therefore be adequately regulated by existing federal agencies under 
existing statutes, obviating the need for new legislation dedicated 
specifically to regulating GMOs. The Coordinated Framework 
established a division of responsibilities among the three US 
regulators, with the FDA serving as the primary regulator for GM 
foods, the USDA charged with oversight of the planting of GM 
crops, and the EPA limited to overseeing the environmental and food 
safety impact of GM crops that have pesticidal characteristics.” 560 
 
In a study entitled Promotion Versus Precaution: The Evolution of 
Biotechnology Policy in the United States (2006), Adam Sheingate pointed at 
three particular repercussions of the Reagan White House’s policy choice in 
favour of green biotechnology. First, with regard to regulatory policy, the efforts 
of the Reagan White House refocused the GMO debate away from risks and 
onto “commercial opportunities of biotechnology and its importance of a 
strategic sector for international economic competition”.561 Second, at 
administrative levels, the product-based approach implied the assignment of 
regulatory tasks according to product categories. Sheingate noted that the 
division of administrative authority “along product lines enhanced the role of the 
FDA and USDA in the regulatory process at the expense of EPA”.562 Third, the 
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reallocation of administrative powers among U.S. agencies “became to be 
reflected in the jurisdiction of congressional committees over biotechnology 
issues. Oversight hearings on the regulation of agricultural biotechnology, for 
example, fell within the jurisdiction of the House and Senate agriculture 
committees”.563 
 
Additionally, the policy choice of the Reagan Administration in favour of the 
commercialisation of biotechnology applications in agriculture also changed the 
rules of the game in policy making. Pollack and Shaffer observed that the 
institutional and regulatory reshuffle, in fact, weakened biotechnology sceptics 
in the United States:  
 
“The Reagan Administration was able to move primary regulatory 
responsibility to the USDA, whose primary constituency is 
agricultural trade associations, and in the process, shift primary 
legislative oversight to the agricultural committees of the House and 
Senate. In the 1990s in the White House, the US Council on 
Competitiveness would take the lead on biotech policy formation. 
These choices have made it more difficult for GM skeptics to use the 
existing regulatory and political framework to impede approval of 
GM crops and foods in the US.” 564 
 
Cornerstone of the US Coordinated Framework was the presupposition “that the 
process of biotechnology itself poses no unique risks”.565 Based on that 
presumption, an approach focusing on specific products, and not on the process 
of their making, was established. The established product-based approach led to 
the conclusion “that products engineered by biotechnology should therefore be 
regulated under the same laws as conventionally produced products with similar 
compositions and intended uses”.566 
 
Though, as a preliminary conclusion, it is noted that the US approach towards 
biotechnology was shaped by decisive policy interventions, steered by the 
Reagan Administration. The policy intervention resulted in the establishment of 
a product-based approach, based on the presumption that genetically modified 
                                                 
563 Adam D. Sheingate ibid. 
564 Mark A. Pollack, and Gregory C. Shaffer, When Cooperation Fails. The International Law 
and Politics of Genetically Modified Foods (Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 47 (footnotes 
omitted). 
565 Mark A. Pollack, and Gregory C. Shaffer, ibid. p. 46, citing from the 2004 report of the 
Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology.  
566 Mark A. Pollack, and Gregory C. Shaffer, ibid. p. 46, citing from the 2004 report of the 
Pew Initiative on Food and Biotechnology. 
 195 
(GM) products are substantially equivalent567 to their conventional counterparts. 
Thus, the presumption that biotechnology, as a technical process, does not pose 
unique risks led to the establishment of a product-based approach, basically 
treating GM crops as equivalent to their conventional counterparts.  
 
Though, it is the product-based approach which essentially discerns the 
regulatory approach of the United States towards GMOs from the regulation of 
green biotechnology in the European Union. As Adam Sheingate noted:  
 
“[I]t is the product-based approach of the Coordinated Framework 
that distinguishes the US regulatory regime from the precautionary, 
process-based approach to agricultural biotechnology in Europe. The 
history of the Coordinated Framework reveals that this outcome 
grew out of a political process, a period of policy entrepreneurship 
sparked by the commercialisation of biotechnology.”568 
 
The product-based approach relies on empirical testing on a case-by-case basis. 
It could therefore be related to ‘empirical’ agriculture.  
 
2. Process-based Regulation in the European Union 
 
In short, the approach of the European Union (EU) towards biotechnology 
applications in agriculture was shaped by, firstly, a climate of public alert due to 
various food scandals which effected in, secondly, a decay of public trust in 
food safety surveillance. In response, thirdly, the European Commission was 
prompted to adopt a cautious stance towards GMOs.  
 
A first difference between the regulatory approaches toward GM crops adopted 
by the United States and the European Union, respectively, was the broader 
environment within which the debate enfolded. Whereas the debate in the 
United States was initially steered by scientists, culminating in the 1975 
Asilomar conference, the setting was rather different in the European Union. 
Ulrich Beck, it his unequivocal manner, described the broader landscape within 
which the GMO debate in European countries enfolded as follows: 
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“In February 1999, the British consumer, still terrified by the BSE 
crisis, was shocked by headlines proclaiming ‘Frankenstein Food’ – 
an approach which reached its climax on the front page of The Daily 
Mirror, a leading British newspaper. It featured a picture of Tony 
Blair, genetically modified to look like Boris Karloff, complete with 
green face and neckbolt, under the headline ‘The Prime Monster’. 
This was the mass media’s response to Blair’s attempt to restore trust 
by demonstratively eating genetically modified food in public with 
his daughter.”569 
 
Indeed, the GMO debate in Europe fell amidst a public already on alert caused 
by various food scandals, such as the outbreak of bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy (BSE). The BSE scandal in particular affected the credibility of 
food safety surveillance systems across the European Union. Pollack and 
Shaffer observed that the BSE scandal “generated extraordinary public 
awareness of food-safety issues and widespread public distrust of regulators and 
scientific assessments”.570 The second feature of the GMO debate in Europe, the 
decay of public trust in established food safety systems, was analysed by 
Pollock and Shaffer:  
 
“Prior to the admission of the BSE risk, ‘the European Commission 
had relied on the advice of the [EU’s] Scientific Veterinary 
Committee, which was chaired by a British scientist and primarily 
reflected the thinking of the British Ministry of Agriculture, 
Fisheries, and Food – advice which subsequently proved flawed’. 
There was thus considerable scepticism as to the political 
independence of the committee’s ‘scientific’ advice.” 571 
 
As a consequence, the approach finally adopted by the European Union for 
regulating GMOs was moulded by political considerations. The resulting 
cautious approach of the EU for regulating GMOs was reflected in an 
administrative setup quite different from that adopted by the United States. In 
the United States, regulatory powers had been shifted away from the 
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Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to the US Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Within the bureaucracy 
of the European Commission, on the other hand, regulatory powers were 
gradually transferred from the Directorate-General (DG) for Science, Research 
and Development (DG XII) to the DG for the Environment. Pollack and Shaffer 
observed that over time, DG Environment took the lead over DG Science, 
Research and Development, as well as over DG Agriculture:  
 
“Increasingly, according to observes such as Cantley, DG 
Environment cut out DG Science, Research and Development from 
policy influence, ‘prefer[ing] to consult its own experts,’ and 
reluctant to accept other experts’ advice, especially those wary of the 
advisability of new legislation. DG Environment knew it lacked 
allies in DG Science, Research and Development for its desired 
regulatory role, which DG Science found to be duplicative and 
without scientific justification.” 572  
 
The DG Environment adopted an approach based on the consideration “that GM 
crops needed to be assessed in environmental terms”.573 The result was an 
approach focusing on the process by which GM crops were produced, rather 
than on particularities of the products itself. This process-based approach 
outlined in a Community Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology, 
prepared by the DG Environment and released by the European Commission in 
1986. Though, by 1986, the regulatory landscape in the United States and in the 
European Union, respectively, differed in significant ways. Whereas in the 
United States, a product-based approach was implemented, the European 
Commission, following the DG Environment, had adopted a process-based 
approach. Reasons for this divergency are many.574 One factor marking an 
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important difference was the fact that biotech industries based in the United 
States and in European countries deployed different political leverage. Pollock 
and Shaffer noted:  
 
“As many commentators have noted, the biotech industry was not as 
well organized in Europe and was unable to mobilize political 
resources to prevent the enactment of process-based GM regulation 
that was framed in environmental terms. Thus by 1986, the year of 
both the US Coordinated Framework and the EC Community 
Framework, Europe and the US had started down different paths.”575 
 
The product-based approach of the European Commission materialised in two 
outstanding regulatory frameworks.576 The first set of rules was incorporated in 
Directive 90/220 on the Deliberate Release into the Environment of Genetically 
Modified Organisms. A cornerstone of Directive 90/220 was the implementation 
of a process-based approach. As Pollock and Shaffer noted: “In contrast with US 
agencies, which elected to regulate GM foods only in terms of their final 
characteristics as products, the European Commission elected to apply 
distinctive regulations to GM foods as a function of the process through which 
they were developed.”577  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
individual and class action law suits. It is thus not surprising that European 
regulators take a more stringent regulatory approach on account of their greater 
responsibility for any potential harm that could occur” (Mark A. Pollack, and 
Gregory C. Shaffer, ibid. p. 53, original emphasis).  
Whereas Pollock and Shaffer emphasised differences between common law and civil law 
systems, they rejected simplistic characterisations of “either the US or the EU as the more 
risk-averse beyond the context of agricultural biotechnology” (Mark A. Pollack, and Gregory 
C. Shaffer, ibid. p.42). In terms of a summary of various reasons for different approaches in 
the US and the EU for regulating green biotechnology, Pollack and Shaffer concluded: “We 
believe that the best explanation for these enduring differences [between the US and Europe] 
is that US and European interest groups have pursued their interests within existing 
institutional and cultural contexts that, together with contingent events, provided opportunities 
as well as constraints, to define issues and frame perceptions of GM foods in different ways” 
(Mark A. Pollack, and Gregory C. Shaffer, ibid. p. 76).  
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576 In the following, the focus is on Directive 90/220 on the deliberate release of GMOs and 
on Regulation 258/97 on GMO foods, thus letting aside Directive 90/219 on the contained use 
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With regard to procedural matters, Directive 90/220 set forth a comprehensive 
body of rules for the approval of biotech products.578 The first step for any 
request for deliberate release of a GMO into the environment was an application 
to the competent authority of the EU member state in which the release was 
meant to take place. Importantly, the application had to include a risk 
assessment which was then evaluated by the member state authority according 
to the criteria set forth in Directive 90/220. In case of rejection of the 
application, the procedure would end at stage one. In case of approval, however, 
the application would be forwarded onto stage two, which consisted of the 
European Commission, on the one hand, and the other EU member states 
governments, on the other hand. At stage two, again two alternatives existed. If 
no objections were raised against the application by either governments of other 
EU member states or the European Commission, the GMO at issue would be 
released for marketing throughout the European Union. If, however, 
governments of other EU member states or the European Commission would 
object to the application, the latter would be subject to qualified scrutiny. In case 
of objections to the application, Directive 90/220 authorised the European 
Commission to carry out its own risk assessment. After having assessed the 
GMO at issue, the European Commission had to submit its draft decision 
whether to admit or to reject the application to a Regulatory Committee 
composed of representatives of EU member states. At this third stage of the 
approval procedure, the EU member-states representatives, assembled in the 
Regulatory Committee, had the option of either to approve a draft decision 
submitted by the European Commission by a qualified majority of votes. Or, in 
case the Regulatory Committee disapproved the European Commission’s draft 
decision, the latter had to be forwarded to the Council of the European Union 
(the Council of Ministers). At this final stage of the approval procedure, two 
particularities set forth by Directive 90/220 have to be mentioned. Firstly, the 
Council of the European Union could approve draft decisions of the European 
Commission by qualified majority, but could reject them only by unanimous 
vote. Secondly, in case the Council of the European Union failed to arrive at a 
decision within a period of three month, Article 21 of Directive 90/220 
authorised the European Commission to adopt the proposed measures.  
 
Additionally, Article 16 of Directive 90/220 set forth a safeguard clause, upon 
which EU member states could “provisionally restrict or prohibit” the marketing 
of biotech products on their respective territory. The condition for triggering the 
safeguard clause was the provision of new evidence for risks to human health or 
the environment posed by the GMO at issue.  
 
                                                 
578 The summary of the rules of procedure governing the approval of biotech products under 
Directive 90/220 are mainly taken from Mark A. Pollack, and Gregory C. Shaffer, ibid. pp. 
60-62.  
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Summarising the regulatory framework established by Directive 90/220, Pollack 
and Shaffer identified three particular gateways enabling politicians to influence 
decisions on the approval of biotech products in the European Union:  
 
“First, it was politicians who enacted a new regulatory framework 
for the growing and marketing of GM foods and crops. Second, it 
was the [European] Commission, consisting of political officials 
designated by member-states governments, which would make the 
decision whether to approve individual GM varieties. Third, the 
[European] Commission’s decisions are subject to review by 
committees of member-states representatives, and ultimately by 
national politicians in the Council of Ministers.” 579 
 
The second set of rules was intended to supplement Directive 90/220 by 
addressing genetically modified (GM) foods. Established in 1997, Regulation 
258/97 Concerning Novel Foods and Novel Food Ingredients, so-called Novel 
Foods Regulation, was also based on a process-based approach. The process-
orientation was expressed by the definition of “novel foods” covering all foods 
and food ingredients that had ‘not hitherto been used for human consumption to 
a significant degree within the Community”.580 As Pollock and Shaffer 
explained, this definition “included both GM foods as well as foods produced 
from, but not containing, GMOs (for example, oils processed from GM crops 
but no longer containing any traces of GM material)”.581 Thus, the Novel Foods 
Directive covers not only foods containing GMOs, as well as foods produced by 
processes involving GMOs, for example genetically modified bacteria. As did 
Directive 90/220, Regulation 258/97 also provided a safeguard clause for 
individual EU member states in case of the establishment of risks deriving from 
GMOs.  
 
Together, Directive 90/220 and Regulation 258/97 established a regulatory 
framework which “was more complex, more decentralized, and more politicized 
than the US system”.582 Pollack and Shaffer explained:  
 
“It was more decentralized because of the key role of member states 
to start, oppose, and reject (through the imposition of safeguards) the 
approval of a GM seed or food. It was more politicized because of 
the involvement of politicians in the approval process. And it was 
more complex in that it created more institutional ‘veto points’, 
                                                 
579 Mark A. Pollack, and Gregory C. Shaffer, ibid. p. 62. 
580 Mark A. Pollack, and Gregory C. Shaffer, ibid. p. 63. 
581 Mark A. Pollack, and Gregory C. Shaffer, ibid. p. 63 (footnote omitted).  
582 Mark A. Pollack, and Gregory C. Shaffer, ibid. p. 63.  
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where the approval of new GM varieties or the release and marketing 
of EU-approved varieties could be blocked.” 583 
 
The process-based approach of the European Union takes into account various 
factors. It could therefore be associated rather with ‘rational’ than with 
‘empirical’ agriculture. 
 
3. The Political Nature of Regulation 
 
Following Pollock and Shaffer, the US and the EU regulatory schemes for 
addressing biotech products may be characterised by the following antipodes:  
 
Comparison of US and EU Biotech Regulations  
 
Characteristics Entity 
 United States European Union 
Approval procedure administrative politicised  
Approach  product-based  process-based 
Doctrine substantially 
equivalence 
precautionary 
principle  
Governance centralised  decentralised  
Business-orientation one-stop shop complex 
Institutional  technocratic  democratic 
 
Comparisons between the regulatory systems for biotech products of the United 
States and the European Union are typically meant to highlight transatlantic 
differences. Such approaches, however, tend to pass over a significant similarity, 
that is the fact that both systems are the result of political decisions in the first 
place. In the case of the United States, it was shown that it was the Reagan 
White House pushing for a business-friendly approach in regulating GMOs. In 
particular, it was the Reagan Administration’s Office of Science and 
Technology Policy (OSTP) issuing the ‘Coordinated Framework for the 
Regulation of Biotechnology’ that laid down the substantially equivalence 
doctrine, considering biotechnology as a mere continuation of traditional plant 
breeding and thus genetically engineered crops not substantially different than 
their conventional counterparts. From an institutional perspective, it was the 
                                                 
583 Mark A. Pollack, and Gregory C. Shaffer, ibid. p. 63. Pollock and Shafer were eager to add 
that they did “not use the term ‘politicized’ in a derogatory way”. Indeed, Pollock and Shaffer 
accounted for views considering “that the European approach is more ‘democratic’, as 
opposed to a US technocratic approach”. Hence, the major focus of Pollock and Shaffer was 
to demonstrate that, “from an institutional perspective, the regulation of GM foods and crops 
in Europe has been channelled through a political process more than a purely administrative 
one” (Mark A. Pollack, and Gregory C. Shaffer, ibid. pp. 63-64).  
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Reagan White House which mandated the Biotechnology Science Coordinating 
Committee (BSCC) to transfer regulatory powers away from the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) mainly to the United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) (and to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to some extent). 
Therefore, the establishment of the substantially equivalence doctrine, the 
downgrading of the EPA, and the implementation of the product-based approach 
were, first of all, the result of policy choices by the Reagan Administration.  
 
Similar findings have been made with regard to the formation of the regulatory 
system for addressing GMOs in the European Union. Albeit the resulting system 
was rather different, the establishment of the EU regulatory system mainly 
followed political considerations. At his point, it seems sufficient to recall the 
BSE crisis as setting the scene for a cautious approach to risk regulation in 
general, and the prevalence of the Directorate-General (DG) for the 
Environment above the DG for Science, Research and Development (DG XII) 
within the intra-Commission power struggle. As a result, the DG Environment 
was, unlike the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in the United States, 
able to root the EU Community Framework for the Regulation of Biotechnology 
in an environmental angle. As a result of these policy choices, in the European 
Union the notion prevailed “that GM crops needed to be assessed in 
environmental terms”.584 The result was a process-based approach subsequently 
implemented in Directive 90/220 and Regulation 258/97.585 
 
The US system, comprising of the substantially equivalence doctrine and a 
product-based approach, is usually depicted as being based on ‘sound’ science. 
In comparison, the EU system, purporting a process-based approach and relying 
on the precautionary principle, is said to be more politicised. However, both 
systems have been initially chosen by political and administrative authorities 
following their respective political agendas. In the United States, it was the 
Reagan Administration pushing for a business-friendly approach. In the 
European Union, on the other hand, it was the European Commission and the 
DG Environment in particular pushing for a precautionary approach. In other 
words, despite US and EU frameworks for regulating GMOs are differing 
significantly, they are both the result of policy choices in the first place. The 
                                                 
584 Mark A. Pollack, and Gregory C. Shaffer, ibid. p. 59.  
585 Recently, however, the EU Commission seems of changing its approach towards GMOs. 
In particular, the competence for GMOs shifted from the rather GM-sceptical Environmental 
Commissioner Stavros Dimas to the Commissioner for Health & Consumers, John Dalli 
(Steffi Ober, ‘Dalli, Dalli – Die neue EU-Kommission setzt auf Gentechnik’, in umwelt 
aktuell, Mai 2010, p. 15. The new regulatory framework of the EU concerning GMOs 
basically consists of three main legal texts: (1) Directive 2001/18/EC on the deliberate release 
of GMOs into the environment (replacing Directive 90/220/EEC), (2) Regulation 
1829/2003/EC on GM food and feed (replacing Regulation 258/97, and (3) Regulation 
1830/3003/EC on traceability and labelling of GMOs and food and feed produced thereof.  
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Reagan Administration did curtail the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
on political grounds, in order to foster US biotech companies. And the European 
Commission adopted a cautious stance in order to stabilise the European food 
market and to restore the credibility of EU authorities and Community 
regulation.  
 
The reason why the political rationale underlying the US regulatory framework 
for GMOs is usually neglected – whereas the political nature of the EU 
regulations may be overdrawn sometimes – can be seen in the misconception of 
US agencies as politically neutral and purely technocratic institutions. However, 
Pollack and Shaffer noted that the relevant US agencies are not operating in a 
political vacuum:  
 
“US regulation of food safety by specialized [US] agencies is 
sometimes contrasted with European regulation of GMOs by 
politicians. It is contended that decision-making by these US 
agencies is more neutral and technocratic. However, none of the 
three US agencies (USDA, EPA, or FDA) are technically 
‘independent agencies’ in the sense used in the US political context 
in which independent agencies refer to agencies that Congress has 
created to be independent of the executive branch, such as the 
Federal Reserve Bank, Federal Trade Commission, and Federal 
Communications Commission. The USDA is a cabinet-level 
department within the executive; the FDA operates within the US 
Department of Health and Human Services, and the EPA, although 
not a ‘department’, operates under executive branch control. (…)586 
Moreover, all federal agencies, whether ‘independent’ or not of the 
executive branch, are subject to various legislative-branch control 
devices, such as Congress’s ability to pass new legislation,587 to 
                                                 
586 Providing examples of political inference, Pollack and Shaffer observed that “[t]he 
executive branch is periodically accused of using these agencies for political purposes, as 
when a senior USDA economist came under fire ‘for suggesting that the Bush administration 
could maximize votes in key dairy states by keeping milk prices high through the election’, or 
when EPA political appointees are accused of suppressing scientific studies showing global 
warming trends, arsenic levels in water, or particulate concentrations in air” (Mark A. 
Pollack, and Gregory C. Shaffer, When Cooperation Fails. The International Law and 
Politics of Genetically Modified Foods (Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 52, footnotes 
omitted).  
587 Examples of political inference by the legislative branch are the Delaney Clause and the 
debate about saccharin. The Delaney Clause was an amendment introduced in 1958 to the 
Food, Drugs and Cosmetic Act which forbade any food additive found to induce cancer 
during laboratory and/or animal testing. Because the amendment did not rely on threshold 
levels but ruled out carcinogens even at minuscule levels, the Delaney Clause “was opposed 
even by the FDA and many scientists” (William Patrick, The Food and Drug Administration 
(Chelsea House Publishers, 1988), pp. 38-39. In 1972, the USDA intended to ban saccharin 
 204 
allocate or withhold funds, or to object to key appointments, which 
limit their autonomy. US regulatory agencies’ actions are likewise 
subject to extensive administrative law requirements under the US 
Administrative Procedure Act, requiring prior notice and comment of 
all proposed regulations, backed up by judicial review before the 
federal courts. Interest groups can use these procedures to constrain 
agencies’ ability to operate, especially when coupled with constraints 
on these agencies’ enforcement budgets.”588 
 
Marsha Echols worked out relationships between different agricultural 
prototypes, i.e. systems of agricultural production, and regulatory approaches. 
Echols considered the US positioned in an agricultural prototype characterised 
by a segregation of food production and culture. In such a technology-driven 
agricultural system “[f]ood production and culture no longer overlap, since the 
majority of people have no personal knowledge about the production of what 
they eat. Farming must confront genetic engineering of seeds and plants, 
irradiation and technologies that create fortified and functional foods”.589 
Importantly, though, US regulation is seen as reflection of US agricultural 
policies and US agribusiness structure:  
 
“The involvement of corporations and large cooperatives in 
vertically integrated farming and the use of cutting edge production 
technologies and techniques, coupled with sophisticated marketing, 
give agribusiness its business slant. U.S. policy exhibits confidence 
in agribusiness, in the ability of science and scientific methodology 
to ensure a safe food supply and in new technologies like genetic 
modification. Its regulatory structure reflects the economic 
importance of the business of food production and the accompanying 
technological innovations. There is less direct financial support for 
farmers domestically, with the assumption that exports will help 
efficient farmers to survive. Hence the emphasis on market access 
and fair trade competition.” 590 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
because of alleged carcinogenicity, but US Congress passed special legislation for keeping 
saccharin on the market (National Research Council, Risk Assessment in the Federal 
Government: Managing the Process (National Academy Press, 1983), p. 14).  
588 Mark A. Pollack, and Gregory C. Shaffer, When Cooperation Fails. The International Law 
and Politics of Genetically Modified Foods (Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 51-52 
(original footnotes omitted).  
589 Marsha A. Echols, Food Safety and the WTO. The Interplay of Culture, Science and 
Technology (Kluwer Law International, 2001), p. 37.  
590 Marsha A. Echols, ibid. p. 37. Thomas Bernauer emphasised the predominant role played 
by the agribusiness in shaping US regulatory policy (see Thomas Bernauer, Genes, Trade, 
and Regulation. The Seeds of Conflict in Food Biotechnology (Princeton University Press, 
2003), p. 94-100.  
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The point which is stressed here is that both systems for regulating biotech 
products in the United States as well as in the European Union are the outcome 
of policy choices.591 Albeit the US system is typically characterised as based on 
‘sound science’, whereas the EU system is usually termed to be ‘politicised’, 
both systems have been established in line with respective political agendas. The 
fact that a regulatory system, albeit referring to ‘sound science’, may well have 
been established upon political intentions is a finding with the following 
consequences. First, the finding that regulatory systems invoking ‘sound 
science’ are nevertheless able to perform political functions may complicate and 
intensify frictions between different regulatory systems at the international level. 
With regard to the Biotech dispute between the United States and the European 
Union in particular, the finding that the application of a science-based approach 
is not tantamount to political neutrality may call into question the role of 
impartial arbiter attributed to science by the WTO Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement). The 
finding that even regulatory systems purportedly based on science may 
intrinsically be value-laden casts doubt on the role of science in the SPS 
Agreement in particular.592 Second, in view of the following general discussion 
                                                 
591 This conclusion is, of course, not limited to the US and the EU. Turkey, for instance, is 
challenged by its position between the GMO-critical EU and the GMO-friendly US. In this 
respect, Zeynep Kivilcim observed that  
“… [T]he decision on the adoption of agrobiotechnology was not motivated by 
the needs of Turkish farmers or oriented to the concerns of consumers. The 
administrative authorities were constrained by pressure from multinational 
agrobiotechnology companies.  
The regulatory work on agrobiotechnology in Turkey and the position of 
Turkish delegations during the negotiations for international treaties on biosafety 
are closely followed by American authorities. Interviews with Turkish officials 
reveal that the US Department of Agriculture and the American Embassy 
organize briefings or sometimes visits to the USA for concerned Turkish 
ministerial officials and members of parliament in order to communicate the 
benefits of the use of modern biotechnology in agriculture. (…) This pressure is 
real and effective. However, the Turkish government has also to fulfil its legal 
obligations under the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. Furthermore, EU 
membership is a political priority and the EU member countries are the main 
importers of Turkey’s agricultural products. Hence, the adoption of the 
community legal framework in the field of agriculture is a constant strain on the 
Turkish authorities” (Zeynep Kivilcim, ’The Legal Framework for 
Agrobiotechnology in Turkey: The Challenges to the Implementation of the 
Precautionary Principle,’ in Karapinar, Baris, Adaman, Fikret, and Ozertan 
Gokhan (eds.), Rethinking Structural Reform in Turkish Agriculture: Beyond the 
World Bank’s Strategy (Nova Science Publishers, 2010), [pp. 265-280], p. 277.  
592 In this respect, Marsha Echols noted that “[t]he United States and its principal consumer 
organizations had been leaders in the campaign for the science-based SPS Agreement” 
(Marsha A. Echols, Food Safety and the WTO. The Interplay of Culture, Science and 
Technology (Kluwer Law International, 2001), p. 37, footnote no. 59).  
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of positivism, it shall be noted that the reference to science does not exclude a 
political agenda from the outset.  
 
The following table shows how both the US and the EU regulatory framework 
for biotech products were established in line with respective political rationales 
and were implemented through agencies prone to political interferences.  
 
Comparison of US and EU Biotech Policies  
 
Characteristics Entity 
 United States European Union 
Decision-maker Reagan White House EU Commission 
Policy  Industry-oriented Consumer & farmer-
oriented 
Rationale US dominance of 
international markets 
Legitimacy of EU 
institutions, stability of 
the Common Market 
 
The above findings made in context of biotech regulation can be fairly 
generalised. Similar attempts for instrumentalising science have been observed 
particularly in trade disputes involving novel technologies for food production. 
Another telling example in this regard was the two-year controversy in the 
Codex Alimentarius Commission about ‘Statements of Principle Concerning the 
Role of Science in the Codex Decision-Making Process and the Extent to which 
other Factors are taken into Account’ (in the following: Statements of Principle). 
Reviewing the dispute over the Statements of Principle fought out within the 
Codex Alimentarius Commission, Josling et al. observed that  
 
“… the United States and [the] European Union sought to propagate 
decision criteria that favored their domestic agricultural policy 
regimes. The United States and its allies argued that food safety 
standards should rest solely on scientific evidence, while Europe and 
its allies sought to introduce a ‘need’ criterion, which held that 
productivity-enhancing food technologies threatened the livelihoods 
of economically marginal farmers and were not ‘needed’ in the face 
of excess global capacity. A compromise resulted in a statement that 
Codex standards ‘shall be based on the principle of sound scientific 
analysis and evidence’, but, where appropriate, Codex will consider 
‘other legitimate factors’ in protection consumer health and 
promoting fair trade practices …” 593 
                                                 
593 Tim Josling, Donna Roberts and David Orden, Food Regulation and Trade. Toward a Safe 
and Open Global System (Institute for International Economics, 2004), footnote no. 8, pp. 43-
44. Josling et al. added that “[s]ubsequent efforts by Codex to translate these principles into 
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Different agricultural policies are leading to different regulatory approaches 
which, in turn, are providing different foundations for the judiciary, both 
domestically and internationally. In this respect, Elizabeth Fisher showed that 
different regulatory regimes may lead to different approaches towards risk 
analysis by panels and the Appellate Body. Particularly referring to the case EC 
– Hormones, Fisher found that the Panel was following US regulatory doctrine, 
whereas the Appellate Body’s approach rather reflected regulatory policies of 
the EU:  
 
“[T]he Panel’s risk assessment/risk management distinction is a 
product of US regulatory politics, and, in embracing this distinction, 
the Panel also embraced the RI [i.e. rational-instrumental] paradigm 
that has dominated US risk regulation for the last 20 years. In 
contrast, the Appellate Body could be understood as reflecting the 
more deliberative nature of EU regulatory standard-setting.” 594 
 
In terms of a summary of previous paragraphs, two basic approaches towards 
agriculture have been identified. On the one hand, there is growth- or market-
oriented agriculture, formerly also called ‘empirical agriculture’. The objective 
of ‘empirical agriculture’, namely production increase and profit maximisation, 
is shaped by economic sciences. The objective is achieved by applying labour-
saving, i.e., efficient and innovative technologies such as large-scale 
mechanisation and automation, genetic engineering, and cloning. Limits to 
market-oriented agricultural production are established in an ‘objective’ manner, 
by relying on empirical testing carried out by quarantine sciences. By 
determining appropriate levels of protection (ALOP), anthropocentric criteria 
are applied. Because the determination of appropriate levels of protection 
(ALOP) is based on the same sciences, i.e. quarantine sciences, and 
anthropocentric criteria are basically the same everywhere, namely health 
protection and the protection of investments in animals and crops, resulting 
levels of protection are basically globally valid and can thus be standardised at 
the international level.  
 
On the other hand, there is equilibrium-centred or sustenance agriculture, 
formerly also called ‘rational agriculture’. The objective of ‘rational 
agriculture,’ namely the maintenance of soil nutrient cycles and the well-being 
of rural communities including all animals, plants and natural resources upon 
                                                                                                                                                        
more specific guidance have achieved some progress, but fundamental differences in 
approaches to risk management are still evident …” (Tim Josling et al., ibid.).  
594 Elizabeth Fisher, ‘Beyond the Science/Democracy Dichotomy: The World Trade 
organisation Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement and Administrative Constitutionalism’, in 
Christian Joerges and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (eds.), Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade 
Governance and Social Regulation (Hart Publishing, 2006), [pp. 327-349], p. 345 (footnotes 
omitted).  
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which they are build upon, follows basic principles, as established by natural 
sciences. The objectives are achieved by applying resource-saving and locally 
adapted technologies and traditional knowledge. If sustenance agriculture would 
dominate, no limits to production would be required because production is 
meant to remain more or less stable. However, considering globalised realities 
of today, the protection of persisting and new forms of sustenance farming 
would require ‘draconian regulation’ in particular at the international level. At 
local levels, in turn, food safety would be assured by community control based 
on traditional forms of knowledge such as Ayurveda and empirical testing on 
respective local markets. Thus, appropriate levels of protection (ALOP) would 
be determined by the (local) people concerned and contingent upon different 
modes of production.  
 
Because modes of production shall be taken into account, ecocentric approaches 
for determining ALOP have been characterised as process-based. Vandana 
Shiva stressed that “[d]iverse production processes and products need laws and 
science appropriate to them. Chemical processing needs chemistry labs and 
chemists, GMOs need genetic ID laws, organic processing needs indigenous 
science and community control.”595 Hence, different products would attract 
different regulation; for local products local rules would apply, whereas for 
industrial products national and international standards might be appropriate. 
Finally, genetically modified organisms (GMOs) would be the object of 
particularly strict regulation, taking into account preferences of local 
communities. The resulting regulatory landscape would be one of regulatory 
fragmentation: at the international level, ‘draconian controls’ would protect 
persisting and new forms of sustenance farming. However, at national levels and 
particularly at local levels, scopes and levels of protection would be varying 
considerably, according to specific requirement of respective communities.  
 
Today, however, the regulatory landscape is dominated by the rules of the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO). With regard to the determination of 
appropriate levels of protection (ALOP) in particular, the Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) takes 
centre stage. The SPS Agreement basically requires that protective measures are 
based on a risk assessment, carried out by quarantine sciences. As mentioned 
above, the scope of the SPS Agreement is anthropocentric, i.e., covering 
measures to protect human health and related agricultural investments. Because 
the scope of ecocentric approaches towards the determination of appropriate 
levels (ALOP) is broader than the scope of anthropocentric approaches, a range 
of measures based on ecocentric worldviews would, in principle, fall outside the 
narrow scope of the SPS Agreement. But because of the broad interpretation of 
                                                 
595 Vandana Shiva, Earth Democracy. Justice, Sustainability, and Peace (Zed Books, 2005), 
p. 158. 
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the scope of the SPS Agreement, protective measures based on ecocentric 
worldviews may nevertheless be considered in light of the disciplines set forth 
by the SPS Agreement.596 On this account, measures based on ecocentric 
worldviews are challenged to qualify for approval by rules and disciplines 
actually designed according to a different, namely anthropocentric, world-
conception. According to SPS rules, the challenge to qualify for ‘scientificity’ 
has to be accepted by putting forward a risk assessment pursuant to Article 5 of 
the SPS Agreement. This is why fundamental controversies translate into 
‘scientific’ disputes.597 However, the transformation of fundamental 
controversies into scientific disputes seems inappropriate for addressing the 
former. In particular, examples of WTO disputes over applications of growth-
hormones to cattle (EC – Hormones) and biotechnology in food production (EC 
– Biotech) are showing that the science-based approach of the SPS Agreement is 
inappropriate to address fundamental controversies between opposing world-
conceptions. Rather than addressing underlying fundamental questions, SPS 
disputes are fought out by emplacing contradictory ‘risk assessments’. Thus, risk 
disputes became proxies for underlying controversies between conflicting 
worldviews. However, as Tracey Epps observed, “the SPS Agreement is not the 
appropriate venue where health is not a concern and disputes turn on public 
morals and concerns about socio-economic factors, such as maintaining a 
traditional rural sector”.598 In fact, when conflicting world-conceptions are at 
stake, the science-based approach of the SPS Agreement leaves interested 
parties no alternative than to bend scientific arguments into the shape of 
respective political agendas.  
 
                                                 
596 In particular, the scope of the SPS Agreement was significantly broadened by the panel in 
EC – Biotech considering that GMOs are covered by the SPS Agreement and by establishing 
strict requirements for the applicability of the Cartagena Protocol in trade disputes. With 
respect to the broad interpretation of the scope of the SPS Agreement by case law, Lukasz 
Gruszczynski noted that,  
“[a]s a consequence of the broad interpretation of the conditions pertaining to its 
applicability, the Agreement appears to cover different regulatory measures, 
some of them exceeding traditional SPS risks. In particular, indirect risks as well 
as some environmental risks, which are reducible to animal and plant life and 
health and which result from the entry, establishment and spread of pests, proved 
to constitute an SPS risk” (Lukasz Gruszczynski, Regulating Health and 
Environmental Risks under WTO Law. A Critical Analysis of the SPS Agreement 
(Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 71).  
597 It is not denied that most WTO disputes are motivated by more tangible interests than 
philosophical world-conceptions. The aim of the study at hand is, however, to demonstrate 
that by focusing on tangible interests only, underlying causes of WTO disputes can hardly be 
understood, yet settled.  
598 Tracey Epps, International Trade and Health Protection. A Critical Assessment of the 
WTO’s SPS Agreement (Edward Elgar, 2008), p. 305.  
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PART TWO: SCIENCE AND JUDGEMENT IN RISK 
ASSESSMENT 
 
The conclusion of part one was that risk regulation essentially is very much a 
political exercise. In part two, it shall be shown that risk assessment requires 
non-scientific considerations, i.e. judgement, for bridging data gaps and theory 
gaps. These so-called inferential or inference bridges are taken as 
epistemological arguments for further questioning the positivist presumption 
that risk assessment can – and should – be void of political considerations.  
 
 
CHAPTER 6 RISK ASSESSMENT: SCIENCE OR ART? 
 
In the previous chapter, it was shown that risk regulation at national or regional 
levels is primarily a political exercise. However, the political nature of risk 
regulation inevitably influences procedures preceding risk regulation, that is, 
risk assessment.  
 
The problem shall be explained by providing the following example of pesticide 
usage: Considering the use of pesticides, an economically rational farmer would 
consider the pesticide question mainly from a perspective of profitability. He 
would ask “Is a rise in pesticide use profitable?” A consumer, on the other hand, 
would consider the pesticide question mainly from a health perspective. He 
would ask ”Does a rise in pesticide use harm my health?”. Thus, from a farmer’s 
perspective, but taking into account regulatory restrictions, the question to 
scientific risk assessors would be “Where is the highest threshold up to which I 
can increase the use of pesticide X unless consumer’s health starts to become 
affected?” From a consumer’s point of view, in contrast, the question to 
scientific risk assessors would be “Where is the lowest threshold at which 
adverse effects deriving from the use of pesticide X might occur?” The question 
from which perspective risk issues are approached is fundamental.  
 
From a theoretical point of view, the fundamental question of perspective in risk 
considerations can be addressed in two ways; either it is left to scientific risk 
assessors themselves, or it is decided by risk managers. Proponents of the first 
alternative are of the view that scientific risk assessments and science in general 
are ‘neutral’ and ‘objective’. Proponents of the second approach argue that 
science and scientists are inseparable of society and that the claim for scientific 
neutrality and objectivity is a positivist illusion. Whereas adherents to the first 
group may be called objectivists or positivists, followers of the second approach 
may be called subjectivist or relativists. Whereas positivists consider risk 
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assessment as a scientific discipline and science as intrinsically objective and 
neutral, relativists consider risk assessment as a method, providing different 
outcomes contingent upon the person applying it. Whereas positivists emphasise 
the universality of science and scientific elements in the risk concept, relativists 
point at the functional component of the risk idea, i.e., the intrinsically 
expansive character of the risk analysis method. Whereas positivists abstract 
from the functional component of the risk concept, that is, its expansive 
character in favour of those individuals applying it, relativists tend to disregard 
the existence of objective components in the concept of risk. 
 
If one follows a positivist risk conception, facts and values can be separated and 
the former can be assessed in the stage of risk assessment. Because positivists 
presume that scientifically established facts are value-neutral, they are of the 
view that scientific risk assessments will provide unbiased and universally 
acceptable outcomes. Therefore, positivists are calling for a strict separation of 
risk analysis phases, in particular between the stage of scientific risk assessment 
and the stage of policy-driven risk management.  
 
If one follows a relativist notion of risk, however, facts and values cannot be 
separated and both have to be taken into account already in the stage of risk 
assessment. Because relativists do not presume that scientifically established 
facts are value-neutral, they are not of the view that scientific risk assessments 
will provide unbiased and universally acceptable outcomes. Therefore, 
relativists are not calling for a strict separation of risk analysis phases, in 
particular between the stage of scientific risk assessment and the stage of policy-
driven risk management. 
 
The two concepts of risks are reflections of the enigmatic character of risk and 
its Janus face. The reason for its enigmatic character is that risk is not a natural 
or ‘given’ fact, but the product of an intellectual exercise. Basically, that 
intellectual exercise consists in attributing to a certain factual danger a certain 
probability of occurrence in the future. The intellectual exercise producing risk 
is called risk assessment. Through the intellectual exercise of risk assessment, 
naturally occurring or man-made dangers are examined. In particular, the 
intellectual exercise of risk assessment is meant to figure out the probability of a 
factual danger to occur in the future.599 Hence, a distinction has to be made 
between risks and factual dangers. The technical term for a factual danger is 
hazard.  
                                                 
599 The decisive role of ‘future’ as a major element in scientific forecasting was emphasised, 
inter alia, by Hans Jonas calling for a comparative futurology as a new scientific discipline 
(Hans Jonas, Das Prinzip Verantwortung. Versuch einer Ethik für die technologische 
Zivilisation (Insel Verlag, 1979), p. 62; taken from Christoph Rehmann-Sutter, ‘Ethik’, in 
Christoph Rehmann-Sutter, Adrian Vatter, Hansjörg Seiler, Partizipative Risikopolitik 
(Westdeutscher Verlag, 1998), p. 66.  
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The Codex Alimentarius Commission, for example, defines hazard as a 
“biological, chemical or physical agent in, or condition of, food with the 
potential to cause an adverse health effect”.600 Hence, in everyday speech, a 
hazard is “something which can cause adverse (health) effects”. In contrast to 
risk, the term hazard does not carry any notion of probability or severity with it. 
Rather, the term hazard may imply some degree of randomness. Hazard simply 
stands for a certain threat at issue, whereas risk is a measurement indicating 
whether and how that threat may manifest itself. Whereas a hazard can be 
comprehended by empirical observation and based on past experience, a risk 
requires considerations of probabilities and future alternatives.601 Hence, hazard 
and risk must be distinguished.602 However, whereas hazard and risk must be 
distinguished, they become related through the process of risk assessment. As 
said, risk assessment can be understood as a way to evaluate the probability of a 
future hazard manifestation. Hence, risk assessment relates hazard and risk into 
an intellectual relationship. Therefore, risk assessment can be understood as an 
intellectual mode for transforming factual and randomly occurring hazards into 
assessable and predictable risks. Risk assessment, in turn, is the first stage of a 
broader process called risk analysis. There is widespread consent that risk 
analysis consists of the three stages: (i) risk assessment, (ii) risk management, 
and (iii) risk communication. 603 However, unanimity ends when it comes to the 
content of each of these stages and interplays between them. 
 
If one follows the positivist notion of risk, then the assessment of risk is a 
scientific operation. From a positivist point of view, risk analysis and the stage 
of risk assessment in particular is a process essentially based on ‘objective’, 
hence quantitative and scientific principles, such as mathematical algorithms and 
statistical methods. Based on the premise that  facts and values can be separated 
positivists are calling for a strict separation of risk analysis phases, in particular 
between the stage of ‘scientific’ risk assessment and the stage of ‘policy-driven’ 
risk management. Therefore, from a positivist point of view, the approach of the 
risk analysis model to discern between the three stages risk assessment, risk 
                                                 
600 Codex Alimentarius Commission, Procedural Manual, Section IV, ‘Definitions of Risk 
Analysis Terms related to Food Safety’, 19th ed. (Secretariat of the Joint FAO/WHO Food 
Standards Programme, 2010), p. 92. 
601 Hellström, for example, stated that risk is „not real (or a natural kind)“ whereas hazards 
„can be said to be real in some respect“ (Thomas Hellström, Risk-Based Planning. 
Institutional Uncertainty in the Science-Policy Interface, Doctoral Dissertation at Göteborg 
University, Department of Theory of Science and Research, (Göteborg University, 1998), p. 
8).  
602 The distinction between hazard and risk is commonly acknowledged in risk theory. See, 
for example, Stanley Kaplan and B. John Garrick, ’On The Quantitative Definition of Risk’ 
(1981), 1 Risk Analysis, p. 12. 
603 Adrian Ely, Andy Stierling, Marion Dreyer, Ortwin Renn, Ellen Vos, and Frank Wendler, 
‘The Need for Change’, in Marion Dreyer and Ortwin Renn (eds.) Food Safety Governance. 
Integrating Science, Precaution and Public Involvement (Springer-Verlag, 2009), p. 11.  
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management and risk communication is more than a formal concept. From a 
positivist perspective, the separation of different stages in risk analysis, in 
particular between risk assessment and risk management, is a fundamental, yet 
substantive issue. Without a clear separation of risk assessment and risk 
management, i.e. of facts and values, the ‘scientificity’ of risk analysis would be 
questioned entirely.  
 
If one follows the relativist notion of risk, on the other hand, risk assessment is 
rather an art, involving projections into the future and value judgements. From a 
relativist viewpoint, assumptions underlying risk assessments in general and 
probability estimates in particular inevitably require some human judgement. 
Arguing that the establishment of facts can never be value-neutral, relativists are 
not calling for a strict separation of risk analysis phases. In particular, relativists 
consider that the stages of ‘scientific’ risk assessment and the stage of ‘policy-
driven’ risk management are intertwined. Relativists consider the differentiation 
between the three stages for risk analysis, i.e. risk assessment, risk management 
and risk communication, as a conceptual tool for organising the process. 
Though, the formal character of the division of risk analysis into three different 
stages nevertheless allows for substantive interlinks between the three stages. 
From a relativist point of view, a clear and substantive separation of risk 
analysis stages, in particular between risk assessment and risk management, 
would fragment the whole process into dysfunctional components.  
 
In the following, it is shown that already in the first stage of risk analysis, i.e., in 
the risk assessment stage, non-scientific considerations are inevitable. In 
particular, human judgement is required for bridging data gaps and theory gaps 
(so-called inferential or inference bridges). In risk analysis practice, the 
requirement for some sort of guidance for scientific risk assessors is 
acknowledged. In particular, guidance is required for providing scientific risk 
assessors with directives on the question on what assumptions inferential bridges 
shall be based. Guidance provided by risk managers to scientific risk assessors is 
usually known as risk assessment policy.604  
 
A. Bridges over Swamplands 
 
The purpose of the first stage of risk analysis, i.e., risk assessment, is to infer 
from identifiable but randomly occurring hazards to predictable estimates. 
Technically, estimates of hazard occurrence are called risk, risk characterisation 
                                                 
604 In the field of food safety, risk assessment policy should consist of ‘[d]ocumented 
guidelines on the choice of options and associated judgements for their application at 
appropriate decision points in the risk assessment such that the scientific integrity of the 
process is maintained’ (Codex Alimentarius Commission, Procedural Manual, 19th edition 
(Secretariat of the Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme, 2010), p. 92.).  
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or risk estimate.605 The methods for inferring from hazard to risk can differ, 
contingent upon the hazard in question (e.g., naturally occurring hazard, or man-
made hazard?) and the conditions under which a particular risk assessment is 
operating (e.g., available scientific information, technical resources, political 
constraints, etc.). Regarding methods of risk assessment, a classification 
provided by Hellström was presented above. As mentioned, Hellström discerned 
between three approaches to risk assessment, namely technical, economic, and 
psychometric risk assessments. The three approaches share the attempt of trying 
to bridge, each in its respective field of operation, from identified hazards to 
estimates about the occurrence of those hazards. The methods for bridging the 
gap between random hazards and predictable risk estimates are varying, 
contingent upon the field of operation (technical, economic, psychometric). 
Nevertheless, any risk assessment approach is challenged at one step or another 
by missing scientific information.606 Therefore, any risk assessment approach 
requires methods for bridging gaps of scientific information between hazards 
and risks. Gaps of scientific information are usually bridged by the technique of 
inference: from some piece of scientific information it is inferred to another 
peace of scientific information, thus expanding the scope of scientific 
consideration beyond ‘experience’. Inference from smaller to bigger pieces is 
called induction.607 The opposite approach, i.e., inferring from a broad piece of 
information to a single statement, is called deduction.  
 
                                                 
605 Risk in the technical sense means the probability of hazard occurrence. Risk 
characterisation is the technical term used for the fourth step in risk assessment, as well as the 
product thereof. The product of the stage of risk characterisation in risk assessment is also 
called risk estimates. It should be noted that already by the choice of terms, different 
approaches towards risk analysis express themselves. Whereas objectivists prefer the term 
“risk characterisation”, implying a high degree of scientificity, constructivists prefer the term 
“risk estimate”, hinting at the notion that risk is a mental construct. 
606 Missing scientific data is, of course, not an issue particular to the risk assessment 
discipline. Rather, missing scientific data are the raison d’être of scientific endeavours; in a 
state of complete scientific knowledge, there is no need for further scientific efforts.  
607 Legendary is David Hume’s (1711-1776) application of induction to literally small pieces, 
namely eggs. Hume reasoned:  
“Nothing so like as eggs; yet no one, on account of this apparent similarity, 
expects the same taste and relish in all of them. ‘Tis only after a long course of 
uniform experiments in any kind, that we attain a firm reliance and security with 
regard to a particular event. Now where is that process of reasoning, which from 
one instance draws a conclusion, so different from that which it infers from a 
hundred instances, that are no way different from that single instance? This 
question I propose as much for the sake of information, as with any intention of 
raising difficulties. I cannot find, I cannot imagine any such reasoning. But I 
keep my mind still open to instruction, if any one will vouchsafe to bestow it on 
me” (David Hume, ‘Philosophical Essays concerning Human Understanding’, in 
John Maynard Keynes, A Treatise on Probability, first published in 1920 
(Cosimo, 2006), p. 217).  
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Induction is typically applied if some piece of scientific evidence has been 
discovered, for example through laboratory experimentation, but a broader 
picture, i.e., a scientific theory, has not yet been established.608  
 
Because in the final chapter reference is made to the critical method in science 
which, in turn, is based upon Karl Popper’s refutation of induction and 
‘inductivism’, a question mark is already set behind induction as a scientific 
method at this point.609 
 
                                                 
608 Popper called “an inference ‘inductive’ if it passes from singular statements (sometimes 
also called ‘particular’ statements), such as accounts of the results of observations or 
experiments, to universal statements, such as hypotheses or theories” (Karl R. Popper, The 
Logic of Scientific Discovery, 2nd English edition, (Hutchinson & Co Publishers, 1968), p. 
27).  
An earlier – probably even the first ever established – description of induction as scientific 
method was provided by Ibn al-Haytham in his Book of Optics:  
“We should, that is, recommence the inquiry into its principles and premisses, 
beginning our investigation with an inspection of the things that exist and a 
survey of the conditions of visible objects. We should distinguish the properties 
of particulars, and gather by induction what pertains to the eye when vision takes 
place and what is found in the manner of sensation to be uniform, unchanging, 
manifest and not subject to doubt. After which we should ascend in our inquiry 
and reasonings, gradually and orderly, criticizing premisses and exercising 
caution in regard to conclusions – our aim in all that we make subject to 
inspection and review being to employ justice, not to follow prejudice, and to 
take care in all that we judge and criticize that we seek the truth and not to be 
swayed by opinion” (A. I. Sabra, The Optics of Ibn al-Haytham, Books I-III On 
Direct Vision. Vol. 1 (Translation). Translated with introduction and 
commentary by A. I. Sabra. Studies of the Warburg Institute, vol. 40, i 
(University of London, 1989). pp. 5-6; emphasis added. Specifically on Ibn al-
Haytham’s approach to induction, see Saleh Beshara Omar, Ibn al-Haytham’s 
Optics (Bibliotheca Islamica, Minneapolis, 1977), §§ 147-148.  
609 In fact, Karl Popper bluntly stated that “there is no such thing as induction” (Karl R. 
Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, 2nd English edition, (Hutchinson & Co Publishers, 
1968), p. 40). According to Popper, inductive “inference to theories, from singular statements 
which are ‘verified by experience (whatever that may mean), is logically inadmissible” (Karl 
R. Popper, ibid.). With ‘inductivism’, Popper denoted ‘belief philosophers’ taking subjective 
experience as point of reference. In Poppers words, inductivistic epistemologists “fail to 
distinguish between objective and subjective knowledge. This leads them to believe in belief 
as the genus of which knowledge is a species (‘justification’ or perhaps a ‘criterion of truth’ 
such as clarity and distinctness, or vivacity, or ‘sufficient reason’, providing the specific 
difference)” (Karl R. Popper, Objective Knowledge. An Evolutionary Approach (Oxford 
University Press, 1973), p. 25, footnote omitted. Popper concluded: “This is why (…) I do not 
believe in belief” (ibid.). 
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Deduction, on the other hand, is typically invoked if a broader theory has been 
established, for example the theory of relativity, and shall now be applied on a 
single case, or tested empirically. 610 
 
From the two ways of applying inference, i.e. induction and deduction, one can 
see that there are typically two categories of missing scientific information: a) 
missing factual information, and b) theory gaps. In fact, the NRC identified two 
categories of epistemological problems in risk assessments: “missing or 
ambiguous information on a particular substance and gaps in current scientific 
theory”.611 Such information gaps and theory gaps, the NRC found, are requiring 
inferential bridges allowing the risk assessment process to overcome the gaps.612 
As the term “inference” suggests, these inferential bridges imply human 
judgement. Or, in the words of the NRC: “The judgments made by the 
scientist/risk assessor (…) often entail a choice among several scientifically 
plausible options”.613 The NRC referred to different scientifically plausible 
options as inference options.  
 
The term inferential bridge depicts the idea of artificial structures built over 
gaps of knowledge aptly, yet it is a common epistemological metaphor. In this 
regard, Karl Popper observed that the empirical basis of objective science is 
nothing ‘absolute’. In metaphorical language, Popper explained that science 
                                                 
610 Deduction works from universal statements to singular statements. Popper explained: 
“From a new idea, put up tentatively, and not yet justified in any way – an anticipation, a 
hypothesis, a theoretical system, or that you will – conclusions are drawn by means of logical 
deduction” (Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, 2nd English edition, 
(Hutchinson & Co Publishers, 1968), p. 32. A particular form of logical deduction is “the 
testing of the theory by way of empirical applications of the conclusions which can be derived 
from it” (Karl R. Popper, ibid., p. 33). By doing so, a theory can be empirically falsified, but – 
following Popper – not empirically, i.e., positively, verified. Popper established the criterion 
of falsifiability as follows:  
“Theories are, therefore, never empirically verifiable. If we wish to avoid the 
positivist’s mistake of eliminating, by our criterion of demarcation, the 
theoretical systems of natural science, then we must choose a criterion which 
allows us to admit to the domain of empirical science even statements which 
cannot be verified. But I shall certainly admit a system as empirical or scientific 
only if it is capable of being tested by experience. These considerations suggest 
that not the verifiability but the falsifiability of a system is to be taken as a 
criterion of demarcation. In other words: I shall not require of a scientific system 
that it shall be capable of being singled out, once and for all, in a positive sense; 
but I shall require that its logical form shall be such that it can be singled out, by 
means of empirical tests, in a negative sense: it must be possible for an empirical 
scientific system to be refuted by experience (Karl R. Popper, ibid., pp. 40-41, 
original emphasis, footnotes omitted).  
611 National Research Council, Risk Assessment in the Federal Government: Managing the 
Process (National Academy Press, 1983), p. 28. 
612 National Research Council, ibid.  
613 National Research Council, ibid. 
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“does not rest upon solid bedrock.” In contrast, Popper depicted a swampland of 
ignorance, upon which science erects the “bold structure of its theories.” In 
Poppers words, science is “like a building erected on piles” whose piles are 
drilled into the swamp. However, the piles do not reach down to a naturally, 
somehow ‘predefined’ or ‘given’ ground. “If we stop driving the piles deeper,” 
Popper said, “it is not because we have reached firm ground. We simply stop 
when we are satisfied that the piles are firm enough to carry the structure, at 
least for the time being.”614 
 
Neither positivists nor relativists deny the requirement for inferential bridges in 
risk assessment in order to overcome knowledge gaps. Positivist and relativists, 
however, disagree on the weight and role inferential bridges shall play in risk 
assessment. On the one hand, positivists are pointing at the narrowness of the 
swamp of ignorance, the solidity of the bridge and the fact that each day 
thousands of cars are passing through. Relativists, on the other hand, are 
emphasising the extensiveness of the swamplands, the shaky grounds at both 
ends of the bridge, and the fact that a bridge of similar type has broken down in 
                                                 
614 Karl R. Popper, Logik der Forschung, 6th edition (J.C.B Mohr (Paul Siebeck) 1976), pp. 
75-76; and Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, 2nd English edition, 
(Hutchinson & Co Publishers, 1968), p. 111. The English edition is a translation of Logik der 
Forschung, published in Vienna in 1934 (imprint ‘1935’). The translation was prepared by 
Karl R. Popper himself, assisted by Julius and Lan Freed. The section shall be provided in 
full:  
“The empirical basis of objective science has thus nothing ‘absolute’ about it. 
Science does not rest upon solid bedrock. The bold structure of its theories rises, 
as it were, above a swamp. It is like a building erected on piles. The piles are 
driven down from above into the swamp, but not down to any natural or ‘given’ 
base; and if we stop driving the piles deeper, it is not because we have reached 
firm ground. We simply stop when we are satisfied that the piles are firm 
enough to carry the structure, at least for the time being” (Karl R. Popper, The 
Logic of Scientific Discovery, 2nd English edition, (Hutchinson & Co Publishers, 
1968), p. 111, footnote omitted).  
The metaphor of the bold structures of scientific theories rising above swamplands of 
ignorance and the conclusion drawn from it by Popper that “the objectivity of science can be 
bought only at the cost of relativity” was considered “the end of foundationist philosophy by 
Malachi Hacohen. Following Hacohen, objectivity no longer rested upon solid bedrock but 
“on the turns of scientific experimentation and criticism, as much a matter of vagary and luck 
as of talent and method”. Hacohen added that therefore, Popper should be considered a 
nonfoundationist philosopher, instead of associating him with foundationism (see Malachi 
Hacohen, ‘Critical Rationalism, Logical Positivism, and the Poststructuralist Conundrum: 
Reconsidering the Neurath-Popper Debate’, in Michael Heidelberger, Friedrich Stadler (eds.), 
History of Philosophy of Science. New Trends and Perspectives (Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 2002), p. 307). It seems that the finding of modern epistemology that science 
resembles to a structure built over swampy grounds whose firmness is “as much a matter of 
vagary and luck as of talent and method” does neither correspond with naïve positivist’s 
assertions that science is objective, nor with public calls for scientific certainty particularly in 
risk assessment.  
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a recent earthquake. Whereas objectivists trust in the technological splendour of 
the pile dwelling, constructivists question seismologic data put forward by the 
contractor and local politicians. In other words, whereas positivist emphasise the 
solid grounds of available scientific data, relativists point at the huge gaps 
requiring subjective judgement. Whereas positivists emphasise the extensiveness 
of scientific data available, relativists point at the missing links and black holes 
and persisting scientific uncertainties.  
 
 
 
Inferential Bridge  
 
 
B. Beyond Probability 
 
Different perceptions by objectivists and constructivists can also be shown by 
looking at respective limits of inference bridges.  
 
Objectivists are of the view that virtually every gap in scientific knowledge can 
be bridged, that this is just a matter of time. Objectivists perceive inference 
bridges as a tool for overcoming gaps in scientific data or gaps in scientific 
theory. But objectivists believe that in any case, these gaps can be bridged in the 
end.  
 
Constructivists, on the other hand, consider that there are scientific problems 
other than data gaps and theory gaps. In such cases, constructivists refer to 
scientific uncertainty.  
 
Considering risk assessment, objectivists point at scientific data and elements of 
scientific theory which are available, whereas constructivists tend to focus on 
INFERENCE 
(Assumption) 
(Judgement) 
 
          
HAZARD RISK 
(objective) (subjective) 
(Reality) (Perception)
 (Randomness) (Probability) 
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scientific data and elements of scientific theory which are missing. From the 
perspective of objectivists, risk is an issue of imperfect scientific information 
which can be ascertained by adding on scientific data and theory. From the 
perspective of constructivist, however, there exist situations where scientific 
information is incomplete, namely situations of scientific uncertainty. In 
situations of incomplete scientific information, constructivists don’t rely on risk 
assessment in the first instance, but tend to invoke precaution. 
 
Shrader-Frechette referred to (probabilistic) uncertainty for characterising cases 
in which the probability of a given outcome is unknown.615 As an example, 
Shrader-Frechette mentioned the “partial ignorance” about the probability 
whether in a nuclear power plant a core meltdown accident might happen.616 On 
the other hand, in cases where probabilities relating to the outcome of certain 
choices are known, then one typically speaks of risk. In this regard, Shrader-
Frechette pointed at the classical example of choices between bets on fair coins 
for which probabilities have been established. Shrader-Frechette referred to 
classical situations of choices under conditions of calculated probabilities as 
“risks in the Bayesian sense (after Thomas Bayes, a British mathematician in the 
18th century). Shrader-Frechette further discerned situations of unknown 
probabilities (probabilistic uncertainty) and established probabilities (risk in the 
Bayesian sense) from situations of certainty. Under conditions of scientific 
certainty, the outcome of choice is known. As an example of scientific certainty, 
Shrader-Frechette mentioned the fact that nuclear power production results in 
nuclear waste to manage.617  
 
Certain approaches in risk theory are invoking different categories for risk and 
uncertainty for discerning between two distinct situations. Risk, on the one hand, 
characterised situations where knowledge gaps can be bridged by assumptions, 
e.g. in risk assessments. Uncertainty, on the other hand, stands for situations 
                                                 
615 Shrader-Frechette referred to situations where probabilities of given outcomes are 
unknown as uncertainty. In contrast, situations where probabilities of given outcomes are 
known were referred to as risks (Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, Risk and Rationality. 
Philosophical Foundations for Populist Reforms (University of California Press, 1991), pp. 
101-102).  
616 From a today’s perspective, this example seems somehow questionable. In fact, the risk of 
a core meltdown seems to be better addressed by what Hellström called multi-dimensional 
environmental risk assessment. Although resulting hypotheses are so manifold that the 
distinction between risk and uncertainty becomes blurred, the probability of a reactor 
catastrophe, as well as its fatal impact, seems nevertheless accessible for probability 
considerations.  
617 Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, Risk and Rationality. Philosophical Foundations for Populist 
Reforms (University of California Press, 1991), pp. 101-102.  
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where knowledge gaps seem to be too huge to overcome and therefore 
precaution is required.618 
 
In fact, the concept of discerning between risk and uncertainty dates back to the 
work of Frank Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, originally published in 
1921. Epistemologically highly significant is Knight’s attribution of the term 
‘objective’ to the concept of risk and the term ‘subjective’ to the notion of 
‘uncertainty’, respectively.619 In practice, the difference between risk and 
uncertainty manifests as follows:  
 
“The practical difference between the two categories, risk and 
uncertainty, is that in the former the distribution of the outcome in a 
group of instances is known (either through calculation a priori or 
from statistics of past experience), while in the case of uncertainty 
this is not true, the reason being in general that it is impossible to 
form a group of instances, because the situation dealt with is in a 
high degree unique. The best example of uncertainty is in connection 
with the exercise of judgment or the formation of those opinions as 
to the future course of events, which opinions (and not scientific 
knowledge) actually guide most of our conduct.” 620 
 
Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen related the term risk to situations where knowledge 
is incomplete, opposing them to situations where knowledge is imperfect. 
According to Georgescu-Roegen, the point is that “incomplete refers to 
knowledge as a whole, but imperfect refers to a particular piece of the extant 
knowledge”.621 For an example, Georgescu-Roegen pointed at the fact that we 
know in advance that the next birth in a certain case will either be a girl or a 
boy. However, far in advance, only laws of randomness might provide some 
guidance in guessing the correct sex of the future birth: “Knowledge of pertinent 
laws – say, the correlation of an infant’s sex with the mother’s age, with the sex 
of his elder siblings, etc. – would enable us only to guess correctly more often, 
not to reach perfect knowledge”.622 The situation of someone guessing whether 
the next birth will result in the birth of a girl or a boy is, hence, one of imperfect 
                                                 
618 Actually, there is no coherent taxonomy of uncertainty vis-à-vis of risk. Lukasz 
Gruszczynski, for instance, noted that “there is no established classification of uncertainty in 
the literature. Different authors put forward their own taxonomies, which divide uncertainty 
according to such criteria as a source, nature, or type of generated methodological challenges” 
(Lukasz Gruszczynski, Regulating Health and Environmental Risks under WTO Law. A 
Critical Analysis of the SPS Agreement (Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 31; footnote 
omitted).  
619 Frank H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (Dover Publications, 2006), p. 233.  
620 Frank H. Knight, ibid.  
621 Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, The Entropy Law and the Economic Process (Harvard 
University Press, 1971), p. 122. 
622 Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, ibid. 
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knowledge. According to Georgescu-Roegen, situations of imperfect knowledge 
are related to risk: “Risk describes the situations where the exact outcome is not 
known but the outcome does not represent a novelty.”623 
 
Uncertainty, on the other hand, relates to situations of incomplete knowledge. 
According to Georgescu-Roegen, “[u]ncertainty applies to cases where the 
reason why we cannot predict the outcome s that the same event has never been 
observed in the past and, hence, it may involve a novelty”.624 As an example, 
Georgescu-Roegen put forward the question what sort of species may, or may 
not, evolve from homo sapiens, a question to which we have absolutely no 
answer, hence, we are in a situation of incomplete knowledge.  
 
Finally, knowledge may be considered of being insufficient for making a 
decision in cases where there is hope to obtain additional knowledge within a 
reasonable period of time. Examples are time periods required for carrying out 
animal experiments in risk assessments. 
 
Drawing from Georgescu-Roegen, the following stages from certainty to 
uncertainty can be observed:  
 
1. Scientific Certainty: scientific information is considered to be 
sufficient for making an informed decision. Empirical testing and the 
transfer of knowledge from generation to generation can provide a 
solid stock of accumulated, empirically-based “certainty”.  
2. Imperfect Scientific Information: According to Georgescu-Roegen, 
imperfect scientific information refers to situations where the exact 
outcome is not known but is defined within the laws of randomness, 
for example, either a boy or a girl. Decision-making in such 
situations, for example buying a baby-dress in a typical girls’ colour 
because a girl is expected, is called risky. Decision-making based on 
laws of randomness and probability calculation, is the domain of 
financial risk management which coined the predominant economic 
notion of ‘risk’. The NRC specified imperfect scientific information 
as lack of scientific data and theory gaps. 
3. Incomplete Scientific Information: scientific information is 
incomplete when not even laws of randomness or probability are 
providing some vague prospects into the future. As a comparison, 
imagine the feeling of disorientation which may occur in the moment 
of realising that one is walking without any map or guideline on a 
road never walked before. That is the meaning of the term 
uncertainty as given by Georgescu-Roegen: we are unable to foresee 
                                                 
623 Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, ibid. 
624 Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, ibid. 
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the end of the road because we have never gone this particular way 
before. Hence, the end of the journey is unpredictable.  
 
Evidently, alternative 1 is the easiest to handle and does not require further 
comment at this stage.  
 
Alternative 2 is the classical case of “risky” decision-making: costs have to be 
weighed against benefits, and there will be winners and losers.  
 
From the perspective of scientific evaluation, situation 2, imperfect scientific 
information, and situation 3, incomplete scientific information, are addressed 
differently. In the case of imperfect scientific information, assumptions are 
introduced for bridging data gaps and theory gaps and for establishing potential 
cause-and-effect relationships. The focus is on cause-and-effect relationships 
and the extent of the problem. For instance, in the mentioned example, one 
might question: “what are the problems occurring from nuclear waste? 
Situations of imperfect scientific information are typically addressed by risk 
evaluation.  
 
In contrast, cases of incomplete scientific information are different because they 
address, according to Georgescu-Roegen, cases where novelty is involved. 
Cases of uncertainty are usually not addressed by risk evaluation, but by 
precaution.  
 
Delving further into the issue of uncertainty and precaution, Marion Dreyer, 
Ortwin Renn et al. provided the following three distinctions for expressions of 
uncertainty. First, Dreyer and Renn defined “uncertainty” as a state “under 
which the possible outcomes are clear, but it is difficult to quantify 
probabilities”.625 Second, Dreyer, Renn et al. identified a stage called 
“ambiguity”. According to Dreyer, Renn et al., ambiguity is a state “where the 
problem lies not with probabilities, but in agreeing the appropriate values, 
priorities, assumptions, or boundaries that apply in defining the possible 
outcomes”.626 Third, Dreyer, Renn et al. discerned a condition of “ignorance” 
under which “neither probabilities nor outcomes may be fully or confidently 
                                                 
625 Adrian Ely, Andy Stierling, Marion Dreyer, Ortwin Renn, Ellen Vos, and Frank Wendler, 
‘The Need for Change’, in Marion Dreyer and Ortwin Renn (eds.) Food Safety Governance. 
Integrating Science, Precaution and Public Involvement (Springer-Verlag, 2009), p. 13; with 
references to Frank Knight’s Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, and John Maynard Keynes’ A 
treatise on probability.  
626 Adrian Ely et. al., ibid. For an example of ambiguity, Dreyer, Renn et al. pointed at 
“[q]uestions around the tolerability of a new form of battery husbandry with animal welfare 
implications” which could produce “a condition of ambiguity” (Adrian Ely et. al., ibid.). 
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characterised”.627 Having identified the reliance on probabilities as “key 
diagnostic feature of conventional approaches to risk assessment”, Dreyer, Renn 
et al. summarised the three other conditions, i.e., uncertainty, ambiguity, and 
ignorance, as follows:  
 
“Various forms of conventional risk assessment remain applicable 
under conditions of complexity. But uncertainty, ambiguity, and 
ignorance are, by definition, states of knowledge under which 
conventional probability-based risk assessment is quite simply 
inapplicable (Stirling 1999). In such cases we look towards 
resilience, flexibility, and diversity in the agri-food systems in order 
to allow effective responses to areas of ignorance once they have 
been identified. Where conventional risk assessment leaves residual 
uncertainties unaddressed, these must be addressed by other 
complementary methods. It is in recognition of this challenge that we 
find the basis for reconciling conventional risk assessment and 
precaution in terms of their complementarity.”628 
 
Ulrich Beck provided a practical tool for deciding whether a situation is either 
risky or uncertain: it depends whether the entrepreneur gets insurance for it or 
not. If an enterprise is available to attract coverage by an insurance company, it 
is considered risky, but not uncertain. On the other hand, if insurers decline 
coverage, then the enterprise is operating under conditions of uncertainty. 
Hence, the criterion of insurability provides a simple but practical tool for 
deciding between risk and uncertainty.629 For man-made endeavours operating 
under conditions of uncertainty or indeterminacy, Beck established the term 
manufactured uncertainties.630 As examples of such manufactured uncertainties, 
Beck mentioned atomic energy and genetic engineering.631 
 
                                                 
627 Adrian Ely et. al., ibid. As an example of ignorance, Dreyer, Renn et al. made reference to 
the BSE crisis in the United Kingdom which early stage was characterised with the words 
“we don’t know what we don’t know” (Adrian Ely et al., ibid.). 
628 Adrian Ely et al., ibid. pp. 13-14.  
629 Ulrich Beck, World Risk Society (Polity Press, 1999/2005), pp. 31-34. 
630 Ulrich Beck, ibid. p. 112. Epistemologically, however, Beck differed with the distinction 
between risk and uncertainty put forward by Frank Knight. For Beck, the term manufactured 
uncertainty “means a mélange of risk, more knowledge, more unawareness and reflexivity, 
and therefore a new type of risk” (Ulrich Beck, ibid. p. 112, italics by Beck). 
631 Ulrich Beck, ibid. p. 31. With reference to Ulrich Beck, Adrian Vatter explicitly referred to 
nuclear and chemical large scale plants as examples for risks beyond traditional regulatory 
coverage established by the industrial society (Adrian Vatter, ‘Politik’, in Christoph 
Rehmann-Sutter, Adrian Vatter, Hansjörg Seiler, Partizipative Risikopolitik (Westdeutscher 
Verlag, 1998), p. 180.  
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For Ulrich Beck, genetically modified organisms (GMOs) are not examples of 
risk, but of manufactured uncertainties. According to Beck, there is a pragmatic 
indication for discerning risks from manufactured uncertainties:  
 
“If you ask ‘Are genetically modified food industries privately 
(adequately) insured?’ the answer is ‘No’. Thus the industries and 
their experts say ‘no risk’, but the private insurance businesses say 
‘too risky, no (cheap) insurance’.”632 
 
Beck continued to emphasise on uncertainties related to GMOs. Beck noted:  
 
“Genes interact in ways that remain fundamentally unpredictable. 
And, out there in the real world, genetic change in one organism may 
have incalculable effects on the whole environment – or not. This 
complexity and acknowledged non-knowledge is the true context 
within which the genetically modified food debate should be 
viewed.”633 
 
Following the criterion of insurability, atomic energy and genetic engineering, 
for which no private insurance is available yet, should not be addressed by risk 
assessment – because they are not risky but uncertain – but by precaution 
instead. In reality, this is, however, not the case. In the case EC – Biotech, 
biotechnology applications in agricultural and food production were addressed 
by traditional means of risk assessment, and the Panel refrained from applying 
the precautionary principle to the case at hand.634 
 
Beck’s approach stands in the tradition of Knight and Keynes who made a 
fundamental distinction between the epistemological categories of risk and 
                                                 
632 Ulrich Beck, World Risk Society, (Polity Press, 1999/2005), p. 105. 
633 Ulrich Beck, ibid. p. 106. An example for unpredictabilities involved in genetic 
engineering was the cross-contamination between two genetically modified maize varieties. 
In 2004, one discovered that Bt11 maize, a maize variety genetically modified to emit 
insecticidal toxins from the bacteria Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt), was contaminated with 
another genetically modified maize variety, Bt10 (Adrian Ely, ‘Implementation of the General 
Framework: Genetically Modified (Cry1Ab) Maize Case Study’, in Marion Dreyer and 
Ortwin Renn (eds.) Food Safety Governance. Integrating Science, Precaution and Public 
Involvement (Springer-Verlag, 2009), pp. 143-144).  
634 EC – Biotech, Panel Reports, para. 7.89. At a seminar held at the World Trade Institute in 
Bern, May 16, 2007, organised by Sufian Jusoh, issues of liability and redress surrounding 
biotechnology applications in agriculture were discussed, emphasising the particular 
perspective of the insurance industry on the topic. In this respect, Pollack and Shaffer 
observed that the US legal system, in contrast to European legal systems, provides legal 
instruments such as tort liability and class actions for addressing eventual harm caused by 
GMOs (see Mark A. Pollack, and Gregory C. Shaffer, When Cooperation Fails. The 
International Law and Politics of Genetically Modified Foods (Oxford University Press, 
2009), p. 53).  
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uncertainty. Following the Knightian and Keynesian conception, risk is 
ascertainable by probability considerations and thus assurable. Because the same 
does not count for uncertainty, the latter epistemological category also 
questioned the alleged universality of the model of rational choice. Where there 
is no basis for making rational analysis, where should there be a basis for 
rational decisions? Thus, the Knightian and Keynesian distinction between risk 
and uncertainty challenged the rational choice model of neoclassical economic 
theory.635 In other words, the epistemological and economical controversy 
whether or not to discern between risk and uncertainty is reflected by the 
conflict whether or not to apply the precautionary principle in international trade 
disputes. However, as Catherine Button observed, respective provisions of the 
SPS Agreement are not able to provide clarity: 
 
“The SPS Agreement does provide for regulation in the face of 
uncertainty in two ways. A risk assessment that qualifies under 
Article 5.1 may utilise the assumptions and policies that have long 
been accepted as part of mainstream science in order to overcome 
some uncertainties that would otherwise prevent the completion of a 
risk assessment. The SPS Agreement also accommodates uncertainty 
by allowing provisional measures under Article 5.7, although the 
borderline between the level and type of uncertainty that can be 
accommodated within a risk assessment under Article 5.1 and that 
which necessitates recourse to Article 5.7 is not clear.” 636 
 
In non-technical and practical terms, the distinction between the two 
epistemological categories of risk and uncertainty may help to better approach 
different degrees of scientific (un-)certainty. In such as simple understanding, 
which is applied here and in the following, uncertainty is an expression for 
situations where scientific certainty is low, thus requiring far-stretching 
inference bridges. In a simplified setting, the passage of time may serve as 
indicator for scientific (un-)certainty: as longer the time span covered by risk 
predictions, as more one tends to shift from objectivist risk assessment 
approaches to expectant attitudes, awaiting additional scientific data.637 
Typically, short-term risk assessments are focusing on safety issues, e.g., food 
                                                 
635 Nathalie Moureau and Dorothée Rivaud-Danset, L’incertitude dans les théories 
économiques (Éditions La Découverte, 2004), pp. 19-20.  
636 Catherine Button, The Power to Protect. Trade, Health, and Uncertainty in the WTO (Hart 
Publishing, 2004), pp. 117-118.  
637 The term objectivist in relation to risk assessment indicates the attempt to positively 
establish cause-effect relationships. The term expectant is a translation of the French words 
attente and attentisme. Moureau and Rivaud-Danset referred to attentisme (expectant attitude) 
for describing rational behaviour in situations of scientific uncertainty; that is, to apply the 
precautionary principle. See Nathalie Moureau and Dorothée Rivaud-Danset, L’incertitude 
dans les théories économiques (Éditions La Découverte, 2004), p. 110. 
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safety, whereas long-term risk evaluations are looking at security questions in 
the long run, e.g., food security or climate change. Safety risk assessments and 
security risk assessments differ in the way they approach scientific uncertainty: 
safety assessments try to establish cause-and-effect relationships in positive 
ways, asking whether a certain hazard may cause adverse effects. Security 
assessments, on the other hand, aim at providing risk scenarios and options for 
dealing with such scenarios.  
 
The implications of the time factor in assessing risks and uncertainties can be 
shown by the following figure:  
 
 
 
Time-Information Relationships in Risk Assessment 
 
 
 
Risk is a prediction about an event to occur in the future and based on factual 
and conceptual elements. On the factual side, risk predictions are based on facts 
ascertained in the past and in the present. On the conceptual side, risk 
predictions are based on concepts for overcoming knowledge gaps through 
inference bridges. These concepts are based on assumptions how things may 
evolve in the future. Assumptions, in turn, are influenced by our mindset. And 
our mindset may contain – consciously or unconsciously – ideas stemming from 
old philosophical traditions. With regard to risk theory, most influential 
philosophical traditions were positivism and relativism, respectively. Whether 
one tends to the one or the other philosophical tradition – consciously or 
unconsciously – affects our mindset, and thus our assumptions. In other words, 
the conceptual side of risk predictions is based on assumptions, and assumptions 
are influenced by philosophical ideas and political positions. 
Perfect 
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The survey on respective effects of different concepts of risk, namely the 
positivist and the relativist concept, showed significantly different outcomes at 
the ground. Thus, choices among different risk concepts are not, in the first 
instance, scientific or technical questions. Choices among different risk concepts 
are, first and foremost, political choices.  
 
The overall choice of the appropriate assessment and paramount policy 
objectives for risk analysis are issues commonly addressed under headings such 
as deliberation and risk communication. The problem of decision-making within 
the risk assessment process in the narrow sense refers to the issue of risk 
assessment policy. In the following paragraph, the requirement for defining risk 
assessment policies for risk assessments in general and for the development of 
inferential bridges in particular will be explained.  
 
 
CHAPTER 7 INFERENTIAL BRIDGES IN RISK ASSESSMENT 
 
In the following, epistemological problems related to inferential bridges and 
inference options required at each of the four steps of risk assessment are 
examined. For substantiating the risk assessment, reference is made to the 
example of a food safety risk assessment. In light of the classification scheme 
provided by Hellström, toxicological and food safety risk assessments are 
belonging to the group of technical approaches towards risk and risk analysis.638 
The example is chosen because food safety risk analysis is the backbone of the 
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS 
Agreement) of the WTO.639 
 
As mentioned above, risk assessment is the process through which factual, but 
random hazards are transformed into assessable and predictable risks. The same 
applies for food safety hazards. Through food safety risk assessments, food 
safety hazards shall be transformed into controllable risks. To this purpose, 
causalities between agents, i.e., food-borne hazards, and adverse health effects 
                                                 
638 Tomas Hellström, Risk-Based Planning. Institutional Uncertainty in the Science-Policy 
Interface, Doctoral Dissertation at Göteborg University, Department of Theory of Science and 
Research, (Göteborg University, 1998), p. 12.  
639 The SPS Agreement provides two kinds of risk assessment; one for the assessment of 
food-borne hazards, and another for the assessment of animal diseases and plant pests (see 
Annex A of the SPS Agreement). Each of the three types of hazards, i.e., food-borne hazards, 
animal diseases and plant pests, are analysed by different international bodies: food-borne 
hazards by the Codex Alimentarius Commission (Codex), animal diseases by the World 
Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), and plant pests by the framework of the International 
Plant Protection Convention (IPPC). In the following, documents from Codex are taken as 
reference point for explaining risk assessment in detail because Codex established 
sophisticated schemes for the analysis of food safety risks.  
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are analysed. In practice, methods such as animal testing are applied for 
isolating causal agents from intervening variables such as particular dietary 
habits. The procedure from hazard identification to the final risk estimate is 
called risk assessment. The risk assessment procedure, in turn, consists of 
several steps. In the case of food safety risk assessment, four steps have been 
defined.640 As mentioned earlier, the final outcome of risk assessment is called 
risk characterisation or risk estimate.641  
 
In the field of food safety, the Codex Alimentarius Commission (Codex) is the 
authoritative body at the international level. Therefore, the following paragraph 
relies on the concept of risk assessment as put forward by the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission. In particular, it is referred to the “Working Principles 
for Risk Analysis for Application in the Framework of the Codex Alimentarius” 
in section V of the Procedural Manual of the Codex Alimentarius Commission 
(in the following: Working Principles for Risk Analysis). 642 
 
Risk Assessment is defined by Codex’ Procedural Manual as “[a] scientifically 
based process consisting of the following steps: (i) hazard identification, (ii) 
hazard characterization, (iii) exposure assessment, and (iv) risk 
characterization”.643  
 
In the following, the four steps of food safety risk assessment are discussed. 
Thereby, first, a description of each step is provided, essentially following the 
Procedural Manual of the Codex Alimentarius Commission. Second, problems 
within each of the four steps are addressed. In particular, epistemological 
                                                 
640 It has to be noted that other risk assessment approaches may define the number and the 
content of particular steps within risk assessment differently (see footnote no. 643 below). 
Nevertheless, the purpose of risk assessment is always the same, namely bridging the gap 
between random hazards and predictable risks by technical or other means. Because risk 
assessment is applied to a wide range of questions, the means and steps for bridging inference 
gaps between hazards and risk estimates may differ.  
641 It has to be emphasised that risk assessment, in turn, is only the first phase in a broader 
operation called risk analysis. The three phases of risk analysis are (i) risk assessment, (ii) risk 
management, and (iii) risk communication.  
642 ‘Working Principles for Risk Analysis for Application in the Framework of the Codex 
Alimentarius’, Section IV of the Procedural Manual of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, 
19th edition, 2010, pp. 86-91. Web access: 
ftp://ftp.fao.org/codex/Publications/ProcManuals/Manual_19e.pdf (visited December 20, 
2010).  
643 ‘Definitions of Risk Analysis Term Related to Food Safety’, at the end of the Working 
Principles for Risk Analysis for Application in the Framework of the Codex Alimentarius”, 
Section IV of the Procedural Manual of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, 19th edition, 
2010, p. 92). In other areas, such as environmental protection, risk assessment may be divided 
in three steps only: (1) hazard identification, (2) risk estimation, and (3) risk evaluation; see: 
Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, Risk and Rationality. Philosophical Foundations for Populist 
Reforms (University of California Press, 1991), p. 5.  
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problems are discussed in light of an objectivist and a constructivist perspective, 
respectively. Arguments for the discussion of epistemological problems are 
mainly taken from the then groundbreaking study of the National Research 
Council (NRC) of the United States of America, called Risk Assessment in the 
Federal Government: Managing the Process (1983). 644 Because of its red 
colour, the NRC study is also known as the Red Book.  
 
A. Hazard Identification  
 
The first step in food safety risk assessment is hazard identification. The stage of 
hazard identification is common to qualitative as well as to quantitative risk 
assessments.645 The Codex Alimentarius Commission described hazard 
identification as:  
 
“The identification of biological, chemical, and physical agents 
capable of causing adverse health effects and which may be present 
in a particular food of group of foods”.646 
 
In everyday speech, the question in the stage of hazard identification is: “Does 
the agent cause the adverse effect?”647 
 
In risk assessment, a broad array of scientific data input is used. The National 
Research Council (NRC), for instance, identified four classes of data used in risk 
assessment: (i) epidemiologic data, (ii) animal-bioassay data (data derived from 
animal experiments), (iii) data on in vitro effects (short-term studies), and (iv) 
data on molecular structure.648  
 
In the following, scientific data derived from animal testing (animal-bioassay 
data) and from in vitro studies are taken as main examples. Reasons are the 
                                                 
644 National Research Council, Risk Assessment in the Federal Government: Managing the 
Process (National Academy Press, 1983), also known as the Red Book. The NRC Committee 
authoring the Red Book, i.e., the Committee on Institutional Means for Assessment of Risks to 
Public Health, was mandated to evaluate risk regulation in the United States of America with 
a particular focus on cancer risks deriving from exposure to chemicals, for example saccharin, 
asbestos, and formaldehyde.  
645 National Research Council, Science and Judgment in Risk Assessment (National Academy 
Press, 1994), p. 26. 
646 ‘Definitions of Risk Analysis Term Related to Food Safety’, at the end of the Working 
Principles for Risk Analysis for Application in the Framework of the Codex Alimentarius”, 
Section IV of the Procedural Manual of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, 19th edition, 
2010, p. 92. 
647 National Research Council, Risk Assessment in the Federal Government: Managing the 
Process (National Academy Press, 1983), p. 21. 
648 National Research Council, ibid. p. 20. 
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relevance of the two methods for food safety risk assessments, problems of 
extrapolating from short-term studies to long-term exposure, as well as the fact 
that animal testing is a contended issue by itself. 
 
Scientific data input is of particular importance in the first and second stage of 
risk assessment, i.e., identification and characterisation of hazards. In the hazard 
identification stage in particular, the necessary scientific data is commonly 
derived from experimental work such as animal and epidemiologic studies and, 
for environmental risk assessments, from environmental data monitoring. With 
regard to the identification of toxicological and food safety hazards, scientific 
data from animal bioassays (animal testing) are points of reference and the 
“most commonly available”.649  
 
In the Red Book, the NRC started the discussion on epistemological problems of 
the use of animal-bioassay data in the hazard identification stage of risk 
assessment by pointing at the basic assumption of animal testing: “The inference 
that results from animal experiments are applicable to humans is fundamental to 
toxicological research; this premise underlies much of experimental biology and 
medicine and is logically extended to the experimental observation of 
carcinogenic effects”.650 Considering the epistemological challenge of building 
upon assumptive bases, the NRC observed: “Despite the apparent validity of 
such inferences and their acceptability by most cancer researchers, there are no 
doubt occasions in which observations in animals may be of highly uncertain 
relevance to humans”.651 
 
Having considered basic assumptions underlying the use of animal-bioassay 
data for hazard identification, the NRC turned to requirements for reliable data 
from animal experiments. For identifying carcinogenic effects, for example, the 
NRC singled out the following pieces of scientific evidence: consistent and 
positive test results (a) in the two sexes of test animals and (b) in several strains 
and species of the test animals and (c) a positive correlation between higher 
incidences and higher doses.652 Considering these data requirements, the NRC 
observed: “More often than not, however, such data are not available. Instead, 
because of the nature of the effect and the limits of detection of animal tests as 
they are usually conducted, experimental data leading to a positive finding 
sometimes barely exceed a statistical threshold and may involve tumor types of 
uncertain relation to human carcinogenesis”.653 
 
                                                 
649 National Research Council, ibid. p. 22.  
650 National Research Council, ibid. 
651 National Research Council, ibid. 
652 National Research Council, ibid. 
653 National Research Council, ibid. 
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Turning to short-term studies, i.e. on data on in vitro effects, the NRC pointed at 
their advantages of being rapid and cost-effective.654 Therefore, data from in 
vitro studies are considered useful for complementing animal testing and other 
time-consuming and expensive methods.655 As an example for the screening for 
carcinogenic effects, the NRC mentioned the method of mutagenicity assays. 
Mutagenicity assays are based on “the proposition that most chemical 
carcinogens are mutagens and that many mutagens are carcinogens”.656 
Therefore, the assumption goes that “a positive response in a mutagenicity assay 
is supportive evidence that the agent tested is likely to be carcinogenic”.657 
Because of presumptions underlying short-term studies, the NRC considered 
that data on in vitro effects should be used complementary to animal testing 
data: “Such data [i.e. data from in vitro assays], in the absence of a positive 
animal bioassay, are rarely, if ever, sufficient to support a conclusion that an 
agent is carcinogenic.”658 
 
For exemplifying epistemological problems at the hazard identification stage of 
risk assessment, it is referred to a list of questions pointing at inference options 
with regard to animal-bioassay data and short-term test data. The NRC provided 
the following list of questions highlighting arrays of inference options for hazard 
identification:659 
 
 
Inference Options in the Stage of Hazard Identification  
 
Animal-Bioassay Data 
 
• What degree of confirmation of positive results should be necessary? Is a 
positive result from a single animal study sufficient, or should positive 
results from tow or more animal studies be required? Should negative 
results be disregarded or given less weight?  
• Should a study be weighted according to its quality and statistical power?  
• How should evidence of different metabolic pathways or vastly different 
metabolic rates between animals and humans be factored into a risk 
assessment?  
                                                 
654 National Research Council, ibid. p. 23.  
655 National Research Council, ibid. 
656 National Research Council, ibid. p. 22.  
657 National Research Council, ibid. pp.22-23.  
658 National Research Council, ibid. p. 23. 
659 National Research Council, ibid. pp. 29-30. The purpose of reproducing excerpts of the list 
displayed in the Red Book (1983) integrally is to demonstrate the vide range of inference 
options requiring human judgement at all four stages of risk assessment. The idea is not to 
give an accurate picture of scientific problems of today.  
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• How should the occurrence of rare tumors be treated? Should the 
appearance of rare tumors in a treated group be considered evidence of 
carcinogenicity even if the finding is not statistically significant?  
• How should experimental-animal data be used when the exposure routes 
in experimental animals and humans are different?  
• Should a dose-related increase in tumors be discounted when the tumors 
in question have high or extremely variable spontaneous rates?  
• What statistical significance should be required for results to be 
considered positive?  
• Does an experiment have special characteristics (e.g., the presence of 
carcinogenic contaminants in the test substance) that lead one to question 
the validity of its results?  
• How should findings of tissue damage or other toxic effects be used in the 
interpretation of tumor data? Should evidence that tumors may have 
resulted from these effects be taken to mean that they would not be 
expected to occur at lower doses?  
• Should benign and malignant lesions be counted equally?  
• Into what categories should tumors be grouped for statistical purposes?  
• Should only increases in the numbers of tumors be considered, or should a 
decrease in the latent period for tumor occurrence also be used as 
evidence of carcinogenicity?  
 
 
Short-Term Test Data 
 
• How much weight should be placed on the results of various short-term 
tests?  
• What degree of confidence do short.-term tests add to the results of 
animal bioassays in the evaluation of carcinogenic risks for humans?  
• Should in vitro transformation tests be accorded more weight than 
bacterial mutagenicity tests in seeking evidence of a possible carcinogenic 
effect? 
• What statistical significance should be required for results to be 
considered positive?  
• How should different results of comparable tests be weighted? Should 
positive results be accorded greater weight than negative results?  
 
 
The choice of a certain inference option may have significant effects. With 
regard to the interplay and demarcation between science and policy, the most 
signification effect is the effect on the degree of conservatism. In risk analysis, 
conservatism indicates “the degree to which a particular inference option (…) 
will increase the likelihood that a substance will be judged to be a significant 
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hazard to human health”.660 In other words, conservatism is a measurement for 
policy considerations affecting and determining judgements in risk assessment.  
 
In the Red Book, the NRC provided two examples for the significance of 
inference options on conservatism, in other words, on the interplay between 
science and policy in risk assessment.  
 
The first example provided by the NRC was the question how to use data from 
animal testing to infer risks to humans. Basically, there is the choice between 
positive animal data and negative animal data. The use of positive animal data 
indicating the presence of carcinogenic risk is the more conservative method. 
The use of negative animal data indicating the absence of carcinogenic risk, on 
the other hand, “is less conservative, especially when the sensitivity of the assay 
is low”.661 
 
The second example provided by the NRC related to the question whether all 
kind of tumours, i.e., malignant and benign tumours, shall be counted as 
evidence for carcinogenicity, or only malignant ones. The significance behind 
that inference option is the following: “Some benign tumors probably can 
progress to malignant lesions and some probably do not. The judgment that 
benign tumors and malignant tumors should be counted equally will affect 
tumor incidence and may influence the yes-no determination in hazard 
identification, and it can also affect the dose-response relation by increasing 
incidence at the doses tested.”662 Therefore, choosing the inference option of 
including benign tumours in the tumour counting “is often the more 
conservative approach”.663 
 
The two examples provided by the NRC demonstrated how choices among 
several available and scientifically equally plausible inference options lead to 
more or less conservative results. The recognition that human judgement is 
inevitable in risk assessment invited constructivists to question whether risk 
analysis really can be considered ‘objective’ and ‘scientific’. In the pursuit of 
the analysis of the other steps of risk assessment, it will be shown that the 
relative weight of judgement is increasing with every step of risk assessment. In 
other words, human judgement becomes more important as risk assessment 
proceeds from the step of hazard identification to the steps of hazard 
characterisation, exposure assessment and finally risk characterisation. But it is 
important to recall, as the examples showed, that already in the first stage of risk 
assessment, i.e., hazard identification, choices among similarly plausible options 
are influencing the outcome of risk assessment. This point is relevant because 
                                                 
660 National Research Council, ibid. p. 34.  
661 National Research Council, ibid. pp. 33-34.  
662 National Research Council, ibid. p. 34. 
663 National Research Council, ibid. 
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even constructivists acknowledge that the step of hazard identification is the 
most ‘objective’ and hence most ‘scientific’ in risk assessment.664 Therefore, 
constructivists would emphasise that already in the first and most ‘scientific’ 
stage of risk assessment, that is, hazard identification, scientists/risk assessors 
are required to make choices among similarly plausible inference options. 
Choices among various inference options are, in turn, leading to more or less 
conservative results. As conservatism indicates the likelihood that a substance 
will be judged hazardous, constructivists will claim that any choice among 
similarly plausible inference options inevitably requires value judgements by 
scientists/risk assessors. It is this requirement for value judgements which leads 
constructivists to deny risk assessment the attribute ‘objective’. In the pursuit of 
the overview on risk assessment steps in detail, it shall be shown that value 
judgements are inevitable components of all stages of risk assessment.  
 
B. Hazard Characterisation  
 
The second step of food safety risk assessment is hazard characterisation. The 
Codex Alimentarius Commission defined hazard characterisation as follows:  
 
 “The qualitative and/or quantitative evaluation of the nature of the 
adverse health effects associated with biological, chemical and 
physical agents which may be present in food. For chemical agents, a 
dose-response assessment should be performed. For biological or 
physical agents, a dose-response assessment should be performed if 
the data are obtainable”.665 
 
                                                 
664 Hellström, for example, observed: “Hazards, and consequences of hazards, which are an 
essential component of risk, can be said to be real in some respect, although severity of such 
hazards must be subjectively interpreted from case to case” (Thomas Hellström, Risk-Based 
Planning. Institutional Uncertainty in the Science-Policy Interface, Doctoral Dissertation at 
Göteborg University, Department of Theory of Science and Research, (Göteborg University, 
1998), p. 8.  
665 ‘Definitions of Risk Analysis Term Related to Food Safety’, at the end of the Working 
Principles for Risk Analysis for Application in the Framework of the Codex Alimentarius”, 
Section IV of the Procedural Manual of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, 19th edition, 
2010, p. 93. Because the NRC focused on chemical agents in particular, it termed the hazard 
characterisation stage dose-response assessment. The NRC provided the following definition 
for dose-response assessment: “The process of characterizing the relation between the dose of 
an agent administered or received and the incidence of an adverse health effect in exposed 
populations and estimating the incidence of the effect as a function of human exposure to the 
agent”; see: National Research Council, Risk Assessment in the Federal Government: 
Managing the Process (National Academy Press, 1983), p. 19. In practice, terminological 
differences between Codex and the NRC with respect to hazard characterisation and dose-
response assessment, respectively, seems of little significance (see also Catherine Button, The 
Power to Protect. Trade, Health and Uncertainty in the WTO (Hart Publishing, 2004), p. 96. 
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Applications of dose-response assessments are, for example, “differences in 
susceptibility between young and old people”.666 The assessment of the 
relationship between the dose and the toxic response may require the use of 
mathematical models and statistical methods.  
 
In everyday speech, the question in the hazard characterization or dose-response 
assessment stage: “What is the relationship between dose and incidence in 
humans?”667 
 
In the Red Book, the NRC highlighted the problem of extrapolation. In the 
context of food safety risk analysis, extrapolation can be understood as a method 
for inferring from doses administered in laboratory experiments to incidences in 
humans.  In particular, the NRC highlighted two problems, the problem of low-
dose extrapolation and the problem of animal-to-human dose extrapolation.  
 
The problem of low-dose extrapolation typically occurs because of practical 
reasons. Animal testing is usually “designed for hazard identification, rather 
than for determining dose-response relations”.668 However, the purpose of 
hazard identification is to establish whether there is a relationship between 
exposure and incidence or not, rather than to determine characteristics and the 
quality of that relationship. Therefore, test designs mainly focused on high dose 
exposure. The NRC observed: “Under current testing practice, one group of 
animals is given the highest dose that can be tolerated, a second group is 
exposed at half that dose, and a control group is not exposed.”669 But whereas 
the application of high doses is necessary in hazard identification, the use of 
high doses is questionable in the stage of hazard characterisation. In particular, 
the NRC pointed out problems of metabolic differences between high and low 
doses and among different animal species.670 In order to overcome metabolic 
differences between high and low doses and between humans and laboratory 
animals, doses administered experimentally must be converted. The method for 
converting higher doses administered in animal experiments to lower doses 
humans are exposed to is called extrapolation. 
 
                                                 
666 National Research Council, Science and Judgment in Risk Assessment (National Academy 
Press, 1994) p. 26. 
667 National Research Council, Risk Assessment in the Federal Government: Managing the 
Process (National Academy Press, 1983), p. 21. 
668 National Research Council, ibid. p. 23.  
669 National Research Council, ibid. Once more, it has to be emphasised that the NRC 
published the Red Book in 1983 and that testing methods have evolved over time. 
Nevertheless, the Red Book is taken as a reference point for explaining basic problems of risk 
assessment persisting over time.  
670 National Research Council, ibid. p. 24.  
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Extrapolations are usually framed in mathematical models. However, applying 
data from animal dose-response experiments into mathematical models is not 
sufficient for obtaining data valuable for human exposure to lower doses. The 
NRC noted: “At present, the true shape of the dose-response curve at doses 
several orders of magnitude below the observation range cannot be determined 
experimentally.” 671 The NRC observed that a particular “difficulty with low-
dose extrapolation is that a number of the extrapolation methods fit the data 
from animal experiments reasonably well, and it is impossible to distinguish 
their validity on the basis of goodness of fit”.672 Therefore, the NRC concluded 
that low-dose extrapolation must be more than a mathematical exercise, because 
“considerations of biological plausibility must be taken into account”.673  
 
With regard to animal-to-human dose extrapolation, the NRC observed that 
“doses used in bioassays must be adjusted to allow for differences in size and 
metabolic rates”.674 With view on methods used for adjusting these differences 
between animals and humans, the NRC made two particularly interesting 
observations. Firstly, the NRC observed that there are several methods for 
inferring from animals to humans. But “[a]lthough some methods for conversion 
are used more frequently than others, a scientific basis for choosing one over the 
other is not established”.675 Secondly, the NRC noted that all methods for 
interspecies conversion were based on the same assumption: the assumption that 
“animal and human risks are equivalent when doses are measured as milligrams 
per kilogram per day, as milligrams per square meter of body surface area, as 
parts per million in air, diet, or water, or as milligrams per kilogram per 
lifetime”.676 
 
Wong used the term “inference design” for referring to the framing and 
sampling of models in quantitative animal carcinogenicity bioassays.677 
 
The problem of extrapolation was also invoked by Wynne for illustrating policy 
implications when deciding upon inference options. Wynne noted:  
 
                                                 
671 National Research Council, ibid. Although testing methods may have evolved since 1983, 
the problem of extrapolating data from animal testing to human exposure remained.  
672 National Research Council, ibid. p. 25. The NRC further noted that mathematical certainty 
on the basis of experimental data would require “an extremely large experiment” which, from 
a practical point of view, “is probably impossible” (ibid.).  
673 National Research Council, ibid. p. 25.  
674 National Research Council, ibid., pp. 25 and 27. 
675 National Research Council, ibid. p. 27. 
676 National Research Council, ibid.  
677 S.C.Y. Wong, ‘Model Uncertainty: Implications for Animal Low-Dose Cancer Risk 
Assessment Experiments’, in Vincent T. Covello, Lester B. Lave, Alan Moghissi, and V.R.R. 
Uppuluri (eds.), Uncertainty in Risk Assessment, Risk Management, and Decision Making 
(Plenum Press, 1987), p. 349. 
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“A good example is the choice of an extrapolation rule for low-dose 
toxicity or carcinogenicity effects in humans, when what empirical 
data there are rest upon high doses, in animals. Choice of a linear, 
quadratic, linear-quadratic, or threshold low-dose-effect relationship 
is more or less equally legitimate according to available high-dose 
data, but the chose often dramatically affects the estimated effects, 
e.g., excess cancers, depending upon the constants employed. (…) It 
therefore seems to be necessary for policy to make an inference 
bridge, but which scientific inference rule to choose as a ‘risk 
assessment policy’ is legitimately a matter of policy choice.” 678 
 
For exemplifying epistemological problems at the hazard characterisation (or 
dose-response assessment) stage of risk assessment, it is referred to a list of 
questions pointing at inference options with regard to animal-bioassay data and 
short-term test data. The NRC provided the following list of questions 
highlighting arrays of inference options for hazard characterisation (dose-
response assessment):679 
 
 
Inference Options in the Stage of Hazard Characterisation (Dose-Response 
Assessment) 
 
Animal-Bioassay Data 
 
• What mathematical models should be used to extrapolate from 
experimental doses to human exposures?  
• Should dose-response relations be extrapolated according to best 
estimates or according to upper confidence limits? If the latter, what 
confidence limits should be used?  
• What factor should be used for interspecies conversion of dose from 
animals to human?  
• How should information on comparative metabolic processes and rates in 
experimental animals and humans be used?  
                                                 
678 Brian Wynne, ‘Risk Assessment and Regulation for Hazardous Wastes’, in Brian Wynne 
(ed.), Risk Management and Hazardous Waste. Implementation and the Dialectics of 
Credibility (Springer-Verlag, 1987), p. 341 (italics in original). Wynne pointed at an example 
of “three equally credible alternative modes of dose-response curve for nasal tumors in rats 
exposed to the defumigant, ethylene dibromide, showing that the choice of model changes the 
estimated tumor rate at low doses by over two orders of magnitude” (Brian Wynne, ibid.).  
679 National Research Council, Risk Assessment in the Federal Government: Managing the 
Process (National Academy Press, 1983), pp. 31-32. The purpose of reproducing excerpts of 
the list displayed in the Red Book (1983) integrally is to demonstrate the vide range of 
inference options requiring human judgement at all four stages of risk assessment. The idea is 
not to give an accurate picture of scientific problems of today.  
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• If data are available on more than one nonhuman species or genetic strain, 
how should they be used? Should only data on the most sensitive species 
or strain be used to derive a dose-response function, or should the data be 
combined? If data on different species and strains are to be combined, 
how should this be accomplished?  
• How should data on different types of tumors in a single study be 
combined? Should the assessment be based on the tumor type that was 
affected the most (in some sense) by the exposure? Should data on all 
tumor types that exhibit a statistically significant dose-related increase be 
used? If so, how? What interpretation should be given to statistically 
significant decreases680 in tumor incidence at specific sites? 
 
 
In sum, the NRC pointed at two major points in hazard characterisation where 
inference options require human judgement, namely high-to-low-dose 
extrapolation and interspecies dose conversion.681 The NRC illustrated its 
findings with the following examples:  
 
For illustrating inference options with regard to high-to-low-dose extrapolation, 
the NRC referred to three extrapolation models tested for the same purpose, that 
was, the assessment of carcinogenic nitrosamine (dimethylnitrosamine).682 The 
three tested extrapolation models, i.e., the one-hit model, the multistage model, 
and the multihit model, delivered differing results: “[T]he risk estimate per unit 
of dose would be higher for the one-hit and multistage models than for the 
multihit model for this experiment”.683 
 
For illustrating choices among inference options with regard to interspecies 
conversion, the NRC pointed at the following examples:  
 
• Choice of the experimental data set: If there are several data sets 
available, the choice of the experimental data set to estimate the 
relation between dose and incidence may influence its outcome. For 
example, the “use of the most sensitive animal group will result in 
the most conservative estimate”.684 
• Choice of the scaling factor for interspecies conversion: As the NRC 
noted, the choice of the scaling factor for interspecies conversion 
“can vary by a factor of up to 35, depending on the method used”.685  
                                                 
680 Original underlining.  
681 National Research Council, Risk Assessment in the Federal Government: Managing the 
Process (National Academy Press, 1983), p. 34.  
682 National Research Council, ibid. p. 35. 
683 National Research Council, ibid.  
684 National Research Council, ibid.  
685 National Research Council, ibid. 
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• Choice to combine tumour types or not: As mentioned under the 
paragraph on hazard identification, “the decision to lump tumors 
might be more or less conservative than the decision not to combine 
incidences from different tumor types”.686 
 
The fact that in the hazard identification stage of risk assessment extrapolations 
are indispensable might attract the attention of constructivists. Constructivists 
would, firstly, point at the finding of the NRC that there is no scientific basis for 
deciding upon the methodological objectivity of interspecies conversion. 
Secondly, constructivists might question the basic assumption that animal and 
human risks are equivalent under conditions of equivalent dose exposure. That 
these issues are more than theoretical problems shows the case of EBDC 
(ethylene bisdithiocarbamate).  
 
EBDC pesticides were used to protect, in particular, tobacco plants from fungi 
and moulds. In the 1980s, however, evidence was mounting that a common 
derivative of EBDC, called ethylene thiourea (ETU), may cause cancer. 
However, due to obstructive manoeuvres of the tobacco industry, the 
carcinogenic potential of EBDC pesticides remained in the dark for a prolonged 
period.687 What is of interest at this point are questions about interspecies 
conversion and the transfer of results from animal testing on humans under 
conditions of scientific uncertainty. After the conspiratorial methods of the 
tobacco industry came to light, the question whether tobacco products treated 
with EBDC pesticides should be banned also became an issue discussed in the 
Swiss Federal Assembly.688 However, on parliamentary request, the 
government, i.e. the Swiss Federal Council, abstained from banning the use of 
EBDC and products treated therewith ‘immediately and unilaterally’.689 Looking 
at scientific evidence, the government noted that rats and mice developed cancer 
only if treated with high doses of EBDC. According to the government’s 
observations, only high doses of EBDC were able to affect the genetic make-up 
and to cause thyroid cancer in rats. In contrast, low-dose exposure to EBDC – 
the typical case in the real world – did not cause thyroid cancer in rats, the 
government argued. For backing its arguments, the Swiss Federal Council 
referred to modified practices of ‘many other health authorities’.690 The new 
                                                 
686 National Research Council, ibid.  
687 The conspiratorial methods of the tobacco industry were finally revealed in a report 
commissioned by the World Health Organisation (see Thomas Zeltner et. al., Tobacco 
Company Strategies to Undermine Tobacco Control Activities at the World Health 
Organization. Report of the Committee of Experts on Tobacco Industry Documents (WHO, 
2000). See also chapter 18.B. below.   
688 Anne-Catherine Menétrey-Savary, Interpellation no. 00.3455 of 25 September 2000 on 
dubious practices of the tobacco industry (German title: Die zweifelhaften Methoden der 
Tabakindustrie).  
689 Anne-Catherine Menétrey-Savary, ibid. p. 3.  
690 Anne-Catherine Menétrey-Savary, ibid. p. 3.  
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practice of health authorities, the Swiss government explained, consisted in a 
departure from assumptions concerning interspecies conversion. Thus, the mere 
fact that one animal species shows carcinogenic effects when exposed to high 
doses of a certain substance is no longer taken as a basis sufficient for 
concluding that similar effects occur in a different species under similar 
conditions. Things would be different, the government added, if the substance in 
question would cause adverse effects on the genotype. Because the government 
found no scientific evidence that cancer established in rats and mice were 
induced by genetic modifications caused by EBDC, the Federal Council did not 
recognise the need for immediate action. Instead, the government referred to 
ongoing assays conducted by EU authorities at the regional level and by the 
Joint FAO/WHO Expert Meetings on Pesticide Residues (JMPR) at the 
international level.691  
 
C. Exposure Assessment  
 
The third stage of risk assessment is exposure assessment. The Codex 
Alimentarius Commission defined the exposure assessment stage as follows:  
 
 “The qualitative and/or quantitative evaluation of the likely intake of 
biological, chemical, and physical agents via food as well as 
exposures from other sources if relevant”. 692 
 
In everyday speech, the question in the exposure assessment phase is: “What 
exposures are currently experienced or anticipated under different conditions?” 
693 
 
The NRC observed that although concentrations of intakes might be directly 
measured, it is more likely that “exposure data are incomplete and must be 
estimated”.694 With regard to food intake in particular, the NRC pointed at the 
difficulties of variations in diet and personal habits among different groups in 
the population, as well as differences in food storage practices, in food 
preparation, and in dietary frequencies.695 Additionally, the NRC mentioned the 
important aspect of considering which groups are especially exposed to certain 
                                                 
691 Anne-Catherine Menétrey-Savary, ibid. p. 3. 
692 ‘Definitions of Risk Analysis Term Related to Food Safety’, at the end of the Working 
Principles for Risk Analysis for Application in the Framework of the Codex Alimentarius”, 
Section IV of the Procedural Manual of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, 19th edition, 
2010, p. 93 
693 National Research Council, Risk Assessment in the Federal Government: Managing the 
Process (National Academy Press, 1983), p. 21. 
694 National Research Council, ibid. p. 27.  
695 National Research Council, ibid. p. 27.  
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hazards: “Pregnant women, very young and very old people, and persons with 
impaired health may be particularly important in exposure assessment.” 696 
Furthermore, the NRC pointed at the problem that people can be exposed to a 
mixture of risk factors. For example, the NRC mentioned cumulative exposure 
to cigarette smoke and asbestos, noting that “exposure to cigarette smoke and 
asbestos gives an incidence of cancer that is much greater than anticipated from 
carcinogenicity data on each substance individually”.697 However, because data 
on synergistic effects, i.e., from cigarette smoke and asbestos exposure, are often 
lacking, such data “are often ignored or accounted for by the use of various 
safety factors”.698  
 
For exemplifying the mentioned epistemological problems, the NRC displayed a 
list of questions with regard to inference options which may occur in the 
exposure assessment stage of risk assessment:699 
 
 
Inference Options in the Stage of Exposure Assessment 
 
• How should one extrapolate exposure measurements from a small 
segment of a population to the entire population?  
• How should one predict dispersion of air pollutants into the atmosphere 
due to convection, wind currents, etc., or predict seepage rates or toxic 
chemicals into soils and groundwater?700 
• How should dietary habits and other variations in lifestyles, hobbies, and 
other human activity patterns be taken into account?  
• Should point estimates or a distribution be used?  
• How should differences in timing, duration, and age at first exposure be 
estimated?  
• What is the proper unit of dose?  
• How should one estimate the size and nature of the populations likely to 
be exposed?  
• How should exposures of special risk groups, such as pregnant women 
and young children, be estimated?  
 
 
                                                 
696 National Research Council, ibid. p. 28.  
697 National Research Council, ibid.  
698 National Research Council, ibid. 
699 National Research Council, ibid. p. 32. The purpose of reproducing excerpts of the list 
displayed in the Red Book (1983) integrally is to demonstrate the vide range of inference 
options requiring human judgement at all four stages of risk assessment. The idea is not to 
give an accurate picture of scientific problems of today.  
700 This point seems to be of particular importance with regard to the dispersion of GMOs in 
the environment.  
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A major problem in exposure assessments is “the fact that current methods and 
approaches to exposure assessment appear to be medium- or route-specific”.701 
As examples, the NRC mentioned that models describing transportation of 
hazardous agents through the atmosphere must necessarily be quite different 
from models describing transportation of hazardous agents through water or 
soil.702 Depending on which inference option is chosen, the outcome will differ: 
A scientist or risk assessor, the NRC explained, “has several options available 
for estimating exposure to a particular agent in a particular medium, and these 
options will yield more or less conservative estimates of exposure”.703 Hence, 
the degree of conservatism resulting from exposure assessment estimates is 
dependent on the chosen assumption. In other words, the degree of conservatism 
is influenced by choices about “the frequency and duration of human exposure 
to an agent or medium, rates of intake or contact, and rates of absorption”.704  
 
Sceptics might be concerned about the fact that food safety risk assessments are 
carried out for large national or even international markets, whereas exposure 
assessments are based on rather small samples of populations. If risk 
assessments in general and exposure assessments in particular are applied 
indiscriminately, critics may question their basic assumption: how can variations 
and differences in populations, dietary habits and vulnerability to certain hazards 
be taken into account in exposure assessments for food products distributed 
internationally?  
 
D. Risk Characterisation  
 
The fourth stage of risk assessment is risk characterisation. The Codex 
Alimentarius Commission defined the risk characterisation stage as follows:  
 
 “The qualitative and/or quantitative estimation, including attendant 
uncertainties, of the probability of occurrence of known or potential 
adverse health effects in a given population based on hazard 
identification, hazard characterisation and exposure assessment”.705 
 
                                                 
701 National Research Council, Risk Assessment in the Federal Government: Managing the 
Process (National Academy Press, 1983), p. 35.  
702 National Research Council, ibid. 
703 National Research Council, ibid.  
704 National Research Council, ibid. pp. 35-36.  
705 ‘Definitions of Risk Analysis Term Related to Food Safety’, at the end of the Working 
Principles for Risk Analysis for Application in the Framework of the Codex Alimentarius”, 
Section IV of the Procedural Manual of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, 19th edition, 
2010, p. 92 
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In everyday speech, the question in the phase of risk characterization is: “What 
is the estimated incidence of the adverse effect in a given population?” 706 
 
In the Red Book of 1983, risk characterisation was understood as “the estimate 
of the magnitude of the public-health problem”.707 The step of risk 
characterisation marks the end of the risk assessment phase. The outcome of risk 
characterisation, that is, the risk estimate, links the phase of risk assessment with 
the phase of risk management in the following way: “The final expression of 
risk derived in this step [i.e. the step of risk characterisation] will be used by the 
regulatory decision-maker when health risks are weighed against other societal 
costs and benefits to determine an appropriate action.” 708  
 
In these days, the NRC was of the view that the risk characterisation stage 
“involves no additional scientific knowledge or concepts”.709 However, the NRC 
in the Red Book considered that risk characterisation requires “the exercise of 
judgment in the aggregation of population groups with varied sensitivity and 
different exposure”.710 In other words, the NRC acknowledged that risk 
characterisation is influenced by judgements about the effects of conditions of 
life on risk to public health.  
 
For exemplifying epistemological problems, the NRC displayed a list of 
uncertainties requiring judgements in the risk characterisation stage of risk 
assessment:711 
 
 
Inference Options in the Stage of Risk Characterisation 
 
• What are the statistical uncertainties in estimating the extent of health 
effects? How are these uncertainties to be computed and presented?  
• What are the biologic uncertainties in estimating the extent of health 
effects? What is their origin? How will they be estimated? What effect do 
they have on quantitative estimates? How will the uncertainties be 
described to agency decision-makers?  
                                                 
706 National Research Council, Risk Assessment in the Federal Government: Managing the 
Process (National Academy Press, 1983), p. 21. 
707 National Research Council, ibid. p. 28. 
708 National Research Council, ibid. p. 36.  
709 National Research Council, ibid. p. 28.  
710 National Research Council, ibid.  
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• Which dose-response assessments and exposure assessments should be 
used?  
• Which population groups should be the primary targets for protection, and 
which provide the most meaningful expression of the health risk?  
 
 
In the Red Book, the NRC commented the uncertainties listed above as follows: 
“Little guidance is available on how to express uncertainties in the underlying 
data and on which dose-response assessments and exposure assessments should 
be combined to give a final estimate of possible risk.” 712 In other words, there 
was little guidance for scientists and risk assessors for expressing uncertainties 
inherent to risk assessment procedures to risk managers. Hence, the conclusion 
can be drawn that it came to rest upon individual scientists and risk assessors 
whether and how to inform risk managers about uncertainties and choices of 
options underlying particular risk estimates. This conclusion is important in 
several respects.  
 
First, it shows the interplay between science and policy.  
The interplay between science and policy can be demonstrated by the following, 
invented example. Let’s imagine a simple situation with a scientist/risk assessor 
and a risk manager. In the first alternative, the scientist/risk assessor is factoring 
in high degrees of conservatism at each step where inference options were 
required in a certain risk assessment. Let’s further assume that the scientist or 
risk assessor does not inform the recipient of the risk assessment, that is, the risk 
manager, about the degree of conservatism factored in the final risk estimate. In 
such a situation, the risk manager would be tempted to take regulatory action, 
because the likelihood of hazardous effects seems to be high. In a second 
alternative, let’s imagine that the scientist or risk assessor is factoring in low 
degrees of conservatism at each possible step in a certain risk assessment. If the 
scientist / risk assessor is not informing the risk manager about the low degrees 
of conservatism factored in the final risk estimate, the effect would be the 
opposite to those of the first alternative: the risk manager would be tempted not 
to take regulatory action because the likelihood of hazardous effects seems to be 
low.  
 
An additional element in both alternative scenarios is the fact that usually risk 
managers apply additional safety factors in the phase of risk management. This 
fact is of particular importance with regard to the first alternative, i.e., in the 
case scientists/risk assessors have already factored in high degrees of 
conservatism into estimates in risk assessment. If risk managers are not aware 
about the high degree of conservatism already factored in the assessed risk, the 
                                                 
712 National Research Council, Risk Assessment in the Federal Government: Managing the 
Process (National Academy Press, 1983, p. 36.  
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additional safety factors applied in the phase of risk management are adding up 
a supplementary margin of safety.713 
 
The simple examples demonstrate how assumptions, choices and judgements 
regarding inference options by scientists/risk assessors may not only influence 
the outcome of risk assessment, but the outcome of the whole risk analysis 
exercise. And it seems to be naïve to believe that scientists/risk assessors are not 
aware of this fact. However, if one has to assume that scientists/risk assessors 
are aware of the fact that their assumptions, choices and judgements and their 
way to communicate them are influential on the final risk decision, it is hard to 
maintain that there is a clear separation between ‘scientific’ and ‘objective’ risk 
assessment and ‘political’ risk management. And even if one likes to assume 
that scientists/risk assessors are unaware about the influence of their 
assumptions, choices and judgements, the latter nevertheless do influence the 
final outcome of risk analysis.  
 
No wonder, though, that the interplay between science and policy came more 
and more in the focus of science policy.  
 
The Reagan Administration, observing that inference bridges in risk assessments 
imply value judgements and may serve as open doors for policy considerations, 
called for a strict separation of science and policy. Brian Wynne noted: “The US 
White House Office of Science and Technology Policy proposed in 1980 that 
the observed infusion of scientific risk analysis by policy values could be 
overcome by a ‘return’ to strict separation of facts and values”.714 A “more 
sophisticated approach” (Wynne) was developed by the Committee on Risk 
Assessment in the Federal Government, established by the US National 
Research Council (NRC).715 In its famous Red Book, the NRC “proposed a 
                                                 
713 In this respect, Catherine Button pointed at the problem of additional layers of 
conservatism factored in by uninformed risk managers:  
“The real dialogue now concerns methods by which the extent of the 
conservatism that is built into risk estimates can be made clear to risk managers 
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layer of conservatism which, because of the conservatism built-in to risk 
assessment, is not necessary” (Catherine Button, The Power to Protect. Trade, 
Health, and Uncertainty in the WTO (Hart Publishing, 2004), p. 99, footnotes 
omitted).  
714 Brian Wynne, ‘Risk Assessment and Regulation for Hazardous Wastes’, in Brian Wynne 
(ed.), Risk Management and Hazardous Waste. Implementation and the Dialectics of 
Credibility (Springer-Verlag, 1987), p. 341.  
715 Brian Wynne, ibid.   
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distinction between scientific risk assessment, risk assessment policy, and risk 
management”.716 
 
Wynne pointed at the requirement of a risk assessment policy when facing 
questions “unanswerable by science”. Wynne observed:  
 
“Here questions of a scientific nature are nevertheless strictly 
unanswerable by science, either because of uncertainty due to gaps in 
science, or to inherently trans-scientific properties of the issue. Any 
one of several scientific inference bridges or decision rules could be 
legitimately used to reach across the gaps and allow to construction 
of policy-relevant scientific knowledge – each might be consistent 
with, but not determined by, existing scientific knowledge. Yet each 
may have its own policy implications, so that the choice of a 
‘scientific’ decision rule is inevitably party a policy matter.” 717 
 
The proclivity of some social scientists and lawyers in particular towards the 
doctrine of separating scientific questions from political questions seemingly 
stems from a naïve understanding of scientific method, based on personal 
experience in legal practice rather than scientific knowledge. In legal practice, 
there are “questions of fact” which are separated from “questions of law”. 
“Questions of fact” shall provide answers to the question how things actually 
happened and about respective consequences. “Questions of law”, in contrast, 
are focusing, inter alia, on the issues of liability and penalty. For explaining 
differences of legal and scientific approaches, Susan Sterrett introduced the 
example of scientific scale models. Scale models are of different utility whether 
applied in a laboratory or in a courtroom. Susan Sterrett observed:  
 
“On can use the scale model only to establish answers to questions of 
the first sort [i.e., to questions of fact]. In fact, once all the questions 
of the sort that could be settled by a scale model are settled, 
questions about responsibility, blame, and regret, are still untouched. 
In such a context, anyone who thought that empirical propositions 
might have anything to say about such questions should – and often 
would – be brought to realize that they don’t. In a law court, 
someone following such a line of thought might be silenced by being 
told that the question they are attempting to provide evidence for to 
the jury is a question of law, not of fact. (…) Perhaps there is an 
analogous point about ethics that resonated when reflecting on the 
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717 Brian Wynne, ibid. p. 341 (italics in original).  
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limits to what a scale model could portray about a situation in the 
context of a courtroom, rather than a laboratory.” 718 
 
The reason underlying the misconception of science common in social sciences 
and for lawyers in particular is the confusion of facts with truth. In the 
courtroom, facts established by the court are ‘true’. In science, however, 
established facts are just facts. Scientific facts cannot be ‘true’ or ‘false,’ they 
exist or don’t exist. What can be ‘true’ or ‘false’ are scientific theories; scientific 
theories can be falsified.719 Following the suggestion of separating facts and 
values would divest the former from a theory interpreting them. Facts would 
virtually remain ‘bare facts.’ However, it was explained above that risk 
assessment consists of the four steps hazard identification, hazard 
characterisation, exposure assessment and risk characterisation. The whole 
process of assessing risk is basically an exercise of apportioning probabilities to 
cause adverse effects to certain hazards. It was further explained that risk 
assessment procedures, in particular the fourth stage of risk characterisation, is 
underlayed by theoretical assumptions and predictions, i.e., inferential bridges. 
For that reason, it was concluded that risk assessment not only consists of 
empirical testing, but also of theoretical analysis. Empirical testing without 
theoretical underpinnings amounts to empty empiricism, or inductivism (as 
called by Popper), or empiriocriticism (as called by Lenin). And similar to 
inductivism and empiriocriticism, the reduction of risk assessment to empty 
empiricism would also translate into a political effect: ‘bare facts’ in risk 
assessment are mere hazards. Thus, the reduction of risk assessment to empty 
empiricism would basically stop the risk assessment process at initial stages, that 
is, hazard identification and hazard characterisation, eventually. Obviously, such 
a reductionist or inductivistic approach would significantly reduce the scope of 
risk assessment. Only empirically ascertainable ‘risks’ (i.e. hazards) would be 
identifiable by such an inductivistic or ‘empiriocritical’ risk assessment. On the 
other hand, risks previously established by applying inferential bridges for 
overcoming factual or theoretical gaps would not any more qualify as 
empirically ascertained ‘risks’. The reduction of risk assessment to inductivistic 
or ‘empiriocritical’ hazard assessment would translate into a narrowing of the 
scope of protection.720 
                                                 
718 Susan G. Sterrett, ‘Physical Pictures: Engineering Models circa 1914 and in Wittgenstein’s 
Tractatus’, in Michael Heidelberger, Friedrich Stadler (eds.), History of Philosophy of 
Science. New Trends and Perspectives (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002), p. 133. The 
example is taken from Sterrett’s closing words to her contribution, entitled The Laboratory 
and the Courtroom (ibid.).  
719 Following Popper, scientific theories can never be verified by empirical means. Thus, the 
sole criterion of scientific validity is not verification, but falsification (Karl R. Popper, The 
Logic of Scientific Discovery, 2nd English edition (Hutchinson & Co Publishers, 1968), p. 40).  
720 For example, it might be difficult to examine all variants of interactions between GMOs 
and naturally occurring organisms by means of empirical field trials simply because there are 
too many probabilities and constellations for such interactions. Until a convincing theory 
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Some authors noted that calls for separating facts and values in risk assessment 
are typically corresponding to a bureaucratic, even paternalistic understanding of 
the state and its administrative functions. For instance, considering Turkey in 
particular, Zeynep Kivilcim noted that the paternalistic-bureaucratic style of 
Turkish administration actually hindered effective public participation in the 
debate about the application of biotechnology in Turkish agriculture:  
 
“According to the officials of the Ministry, the actors in the 
agrobiotechnology debate in Turkey consist of institutions or 
individuals acting according to their economic interests, or else they 
are uninformed people under the influence of lobbies. The Ministry, 
by standing at the distance from all the stakeholders, can only take 
neutral decisions and set up balanced legislation. This view reveals 
the paternalistic-bureaucratic style of administration, and also shows 
the idea that civil society’s position and opinions are by their nature 
subjective and therefore not noteworthy. By distinguishing extra-
scientific factors from ‘science’, the official discourse presents the 
concept that science itself is value free and neutral, and that the other 
actors are misled by some hidden political or economical agenda. 
The actual subjectivity of the experts, and the economic power of 
some stakeholders and their consequent influence on the public 
authorities and procedures, are not officially acknowledged, an the 
assumption of ‘objective’ expertise and of ‘neutral’ decisions taken 
at the end of the administrative process give much legitimacy to the 
labeling of the perceptions and evaluations of the other stakeholders 
as ‘subjective’.” 721 
 
Whereas the Red Book advocated for a clear separation of risk assessment and 
risk management, that is, science and policy, later studies of the NRC were less 
apodictic. Because of its rather technical approach, the NRC, however, focused 
rather on the interplay between risk assessors and risk managers than on 
epistemological fundamentals. The NRC addressed the interplay between risk 
assessors and risks managers under the theme of risk assessment policy and 
deliberation.  
 
The second conclusion which can be drawn from the finding that scientists/risk 
assessors decide whether and how to inform risk managers about uncertainties 
                                                                                                                                                        
explaining GMO conduct in the environment is established, arguments persist that certain 
risks might have escaped empirical approaches. Thus, the GMO debate might well carry on.  
721 Zeynep Kivilcim, ’The Legal Framework for Agrobiotechnology in Turkey: The 
Challenges to the Implementation of the Precautionary Principle,’ in Karapinar, Baris, 
Adaman, Fikret, and Ozertan Gokhan (eds.), Rethinking Structural Reform in Turkish 
Agriculture: Beyond the World Bank’s Strategy (Nova Science Publishers, New York 2010) 
[pp. 265-280], pp. 274-275. 
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and choices underlying risk estimates is the importance of risk assessment 
policies and deliberation between risk assessors and risk managers.  
 
In the following, some new approaches to risk analysis procedures, emphasising 
requirements for risk assessment policies and deliberation between risk 
assessors and risk managers, are addressed in more detail. To start with, the 
evolvement of NRC approaches towards risk characterisation and deliberation 
between risk assessors and risk managers is outlined.  
 
E. New Approaches 
 
Attempts for reforming risk analysis procedures are usually characterised by 
deliberative and/or participatory elements.722 In the context of risk analysis, 
deliberative and/or participatory elements can be considered from different 
angles. From an institutional angle, deliberative and participatory elements can 
be found in risk governance approaches. From a procedural perspective, 
deliberative elements can take various particular forms. Finally, from the angle 
of dispute settlement, participatory elements can be found in the model of 
mediation723 and other forms of “alternative dispute resolution” (ADR).724 
 
1. Deliberative Approaches  
 
Approaches to risk characterisation and deliberation are good examples of the 
evolving character of risk analysis. In the Red Book (1983), the National 
Research Council defined risk characterisation as a mere summary of the 
previous three steps of risk assessment:  
 
                                                 
722 The distinction made by democracy theory between deliberative and participatory 
perspectives was, for example, worked out by Heike Walk who analysed the model of multi-
level governance in light of democracy theory in general and from a participatory perspective 
in particular (Heike Walk, ‘Demokratische Herausforderungen für Multi-Level-Governance. 
Ein Blick aus partizipativer Perspektive’, in Achim Brunnengräber and Heike Walk (eds.), 
Multi-Level Governance. Klima-, Umwelt- und Sozialpolitik in einer interdependenten Welt 
(Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2007), p. 38.  
723 Mediation was defined as „a voluntary process in which those involved in a dispute jointly 
explore and reconcile their differences. The mediator has no authority to impose a settlement. 
His or her strength lies in the ability to assist the parties in settling their own differences. The 
mediated dispute is settled when the parties themselves reach what they consider to be a 
workable solution” (Adrian Vatter, ‘Politik’, in Christoph Rehmann-Sutter, Adrian Vatter, 
Hansjörg Seiler, Partizipative Risikopolitik (Westdeutscher Verlag, 1998), p. 288; citing from 
the Washington’s Institute for Environmental Mediation).  
724 Adrian Vatter, ‘Politik’, in Christoph Rehmann-Sutter, Adrian Vatter, Hansjörg Seiler, 
Partizipative Risikopolitik (Westdeutscher Verlag, 1998), p. 288.  
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“Risk characterization is the process of estimating the incidence of a 
health effect under the various conditions of human exposure 
described in exposure assessment. It is performed by combining the 
exposure and dose-response assessments. The summary effects of the 
uncertainties in the preceding steps are described in this step.” 725 
 
In a later report, Science and Judgment in Risk Assessment (1994), the NRC put 
more emphasis on challenges posed by the stage of risk characterisation. The 
NRC noted that the risk characterisation phase is probably the most challenging 
one, because it requires the “integration of information from the first three steps 
to develop a qualitative or quantitative estimate of the likelihood that any of the 
hazards associated with the agent of concern will be realized in exposed 
people”.726 In addition, risk characterisations should also “include a full 
discussion of the uncertainties associated with the estimates of risk”.727 
 
Finally, in a third report, Understanding Risk. Informing Decisions in a 
Democratic Society (1996), the NRC stated that the view of risk characterisation 
“as a translation or summary is seriously deficient”.728 Instead of being “an 
activity added at the end of risk analysis”, requirements for risk characterisation 
“should largely determine the scope and nature of risk analysis”.729 This new 
approach of the NRC towards risk characterisation is important because it shows 
that the traditional demarcation between a science-driven risk assessment phase 
and a policy-driven risk management phase became more and more permeable. 
In particular, the new understanding of risk characterisation as a process jointly 
guided by analytical principles and deliberative procedures shows that policy 
considerations are already involved in – and thus inherent to – the risk 
assessment phase. The new understanding of risk characterisation by the NRC 
reads as follows (excerpts):  
 
“Risk characterization is the outcome of an analytic-deliberative 
process. Its success depends critically on systematic analysis that is 
appropriate to the problem, responds to the needs of the interested 
and affected parties, and treats uncertainties of importance to the 
decision problem in a comprehensible way. Success also depends on 
deliberations that formulate the decision problem, guide analysis to 
improve decision participants’ understanding, seek the meaning of 
                                                 
725 National Research Council, Risk Assessment in the Federal Government: Managing the 
Process (National Academy Press, 1983) p. 20.  
726 National Research Council, Science and Judgment in Risk Assessment (National Academy 
Press, 1994), p. 27, italics added.  
727 National Research Council, ibid. p. 27, italics added. 
728 National Research Council, Understanding Risk. Informing Decisions in a Democratic 
Society (National Academy Press, 1996) p. 2.  
729 National Research Council, ibid. 
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analytic findings and uncertainties, and improve the ability of 
interested and affected parties to participate effectively in the risk 
decision process.” 730 
 
The understanding of risk characterisation as an analytic-deliberative process is 
fundamentally different from the perception of risk characterisation as a mere 
summary of previous risk assessment steps. The recognition of deliberation as a 
complementary element to analysis requiring equal consideration in the risk 
characterisation phase highlights societal implications of risk assessment. In the 
words of the NRC, analysis and deliberation “can be thought of as two 
complementary approaches to gaining knowledge about the world, forming 
understandings on the basis of knowledge, and reaching agreement among 
people.”731 In the definition of risk characterisation as an analytic-deliberative 
process, the analytic part is well established. Though, it might be noted that the 
NRC includes the application of social and decision sciences into its definition 
of analysis.732 In contrast, the deliberative element requires further explanation 
because it “is as critical to risk characterization as analysis, although its 
importance has been underappreciated”.733 As deliberation is typically connoted 
with Habermas’ theory of discourse, at least in the European context, one may 
wonder what deliberation has to do with risk assessment. In the context of risk 
assessment and risk characterisation, the NRC defined deliberation as “any 
formal or informal process for communication and collective consideration of 
issues”.734 With regard to broader theories of deliberation, it has to be noted that 
the NRC stressed on differences between deliberation in the context of risk 
characterization, on the one hand, and what is commonly known as ‘public 
                                                 
730 National Research Council, ibid. p. 158, italics by the NRC.  
731 National Research Council, ibid. p. 3.  
732 The NRC defined analysis as using “rigorous, replicable methods, evaluated under the 
agreed protocols of an expert community – such as those of disciplines in the natural, social, 
or decisional sciences, as well as mathematics, logic, and law – to arrive at answers to factual 
questions” (National Research Council, ibid., pp. 3-4). Although the definition of analysis, as 
reframed by the NRC, broadened the scope of sciences applicable to the process of risk 
characterisation towards social and decisional sciences as well as law, the focus of analysis 
remains on factual questions addressed by experts. With regard to the broader range of 
sciences the NRC deemed necessary for risk analysis, the NRC stressed the need for “the 
substantive and methodological expertise of the economic, social, and behavioural sciences: 
for instance, effects on property values, tourism, scenic value, human population migration, 
fairness, and public trust in government may be important outcomes of risk decisions, and 
they are in some cases amenable to rigorous scientific analysis. Even health risks cannot be 
estimated accurately without a good understanding of the behaviour of the individuals and 
organizations that control or are affected by hazardous substances or processes” (NRC, ibid., 
pp. 24-25).  
733 National Research Council, Understanding Risk. Informing Decisions in a Democratic 
Society (National Academy Press, 1996) p. 159. 
734 National Research Council, ibid. p. 4.  
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participation’, on the other hand.735 In particular, the NRC pointed at the 
following three major differences. First, it is proactive in the sense that “it 
precedes agency proposals and action: it is aimed at improving understanding on 
risk situations, as distinct from taking action on them”.736 Second, deliberation 
in the risk characterisation phase of risk assessment is focused on facilitating 
broad understanding of risk. Therefore, “the involvement of knowledgeable 
experts as well as ‘the public’ is essential throughout”.737 Third, deliberation in 
context of risk characterisation is more than public hearings. Rather than a mere 
“forum in which interested citizens can be heard”, deliberation is “a symposium 
in which risk experts, public officials, and the various interested and affected 
parties can interact as equally valid contributors”.738 Such an inclusive approach 
to risk characterisation, including interested and affected parties as well as 
maximally exposed individuals and other particularly affected stakeholders, 
goes far beyond the scope of former models viewing all steps of risk assessment 
as analytical procedures driven by experts. The inclusion of affected or 
interested groups already in the phase of risk characterisation “may need to 
consider alternative sets of assumptions that may lead to divergent estimates of 
risk; to address social, economic, ecological, and ethical outcomes as well as 
consequences for human health and safety (…).739 
 
The very reason for the new understanding and emphasis of the NRC of the 
phase of risk characterisation is the acknowledgement that science and scientific 
analysis “may not always be neutral and objective as a decision-making tool, 
even when it meets all the tests of scientific peer review“. 740 The NRC 
explained:  
 
“Good scientific analysis is neutral in the sense that it does not seek 
to support or refute the claims of any party in a dispute, and its is 
objective in the sense that any scientist who knows the rules of 
observation of the particular field of study can in principle obtain the 
same results. But science is not necessarily neutral and objective in 
its ways of framing problems.” 741 
                                                 
735 By the same token, the NRC gave up a bequeathed distinction between risk 
characterisation and risk communication based on the grounds of who uses it. Whereas risk 
characterisation was formerly said to shed light on the interface between risk assessment and 
risk management and was therefore addressed to agency officials, risk communication was 
intended to exchange information with the public (National Research Council, ibid. p. 27). 
736 National Research Council, ibid. p. 159. 
737 National Research Council, ibid. 
738 National Research Council, ibid. 
739 National Research Council, ibid. p. 3.  
740 National Research Council, ibid. p. 25.  
741 National Research Council, ibid. p. 25. As examples, the NCR mentioned analysis of the 
risks of drunk driving diverting attention from automobile and highway security systems; 
analysis of cancer risks from industrial chemicals drawing attention away from comparable 
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A scientific analysis may be appropriate by itself, “but if the overall scientific 
effort is tilted too far toward only one of the legitimate formulations of a 
problem, it tends to yield biased understanding”.742 For avoiding such biases, 
risk characterisation must do more for supporting decision-making than work on 
scientific knowledge. The NRC considered that even the translation of scientific 
information in common language is not enough. According to the NRC, risk 
characterisation “must address the right questions – the ones that the various 
participants in risk decision wants answered as a basis for making choices – and 
it must give those parties an understanding of the many facts of risk”.743 Hence, 
deliberation shall ensure that the right questions are tabled in risk assessment 
procedures ab initio: “Good risk characterization results from a process that no 
only gets the science right – that is, involves an adequate level of scientific 
inquiry and analysis – but also gets the right science – that is, directs that 
analysis to the most decision-relevant questions.”744 
 
Basing on such insights, the NRC formulated its new definition of risk 
characterisation as follows:  
 
“Risk characterization is a synthesis and summary of information 
about a potentially hazardous situation that addresses the needs and 
interests of decision makers and of interested and affected parties. 
Risk characterization is a prelude to decision making and depends on 
an iterative, analytic-deliberative process.” 745 
 
The understanding of risk characterisation, that is, the fourth step of risk 
assessment, as a prelude to decision making, that is, risk management, reveals 
that the demarcation of risk assessment and risk management is permeable. In 
particular, it has to be noted that the last phase of risk assessment, i.e., risk 
characterisation, comprises of a deliberative element which reaches out beyond 
the closed circles of scientific experts and includes affected and interested 
segments of citizens.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
risks from naturally occurring chemicals in foods; and analysis of the risks of indoor air 
pollution diverting attention from ambient air pollution – and vice versa. In a policy context, 
the NRC formulated the rule of thumb that “analyses of the costs of environmental regulation 
often serve the policy arguments of the opponents of regulation, while analyses of the risks of 
unregulated activities bolster the arguments of the proponents of regulation” (NRC, ibid.).  
742 National Research Council, ibid. p. 25. For example, the NRC observed that risk analysis 
may be compromised “when it is based on assumptions about the conditions of hazard 
exposure that are known to be unreasonable by decision participants who were not consulted 
when the assumptions where selected” (NRC, ibid.).  
743 National Research Council, ibid. p. 156, italics added.  
744 National Research Council, ibid. p. 156, italics added.  
745 National Research Council, ibid. p. 27, italics added.  
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The broadening of the notion of deliberation from a dialogue between risk 
assessors and risk managers to a multi-stakeholder exercise by the NRC is 
significant. It does not only show the permeability between scientific risk 
assessment and policy-driven risk management. The inclusive approach of the 
NRC towards deliberation also blurred the demarcation between objectivist and 
constructivist approaches to risk analysis. This is the third conclusion which can 
be drawn from the development of risk analysis as reflected in the studies and 
reports by the NRC.  
 
In the Red Book, the NRC did not rely on Jürgen Habermas and his deliberative 
theory of democracy. However, it is widely acknowledged that also in the 
United States, the debate on deliberation evolved “largely under the influence of 
Jürgen Habermas”746 
 
Various definitions have been developed for characterising deliberation. For 
example, deliberation may be defined by its outcome. From such a perspective, 
deliberation is “the endogenous change of preferences resulting from 
communication”.747 From a procedural point of view, deliberation can be 
defined as “a conversation whereby individuals speak and listen sequentially 
before making a collective decision”.748 From a governance perspective, 
deliberation was characterised as the “free public reasoning among equals who 
are governed by the decisions”.749 
 
For Ulrich Beck, deliberation stands for better acquaintance between decision-
makers and risks produced, thus including all stakeholders in risk conflicts. 
Beck noted:  
 
“The alternative, then, is the rethinking of government and politics 
so as to create open governments and organizations, tendered by 
much better-informed publics and socially aware firms, all brought 
face to face with the consequences of their actions from which they 
are at present largely divorced.”750 
                                                 
746 Jon Elster, Deliberative Democracy, Cambridge 1998, p. 8. Elisabeth Ehrensperger applied 
criteria of deliberative theory on the establishment of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and demonstrated the validity of deliberative theory in the international context; see 
Elisabeth Ehrensperger, Die Allgemeine Erklärung der Menschenrechte als Modellfall der 
Deliberation. Theorie, Dokumente, Analyse (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2006), in particular 
p. 81.  
747 Susan C. Stokes, ’Pathologies of Deliberation’, in Jon Elster (ed.), Deliberative 
Democracy (Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 123.  
748 Diego Gambetta,’ “Claro!”: An Essay on Discursive Machismo’, in Jon Elster (ed.), 
Deliberative Democracy (Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 19.  
749 Joshua Cohen, ‘Democracy and Liberty’, in Jon Elster (ed.), Deliberative Democracy 
(Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 186.  
750 Ulrich Beck, World Risk Society (Polity Press, 1999/2005), p. 108.  
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Though, for Ulrich Beck, the “divorce” between actions and their consequences 
is at the heart of conflicts over the assessment of risks and ‘manufactured 
uncertainties’, such as GMOs. In this respect, Beck observed that recent cases 
such as the outcry over BSE showed “the extent to which the old methods of 
risk assessment have inflicted an uncontrolled and uncontrollable experiment 
upon society”.751 Although acknowledging that risks are part of modern life, 
Beck suggested that risks should be governed more democratically: “(…) 
[W]hat we can and indeed should achieve is the development of new 
institutional arrangements that can better cope with the risks we are presently 
facing; not with the idea in mind that we might be able to regain full control, but 
much more with the idea in mind that we have to find ways to deal 
democratically with the ambivalence of modern life and decide democratically 
which risks we want to take”.752 
 
Hence, democratic risk governance in the sense of Beck may be understood as a 
new institutional arrangement between science, the economy and democracy 
enabling scientists to “confess their ignorance” and share their doubts with the 
broader public.  
 
New approaches in risk governance shall be addressed in the next paragraph.  
 
2. Risk Governance Approaches 
 
In Food Safety Governance, Marion Dreyer, Ortwin Renn et al. explained the 
risk governance approach as follows:  
 
“[T]he governance process is understood to include, but also to 
extend beyond, the three conventionally recognised elements of risk 
analysis – risk assessment, risk management, and risk 
communication. Governance thus includes matters of institutional 
design, technical methodology, administrative consultation, 
legislative procedure and political accountability on the part of the 
public bodies, and social or corporate responsibility on the part of 
private enterprises.” 753 
 
From the broader view of risk governance, Dreyer, Renn et al. conceived the 
following stages in the risk governance process:  
                                                 
751 Ulrich Beck, ibid. 
752 Ulrich Beck, ibid. 
753 Adrian Ely, Andy Stierling, Marion Dreyer, Ortwin Renn, Ellen Vos, and Frank Wendler, 
‘The Need for Change’, in Marion Dreyer and Ortwin Renn (eds.) Food Safety Governance. 
Integrating Science, Precaution and Public Involvement (Springer-Verlag, 2009), pp. 11-12 
(original emphases, footnote omitted).  
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1. Framing. The stage of framing encompasses “activities such as the 
identification of the scientific inputs required to inform policy”.754 
2. Assessment. Assessment “informs, substantiates and justifies 
governance decisions, policies and wider institutional practices and 
commitments”.755 Conceived as “risk assessment” in the broader 
sense, assessment is meant to gather “information on technical and 
socio-economic risks and benefits, as well as on the concerns of 
stakeholders and citizens”.756 
3. Evaluation. The evaluation stage “involves deliberation around 
divergent values associated with the threats under consideration”.757 
4. Management. As in classical “risk management”, the management 
stage is the phase were intervention measures “are identified, 
assessed, and selected”.758 
 
The innovative element in the risk governance approach put forward by Dreyer, 
Renn et al. – calling it General Framework for the Precautionary and Inclusive 
Governance of Food Safety – consisted of the two new stages framing and 
evaluation. The two stages of framing and evaluation “constitute mediating 
activities between processes of assessment (focused on knowledge generation, 
collection and interpretation) and management (focusing on value-laden 
decision-making in a jigsaw puzzle of facts, uncertainties, stakeholder interests, 
and public concerns)”.759 Most importantly, Dreyer et al. emphasised the 
inclusive nature of the framing stage, extending to societal values:  
 
“Framing provides guidance concerning the articulation of the 
‘problem’ to be addressed, the boundaries of the investigations to be 
conducted and procedures necessary for further handling of the food 
safety threat in question – especially during assessment. It is during 
framing, for instance, that the terms of reference are specified for 
assessment. This task needs to be governed by societal values 
(stating the goals, objectives, and contextual conditions) and inspired 
by what we already know about the threat (suspected impacts, 
exposure, persistence, and others).” 760 
 
                                                 
754 Adrian Ely et. al., ibid. p. 12.  
755 Adrian Ely et. al., ibid.  
756 Adrian Ely et. al., ibid.  
757 Adrian Ely et. al., ibid. p. 12 (emphasis added).  
758 Adrian Ely et. al., ibid. p. 12. 
759 Marion Dreyer, Ortwin Renn, Adrian Ely, Andy Stierling, Ellen Vos, and Frank Wendler, 
‘Summary: Key Features of the General Framework’, in Marion Dreyer and Ortwin Renn 
(eds.) Food Safety Governance. Integrating Science, Precaution and Public Involvement 
(Springer-Verlag, 2009), p. 160.  
760 Marion Dreyer et. al., ibid. p. 160 (emphasis added).  
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By emphasised the inclusion of a broad array of stakeholder already in the initial 
stage of framing, Dreyer, Renn et al. also rejected a rigid separation of science 
and judgement in risk analysis:  
 
“… framing and evaluation may be seen as distinct hybrid activities, 
in the sense that they draw on both political and socio-economic 
considerations as well as scientific knowledge. Whether or not this is 
explicitly acknowledged, knowledge and values are closely 
intertwined in these activities. It is for this reason that many 
stakeholders (for different reasons) identify the need for improved 
interaction between assessors and managers. Such views feature 
prominently and repeatedly as part of general food safety governance 
debates, and are strongly represented in the deliberative processes 
undertaken as part of the development of the present proposed 
framework.” 761 
 
Summarising on all four stages of the proposed General Framework for the 
Precautionary and Inclusive Governance of Food Safety, Dreyer, Renn et al. 
concluded:  
 
“The four-stage design proposed in this General Framework thus 
retains the basic form of familiar institutional activities, but avoids 
associated necessity for naïve assertions over the separation of facts 
and values in assessment and management. However, by retaining a 
respect for the distinct forms of attention required in generating 
knowledge and eliciting values, this approach also avoids concerns 
over ‘post-modern’ or ‘relativist’ views, under which such activities 
are regarded as homogenous.” 762 
 
3. New Understandings of Communication and Participation 
 
Conventionally, risk communication is considered the third stage in the process 
of risk analysis. Studies on risk communication are usually discerning three 
phases in the evolution of risk communication practices.763 The first phase of 
risk communication was characterised by attempts to educate people about 
conceiving probabilities and risk. With regard to that educational phase of risk 
communication, Ortwin Renn observed:  
 
                                                 
761 Marion Dreyer et. al., ibid. p. 160 (original emphasis).  
762 Marion Dreyer et. al., ibid. p. 161.  
763 Ortwin Renn, ‘Communication About Food Safety’, in Marion Dreyer and Ortwin Renn 
(eds.) Food Safety Governance. Integrating Science, Precaution and Public Involvement 
(Springer-Verlag, 2009), p. 121.  
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“The first phase of risk communication emphasized the necessity of 
conveying probabilistic thinking to the general public and to educate 
the laypersons to acknowledge and accept the risk management 
practices of the respective institutions. The most prominent 
instrument of risk communication in phase 1 was the application of 
risk comparisons. If anyone was willing to accept x fatalities as a 
result of voluntary activities, they should be obliged to accept 
another voluntary activity with less than x fatalities. However, this 
logic failed to convince audiences: people were unwilling to abstract 
from the context of risk-taking and the corresponding social 
conditions, and they also rejected the reliance on expected values as 
the only benchmarks for evaluating risks.” 764 
 
As educational attempts in risk communication did not borne expected fruit, the 
focus was shifted to a more persuasive approach, applying public-relations 
techniques. The persuasive approach, adopted in phase two of risk 
communication, was described as follows:  
 
“[Phase two] emphasized persuasion and focused on public relations 
efforts to convince people that some of their behaviour was 
unacceptable (such as smoking and drinking) since it exposed them 
to high risk levels, whereas public worries and concerns about many 
technological and environmental risks (such as nuclear installations, 
liquid gas tanks, or food additives) were regarded as overcautious 
due to the absence of any significant risk level. This communication 
process resulted in some behavioural changes at the personal level: 
many people started to abandon unhealthy habits. However, it did 
not convince a majority of these people that the current risk 
management practices for most of the technological facilities and 
environmental risks were, indeed, the politically appropriate 
response to risk. The one-way communication process of conveying 
a message to the public in carefully crafted, persuasive language 
produced little effect. Most respondents wee appalled by this 
approach or simply did not believe the message, regardless of how 
well it was packaged; this was also true for the area of food safety. 
The various food scares starting with BSE taught most people that 
the experts’ assurances that all food items are safe, are often based 
on wishful thinking, and that uncertainties and ambiguities have been 
downplayed in order to avoid economic losses.” 765 
 
                                                 
764 Ortwin Renn, ibid.  
765 Ortwin Renn, ibid. p. 122.  
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Hansjörg Seiler used the term ‘acceptance management’ for describing 
persuasive approaches in risk management. Seiler noted that such acceptance 
management has nothing to do with democracy or participation, but presumes 
the appropriateness of the decision already taken.766 
 
The third phase of risk communication learnt from works of sociologists such as 
Ulrich Beck who brought the risk issue to the centre of political debate. Whereas 
it was the wealth and then the power issue dominating political debate during 
most of the 20th century, it is now the risk issue, the decision about risks and the 
question who bears the risks and who reaps the benefits shaping political debate. 
Putting risk and risk distribution at the centre of political debate, it follows that 
risk communication takes centre stage. Perceived as a two-way communication 
throughout the whole risk governance process, risk communication is 
understood in a holistic way. Ortwin Renn noted:  
 
“This current phase of risk communication stresses a two-way 
communication process in which it is not only the members of the 
public who are expected to engage in a social learning process, but 
also the risk assessors and risk managers. (…) The ultimate goal of a 
risk communication programme is not, to ensure that everyone in the 
audience readily accepts and believes all of the information give, but 
to enable the receivers to process this information in order to form a 
well-balanced judgement in accordance with the factual evidence, 
the arguments of all sides, and their own interests and preferences. 
To accomplish this goal, a risk communication programme is needed 
to provide the necessary qualifications to all participants and to 
empower them to be equal partners in making decisions about risk.” 
767 
 
Understanding risk communication as a two-way or even circular process, 
Baruch Fischhoff proposed the model of citizens’ commissions for soliciting 
public input. Fischhoff argued that, if risk scientists want to address public 
concerns, they need to know what these concerns are in the first place:  
 
“That requires systematic measurement of public values, in a way 
that provides citizens with a balanced overview of the issues, and 
time to think about them. In order to express their views in a rich and 
nuanced fashion, citizens need a broad communication channel. 
Something like these conditions is created by the Environmental 
                                                 
766 Hansjörg Seiler, ‚Recht’, in Christoph Rehmann-Sutter, Adrian Vatter, Hansjörg Seiler, 
Partizipative Risikopolitik (Westdeutscher Verlag, 1998), p. 329.  
767 Ortwin Renn, ‘Communication About Food Safety’, in Marion Dreyer and Ortwin Renn 
(eds.) Food Safety Governance. Integrating Science, Precaution and Public Involvement 
(Springer-Verlag, 2009), pp. 122 and 141.  
 260 
Protection Agency in the citizens’ commissions that it has convened 
for states and regions, in order to rank the risks that these 
communities face.” 768 
 
Fischhoff considered that “citizens’ commissions might be a better guiding 
metaphor for assessing public values than the opinion poll, which creates 
nothing like these conditions”.  
 
However, the idea of empowering potentially affected citizens with the means of 
making themselves heard is nothing new. Already in 1977, the Council for 
Science and Society emphasised in its report on The Acceptability of Risks the 
importance of public voice:  
 
“Our single major recommendation is that those who are exposed to 
risks which are not immediately obvious to them should have a 
powerful voice – expressed responsibility and on full information 
and sound advice – in deciding what risks they should be exposed 
to.” 769 
 
Marion Dreyer and Ortwin Renn, the editors of Food Safety Governance, 
summarised the discussion about requirements and problems of public 
participation in risk analysis in the following concise manner:  
 
“Still, there is ongoing intense debate over the question of how to 
involve efficiently and legitimate both corporate and civil society 
actors in food safety regulation, especially in conditions of social 
controversy. This question gained prominence through both the BSE 
crisis and the persistent debate on GM crop and food. Currently, its 
is increasingly being discussed in relation to topics such as the use of 
animal cloning for food production, the methods of characterising 
genotoxic substances in food, and a broad range of potential 
applications that rely on nanotechnologies. The need for 
reconsideration of stakeholder involvement in the regulatory process 
in face of these ‘old’ and emerging issues is widely acknowledged. 
At the same time the question over how to feed the perspectives of a 
wide diversity of social groups and also of the wider public 
systematically into the regulator process, without an overkill of 
                                                 
768 Baruch Fischhoff, ‘Public Values in Risk Research’, in Howard Kunreuther and Paul 
Slovic (eds.), Challenges in Risk Assessment and Risk Management, The Annals of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 545 (Sage Periodicals Press, 1996) p. 
83.  
769 Council for Science and Society, ‘The Acceptability of Risks’ (Barry Rose, 1977), p. 54; 
cited from Christoph Rehmann-Sutter, ‘Ethik’, in Christoph Rehmann-Sutter, Adrian Vatter, 
Hansjörg Seiler, Partizipative Risikopolitik (Westdeutscher Verlag, 1998), p. 65.  
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participatory procedures that would abuse the scarce resources of 
both the responsible institutions and those ‘involved’, become more 
important. (…) At the core of this debate is the question of how to 
ensure that this does not compromise the safeguarding of assessment 
against ‘inappropriate’ non-scientific influences.” 770 
 
The recognition by the NRC in the 1990s of the vital role of risk assessment 
policies and deliberation already in the phase of risk assessment – and not only 
in the latter phases of risk management and risk communication – is understood 
as a departure from the strictly objective position taken up by the NRC in the 
1980s. For addressing requirements for integrating value judgements into risk 
assessment, the NRC was constrained to soften the rigorous demarcation 
between facts and values already in the risk assessment stage. The new focus on 
inclusive, i.e., multi-stakeholder deliberation already in the risk assessment 
stage, however, also implies a softening of the demarcation between the two 
phases of scientific risk assessment, on the one hand, and policy-driven risk 
management, on the other hand. In other words, inviting the broader public for 
drafting “the right questions” for science to be answered in risk assessment 
implies a circular rather than a linear understanding of respective stages and 
phases in risk analysis.  
 
The NRC’s acknowledgement of requirements for deliberation already in the 
stage of risk assessment implied, in fact, a double avowal.  
First, the NRC’s consideration of deliberation as an indispensable instrument for 
risk assessment implies that the application of scientific methods alone is not 
enough for assessing risks; that science is an essential, but not sufficient tool for 
risk assessment.  
Second, the NRC’s appraisal of deliberation as essential already in the stage of 
risk assessment implies that facts and value judgements cannot be separated, not 
even in the first stage of risk analysis, that is, risk assessment. Thus, the 
recognition of deliberation as an essential tool already in the stage of risk 
assessment virtually disproves the positivist doctrine that science and value 
judgement can – and should – be separated in risk assessment.  
 
On the other hand, the emphasis given by the NRC on deliberation implies that 
risks and especially the characterisation of risks are involving value judgements 
and therefore are requiring public participation. In other words, the 
establishment of deliberation as an essential tool in risk assessment implied a 
shift from a science-oriented approach to a holistic approach, recognising the 
necessity of both scientific and deliberative elements in risk assessment.  
 
                                                 
770 Marion Dreyer and Ortwin Renn (eds.), Introduction to Food Safety Governance. 
Integrating Science, Precaution and Public Involvement (Springer-Verlag, 2009), p. 5.  
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In terms of a summary, one may note that the doctrine of clearly separating 
‘science-based’ risk assessment and ‘policy-driven’ risk management, 
established in the 1980s, was superseded by new and more holistic approaches 
in the meantime. Above, it was shown how opposing worldview shaped 
mutually exclusive risk concepts. It was also shown how risk assessors and risk 
managers tried to overcome theoretical controversies in risk assessment practice. 
In particular, the new approach of the NRC for establishing deliberation as a 
means to overcome risk controversies was outlined. This more holistic approach 
to risk assessment resembles rather to arts than to science.  
 
However, if the positivist presumption that science and judgement can be – and 
shall be – separated in the process of risk analysis was invalidated by more 
holistic approaches in the meantime, the old question is re-emerging: how to 
ensure unbiased outcomes in risk analysis? To answer that question, case studies 
of attempts for addressing risk by regulatory, institutional and organisational 
provisions are discussed in the following part three. These case studies of 
regulatory frameworks will shed light on the question how various regulators 
have tried to achieve unbiased outcomes ’in the real world’ where facts and 
values tend to intermingle and science is prone to political and economic 
interferences.  
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PART THREE: ATTEMPTS FOR SEPARATING RISK 
ASSESSMENT AND RISK MANAGEMENT  
 
Positivist approaches to science in general are typically based on the belief that 
facts and values, science and judgement, can be separated. Thus, the doctrine of 
separating risk assessment and risk management is understood as a continuation 
of that positivist belief in regulatory matters. However, in part two above, the 
positivist belief that risk assessment can and should be void of political 
considerations was refuted by establishing the necessity of human judgement in 
bridging data gaps and theory gaps in risk assessments.  
 
However, by rebutting the facts – value dichotomy as a remedy against biases in 
risk analysis, the old question is re-emerging: how to ensure unbiased outcomes 
in risk analysis? To answer that question, case studies of risk management 
attempts for addressing risk by regulatory, institutional and organisational 
provisions are discussed in the following. These case studies of regulatory 
frameworks will shed light on the question how various regulators are trying to 
achieve unbiased outcomes ’in the real world’ characterised by mutually 
convoluted facts and values. It is questioned whether and how different risk 
concepts have influenced regulatory attempts at national and international levels. 
It will be shown that none of the case studies examined, i.e., the Red Book, the 
White Paper, the Codex Alimentarius and the Cartagena Protocol, have 
implemented the doctrine of separating risk assessment and risk management in 
a positivist manner.  
 
 
CHAPTER 8 THE RED BOOK IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
Starting point of a vibrant debate about the role of risk assessment in regulating 
food safety and environmental hazards was a report on institutional means for 
risk assessment, termed Risk Assessment in the Federal Government: Managing 
the Process, issued by the National Research Council (NRC) of the United 
States in 1983.771 Because of its red cover, the legendary report of the NRC is 
referred to as the Red Book up to the present.  
 
                                                 
771 In fact, the report Risk Assessment in the Federal Government: Managing the Process was 
elaborated by the Committee on the Institutional Means for Assessment of Risk to Public 
Health which was formed within the National Research Council’s Commission on Life 
Sciences in October 1981 and accomplished its work in January 1983.  
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A. Conceptual Separation of Risk Assessment and Risk 
Management in Theory  
 
The Red Book was drafted in response to a directive from the Congress of the 
United States which materialised in the following mandate:  
 
• Evaluate “the merits of separating the analytic functions of 
developing risk assessments from the regulatory functions of making 
policy decisions” 772 (separation);  
• Evaluate “the feasibility of designating a single organization to do 
risk assessments for all regulatory agencies” 773 (centralisation);  
• Evaluate “the feasibility of developing uniform risk assessment 
guidelines for use by all regulatory agencies“ 774 (inference 
guidelines).  
 
Background of the study was certain expressions of discomfort with the conduct 
of federal regulatory agencies motivating Congress to initiate an in-depth review 
of the situation, carried out by the NRC. The regulatory agencies in focus of the 
NRC report were the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA), the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA), and the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC). 
 
The NRC summarised the following criticism fuelling discontent among certain 
segments of Congress:  
 
• Bias. A first set of criticism was addressed under the subtitle of 
‘bias’. Critics from this camp claimed that agencies “approach risk 
assessment with attitudes about regulation that preclude 
objectivity”.775 By doing so, critics complain, regulators may be 
tempted to “skew their assessment of risks associated with a 
particular substance to support a preference to regulate or not to 
regulate that substance”.776 
 
• Exaggeration. A second subset of criticism was summarised under 
the catchword ‘exaggeration’. The NRC noted that allegations of 
regulators’ tendencies to exaggerate risks are closely related to the 
first criticism about biased approaches towards risk assessments. 
                                                 
772 National Research Council, Risk Assessment in the Federal Government: Managing the 
Process (National Academy Press 1983), p. 2. 
773 National Research Council, ibid. p. 2. 
774 National Research Council, ibid.  
775 National Research Council, ibid. p. 131. 
776 National Research Council, ibid. 
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Particularly noteworthy with regard to the specific context federal 
agencies in the United States were operating in is the following 
argument underlying criticism about ‘exaggeration’, as noted down 
by the NRC as follows:  
 
 “The suggestion is that regulatory agencies, accustomed to 
operating in an adversary mode and expecting their 
judgements to be challenged in administrative hearings or 
in court, typically overstate the risks associated with 
hazards that they decide to regulate (…)”.777 
 
 With respect to risk assessment procedures in particular, 
‘exaggeration’, or, in the words of the critics, the “instinct to support 
a position with every available argument” may specifically affect 
“interpretations of scientific data, choice of extrapolation procedures, 
and assumption about human exposure”.778 However, the adversary 
mode which nurtures the “instinct to support a position with every 
available argument” also distorts risk management, because “[t]he 
critical role of legal staff in preparing agency documents is though to 
foster the adversarial style”.779 
 
• Poor Public Understanding. Under this subtitle, the NRC 
summarised critical voices expressing concern about public 
misperception of risks caused by inappropriate risk communication 
of federal agencies. It was also pointed at the problem that agency 
action itself may sometimes be difficult to explain. The NRC report 
referred to the case of saccharin which was put forward by critics as 
an example of risk communication by an agency “typically 
stress[ing] the ultimate risk management strategy”, in this case the 
prohibition of saccharin.780 In such cases of agency intervention, 
some critics claimed, “the public is led to infer the degree of risk 
from the action proposed (…)”, although that very action “may be 
dictated by statutory or regulatory policies that emphasize 
considerations other than degree of risk”.781 
 
• Poor-Quality Personnel. Although “unflattering”, as the NRC 
noticed, this set of argument requires further regard because it targets 
                                                 
777 National Research Council, ibid.  
778 National Research Council, ibid. 
779 National Research Council, ibid. p. 131.  
780 National Research Council, ibid. The case of saccharin is an example where Congress 
passed special legislation to pre-empt agency action, in this case “to prevent the removal of 
saccharin from the market” (National Research Council, ibid. p. 14).  
781 National Research Council, ibid. p. 131. 
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on the very basis of reliable risk assessments. On the one hand, 
critics claimed that regulatory agencies “cannot attract or retain 
adequate numbers of highly qualified scientists to perform risk 
assessments”.782 The criticism went on saying that on the other hand, 
scientific staff retaining in regulatory agencies “are removed from 
active research by time and distance and are unfamiliar with the 
latest developments in their fields”.783 
 
• Inconsistency. Criticism about inconsistent risk assessment outcomes 
implied that different federal regulatory agencies “had applied 
inconsistent criteria and reached inconsistent results in assessing the 
risks posed by the same hazards”.784 The NRC noted that this 
criticism was primarily supporting proposals for a centralisation of 
risk assessments.  
 
• Redundancy. With a view on cost-reduction and efficiency of risk 
assessments, critics claimed that a centralisation of risk assessment 
carried out by various regulatory agencies “might yield process 
efficiencies and reduce costs for all participants”.785 This criticism 
was basing on the assumption that different regulatory agencies are 
concerned with similar of the same hazards, hence forcing 
“government regulatory, affected industries, and interested scientists 
to deal with litigation on the risks of a given substance several 
times”.786 
 
It has to be noted that the criticism, above all, centred on intrinsic factors of 
agency conduct, in particular the conduct of risk managers and risk assessors 
within respective agency structures. In particular, biases and exaggerations 
allegedly tampering risk assessments were primarily attribute to the “adversary 
mode” and the “adversarial style” moulding agency conduct. In other words, 
biases and exaggerations in risk assessments were considered results of 
confrontational legal settings where agencies have to operate “in an adversary 
mode and expecting their judgements to be challenged in administrative 
hearings or in court”. It is important to note that in the NRC report no criticism 
was reproduced claiming that federal agencies have in fact succumbed to 
tortuous interference by external interests, for example industry or organised 
segments of public opinion. However, the NRC report displayed an overview on 
external pressure groups which might try to influence agency decisions. The 
NRC report identified three camps of external pressure groups:  
                                                 
782 National Research Council, ibid. p. 132.  
783 National Research Council, ibid. 
784 National Research Council, ibid. p. 132. 
785 National Research Council, ibid. 
786 National Research Council, ibid. 
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• Public Opinion. The NRC noted that especially in cases where life-
threatening hazards are at issue, segments of the public particularly 
exposed to the hazard at issue might be “mobilized to express 
themselves in an agency’s deliberation”.787 Without making any 
explicit allusion to the term ‘precaution’, the NRC noted that such 
groups of the public ”insist that regulatory action need not await 
conclusive evidence of cause and effect and need not be based 
exclusively on the most scientifically advanced testing methods”.788 
 
• Economic Interests. With view on diverging degrees of organisation, 
the NRC observed that it is rarely known which individuals or 
segments of the public are benefiting from regulation that reduce or 
eliminate exposure to a certain hazard. On the other hand, “those 
who bear the economic costs of such restrictions can identify 
themselves without any difficulty”.789 Hence, well organised 
economic interests can easily provide relatively accurate estimates of 
adverse economic effects related to regulatory activity, for example 
in terms of job losses, additional costs inducing higher consumer 
prices, and eventual disinvestments. Equipped with such concrete 
economic data, organised economic interests might therefore 
“question the wisdom of balancing concrete evidence of economic 
damage against evidence of health protection that depends on a 
complex series of assumptions derived from sparse and indirect 
data”.790 
 
• Congressional Action. The NRC noted that Congress, “as the 
legislative voice of popular concern”, can influence agency action.791 
With regard to specific aspects of risk management in particular, the 
NRC observed that Congress “can dictate the factors to be included 
in and excluded from decision-making (the Delaney clause is an 
example), and it can pass special legislation to pre-empt agency 
discretion, as it did in acting to prevent the removal of saccharin 
from the market”.792 
 
                                                 
787 National Research Council, ibid. p. 13. 
788 National Research Council, ibid. p. 13, underlining in original.  
789 National Research Council, ibid. p. 13.  
790 National Research Council, ibid. p. 13. 
791 National Research Council, ibid. p. 13-14. 
792 National Research Council, ibid. p. 14. Named after New York Representative to 
Congress, James Delaney, the Delaney clause of 1958 amended the Food, Drugs and 
Cosmetics Act of 1938, requesting the Secretary of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
not to approve for use in foods chemical additives found to induce cancer.  
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In the debate about problems and prospects of risk assessment and risk 
management in the United States, a major proposal consisted in advocating for 
an organisational separation of risk assessment from the regulatory agencies. 
Proponents of such a reform hoped to de-politicise regulatory activity in the 
United States. The NRC noted the following major arguments against proposals 
for a complete institutional and organisational separation of risk assessment and 
risk management, transferring the former into a new and independent 
organisational structure:  
 
1. “Simply separating risk assessment from the regulatory agencies 
would not separate science from policy.”793 
 The NRC explained that this first critical argument “is based on the 
fact that the risk assessment process requires analytical choices to be 
made that rest, at least in part, on the policy considerations of 
whether to be more or less conservative when determining possible 
public-health risks”.794 
 
2. Acceptance and Accountability of risk management decisions require 
that “the agency must have responsibility for each of these 
components of regulatory decision-making”, i.e., for components 
addressed by risk assessment policy.795 
 The NRC observed that this second critical argument is based on the 
fact that “the agency responsible for deciding what exposure to 
permit or what costs to impose must make what is ultimately a 
political judgement based on the extent of risk determined in the risk 
assessment and often on the benefits and costs of regulatory action 
and its feasibility and political acceptability”.796 On these grounds, 
critics claim, regulatory agencies must maintain responsibility over 
risk assessment policies.  
 
 
 
                                                 
793 National Research Council, ibid. p. 139. 
794 National Research Council, ibid. p. 139. 
795 The NRC noted that Risk Assessments contains four steps, namely, hazard identification, 
dose-response assessment, exposure assessment, and risk characterisation. The NRC observed 
that in each of these four steps, “a number of decision points (components) occur where risk 
to human health can only be inferred from the available evidence. Both scientific judgements 
and policy choices may be involved in selecting from among possible inferential bridges, and 
we have used the term risk assessment policy to differentiate those judgements and choices 
from he broader social and economic policy that are inherent in risk management decisions. 
At least some of the controversy surrounding regulatory actions has resulted from a blurring 
of the distinction between risk assessment policy and risk management policy” (National 
Research Council, ibid., p. 3, underlining by the NRC).  
796 National Research Council, ibid. p. 139. 
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3. Risk assessment and risk management are iterative procedures.  
 The NRC considered that this third critical argument against 
separating risk assessment and risk management “is related to the 
internal process by which agencies reach decisions”.797 The NRC 
noted critics claiming that the decision-making process of agencies 
“is unavoidably an iterative one”, where “[d]ifferent specialists are 
called on repeatedly for analysis and advice as an agency identifies 
and considers new control options in attempting to reach a 
decision”.798 Although the NRC noted that “this description may 
overstate the fluidity of internal agency deliberations, it captures 
something of their ad hoc character”.799  
 
4. Agencies, i.e., risk managers, require scientific capability to 
understand risk assessments and to develop risk management 
strategies.  
 The NRC noted the requirement of agencies “to retain scientific 
capability so that they can understand what a risk assessment means 
and how to use it in developing risk management strategies”.800 On 
these grounds, critics of an organisational separation of risk 
assessment and risk management claimed that “even if risk 
assessment were performed outside the agency, a scientific staff 
representing many different disciplines would still be required, to 
ensure that an assessment would be interpreted and used 
correctly”.801 
 
5. Logistic difficulties.  
 The NRC observed that other criticism of a separation of risk 
assessment and risk management emphasised logistical difficulties, 
claiming that “[e]xperience suggests that it will be difficult for any 
risk assessment body to meet even generous time limits”.802 These 
critics claimed that a central risk assessment body might soon 
become overburdened, thus delaying risk managers required to 
consult before taking action.  
 
6. Risk management measures of different regulatory agencies are not 
inconsistent. 
 Although this point is specific for the context of the NRC report and 
the particular question whether regulatory agencies concerned with 
                                                 
797 National Research Council, ibid. 
798 National Research Council, ibid. p. 139-140. 
799 National Research Council, ibid. p. 140. 
800 National Research Council, ibid. 
801 National Research Council, ibid.  
802 National Research Council, ibid. 
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chemical risk assessments are reaching inconsistent conclusions, the 
arguments are worth to consider. The NRC observed that critics of 
proposals calling for separation and centralisation of risk 
assessments “challenge the assumption that the regulatory agencies 
have reached inconsistent conclusions in evaluation various 
chemicals”.803 The NRC noted that the critics, in particular, argued 
that different risk management measures “have typically reflected 
differences in exposure (and thus in risk characterization) or 
differences in regulatory policy or statutory or administrative 
requirements”.804 The critics claimed that a separation of risk 
assessment from risk management would not address such 
underlying differences.  
 
Having summarised critical voices against an organisational separation of risk 
assessment from risk management, the NRC went on weighing the arguments. 
Initially, the NRC noted that given the organisational differences between the 
four agencies at issue, it was unable to determine “the degree of organizational 
separation [of risk assessment and risk management] that is optimal for 
individual agencies”.805 Then, the NRC turned to specific findings from 
arguments against organisational separation of risk assessment and risk 
management. In particular, the NRC considered that the separation of risk 
assessment functions from agency’s regulatory activities “is likely to inhibit the 
interaction between assessors and regulators that is necessary for the proper 
interpretation of risk estimates and the evaluation of risk management 
options”.806 Such separations, the NRC found, may “lead to disjunction between 
assessment and regulatory agendas and cause delays in regulatory 
proceedings”.807 Furthermore, the NRC suspected an “erosion of scientific 
competence within agency staffs if risk assessments are routinely performed 
outside the agency.” 808 
 
From that paragraph, three considerations made by the NRC against an 
organisational separation of risk assessment from regulatory agencies, i.e., risk 
managers, can be summarised:  
 
a) Disruption of interactions between assessors and regulators; causing  
b)  Delays in regulatory proceedings; 
c)  Erosion of scientific competence within regulatory agencies.  
 
                                                 
803 National Research Council, ibid. 
804 National Research Council, ibid. 
805 National Research Council, ibid. p. 141-142. 
806 National Research Council, ibid. p. 142.  
807 National Research Council, ibid.  
808 National Research Council, ibid.  
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A second set of considerations of the NRC focused on the purpose of a clear-cut 
separation of risk assessment from risk management. With regard to this crucial 
question, the NRC noted that “organisational arrangements” for separating risk 
assessments from risk management “will not necessarily ensure that the policy 
basis of choices made in the risk assessment process is clearly distinguished 
from the scientific basis of such choices”.809 In particular, the NRC enfolded a 
critical reasoning against a separation of risk assessment from risk management 
which, given its paramount importance, shall be displayed in full:  
 
“If risk assessment as practiced by the regulatory agencies were pure 
science, perhaps an organizational separation could effectively 
sharpen the distinction between science and policy in risk assessment 
and regulatory decision-making. However, many of the analytic 
choices made throughout the risk assessment process require 
individual judgements that are based on both scientific and policy 
considerations. The policy considerations in risk assessment are of a 
different character from those involved in specific risk management 
decisions and are generally common to all assessments for similar 
health effects. Thus, even when one has drawn the relatively obvious 
distinction between risk assessment and risk management, there 
remains the more difficult tasks of distinguishing between the 
science and policy dimensions of risk assessment itself. We believe 
that the latter distinction cannot be ensured or maintained through 
organizational arrangements. Given the inherent mixture of science 
and policy in risk assessment, organizational separation would 
simply move risk assessment policy into a different organization that 
would then have to become politically accountable. The Committee 
believes that other approaches are more likely to maintain the 
distinction between science and policy in risk assessment, most 
notably the development of and adherence to guidelines.” 810 
 
Basing on these findings, the NRC did not seek to remedy fundamental 
problems of risk assessment by changing organisational or institutional setups. 
In contrast, the NRC focused on substantive issues as stumbling blocks in risk 
assessment procedures. As the basic problem in risk assessment, the NRC 
identified “the sparseness and uncertainty of the scientific knowledge of the 
health hazards addressed”.811 However, for solving problems of sparse and 
uncertain scientific knowledge, the remedy cannot be found in formal 
improvements focusing on the organisational or institutional setup. True 
correctives for addressing substantive problems of risk assessment, the NRC 
                                                 
809 National Research Council, ibid. 
810 National Research Council, ibid. p. 143, emphases added.  
811 National Research Council, ibid. p. 6.  
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argued, “result from the acquisition of more and better data, which decreases the 
need to rely on inference and informed judgement to bridge gaps in 
knowledge”.812 Because organisational or institutional relocation cannot, by 
itself, improve the data and knowledge base, the implication that the separation 
of risk assessment from risk management “would lead to improved risk 
assessment and hence better risk management decision” was not corroborated by 
the NRC.813 
 
Although the NRC did not recommend to organisationally and institutionally 
separating risk assessment from risk management, it also “believes that policy 
associated with specific risk management decisions should not influence risk 
assessment unduly”.814 However, the NRC did not recommend any particular 
organisational or institutional structure for improving risk assessment 
procedures. Instead, the NRC pointed at the option for restructuring the formal 
organisation, for example by “separating an agency’s or program’s risk 
assessment staff from its policy-making staff, possibly by establishing a separate 
risk assessment unit inside the agency”.815 On the point of formally separating 
risk assessment and risk management staff, the NRC noted that “[o]ne might 
surmise that separating the staffs would help to reduce the likelihood that risk 
management considerations will influence risk assessment, but our survey of 
agency structures provided no clear evidence that such an influence was related 
to the degree of administrative separation.” 816 
 
Basing on its weighing of advantages and disadvantages of a formal, i.e., 
institutional, separation of risk assessment from risk management, the NRC 
came to the following overall conclusion:  
 
“Regulatory agencies should take steps to establish and maintain a 
clear conceptual distinction between assessment of risks and the 
consideration of risk management alternatives; that is, the scientific 
findings and policy judgments embodied in risk assessments should 
be explicitly distinguished from the political, economic, and 
technical considerations that influence the design and choice of 
regulatory strategies.” 817 
 
On the one hand, the NRC stressed the importance of a clear conceptual 
separation of risk assessment and risk management because of their analytical 
distinctiveness. On the other hand, the NRC did not recommend a formal, i.e., 
                                                 
812 National Research Council, ibid. 
813 National Research Council, ibid 
814 National Research Council, ibid. p. 151.  
815 National Research Council, ibid. 
816 National Research Council, p. 151.  
817 National Research Council, ibid. p. 151, emphasis added.  
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organisational separation of risk assessment from risk management which would 
have implied a throughout cut of administrative responsibility over scientific 
staff and institutional affiliations between the regulatory agency (the risk 
manager) and its risk assessment unit.818 By establishing its recommendation for 
a conceptual instead of a formal separation of risk assessment from risk 
management, the NRC elided to address further reform proposals suggesting 
farther-reaching ideas, for instance the establishment of a national science 
council or even a science court.819 
 
The notion of a conceptual separation of risk assessment and risk management 
by the NRC comes close to the functional separation developed by Codex. On 
the other hand, a formal separation of risk assessment from risk management, 
implying administrative and institutional spin-off, would require a far greater 
leap. Although the Red Book is generally portrayed as the blueprint for rigid 
separation of risk assessment and risk management, the deliberate 
recommendations of the NRC as well as their flexible implementation in agency 
practice seem to suggest a rather nuanced approach.  
 
B. Iteration between Risk Assessors and Risk Managers in  Practice 
 
The iterative character of risk assessment in particular was emphasised by 
another report of the NRC, entitled Science and Judgement in Risk Assessment, 
issued in 1994 (hereinafter: Science and Judgement).820 In its overall 
conclusions, the NRC recommended:  
 
“EPA should develop and use an iterative approach to risk 
assessment. This will lead to an improved understanding of the 
                                                 
818 National Research Council, ibid. p. 6, 151-152. 
819 The project of a ‘Science Court’ was considered by the Ford and Carter Administrations, 
following suggestions of Arthur Kantrowitz, scientist and chairman of President Ford’s 
Scientific Advisory Group (Roxanne S. Khamsi, ‘Courting the Facts. Arthur Kantrowitz and 
the History of the Science Court’, in Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Science (DUJS 
online, 2000); Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, Risk Analysis and Scientific Method. 
Methodological and Ethical Problems with Evaluating Societal Hazards (D. Reidel 
Publishing Company, 1985), p. 207. On the ‘Science Court’, see also footnote no. 166 above 
and no. 1418 below. 
820 The Clean Air Act of the United States required the US Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) to mandate NRC with a review of risk assessment methods used by EPA to assess 
adverse health effects, in particular carcinogenicity, of hazardous air pollutants. To this 
purpose, the NRC established the Committee on Risk Assessment of Hazardous Air 
Pollutants for drafting the report Science and Judgment in Risk Assessment.  
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relationship between risk assessment and risk management and an 
appropriate blending of the two.” 821 
 
In a third report, entitled Understanding Risk, issued 1996, the NRC reflected on 
developments in the field of risk analysis since its first report in 1983 (the Red 
Book). On the one hand, the NRC considered that the “conceptual distinction 
between risk assessment (understanding) and risk management (action) remains 
useful for various important purposes, such as insulating scientific activity from 
political pressure and maintaining the analytic distinction between the 
magnitude of a risk and the cost of coping with it”.822 On the other hand, the 
NRC observed:  
 
“For the purpose of improving decision-relevant understanding of 
risk and making that understanding more widely accepted, however, 
a rigid distinction of this sort does not provide the most helpful 
conceptual framework”. 823  
 
In contrast, the NRC stressed the “limitations of an approach to informing risk 
decisions that presumes that it is sufficient to get the science right: that the 
sound way to build understanding of risks is to apply methods from 
epidemiology, toxicology, statistics, and a small number of other scientific 
specialties”.824 In contrast, the NRC believed “that acceptance of too strict a 
separation between risk assessment and risk management has contributed to an 
unworkably narrow view of risk characterization”.825 In particular, the NRC 
pointed at its previous reports for emphasising the limitations of a strict 
separation between risk assessment and risk management. Reconsidering the 
Red Book, the NRC observed that there it was “pointed to the need to iterate 
between risk assessment and risk management so that assessment could 
incorporate analytical assumptions that may need to be different for functions 
such as initial screening and the evaluation of regulatory options (…)” 826 
 
The notion of a conceptual separation of risk assessment and risk management, 
as developed by the NRC, shows that in practice, there is no strict separation of 
‘scientific’ risk assessment from ‘political’ risk management. The notion of an 
intertwined and iterative character between risk assessment and risk 
                                                 
821 National Research Council, Science and Judgment in Risk Assessment (National Academy 
Press, 1994), p. 14, emphasis added.  
822 National Research Council, Understanding Risk. Informing Decisions in a Democratic 
Society (National Academy Press, 1996) p. 33-34.  
823 National Research Council, ibid. p. 34 
824 National Research Council, ibid. 
825 National Research Council, ibid. 
826 National Research Council, ibid. p. 34, italics added.  
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management by the NRC comes close the functional separation and iterative 
character of risk analysis, as established by Codex.  
 
In a similar manner, Catherine Button observed that “the division between risk 
assessment and risk management is permeable”.827 According to Button, the 
reason for the permeability between risk assessment and risk management is that 
science policies and default assumptions have been integrated into “mainstream 
scientific risk assessment”.828 But because the elaboration of science policies 
and default assumptions are, in itself, part of risk management, the separation of 
risk assessment and risk management becomes blurred. Button recognises that 
this is the very reason for the NRC’s insistence on a strict separation of risk 
assessment and risk management. Button noted: “In an effort to preserve, to the 
greatest extent possible, the scientific purity of risk assessment and to reserve 
the political decision to risk management, the NRC’s Red Book recommended a 
fairly strict separation between risk assessment and risk management.” 829 
 
However, Button noted that the NRC and others have softened their stance and 
recognise more interaction between risk assessors and risk managers, “although 
it is still customary to pursue a ‘functional separation’ between risk assessment 
and risk management”.830 
 
In a more fundamental way, the NRC in its 1996 report Understanding Risk 
even questioned the neutrality of science as such. As potential gateway for 
biases, the NRC pointed at choices of assumptions and statistical assumptions in 
the phase of risk characterisation in particular. For instance, the NRC observed 
that “the assumption of the null hypothesis 831 as used in risk analysis contains 
an implicit bias because it places a greater burden of proof on those who would 
restrict than those who would pursue a hazardous activity, presuming these 
activities are safe until proven otherwise”.832 
                                                 
827 Catherine Button, The Power to Protect. Trade, Health, and Uncertainty in the WTO (Hart 
Publishing, 2004), p. 99.  
828 Catherine Button, ibid. 
829 Catherine Button, ibid. p. 99, italics by Button.  
830 Catherine Button, ibid. 
831 The null hypothesis and other assumptions are used as theoretical wildcards in empirical 
research substituting solid scientific theories yet to be developed. However, as pointed out by 
the NRC, theoretical assumptions are not value-free. If, for example, the null hypothesis in a 
risk assessment is framed as “this GMO is safe”, the null hypothesis would remain in force 
until proven wrong by statistically significant numbers of experimental arrangements.  
832 National Research Council, Understanding Risk. Informing Decisions in a Democratic 
Society (National Academy Press, 1996), p. 25 (italics added). The NRC further noted that 
“[e]vidence that science has been censored or distorted to favor particular interested parties 
has long been a source of conflict over risk characterization (NRC, ibid.). The NRC made 
reference to examples about scientific misconduct related to asbestos and leaded gasoline. The 
examples were provided by Rosner and Markowitz, and Lilienfeld. Lilienfeld revealed 
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This shows that not only the science-based or risk-based approaches are 
questionable bases for risk decisions. More into detail, the reasoning of the NRC 
shows that even in the phase of risk characterisation, which is the fourth step of 
risk assessment, science is not sufficient for assuring appropriate outcomes. 
Because the decision of what the decisive questions are cannot be answered by 
scientists alone, already in the risk assessment phase ‘non-scientific’ 
considerations, hence considerations of policy, have to be taken into account.  
 
With such nuanced considerations, the NRC did not only underline the 
permeability between scientific risk assessment and policy-driven risk 
management. By questioning the neutrality of scientific assumptions, for 
example the null hypothesis, the NRC queried a cornerstone of scientific risk 
analysis and of the risk paradigm as such which essentially rely on default 
assumptions and probability forecasts. And as the demarcation between risk 
assessment and risk management became permeable, the hardy position of the 
NRC as objectivistic beacon seems to have softened more and more during the 
years since the publication of the Red Book in 1983. 
 
 
CHAPTER 9 THE WHITE PAPER OF THE EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION 
 
In the 1990s, public trust in European food safety institutions plummeted. The 
reason was a series of food safety crisis, among which the notorious Bovine 
Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) outbreak and the controversy over 
genetically modified (GM) foods. Therefore, attempts for reforming food safety 
                                                                                                                                                        
scientific fraud organised at large scale by the asbestos industry and tacitly supported by 
insurance companies (see David E. Lilienfeld, ‘The Silence: The Asbestos Industry and Early 
Occupational Cancer Research – A Case Study’ (1991) 81(6) American Journal of Public 
Health, 791-800). Rosner and Markowitz depicted the controversy about leaded gasoline in 
the 1920s in the United States. Interestingly, they did not only point at those “who were 
willing to put their science aside to meet the demands of corporate greed”. Rosner and 
Markowitz also emphasised the broader context of the scientists of the day who found it 
“impossible to separate their ‘science’ from the demands of an economy and society that was 
being built around the automobile”. In this perspective, the case of leaded gasoline is not only 
an example of personal and corporate greed, but of the “interlocking relationships between 
science and society” (David Rosner and Gerald Markowitz, ‘A ‘Gift of God’?: The Public 
Health Controversy over Leaded Gasoline during the 1920s’ (1985) 75(4) American Journal 
of Public Health, 344-352, in particular p. 351. The “interlocking relationships between 
science and society”, as revealed by Rosner and Markowitz, may stand for the intertwined and 
iterative relationship between science and policy in risk assessment and risk management.  
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systems have been launched, both in EC Member States as well as at 
Community levels.833  
 
At the Community level, the Commission of the European Communities 
(hereafter: the Commission) developed a proposal for reforming the European 
food safety system. The proposal became generally known as the White Paper.  
 
A. Institutional Separation of Risk Assessment and Risk 
Management in Theory 
 
In the famous White Paper on Food Safety, published in 2000, the Commissions 
repeatedly made reference to the BSE/TSE834 and dioxin crises, among others, 
as catalyst for its “radical new approach” towards food safety in the European 
Union. 835 Cornerstone of the White Paper is a proposal for the establishment of 
a European Food Authority. Essentially, the proposed European Food Authority 
was meant to integrate the Scientific Committees mainly operating in the area of 
food and feed safety.836 In the logic of the Commission, the new Authority was 
meant to carry out risk assessments and to communicate related findings to the 
public, whereas risk management should remain within the competence of the 
Commission, in particular.837  
 
The White Paper of the Commission based to a large extent on findings and 
recommendations made by three experts, published in a report called A 
European Food and Public Health Authority. The future of scientific advice in 
the EU.838 In their report, the experts, Philip James, Fritz Kemper and Gerard 
Pascal, delved into the question which model might be appropriate for 
improving risk assessment and risk management capabilities of the European 
                                                 
833 Marion Dreyer, Ortwin Renn (eds.), Food Safety Governance. Integrating Science, 
Precaution and Public Involvement (Springer-Verlag, 2009), p. 3. 
834 Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) and transmissible spongiform encephalopathy 
(TSE), also known as Prion disease and mad-cow disease, are fatal cattle diseases with the 
ability to affect humans in the form of new variants of the Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease.  
835 Commission of the European Communities, White Paper on Food Safety (12 January 
2000, COM (1999) 719 final). 
836 The nine Scientific Committees operating under the DG SANCO structure were the 
following: 1) Food; 2) Animal Nutrition; 3) Animal Health and Animal Welfare; 4) 
Veterinary Measures relating to public health; 5)  Plants; 6) Cosmetic Products and Non-food 
Products intended for Consumers; 7) Medicinal Products and Medical Devices; 8) Toxicity, 
Eco-toxicity and the Environment; and finally, 9) the overall Scientific Steering Committee 
(Philip James, Fritz Kemper, Gerard Pascal, A European Food and Public Health Authority. 
The future of scientific advice in the EU (13 December 1999, DOC/99/17, Table 6.1. 
837 Commission of the European Communities, White Paper on Food Safety (2000), COM 
(1999) 719 final, p. 14-15.  
838 Philip James, Fritz Kemper, Gerard Pascal, A European Food and Public Health 
Authority. The future of scientific advice in the EU (1999) DOC/99/17. 
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Union. Finally, James, Kemper and Pascal came up with a proposal for the 
establishment of a European Food and Public Health Authority (EFPHA). 
According to the three experts, the remit of the new Authority would have 
encompassed the range of issues so far covered by the nine scientific 
committees.839 A more complex question was how to define the extent of ‘risk 
assessment’ provided by the new Authority vis-à-vis of ‘risk management’ 
remaining within the competence of the European Commission.  
 
With regard to institutional and administrative independence, the report of 
James, Kemper and Pascal was in line with the doctrine of a functional 
separation of risk assessment from risk management. In this regard, the experts 
assigned the role of interface between the assessment and management of risk to 
the secretariat of the new Authority. The experts noted:  
 
“This interfacing function [of the secretariat] is now an integral part 
of the risk analysis process given the Commission’s stated aim of a 
functional separation of risk assessment and risk management. It is, 
however, a matter of experience that this pure separation is often 
hard to realise in practice. Again, the Scientific Secretariat has an 
important role in guiding the process so as to minimise, if not 
exclude, the involvement of the [Scientific] Committees in risk 
management.” 840 
 
The experts continued considering that “this interface depends on a close 
working relationship between the risk assessor and the risk manager (…)”.841 
For enabling frequent and direct contacts between risk assessors and risk 
managers, the experts found it essential that the new Authority “is physically 
located with the central administration which it serves in Brussels”.842 
 
However, with regard to substantive issues, the demarcation between risk 
assessment and risk management drawn in the report The future of scientific 
advice in the EU seems to be rather ambiguous. Some of the various tasks 
foreseen for the new Authority are implicitly expansive in nature, in particular 
the role of the new Authority in crisis management. In the following, the major 
functions of the new Authority, as emphasised by the experts’ report, shall be 
summarised.  
                                                 
839 Philip James, Fritz Kemper, Gerard Pascal, ibid. Table 6.1. 
840 Philip James, Fritz Kemper, Gerard Pascal, ibid. para. 6.1.4. ‘Relating scientific risk 
assessment to risk management’, emphasis added. It is noteworthy that the experts pointed at 
possible inferences of risk assessors with risk management, whereas commonly the opposite 
is suspected.  
841 Philip James, Fritz Kemper, Gerard Pascal, ibid. para. 6.1.4. ‘Relating scientific risk 
assessment to risk management’. 
842 Philip James, Fritz Kemper, Gerard Pascal, ibid. 
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• Surveillance. A Surveillance Unit was foreseen for developing “a 
totally new approach at a European level” towards a coherent 
surveillance system for public health and food safety.843  
 
• Legal studies. The task of the Legal Unit would be to evaluate legal 
implications of scientific opinion. But regulatory functions itself are 
meant to remain by the political authorities, in particular the 
Commission.  
 
• Policy analysis. A Research Policy Unit was envisaged for the 
provision of public health analysis and policy options to all Member 
States. The idea was that this unit “will link the risk managers within 
the Commission”.844 
 
• Communication. A Communication Unit was designated for working 
directly for the new Authority.  
 
• Crisis Management. The role of the new Authority in crisis 
management, as outlined by the experts James, Kemper and Pascal, 
sheds light on practical problems of separating risk assessment and 
risk management. The report of the experts considered 
communication between risk assessors and risk managers as some 
form of one-way-communication instead of a true risk dialogue. On 
the one hand, the experts found that “the scientific committees at 
present provide risk assessments which contribute to risk 
management decision making. Issues of political or industrial 
concern are also put to the committees”.845 On the other hand, the 
expert criticised that the current risk assessment process “has 
negligible input from those dealing with issues of risk management, 
on practical options for change or on the validity and effectiveness of 
control measures”.846 Therefore, the scientific committees “are 
handicapped in providing a realistic and valid analysis of the true 
risks currently faced by the European consumer”.847 The three 
experts James, Kemper and Pascal concluded their call for an active 
role of the new Authority in crisis management by the following 
statement:  
 
                                                 
843 Philip James, Fritz Kemper, Gerard Pascal, ibid. Executive summary. 
844 Philip James, Fritz Kemper, Gerard Pascal, ibid.  
845 Philip James, Fritz Kemper, Gerard Pascal, ibid. 
846 Philip James, Fritz Kemper, Gerard Pascal, ibid. 
847 Philip James, Fritz Kemper, Gerard Pascal, ibid. 
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“It is clear that the public wish to know the true risks of different 
measures. Confining a new organisation to providing advice 
which is divorced from the realities of what consumers have to 
confront will lead to further disenchantment with the European 
system for assuring public health and is therefore unwise.”848 
 
From these excerpts of the report The future of scientific advice in the EU, the 
following insights can be derived: First, with view on the purpose of a reform of 
the food safety system in the European Union, the experts stressed the need for 
regaining consumers’ confidence and addressing “the public’s disenchantment 
with European affairs”.849 Second, the experts explicitly mentioned the mischief 
that risk assessors might interfere with risk management. The perception that 
‘scientification’ of risk management may be a mischief seems to vary from the 
United States where worries have been expressed about interferences primarily 
in opposite directions, i.e., risk managers interfering with risk assessments. 
Third, the experts endorsed the Commission’s attempt to functionally separate 
risk assessment from risk management. Consistently, the experts proposed a 
clear separation of institutional and administrative functions of the new 
Authority from the Commission. On the other hand, however, the 
implementation of a clear-cut separation of risk assessment and risk 
management seems to have proven cumbersome as far as substantive questions 
were concerned. In particular, the experts’ proposal to assign to the new 
Authority a role in crisis management, albeit well-founded, entails a myriad of 
new questions. The necessity to link up risk assessors to the information flow 
from risk managers, in particular concerning “practical options for change [of 
risk management] or on the validity and effectiveness of control measures” 
emphasised by the authors of the report The future of scientific advice in the EU, 
may run counter to a rigid separation of risk assessment from risk management. 
Emblematic for the experts’ opinion that the new Authority should be “fully 
integrated into the risk analysis process” was their insistence that the former 
should be “physically located with the central administration which it serves in 
Brussels”.850 
 
On the last point, the White Paper used more temperate language. Albeit the 
Commission acknowledged the requirement of the new Authority “to develop 
very close working links with the Commission services involved in food safety 
issues”, the Commission did not committed itself to a particular location.851 
Instead, the Commission considered “that the Authority must be established in 
                                                 
848 Philip James, Fritz Kemper, Gerard Pascal, ibid. Executive summary, emphasis added.  
849 Philip James, Fritz Kemper, Gerard Pascal, ibid. Executive summary. 
850 Philip James, Fritz Kemper, Gerard Pascal, ibid. para. 6.1.4. ‘Relating scientific risk 
assessment to risk management’. 
851 Commission of the European Communities, White Paper on Food Safety (2000), COM 
(1999) 719 final, p. 20.  
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an easy accessible location”.852 More important, however, are the Commissions’ 
considerations about the role of the new Authority in risk management.  
 
With regard to the inclusion of risk management in the mandate of the new 
authority, the Commission raised four issues of concern. Firstly, the 
Commission noted that “a transfer of regulatory powers to an independent 
Authority could lead to an unwanted dilution of democratic accountability”.853 
Secondly, the Commission, considering that “[t]he current decision-making 
process provides a high degree of accountability and transparency”, worried that 
accountability and transparency “could be difficult to replicate in a decentralised 
structure”.854 Thirdly, the Commission stressed that the control function is at the 
heart of the Commission’s risk management process”.855 In particular, the 
Commission emphasised its role “to act effectively on behalf of the consumer, 
notably in ensuring that recommendations for action arising from control are 
properly followed-up”.856 The Commission concluded: “The Commission must 
retain both regulation and control if it is to discharge the responsibilities placed 
upon it under the Treaties”.857 Fourthly, the Commission put forward a legal 
argument, saying that a new Authority with regulatory power “would require 
modification of the existing provisions of the EC Treaty”.858 
 
As a result of the Commission’s more temperate approach, the reforms at 
Community levels went less far than proposed by the experts in their report on 
The future of scientific advice in the EU. Instead of establishing a European 
Food and Public Health Authority (EFPHA) in Brussels, the European Food 
Safety Authority (EFSA) was established in Parma, Italy. Nevertheless, core 
elements for fundamentally reforming the European food safety system were 
implemented, in particular the separation of risk assessment and risk 
management. Marion Dreyer and Ortwin Renn observed:  
 
“The core of the reforms at EU-level is the allocation of 
responsibilities for risk assessment and risk management to separate 
institutions destined foremost to ensure the independence of 
scientific analyses and advice. This division of responsibilities is 
codified in the new European Parliament and Council Regulation 
                                                 
852 Commission of the European Communities, ibid. p. 21.  
853 Commission of the European Communities, ibid. p. 15.  
854 Commission of the European Communities, ibid. 
855 Commission of the European Communities, ibid. 
856 Commission of the European Communities, ibid. 
857 Commission of the European Communities, ibid. p. 15, emphasis added.  
858 Commission of the European Communities, ibid. p. 15. 
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178/2002, widely known and referred to as the ‘General Food Law’ 
(…)”.859 
 
Unsurprisingly, industry is favourable for attempts to strictly separate facts and 
values. From an industry perspective, Ruth Rawling stated: “There are only two 
concepts of risk assessment that are being looked at [not four]: one is science-
based risk and the other is societal-based risk” 860 Considering risk analysis 
procedures, Rawling argued for upholding the separation of facts and values in 
distinct stages of risk analysis. Albeit looking from an European perspective, 
Rawling’s focus on EFSA can well be adapted to any risk evaluation authority 
operating at regional or even at international levels. Rawling argued:  
 
“… [W]e think societal concerns are different from the physical 
sciences. While science is international, societal concerns differ from 
country to country and are essentially cultural. If EFSA is going to 
establish its reputation as the premier source for scientific expertise 
on food and feed in Europe, by definition it will also need to have an 
international reputation and be able to work well across boundaries 
when Europe is short of particular expertise. Moreover, given the 
size of the EU market within the global food market, we would 
expect EFSA to contribute its expertise to the ongoing harmonization 
of global food safety standards, which will facilitate trade and global 
supply chains. We feel that including societal concerns in EFSA’s 
remit would be a distraction in building that scientific reputation. 
Moreover, on a controversial subject, societal concerns could 
overshadow the science and with both in EFSA, the science would 
be at risk of getting lost.” 861 
 
Alberto Alemanno observed that the Commission not only had in mind the 
health of consumers, but also its own legitimacy as the protector of the Treaty 
and, with broadened mandates introduced in the Treaties, also its own 
legitimacy as the protector of consumers.862 For this reason, the Commission 
wanted to retain executive and in particular, emergency powers. EC Member 
States, in turn, wanted to retain executive powers for managing risks as 
perceived by their respective constituency, for example alleged risks deriving 
                                                 
859 Marion Dreyer, Ortwin Renn (eds.), Food Safety Governance. Integrating Science, 
Precaution and Public Involvement (Springer-Verlag, 2009) 
860 Ruth Rawling, ‘An Industry Perspective on the Governance Framework’, in Marion 
Dreyer and Ortwin Renn (eds.) Food Safety Governance. Integrating Science, Precaution and 
Public Involvement (Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2009), p. 235.  
861 Ruth Rawling, ibid.p. 236. 
862 Alberto Alemanno, ‚Food Safety and the Single European Market’, in Christopher Ansell 
and David Vogel (eds.), What’s the Beef? The Contested Governance of European Food 
Safety (MIT Press, 2006), pp. 237-258, in particular pp. 247 and pp. 252-255.  
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from GMOs and hormone-treated meat. Together, the EC Commission and EC 
Member States opted for an institutional separation of risk assessment (and risk 
communication) from risk management because:  
 
(1) the Commission sought after consumers’ confidence and thus 
legitimacy by retaining executive, i.e. risk management powers; and 
(2) EC Member states, being aware of consumer’s concerns about risks 
allegedly deriving from GMOs and hormones, wanted to retain 
managing capabilities also in the absence of scientifically 
ascertainable risks.  
 
Catherine Button confirmed the notion of two different motives underlying 
attempts to separate risk assessment and risk management. Typically, separation 
of risk assessment and risk management reflected “a continuing desire to 
minimise the role of policy in the heavily scientific phase of risk assessment and 
a continuing belief in the value of separating, as far as possible, the scientific 
and policy/political aspects of risk regulation”.863 However, scientific purity or 
“value-free science”, particularly stressed by Codex and in the United States, 
may be not the only motive for separating risk assessment and risk management. 
In this regard, Button noted that the separation of risk assessment and risk 
management has, “more recently, been advocated by those committed to 
enhancing the democratic legitimacy of regulation-making by ensuring that 
decisions are ultimately taken by those who are politically accountable”.864 
Button identified the aspect of legitimacy of regulation-making as the decisive 
point for the European Commission’s attempt to retain risk management powers. 
Button noted: “According to the Commission’s reasoning, the European Food 
Safety Authority should not be entrusted with risk management responsibilities 
because to do so would dilute democratic accountability and would deprive the 
Commission of the ability to fulfil its mandate to protect consumers.” 865 
 
 
 
                                                 
863 Catherine Button, The Power to Protect. Trade, Health, and Uncertainty in the WTO (Hart 
Publishing, 2004), p. 100, with reference to the Codex’ Criteria for the Consideration of the 
Other Factors Referred to in the Second Statement of Principle (see Decision of the 24th 
Session of the Codex Alimentarius Commission of 2001 amending the Statements of 
Principle concerning the Role of Science in the Codex Decision-Making Process and the 
Extent to which other Factors are Taken into Account, in the Appendix on General Decisions 
of the Commission at the end of the Procedural Manual). 
864 Catherine Button, ibid. 
865 Catherine Button, ibid., with reference to the White Paper of the European Commission, 
para. 32.  
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B. Interaction of Risk Assessors and Risk Manager in Practice  
 
In the foreword of the book Food Safety Governance, Catherine Geslain-
Lanéelle, Executive Director of the European Food Safety Agency (EFSA), 
declared:  
 
“Our raison d’être [i.e., that of EFSA] is the separation of risk 
assessment from risk management, a principle underpinning the 
White Paper on Food Safety, to ensure maximum independence and 
transparency in the decisions that govern the safety of foods.” 866 
 
However, the editors of Food Safety Governance, Marion Dreyer and Ortwin 
Renn, intended to go beyond the reform induced by the White Paper. Although 
tying in with these recent reforms, Dreyer and Renn provided “suggestions for 
carrying them forward through a set of additional procedural innovations and 
institutional improvements”.867 Among other issues, Dreyer and Renn identified 
as a particular challenge requiring additional reform efforts “[t]he demarcation 
and coordination between assessment and management of food safety 
threats”.868 Dreyer and Renn justified the requirement for reassessing the 
institutional separation of risk assessment and risk management, as introduced 
by the White Paper, by the following arguments:  
 
“The question of how to organise the relationship between scientific 
expertise and political decision-making in the governance of food 
risks, which was placed high on the European policy agenda mainly 
due to the BSE crisis, is still not sufficiently solved in the view of 
many practitioners and concerned or interested observers. It is 
precisely through the full organisational separation of risk 
assessment responsibilities (which lie with the European Food Safety 
                                                 
866 Catherine Geslain-Lanéelle, Foreword to Marion Dreyer, Ortwin Renn (eds.), Food Safety 
Governance. Integrating Science, Precaution and Public Involvement (Springer-Verlag, 
2009), p. vii.  
867 Marion Dreyer, Ortwin Renn (eds.), Food Safety Governance. Integrating Science, 
Precaution and Public Involvement (Springer-Verlag, 2009), Introduction, p. 4.  
868 Marion Dreyer, Ortwin Renn (eds.), ibid. p. 4. The full list of challenges requiring 
additional reform efforts, as put forward by Dreyer and Renn, consisted of five specific issues 
and reads as follows: [Quotation start] 
The demarcation and coordination between assessment and management of food safety 
threats;  
The handling of scientific uncertainty;  
The increase of transparency during the entire food safety governance process;  
The involvement of a diversity of social groups and the wider public into the governance 
process; 
The handling of highly controversial food safety issues. [Quotation end] (Marion Dreyer, 
Ortwin Renn (eds.), ibid., p. 4) 
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Authority, EFSA, located in Parma) from risk management 
responsibilities (which lie with the EU institutions, i.e. European 
Commission, European Parliament and the Council/Member States) 
that it has increasingly become articulate that scientific activities 
cannot be performed in complete isolation and in a political vacuum. 
The famous National Research Council’s ‘Red Book’ has already 
pointed out a central and well-founded criticism of ‘full 
organizational separation’ which states that ‘simply separating risk 
assessment from the regulatory agencies would not separate science 
from policy’ (NRC 1983:139). How then to account for the inherent 
interlinkage between the scientific and the political aspects of food 
safety governance without compromising the generally agreed 
functional differentiation between activities aimed at ‘understanding’ 
risks and activities aimed at ‘acting’ on risks? And how to create 
transparency on the way in which this complex and close 
relationship is dealt with?” 869 
 
Based on empirical data, Dreyer, Renn et al. came to the conclusion that the 
strict separation of risk assessors and risk managers is impractical:  
 
“In the first couple of year after EFSA’s establishment much of the 
official rhetoric tended to evoke the idea of assessors and managers 
doing their jobs in strict separation and sequence. Various 
interviewees and also several participants in the workshops with key 
actors in food safety governance stressed, however, that this concept 
has never presented practical reality in which interaction occurs and 
is deemed necessary. There, obviously, exist tensions between public 
legitimisation needs (insulating science from policy) and practical 
action requirements. Interviews with policy actors and expert 
advisors at EU-level, in France, and also in Germany indicated that 
the experience with the new institutional divide has increasingly 
brought to light that problems might arise if the need for interaction 
is no accounted for at specific points in the risk governance process 
(…).” 870 
 
Dreyer, Renn et al. identified three points in the risk governance process where 
interaction between risk assessors and risk managers is particularly required. 
These three points where (1) the initial phase where the questions, issues and 
assumptions are framed (framing); (2) the final stage where food safety risks 
                                                 
869 Marion Dreyer, Ortwin Renn (eds.), ibid. p. 4 (original emphasis).  
870 Adrian Ely, Andy Stierling, Marion Dreyer, Ortwin Renn, Ellen Vos, and Frank Wendler, 
‘The Need for Change’, in Marion Dreyer and Ortwin Renn (eds.) Food Safety Governance. 
Integrating Science, Precaution and Public Involvement (Springer-Verlag, 2009), p. 21 
(reference omitted).  
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have to be communicated to the public (communication); and (3) a distinct 
phase in the process where specific questions about “relatively high” or 
“relatively low” risks should be coordinated (coordination). More in detail, 
Dreyer, Renn et al. commented the first of these three points, i.e., the framing of 
risk evaluation questions, as follows:  
 
“Interaction is deemed particularly relevant at the start of the risk 
governance process when a problem needs to be defined and the 
questions and tasks for the risk assessors need to be delineated. The 
interviewed Commission official emphasised the necessity to be 
present during meetings of EFSA’s panels in order to explain their 
needs, to better understand the reflections of the scientists, to change 
the terms of reference if deemed necessary by EFSA, and also to 
make sure that a panel is not stepping in risk management issues.” 871 
 
With regard to the second point of the risk governance process relevant for 
interaction between risk assessors and risk managers, i.e., communication of risk 
evaluation results, Dreyer, Renn et al. observed:  
 
“A second interaction issue, brought to light by the comparative 
study, relates to the power of the risk assessment authorities to 
publish autonomously. From the interviews, it could be concluded 
that EU and also French and German risk managers have 
increasingly recognised the need for co-operation with the 
assessment authorities with regard to communicating food risks to 
the public. They expressed a preference for a buffer period before the 
publication of risk assessment opinions and related press 
announcements during which they could read and consider the 
opinion, and, if required, come back to the assessment authority for 
clarification of discussion of particularly important management 
issues. This would enable them to reflect on the management 
implications before being dragged into the limelight by the media 
and to provide both the media and the public with informed and 
coordinated responses.” 872 
 
The third point where interaction between risk assessors and risk managers is 
most required related to the coordination of evaluative judgements. In this 
respect, Dreyer, Renn et al. noted:  
 
“A third critical issue in terms of interaction was highlighted by 
German interviewees in particular. From the side of risk 
                                                 
871 Adrian Ely et. al., ibid. p. 22 (reference omitted). 
872 Adrian Ely et. al., ibid.  p. 22 (original emphasis, footnote omitted). 
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management it was described as a special challenge to tune expert 
evaluative advice along the lines of risks being ‘relatively low’ or 
‘relatively high’ within the wider appreciation of political, economic, 
and social conditions and requirements  on which risk management 
decisions are based. To address this challenge of coordinating 
evaluative judgements would require improved interaction and 
communication between the BfR [the German Federal Institute for 
Risk Assessment] and the risk management authorities (…). At the 
risk assessors workshop it was underlined that the existence of 
different cultures of risk assessment in the EU and different national 
perspectives of what constitutes an acceptable risk, would render 
systematic and transparent evaluation, performed jointly by 
assessors and managers, both a necessity and a major challenge.” 873 
 
The reference to “different cultures of risk assessment (in the EU) and to 
“different national perspectives of what constitutes an acceptable risk” is 
particularly noteworthy with regard to the proposal to relocate risk assessment at 
international levels. From the findings made by Dreyer, Renn et al., one may 
infer that, in case the proposal to relocate risk assessment at international levels 
would be implemented, calls for interaction between risk managers at respective 
national levels and risk assessors at international levels would increase. 
 
Noting that “the strict separation of risk assessment and risk management laid 
down in the General Food Law is in practice somewhat blurred”, Dreyer, Renn 
et al. emphasised the role of risk assessment policy, as characterised by the 
Codex Alimentarius Commission, for example, as an important angle for linking 
risk assessment and risk management. 874 
 
Hence, albeit the White Paper established an institutional separation between 
risk assessors and risk managers, the practice in European food safety 
assessment and regulation is far more flexible. In other words, the strict 
separation of risk assessment and risk management, as laid down in the Red 
Book as well as in the White Paper, are “in practice somewhat blurred,” in the 
United States as well as in the European Union.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
873 Adrian Ely et. al., ibid. p. 22 (original emphases, footnote and references omitted).  
874 Adrian Ely, Andy Stierling, Marion Dreyer, Ortwin Renn, Ellen Vos, and Frank Wendler, 
‘Overview of the General Framework’, in Marion Dreyer and Ortwin Renn (eds.) Food Safety 
Governance. Integrating Science, Precaution and Public Involvement (Springer-Verlag, 
2009), pp. 29-30. 
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CHAPTER 10 THE PROCEDURAL MANUAL OF THE CODEX 
ALIMENTARIUS COMMISSION 
 
A. Functional Separation of Risk Assessment and Risk 
Management in Theory 
 
The concept of risk analysis is addressed by the ‘Working Principles for Risk 
Analysis for Application in the Framework of the Codex Alimentarius’ 
(henceforth: Working Principles for Risk Analysis).875 Paragraph 9 of the 
Working Principles for Risk Analysis prescribes, on the one hand, a ‘functional 
separation’ of risk assessment and risk management.876 On the other hand, 
however, paragraph 9 of the Working Principles for Risk Analysis also 
recognises “that risk analysis is an iterative process, and interaction between risk 
managers and risk assessors is essential for practical application.” 877 
 
The ‘functional separation’ between risk assessors and risk managers, on the one 
hand, and their ‘interaction’, on the other hand, is best exemplified by the 
standard-setting procedure of Codex.  
 
The standard-setting procedure of Codex is generally described as an eight-step 
procedure. This eight-step procedure shall be briefly outlined, in the following, 
in order to enable a closer look at the step most interesting for both the 
separation and the simultaneous interaction of risk assessors and risk 
managers.878 
 
The eight-step procedure for the elaboration of Codex standards is described in 
part 3 of section II of the Procedural Manual of Codex under the title ‘Uniform 
                                                 
875 Working Principles for Risk Analysis for Application in the Framework of the Codex 
Alimentarius, in Section IV of the Procedural Manual of the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission, 19th edition (Secretariat of the Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme, 
2010), pp. 86-91. Web access:  
ftp://ftp.fao.org/codex/Publications/ProcManuals/Manual_19e.pdf (visited November 8, 
2010). 
876 Paragraph 9 of the Working Principles for Risk Analysis, ibid. p. 87. 
877 Paragraph 9 of the Working Principles for Risk Analysis, ibid. 
878 The purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview on the basic structure of the 
standard-setting procedure of Codex. The overview shall prepare the floor for a closer look at 
the issue how the separation of risk assessment and risk management is actually implemented 
in the standard-setting procedure of Codex. Therefore, many important, but for this very 
question not relevant aspects are left out and the text might appear as overly simplistic to 
erudite scholars.  
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Procedure for the Elaboration of Codex Standards and Related Texts’ (in the 
following: Uniform Procedure).879  
 
Step 1: The Commission of the Codex Alimentarius (in the following: the 
Commission or CAC) decides that a Codex Standards shall be elaborated. The 
Commission also decides which subsidiary body should carry out the work.  
 
Step 2: The assigned subsidiary body is assisted in its tasks of elaborating a 
“proposed draft standard” by the secretariat of Codex (in the following: the 
Secretariat). It is at this stage when the Secretariat provides the scientific 
information from related scientific expert bodies to the members of the 
subsidiary body. In particular, the Uniform Procedure explicitly mentions the 
following tasks of the Secretariat:  
 
“The Secretariat arranges for the elaboration of a proposed draft 
standard. In the case of Maximum Limits for Residues of Pesticides 
or Veterinary Drugs, the Secretariat distributes the recommendations 
for maximum limits, when available from the Joint Meetings of the 
FAO Panel of Experts on Pesticide Residues in Food and the 
Environment and the WHO Core Assessment Group on Pesticide 
Residues (JMPR), or the Joint FAO/WHO Expert Committee on 
Food Additives (JECFA). Any other relevant information regarding 
risk assessment work conducted by FAO and WHO should also be 
made available. In the cases of milk and milk products or individual 
standards for cheeses, the Secretariat distributes the 
recommendations of the International Dairy Federation (IDF).”880 
 
Step 3: The Secretariat sends the proposed draft standard to Members of the 
Commission and interested international organisations for comment. These 
comments may extent to all sorts of considerations, including non-scientific 
aspects. In particular, the Uniform Procedure explicitly points at “possible 
implications of the proposed draft standard for … economic interests”.  
                                                 
879 ‘Uniform Procedure for the Elaboration of Codex Standards and Related Texts’, in Part 3 
of Section II on Procedures for the Elaboration of Codex Standards and Related Texts, in the 
Procedural Manual of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, 19th edition (Secretariat of the 
Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme, 2010), pp. 25-26. It shall be indicated that 
there are other procedures for the elaboration of Codex Standards, in particular procedures for 
accelerated elaborations of standards and related texts in cases of, inter alia, ‘new scientific 
information; new technology(ies); urgent problems related to trade and public health; or the 
revision or up-dating of existing standards’ (footnote 7 to part 4 on ‘Uniform Accelerated 
Procedure for the Elaboration of Codex Standards and Related Texts’, in Section II of the 
Procedural Manual of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, 19th edition (Secretariat of the 
Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme, 2010), p. 27. 
880 Step 2 of the ‘Uniform Procedure for the Elaboration of Codex Standards and Related 
Texts’, ibid. p. 27. 
 290 
Step 4: The comments received are forwarded by the Secretariat to the 
subsidiary body in charge for consideration and amendment of the proposed 
draft standard.  
 
Step 5: The Secretariat submits the proposed draft standard, after revision by the 
subsidiary body in charge, to the Executive Committee of the Commission for 
critical review881 and to the Commission. At this stage, the Commission has to 
decide whether to adopt the draft standard proposed by the subsidiary body in 
charge, i.e., the “proposed draft standard”, as a “draft standard” of the 
Commission.  
 
Step 6: The Secretariat sends the draft standard, i.e., the draft standard adopted 
by the Commission, to all members of Codex and to interested international 
organisations for comment. As in step 3, all sorts of comments can be made, 
including comments on possible implications of the draft standard for economic 
interests.  
 
Step 7: Similar to step 4, the Secretariat forwards the received comments to the 
subsidiary body in charge for consideration and amendment of the draft 
standard. 
 
Step 8: The Secretariat submits the draft standard, after review by the subsidiary 
body in charge, to the Executive Committee of the Commission for critical 
review and to the Commission. At this final stage, the Commission has to 
consider proposals from Codex members and international organisations for 
amendments of the draft standard. In the end, the Commission has to decide 
whether to adopt the “draft standard” as an official “Codex standard”.882  
 
                                                 
881 The Executive Committee acts as the executive organ of the Commission (Article 6 of the 
‘Statues of the Codex Alimentarius Commission’, and Rule V of the ‘Rules of Procedure’ of 
the Codex Alimentarius Commission, in Section I of the Procedural Manual of the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission, 19th edition (Secretariat of the Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards 
Programme, 2010), pp. 5 and 9. Within the standard-setting procedure, it is upon the 
Executive Committee to critically review the tabled proposal particularly in light of Codex’ 
work priorities, its strategic objectives, availability of expert scientific advice and other 
aspects relevant for Codex’ overall strategic plan (see part 2, ‘Critical Review’,  in Section II 
on the Procedures for the Elaboration of Codex Standards and Related Texts, in the 
Procedural Manual of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, 19th edition (Secretariat of the 
Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme, 2010), pp. 23-24. 
882 By its rules of procedure, the Commission is requested to “make every effort to reach 
agreement on the adoption or amendment of standards by consensus”. Only if such efforts fail 
may the respective decisions be taken by voting (Rule XII/2 on Elaboration and Adoption of 
Standards of the Rules of Procedure of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, in Section I of 
the Procedural Manual of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, 19th edition (Secretariat of 
the Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme, 2010), p. 14. 
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It is during the elaboration of a proposed draft standard in the second step of the 
eight-step procedure for elaborating a Codex standard where interactions 
between risk assessors and risk managers are taking place. In the following, the 
elaboration of a proposed draft standard and the interaction between risk 
assessors and risk managers shall be exemplified by the work of the Codex 
Committee on Food Additives (CCFA) and the Codex Committee on 
Contaminants in Foods (CCCF).  
 
Section IV of the Procedural Manual entails provisions applying to specific 
work areas. The general ‘Working Principles for Risk Analysis for Application 
in the Framework of the Codex Alimentarius’, as outlined at the beginning of 
section IV of the Procedural Manual,  are now applied on specific areas of 
work, namely on food additives and contaminants and residues of veterinary 
drugs and pesticides. For each of these specific areas of work, specialised 
subsidiary bodies of Codex and corresponding scientific expert bodies are in 
charge. In the following example, the respective roles and interactions of the 
subsidiary bodies of the Codex Alimentarius Commission and the independent 
scientific expert body in charge of food additives and contaminants are 
highlighted.  
 
In particular, it shall be looked at the “Risk Analysis Principles applied by the 
Codex Committee on Food Additives and the Codex Committee on 
Contaminants in Foods” (in the following: Risk Analysis Principles for 
Additives and Contaminants).883 
 
In the following examination, firstly, aspects related to the separation of risk 
assessment and risk management in the field of food additives and contaminants 
shall be highlighted. Secondly, the complementary angle of interactions between 
risk assessors and risk managers in the field of food additives and contaminants 
shall be worked out.  
 
1. Institutional Separation of Risk Managers and Risk Assessors as 
Guiding Principle  
 
For understanding the term ‘functional separation’ of risk assessment and risk 
management in the field of food additives and contaminants, a closer look at 
institutions carrying out the respective functions of assessing and managing risks 
is required.  
                                                 
883 Risk Analysis Principles applied by the Codex Committee on Food Additives and the 
Codex Committee on Contaminants in Foods, in Section IV of the Procedural Manual of the 
Codex Alimentarius Commission, 19th edition (Secretariat of the Joint FAO/WHO Food 
Standards Programme, 2010), pp. 94-97. 
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The Risk Analysis Principles for Additives and Contaminants are referring to 
two subsidiary bodies of Codex and an independent scientific expert body, 
namely:  
 
- The Codex Committee on Food Additives (CCFA), a subsidiary 
body of the Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC) in charge of 
food additives; 
 
- The Codex Committee on Contaminants in Foods (CCCF), a 
subsidiary body of the Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC) in 
charge for contaminants in foods;  
 
- The Joint FAO/WHO Expert Committee on Food Additives 
(JECFA), an independent body comprising of joint scientific experts 
selected by FAO and WHO.  
 
The Risk Analysis Principles for Additives and Contaminants points at the 
separation of risk assessment and risk management by putting forward the 
following repartition of tasks:884  
 
- “CCFA/CCCF are primarily responsible for recommending risk 
management proposals for adoption by the CAC.” 885 
 
- “JECFA is primarily responsible for performing the risk assessments 
upon which CCFA/CCCF and ultimately the CAC base their risk 
management decisions.”886 
                                                 
884 A similar repartition of tasks between risk managers and risk assessors can be observed in 
the field of residues of veterinary drugs in foods where risk management is assigned to the 
Codex Committee on Residues of Veterinary Drugs in Foods (CCRVDF), whereas risk 
assessment is assigned to the Joint FAO/WHO Expert Committee on Food Additives 
(JECFA). See Risk Analysis Principles Applied by the Codex Committee on Residues of 
Veterinary Drugs in Foods, Section IV of the Procedural Manual of the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission, 19th edition (Secretariat of the Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme, 
2010), pp. 101-105.  
In the field of pesticide residues, tasks are divided similarly and risk management is assigned 
to the Codex Committee on Pesticide Residues (CCPR), whereas risk assessment is assigned 
to the Joint FAO/WHO [Expert] Meeting on Pesticide Residues (JMPR). See Risk Analysis 
Principles Applied by the Codex Committee on Pesticide Residues, in Section IV of the 
Procedural Manual of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, 19th edition (Secretariat of the 
Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme, 2010), p. 109-111.  
885 Paragraph 7 of the Risk Analysis Principles applied by the Codex Committee on Food 
Additives and the Codex Committee on Contaminants in Foods, in Section IV of the 
Procedural Manual of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, 19th edition (Secretariat of the 
Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme, 2010), p. 94. 
886 Paragraph 24 of the Risk Analysis Principles applied by the Codex Committee on Food 
Additives and the Codex Committee on Contaminants in Foods, ibid, p. 96.  
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This decisive repartition of tasks between risk managers, i.e., the CCFA and the 
CCCF on the one hand, and risk assessors, i.e., JECFA on the other hand, can be 
considered as a separation focusing on the distinguished tasks to be 
accomplished by each of the respective bodies. Thus, the term ‘functional 
separation’ of risk assessment and risk management can be understood as 
deriving from the repartition of respective tasks between risk managers, 
assembling in subsidiary bodies of Codex, and risk assessors, convening in 
independent expert bodies under the auspices of FAO and WHO.  
 
In the following, the institutional setting of risk managers and risk assessors in 
the field of food additives and contaminants, convening in the CCFA/CCCF and 
in JECFA respectively, shall be analysed.  
 
a) Codex Committees for Risk Managers 
 
The Codex Committee on Food Additives (CCFA) and the Codex Committee on 
Contaminants in Foods (CCCF) are both subsidiary bodies of the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission (CAC). Hence, they both are governed by the rules 
and procedures of the CAC.  
 
The Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC) has laid down the specific 
mandates for the two committees in the form of “terms of reference” in Section 
V of the Procedural Manual of the Codex Alimentarius Commission.887  
 
The terms of reference for the Codex Committee on Food Additives (CCFA) 
read as follows:  
 
“Terms of reference: 
 
(a) to establish or endorse acceptable maximum levels for individual 
food additives;888 
                                                 
887 The terms of reference of the different Codex Committees can be found in the overview on 
Codex Intergovernmental Structure and Session History, in Section V of the Procedural 
Manual of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, 19th edition (Secretariat of the Joint 
FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme, 2010), pp. 127-163. It has to be noted that the Codex 
Committee on Food Additives (CCFA) and the Codex Committee on Contaminants in Foods 
(CCCF) have formed a single committee, the Codex Committee on Food Additives and 
Contaminants (CCFAC) until 2006 when the CCFAC was split up into the CCFA and the 
CCCF. 
888 The term “food additive” is defined by Codex as “any substance not normally consumed as 
a food by itself and not normally used as a typical ingredient of the food” which is 
intentionally applied to a food “for a technological (…) purpose”, hereby “affecting the 
characteristics of such foods” (Definitions for the Purpose of the Codex Alimentarius, at the 
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(b) to prepare priority lists of food additives for risk assessment by 
the Joint FAO/WHO Expert Committee on Food Additives; 
(c) to assign functional classes to individual food additives; 
(d) to recommend specifications of identity and purity for food 
additives for adoption by the Commission; 
(e) to consider methods of analysis for the determination of 
additives in food; and  
(f) to consider and elaborate standards or codes for related subjects 
such as the labelling of food additives when sold as such.”889 
 
The terms of reference for the Codex Committee on Contaminants in Foods 
(CCCF) read as follows:  
 
“Terms of reference:  
 
(a)  to establish or endorse permitted maximum levels,890 and where 
necessary revise existing guidelines levels, for contaminants891 
and naturally occurring toxicants in food and feed; 
(b)  to prepare priority lists of contaminants and naturally occurring 
toxicants for risk assessment by the Joint FAO/WHO Expert 
Committee on Food Additives; 
(c)  to consider and elaborate methods of analysis and sampling for 
the determination of contaminants and naturally occurring 
toxicants in food and feed; 
(d)  to consider and elaborate standards or codes of practice for 
related subjects; and  
                                                                                                                                                        
end of Section I of the Procedural Manual of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, 19th 
edition (Secretariat of the Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme, 2010), p. 18.  
889 Terms of reference for the Codex Committee on Food Additives (CCFA) in the overview 
on Codex Intergovernmental Structure and Session History, Section V of the Procedural 
Manual of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, 19th edition (Secretariat of the Joint 
FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme, 2010), p. 134. 
890 The maximum level for a contaminant in a food or feed commodity is defined by Codex as 
“the maximum concentration of that substance recommended by the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission to be legally permitted in that commodity” (Definitions for the Purpose of the 
Codex Alimentarius, at the end of Section I of the Procedural Manual of the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission, 19th edition (Secretariat of the Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards 
Programme, 2010), p. 19. 
891 The term “contaminant” is defined by Codex as “any substance not intentionally added to 
food, which is present in such food as a result of the production (…) or as a result of 
environmental contamination” (Definitions for the Purpose of the Codex Alimentarius, at the 
end of Section I of the Procedural Manual of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, 19th 
edition (Secretariat of the Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme, 2010), p. 18. 
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(e)  to consider other matters assigned to it by the Commission in 
relation to contaminants and naturally occurring toxicants in 
food and feed.” 892 
 
In general, the legal basis for subsidiary bodies of Codex, like CCFA and CCCF, 
is Article 7 of the Statutes of the Codex Alimentarius Commission empowering 
the Commission to “establish such other subsidiary bodies as it deems necessary 
for the accomplishment of its task, subject to the availability of the necessary 
funds”.893 In addition, Rule XI.1(b)(i) of the Rules of Procedure of the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission specifies that “[t]he Commission may establish … 
subsidiary bodies in the form of:  
 
“(i) Codex Committees for the preparation of draft standards for 
submission to the Commission (…)”.894 
 
Details about institutional affiliations and the organisational structure of 
subsidiary bodies of Codex can be found in Section III of the Procedural 
Manual providing guidelines for subsidiary bodies of Codex. In the following, 
some distinctive institutional and organisational features of subsidiary bodies of 
Codex like the committees on food additives and contaminants, i.e. CCFA and 
CCCF, shall be highlighted.  
 
First, the important role of governments hosting subsidiary Codex bodies must 
be discussed. The eminent role of governments hosting subsidiary Codex bodies 
is already indicated by the fact that particular “Guidelines to Host Governments 
                                                 
892 Terms of reference for the Codex Committee on Contaminants in Foods (CCCF), in the 
overview on Codex Intergovernmental Structure and Session History, Section V of the 
Procedural Manual of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, 19th edition (Secretariat of the 
Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme, 2010), p. 134 (explanatory footnotes added).  
893 Article 7 of the Statutes of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, in Section I of the 
Procedural Manual of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, 19th edition (Secretariat of the 
Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme, 2010), p. 5. 
894 Rule XI.1(b)(i) of the Rules of Procedure of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, in 
Section I of the Procedural Manual of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, 19th edition 
(Secretariat of the Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme, 2010), p. 13. The 
Commission may also establish subsidiary bodies for the finalisation of draft standards (Rule 
XI.1(a) and Coordinating Committees for regions or groups of countries (Rule XI.1(b)(ii). An 
additional category of subsidiary Codex bodies are the flexible Ad hoc Intergovernmental 
Task Forces established by the Codex Alimentarius Commission for addressing new and 
pressing issues, e.g., the Ad hoc Intergovernmental Task Force on Foods derived from 
Biotechnology, hosted by Japan. In the following, the term “Codex Committee” is used in the 
sense of Rule XI.1(b)(i), i.e., for subsidiary bodies established by the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission for the preparation of draft standards, for example the Codex Committee on 
Food Additives (CCFA) and the Codex Committee on Contaminants in Foods (CCCF).  
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of Codex Committees and ad hoc Intergovernmental Task Forces” (in the 
following: Guidelines to Host Governments) have been established.895  
 
With regard to the composition of Codex Committees, the Guidelines to Host 
Governments distinguish between members and observers. Looking at the 
membership of Codex Committees, the Guidelines to Host Governments refer to 
two ways of becoming a member thereof. Either, a member of the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission notifies to the Director-General of FAO or WHO the 
wish for becoming a member of a certain Codex Committee. Or, the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission designates one of its members for a certain Codex 
Committee. In both ways, members of Codex Committees, for example the 
Codex Committee on Food Additives (CCFA) and the Codex Committee on 
Contaminants in Foods (CCCF), are also members of the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission.  
 
Observers, on the other hand, can be members of the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission not having obtained member status of a specific Codex Committee, 
or member states896 of FAO and WHO which are not, at the same time, members 
of the Codex Alimentarius Commission. Observers to Codex Committees have 
basically the same rights as members, except the right to vote and to table 
motions.  
 
Further evidence for the crucial role of governments hosting subsidiary Codex 
bodies can be found in provisions of the Guidelines for Host Governments 
related to organisational matters, in particular the assignment of chairpersons of 
Codex Committees. Although formulated as a duty, the chairmanship of Codex 
Committees can be perceived as some kind of reward for hosting countries. In 
fact, the Guidelines for Host Governments put it into the following phrase:  
 
“The Codex Alimentarius Commission will designate a member 
country of the Commission, which has indicated its willingness to 
accept financial and all other responsibility, as having responsibility 
for appointing a chairperson of the Committee. The member country 
concerned is responsible for appointing the chairperson of the 
Committee from among its own nationals. (…)” 897 
                                                 
895 Guidelines to Host Governments of Codex Committees and ad hoc Intergovernmental 
Task Forces, in Section III of the Procedural Manual of the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission, 19th edition (Secretariat of the Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme, 
2010), pp. 68-72.  
896 The ‘Guidelines to Host Governments’ also refer to associate members of FAO and WHO 
and to international organisation with formal relations to FAO or WHO as possible observers 
to Codex Committees.  
897 Guidelines to Host Governments of Codex Committees and ad hoc Intergovernmental 
Task Forces, ibid. p. 68.  
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Among the responsibilities hosting countries are obliged to bear is the duty to 
provide “all conference services including the secretariat”.898 The secretarial 
duties include administrative support staff able of working in the languages 
required, as well as services for interpretation and documentation. To give an 
impression of the workload – and the financial implications – awaiting host 
countries and the respective secretarial staff assigned to a Codex Committee, an 
excerpt of the provision addressing the preparation and distribution of papers is 
cited:  
 
“Papers for a session [of a Codex Committee] should be sent by the 
chairperson of the Codex Committee concerned at least two months 
before the opening of the session to the following: 
 
(i) all Codex Contact Points,899 
(ii) chief delegates of member countries, of observer countries and 
of international organizations, and 
(iii) other participants on the basis of replies received. Twenty 
copies of all papers in each of the languages used in the 
Committee concerned should be sent to the Secretary, Codex 
Alimentarius Commission, Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards 
Programme, FAO, Rome.” 900 
 
Additionally, a main task of Codex Committees and their respective secretariat 
is the preparation of the draft report to the Codex Alimentarius Commission.901  
 
Considering the costs coming along with the hosting of Codex Committees, 
Article 10 of the Statutes of the Codex Alimentarius Commission makes it clear:  
 
                                                 
898 Guidelines to Host Governments of Codex Committees and ad hoc Intergovernmental 
Task Forces, ibid. p. 69.  
899 Codex Contact Points act as links between member countries and the secretariat of the 
Codex Alimentarius Commission. There are as many Codex Contact Points as members of 
Codex, namely 174 plus the European Communities (Understanding the Codex Alimentarius, 
3rd edition (Secretariat of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, 2006), p. 14, web access:  
ftp://ftp.fao.org/codex/Publications/understanding/Understanding_EN.pdf, visited August 24, 
2009).  
900 Guidelines to Host Governments of Codex Committees and ad hoc Intergovernmental 
Task Forces, in Section III of the Procedural Manual of the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission, 19th edition (Secretariat of the Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme, 
2010), p. 71. Web access:  
ftp://ftp.fao.org/codex/Publications/ProcManuals/Manual_19e.pdf (visited November 9, 
2010). 
901 Guidelines to Host Governments of Codex Committees and ad hoc Intergovernmental 
Task Forces, ibid. p. 69. 
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“All expenses (including those relating to meetings, documents and 
interpretation) involved in preparatory work on draft standards 
undertaken by Members of the Commission, either independently or 
upon recommendation of the Commission, shall be defrayed by the 
government concerned. (…)” 902 
 
Considering the institutional setup of the Codex Committee on Food Additives 
(CCFA) and the Codex Committee on Contaminants in Foods (CCCF), one can 
conclude that their respective functioning is governed by rules of the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission (CAC) and dependent on the logistical support of 
national governments willing and able to host them.  
 
Considering the institutional setup of the Codex Committee on Food Additives 
(CCFA) and the Codex Committee on Contaminants in Foods (CCCF), one can 
conclude that their respective functioning is governed by rules of the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission (CAC) and dependent on the logistical support of 
national governments willing and able to host them.  
 
As pointed out above, membership in the Codex Committee on Food Additives 
(CCFA) and the Codex Committee on Contaminants in Foods (CCCF) is 
contingent on membership in the Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC). 
Because member countries of Codex are represented in Codex bodies by 
national delegates,903 it is clear that members of the Codex Committee on Food 
Additives (CCFA) and the Codex Committee on Contaminants in Foods (CCCF) 
are also nationals delegated by their respective governments.  
 
 
 
                                                 
902 Article 10 of the Statutes of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, in Section I of the 
Procedural Manual of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, 19th edition (Secretariat of the 
Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme, 2010), p. 5. To avoid any misapprehension, it 
shall be emphasised that only expenses for such subsidiary Codex bodies are borne by the 
countries accepting the respective chair which are specifically mandated to prepare draft 
standards, for example the Codex Committee on Food Additives (CCFA) and the Codex 
Committee on Contaminants in Foods (CCCF). The “operating expenses” of the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission itself and subsidiary bodies for which no country has accepted the 
chair, for example subsidiary bodies established under Rule XI.1(a) (subsidiary bodies for 
finalising draft standards) and Rule XI.1(b)(ii) (Coordinating Committees for regions or 
groups of countries) of the Rules of Procedure of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, are 
covered by the Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme (Article 9 of the Statutes of the 
Codex Alimentarius Commission).  
903 See, inter alia, Rules I, III, VI.4. and XI of the Rules of Procedure of the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission, in Section I of the Procedural Manual of the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission, 19th edition (Secretariat of the Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme, 
2010), pp. 6, 7, 10 and 13. 
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b) FAO/WHO Committees for Risk Assessors 
 
The Joint FAO/WHO Expert Committee on Food Additives (JECFA) is 
administered jointly by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations (FAO) and the World Health Organization (WHO). Hence, basic 
provisions governing JECFA can be found in the regulatory framework of both 
international organisations, the FAO and the WHO. In particular, Article VI of 
the Constitution of FAO on Commissions, Committees, Conferences, Working 
Parties and Consultations, and the Regulations for Expert Advisory Panels and 
Committees of WHO also provide the institutional basis for JECFA.  
 
With regard to the purpose of JECFA, the following statement can be found:  
 
“JECFA serves as an independent scientific committee which 
performs risk assessments (…).” 904 
 
With respect to the feature and quality of JECFA’s risk assessment, paragraph 
27 of the Risk Analysis Principles Applied by the Codex Committee on Food 
Additives and the Codex Committee on Contaminants in Foods laid down the 
following:  
 
“JECFA should strive to provide CCFA/CCCF with science-based 
quantitative risk assessments and safety assessments for food 
additives, contaminants, and naturally occurring toxicants in a 
transparent manner.”905 
 
The veritable raison d’être of JECFA is expressed by the following phrase:  
 
“All countries need to have access to reliable risk assessment of 
chemicals in food, but not all have the expertise and funds available 
to carry out separate risk assessments on large numbers of chemicals. 
JECFA performs a vital role in providing a reliable and independent 
source of expert advice in the international setting, thus contributing 
to the setting of standards on a global scale for the health protection 
of consumers of food and for ensuring fair practices in the trade in 
safe food.” 906 
 
                                                 
904 Fact Sheet – What is JECFA? FAO/WHO Joint Secretariat to JECFA (2006).  
905 Paragraph 27 of the Risk Analysis Principles Applied by the Codex Committee on Food 
Additives and the Codex Committee on Contaminants in Foods, in Section IV of the 
Procedural Manual of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, 19th edition (Secretariat of the 
Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme, 2010), p. 96. 
906 Fact Sheet – What is JECFA? FAO/WHO Joint Secretariat to JECFA (2006). 
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Members of JECFA serve in their respective personal capacities as scientific 
experts and not as delegates from governments. In this respect, paragraph 25 of 
the Risk Analysis Principles Applied by the Codex Committee on Food 
Additives and the Codex Committee on Contaminants in Foods clarifies the 
following:  
 
“JECFA’s scientific experts should be selected on the basis of their 
competence and independence, taking into account geographical 
representation to ensure that all regions are represented.” 907 
 
Responsible for the selection of experts are FAO and WHO with complementary 
functions. FAO is responsible for selecting specialists with expertise in 
chemistry, whereas WHO is selecting specialists with expertise in toxicology. 
FAO and WHO have established a sophisticated system for listing scientific 
experts, called ‘rosters’. Among organisational matters, the roster system aims at 
assuring scientific excellence and procedural transparency for preventing 
conflicts of interest. Individual experts are assigned for a period of five years. 
The expert’s expenses for travels and attendance at JECFA meetings are covered 
by FAO and WHO.  
 
Considering the institutional setup of the Joint FAO/WHO Expert Committee on 
Food Additives (JECFA), one can conclude that its functioning is jointly 
governed by rules set up by FAO and WHO and funded by the same 
international organisations.  
 
The members of the Joint FAO/WHO Expert Committee on Food Additives 
(JECFA) are scientific experts selected through a sophisticated process (rosters) 
administered by FAO and WHO. The scientific experts are mandated by FAO 
and WHO in their personal capacity for a period of five years. The scientific 
experts are not paid or mandated by their respective national governments.  
 
In terms of a summary, the following observations can be noted:  
 
The respective functioning of the Codex Committee on Food Additives (CCFA) 
and the Codex Committee on Contaminants in Foods (CCCF) is governed by 
rules of the Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC) and dependent on the 
logistical and financial support of national governments.  
 
                                                 
907 Paragraph 25 of the Risk Analysis Principles Applied by the Codex Committee on Food 
Additives and the Codex Committee on Contaminants in Foods, in Section IV of the 
Procedural Manual of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, 19th edition (Secretariat of the 
Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme, 2010), p. 96. 
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Members of the Codex Committee on Food Additives (CCFA) and the Codex 
Committee on Contaminants in Foods (CCCF) are nationals delegated by their 
respective governments. 
 
In contrast, the functioning of JECFA is jointly governed by rules set up by 
FAO and WHO and funded by the same international organisations.  
 
The scientific experts selected through sophisticated rosters are mandated by 
FAO and WHO in their personal capacity. Their travel expenses are covered by 
the same international organisations.  
 
Perceiving the Codex Committee on Food Additives (CCFA) and the Codex 
Committee on Contaminants in Foods (CCCF) as risk managers, on the one 
hand, and JECFA experts as risk assessors, one can draw the following 
conclusions:  
 
Risk Management in Codex is governed by rules of the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission (CAC), but dependent on the logistical and financial support of 
national governments. On the other hand, risk assessment in the Codex 
framework is governed, administered and funded by international organisations, 
namely FAO and WHO. Therefore, one can draw the following clear 
institutional separation between risk assessment and risk management. On the 
one hand, risk management is governed by rules of the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission, which, in turn, is governed by Member Countries. On the other 
hand, risk assessment is entirely in the realm of international organisations, 
namely FAO and WHO.  
 
B. Communication between Risk Assessors and Risk Managers in 
Practice 
 
Turning to interactions between risk managers, i.e., the Codex Committee on 
Food Additives (CCFA) and the Codex Committee on Contaminants in Foods 
(CCCF), and risk assessors, i.e., JECFA, the third element of risk analysis, 
namely risk communication, takes centre stage. 
 
In general, Codex defines the term “risk communication” as:  
 
“The interactive exchange of information and opinions throughout 
the risk analysis process concerning risk, risk-related factors and risk 
perceptions, among risk assessors, risk managers, consumers, 
industry, the academic community and other interested parties, 
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including the explanation of risk assessment findings and the basis of 
risk management decisions.” 908 
 
The main function of risk communication is not mere “dissemination of 
information”, but “to ensure that all information and opinion required for 
effective risk management is incorporated into the decision making process”. 909 
 
In particular, Codex emphasises the need for communicating risk assessment 
policies, risk assessment procedures and scientific uncertainties:  
 
“Risk communication involving interested parties should include a 
transparent explanation of the risk assessment policy and of the 
assessment of risk, including the uncertainty. The need for specific 
standards or related texts and the procedures followed to determine 
them, including how the uncertainty was dealt with, should also be 
clearly explained. It should indicate any constraints, uncertainties, 
assumptions and their impact on the risk analysis, and minority 
opinions that had been expressed in the course of the risk assessment 
(…).” 910 
 
With regard to requirements for risk communication, the Working Principles for 
Risk Analysis recommend that “[r]isk analysis should include clear, interactive 
and documented communication, amongst risk assessors (Joint FAO/WHO 
expert bodies and consultations) and risk managers (Codex Alimentarius 
Commission and its subsidiary bodies), and reciprocal communication with 
member countries and all interested parties in all aspects of the process”.911 
 
Specifically in respect to risk communication between risk assessors and risk 
managers, the Risk Analysis Principles for Additives and Contaminants 
emphasise the role of risk communication, stating that “CCFA/CCCF and 
JECFA recognize that risk communication between risk assessors and risk 
                                                 
908 Definitions of Risk Analysis Term related to Food Safety, at the end of the Working 
Principles for Risk Analysis for Application in the Framework of the Codex Alimentarius”, in 
Section IV of the Procedural Manual of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, 19th edition 
(Secretariat of the Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme, 2010), p. 92. 
909 Paragraph 39 of the Working Principles for Risk Analysis for Application in the 
Framework of the Codex Alimentarius, in Section V of the Procedural Manual of the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission, in Section IV of the Procedural Manual of the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission, 19th edition (Secretariat of the Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards 
Programme, 2010), p. 91. 
910 Paragraph 40 of the “Working Principles for Risk Analysis for Application in the 
Framework of the Codex Alimentarius”, ibid.  
911 Paragraph 38 of the “Working Principles for Risk Analysis for Application in the 
Framework of the Codex Alimentarius”, ibid.  
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managers is critical to the success of their risk analysis activities”.912 Therefore, 
“CCFA/CCCF and JECFA should continue to develop procedures to enhance 
communication between the two committees”.913 
 
An important component of risk communication is the prioritising of substances 
for risk assessment. In this regard, paragraph 19 of the Risk Analysis Principles 
Applied by the Codex Committee on Food Additives and the Codex Committee 
on Contaminants in Foods notes the following: 
 
“CCFA/CCCF’s risk communication with JECFA includes 
prioritising substances for JECFA review with the view towards 
obtaining the best available risk assessment for purposes of 
elaborating safe conditions of use for food additives and elaborating 
safe maximum levels or codes of practice for contaminants and 
naturally occurring toxicants in food.” 914 
 
In the following, procedures for risk communication between the Codex 
Committee on Food Additives (CCFA) and the Codex Committee on 
Contaminants in Foods (CCCF), i.e., the risk managers, on the one hand, and 
JECFA, i.e., the risk assessors, on the other hand, shall be analysed in more 
detail.  
 
Hereby, the following three elements seem of particular interest:  
1. Risk Assessment Policy,  
2. the question of policy options, and  
3. the handling of insufficient scientific evidence, uncertainties and 
precaution.  
 
1. Risk Assessment Policy  
 
The term “Risk Assessment Policy” is defined as: “Documented guidelines on 
the choice of options and associated judgements for their application at 
                                                 
912 Paragraph 3 of the Risk Analysis Principles applied by the Codex Committee on Food 
Additives and the Codex Committee on Contaminants in Foods, in Section IV of the 
Procedural Manual of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, 19th edition (Secretariat of the 
Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme, 2010), p. 94.  
913 Paragraph 4 of the Risk Analysis Principles applied by the Codex Committee on Food 
Additives and the Codex Committee on Contaminants in Foods, ibid.  
914 Paragraph 19 of the Risk Analysis Principles Applied by the Codex Committee on Food 
Additives and the Codex Committee on Contaminants in Foods, ibid. p. 95. Paragraph 37 of 
the same Risk Analysis Principles requests the JECFA secretariat for closely working with 
CCFA/CCCF when establishing the agenda for JECFA meetings “to ensure that 
CCFA/CCCF’s risk management priorities are addressed in a timely manner” (ibid. p. 97).  
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appropriate decision points in the risk assessment such that the scientific 
integrity of the process is maintained.” 915 
 
The Working Principles for Risk Analysis explain that  
 
“Risk assessment policy should be established by risk managers in 
advance of risk assessment, in consultation with risk assessors and 
all interested parties. This procedure aims at ensuring that the risk 
assessment is systematic, complete, unbiased and transparent.” 916  
 
Paragraph 13 of the Working Principles for Risk Analysis further explains that 
the determination of risk assessment policy “should be included as a specific 
component of risk management”.917 Finally, paragraph 15 of the Working 
Principles for Risk Analysis uses the term “mandate given by risk managers to 
risk assessors” synonymously for risk assessment policy.918  
 
Summing up, risk assessment policy can be considered as the mandate given by 
risk managers to risk assessors providing “guidelines on the choice of options 
and associated judgements” without affecting the scientific integrity of risk 
assessment.  
 
However, the determination of a risk assessment policy is not a one-way 
communication, but an iterative process. Hence, paragraph 16 of the Working 
Principles for Risk Analysis requests risk managers to consult risk assessors 
when determining risk assessment policy:  
 
“Where necessary, risk managers should ask risk assessors to 
evaluate the potential changes in risk resulting from different risk 
management options.” 919 
 
                                                 
915 Definitions of Risk Analysis Terms related to Food Safety, at the end of the Working 
Principles for Risk Analysis for Application in the Framework of the Codex Alimentarius”, in 
Section IV of the Procedural Manual of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, 19th edition 
(Secretariat of the Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme, 2010), p. 92.  
916 Paragraph 14 of the Working Principles for Risk Analysis for Application in the 
Framework of the Codex Alimentarius, in Section IV of the Procedural Manual of the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission, 19th edition (Secretariat of the Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards 
Programme, 2010), p. 88. 
917 Paragraph 13 of the Working Principles for Risk Analysis for Application in the 
Framework of the Codex Alimentarius, ibid.  
918 Paragraph 15 of the Working Principles for Risk Analysis for Application in the 
Framework of the Codex Alimentarius, ibid.  
919 Paragraph 16 of the Working Principles for Risk Analysis for Application in the 
Framework of the Codex Alimentarius, ibid.  
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In this light, the process of determining a risk assessment policy appears as a 
dialogue between risk managers and risk assessors over “different risk 
management options”, on the one hand, and “resulting changes in risk”, on the 
other hand. It is understood that in this dialogue, risk managers and risk 
assessors converge, step by step, towards a level of risk deemed appropriate for 
being reflected in a final risk management option. The final risk management 
option is then written into a document which provides a guideline for the 
following and distinct phase of risk assessment.  
 
This step-by-step process of jointly elaborating a risk assessment policy 
consisting of mutually calibrating “different risk management options” with 
“resulting changes in risk” reflects the notion that risk analysis is an iterative 
process, as considered by the Working Principles for Risk Analysis.920 
 
The participatory character which shall govern the development of risk 
assessment policies was underscored, for example, by Marion Dreyer and 
Ortwin Renn. In particular, Dreyer and Renn “recommended that this [risk 
assessment] policy should be understood as a task to be undertaken jointly by 
assessors and managers, in a fashion that is transparent to and takes account of 
inputs from a wide range of stakeholders”.921 
 
Referring back to the example, it is upon the Codex Committee on Food 
Additives (CCFA) and the Codex Committee on Contaminants in Foods 
(CCCF), i.e., the risk managers, to initiate the process of determining a risk 
assessment policy. However, as outlined above, drafting a risk assessment policy 
is a step-by-step process, requiring risk managers to consult with risk assessors, 
in this case the scientific experts from the Joint FAO/WHO Expert Committee 
on Food Additives (JECFA).  
 
In terms of a summary, one can observe that the drafting of a risk assessment 
policy is an iterative step-by-step process, consisting of mutually calibrating 
“different risk management options” with “resulting changes in risk”. This 
iterative phase of risk analysis requires risk managers to enquire risk assessors 
for each risk policy option about the resulting level of risk.  
 
The participatory character of the joint development of risk assessment policies 
by risk assessors and risk managers implies collaboration, not separation 
between risk assessment and risk management.  
 
                                                 
920 Paragraph 9 of the “Working Principles for Risk Analysis for Application in the 
Framework of the Codex Alimentarius”, ibid. p. 87. 
921 Marion Dreyer and Ortwin Renn (eds.), Introduction to Food Safety Governance. 
Integrating Science, Precaution and Public Involvement (Springer-Verlag, 2009), p. 7 
(original emphasis).  
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2. The Question of Policy Options 
 
Following the Procedural Manual of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, one 
can see that it is upon risk managers to define the range of risk management 
options which shall be evaluated in risk assessment. The determination of the 
range of policy options to be considered by risk assessors (e.g. the Joint 
FAO/WHO Expert Committee on Food Additives JECFA) is basically a duty of 
risk managers (e.g. the Codex Committee on Food Additives (CCFA) and the 
Codex Committee on Contaminants in Foods (CCCF). 
 
This finding is underscored by paragraph 34 of the Working Principles for Risk 
Analysis, which emphasises that it is upon risk management, i.e., “the [Codex 
Alimentarius] Commission and its subsidiary bodies”, to take into account the 
potential impact of risk management measures on international trade “when 
making a choice among different risk management options (…)”. 922 
 
Paragraph 35 of the Working Principles for Risk Analysis adds that risk 
management, i.e., “the [Codex Alimentarius] Commission and its subsidiary 
bodies”, “should also recognize the need for alternative options in the 
establishment of standards, guidelines and other recommendations” (…) when 
considering the economic consequences, the feasibility and the particular 
circumstances of developing countries.923 
 
However, in order to consider alternative policy options resulting from different 
levels of risk, risk managers are in need of scientific advice from risk assessors. 
In this respect, paragraph 16 of the Working Principles for Risk Analysis for 
Application in the Framework of the Codex Alimentarius suggests:  
 
“Where necessary, risk managers should ask risk assessors to 
evaluate the potential changes in risk resulting from different risk 
management options.” 924 
 
With its focus on food additives, the Risk Analysis Principles Applied by the 
Codex Committee on Food Additives and the Codex Committee on 
Contaminants in Foods put it as follows:  
 
                                                 
922 Paragraph 34 of the Working Principles for Risk Analysis for Application in the 
Framework of the Codex Alimentarius, in Section IV of the Procedural Manual of the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission, 19th edition (Secretariat of the Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards 
Programme, 2010), p. 90. 
923 Paragraph 35 of the Working Principles for Risk Analysis for Application in the 
Framework of the Codex Alimentarius”, ibid.  
924 Paragraph 16 of the Working Principles for Risk Analysis for Application in the 
Framework of the Codex Alimentarius, ibid. p. 88. 
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“CCFA/CCCF may also refer a range of risk management options, 
with a view toward obtaining JECFA’s guidance on the attendant 
risks and the likely risk reductions associated with each option.” 925 
 
On the other hand, the scientific experts of the Joint FAO/WHO Expert 
Committee on Food Additives (JECFA) should refrain from discussing trade 
issues and public health policy. The Risk Analysis Principles Applied by the 
Codex Committee on Food Additives and the Codex Committee on 
Contaminants in Foods phrased this limitation of risk assessors with regard to 
the development of policy options in the following way:  
 
“JECFA’s risk assessment output to CCFA/CCCF is limited to 
presenting its deliberations and the conclusions of its risk 
assessments and safety assessments in a complete and transparent 
manner. JECFA’s communication of its risk assessments should not 
include the consequences of its analyses on trade or other non-public 
health consequence. […].” 926 
 
The problem within such a setting is, however, that risk managers tend to reduce 
the policy options to be evaluated by risk assessors to a mere comparison of two 
options, rather than requesting a range of policy options from risk assessors. Lee 
Ann Jackson and Marion Jansen made the following observations:  
 
 “In practice, Codex committees like CCFA or the Codex Committee 
on Contaminants in Food (CCCF) have typically requested JECFA to 
compare only two – rather than a “range of” – policy options. This 
has, for instance, been the case for aflatoxins in cereals, aflatoxin M1 
in milk and ochratoxin A in cereals. JECFA reports are in these cases 
                                                 
925 Paragraph 22 of the Risk Analysis Principles applied by the Codex Committee on Food 
Additives and the Codex Committee on Contaminants in Foods, in Section IV of the 
Procedural Manual of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, 19th edition (Secretariat of the 
Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme, 2010), p. 96 (emphasis added). 
926 Paragraph 36 of the Risk Analysis Principles applied by the Codex Committee on Food 
Additives and the Codex Committee on Contaminants in Foods, in Section IV of the 
Procedural Manual of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, 19th edition (Secretariat of the 
Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme, 2010), p. 97. However, the same paragraph 36 
continued, adding the following exception:  
“Should JECFA include risk assessments of alternative risk management 
options, JECFA should ensure that these are consistent with the Working 
Principles for Risk Analysis for the Application in the Framework of the Codex 
Alimentarius and Risk Analysis Principles applied by the Codex Committee on 
Food Additives and the Codex Committee on Contaminants in Foods”. 
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unlikely to contain full assessments of the risk implications of other 
possible risk management policies.” 927 
 
On these grounds, Lee Ann Jackson and Marion Jansen argued for an 
enlargement of policy options to be evaluated by risk assessors:  
 
“Enlarging the range of policy options analysed by JECFA would 
increase costs, but it would provide policy makers with a more 
complete assessment of the risk implications of the policy basket at 
their disposal. Enlarging the scope of JECFA’s analysis could also be 
useful from the point of view of potential WTO disputes on food  
safety standards (…).” 928 
 
The proposal for enlarging the range of policy options elaborated by risk 
assessors will be resumed in chapter 18.B. below.  
 
3. Insufficient Scientific Evidence, Uncertainty and Precaution 
 
For obvious reasons, requirements for risk communication between risk 
managers and risk assessors, for example between the two Codex Committee on 
Food Additives (CCFA) and on Contaminants in Foods (CCCF), respectively, 
and the Joint Expert Committee on Food Additives (JECFA) increase in cases of 
insufficient scientific evidence and uncertainties. In the following, the approach 
of Codex towards situations of insufficient scientific evidence and uncertainty 
shall be discussed.  
 
Paragraph 10 of the Working Principles for Risk Analysis sets forth a caveat to 
Codex Committees assigned for elaborating draft standards, e.g., the 
Committees on Food Additives (CCFA) and on Contaminants in Foods (CCCF), 
to abstain from work on draft standards in cases of insufficient scientific 
evidence:  
 
“When there is evidence that a risk to human health exists but 
scientific data are insufficient or incomplete, the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission should not proceed to elaborate a standard but should 
consider elaborating a related text, such as a code of practice, 
                                                 
927 Lee Ann Jackson and Marion Jansen, ‘Risk assessment in the international food safety 
policy arena. Can the multilateral institutions encourage unbiased outcomes?’ (2010) 35 Food 
Policy [538-547] 542.  
928 Lee Ann Jackson and Marion Jansen, ibid. 
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provided that such a text would be supported by the available 
scientific evidence.” 929 
 
Codex, in other words, distinguishes between situations where scientific 
evidence is considered to be sufficient for the elaboration of a standard, on the 
one hand, and situations where scientific evidence is considered insufficient for 
the establishment of a standard, but sufficient for the elaboration of a related 
text.930 Related texts are encompassing “codes of practice, guidelines and other 
recommendations”.931 Referring to the example of the Codex Committee on 
Food Additives (CCFA) and the Codex Committee on Contaminants in Foods 
(CCCF), their proposals for draft standards to the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission (CAC) are based on limiting values, expressed, for example, in 
NOELs (No Observed Effect Levels) and ADIs (Acceptable Daily Intake) for 
food additives, or MLs (Maximum Levels) for contaminants in foods.932 These 
limit values are established in scientifically-based risk assessments, for example 
safety assessments933 provided by the Joint FAO/WHO Expert Committee on 
Food Additives (JECFA). Consequently, in cases where scientific data is 
insufficient for accounting for scientifically-based limiting values for certain 
substances, for example particular food additives or contaminants, Codex 
Committees should abstain from drafting standards upon such insufficient or 
                                                 
929 Paragraph 10 of the Working Principles for Risk Analysis for Application in the 
Framework of the Codex Alimentarius, in Section IV of the Procedural Manual of the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission, 19th edition (Secretariat of the Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards 
Programme, 2010), p. 87. 
930 Obviously, a third possible situation has to be mentioned. This situation follows, e 
contrario, from the first clause of paragraph 10 of the Working Principles for Risk Analysis, 
namely the situation where there is no evidence that a risk to human health exists. For such 
situations, paragraph 33 of the Working Principles for Risk Analysis, second phrase, puts 
forward that “[t]he option of not taking any action should also be considered”. 
931 Footnote no. 3 in paragraph 1 of the General Principles of the Codex Alimentarius, in 
Section I of the Procedural Manual of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, 19th edition 
(Secretariat of the Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme, 2010), p. 17. 
932 There are many more limiting values used in the Codex framework. For example, the 
Codex Committee on Residues of Veterinary Drugs in Foods (CCRVDF), and the Codex 
Committee on Pesticide Residues (CCPR) are both applying the limiting value of “maximum 
residue limits” (MRLs).  
933 A “safety assessment” is defined as “a scientifically-based process consisting of: 1) the 
determination of a NOEL (No Observed Effect Level) for a chemical, biological, or physical 
agent from animal feeding studies and other scientific considerations; 2) the subsequent 
application of safety factors to establish an ADI or tolerable intake; and 3) comparison of the 
ADI or tolerable intake with probable exposure to the agent (Temporary definition to be 
modified when JECFA definition is available)” (footnote no. 26 in paragraph 8 of the Risk 
Analysis Principles applied on the Codex Committee on Food Additives and the Codex 
Committee on Contaminants in Foods, in Section IV of the Procedural Manual of the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission, 19th edition (Secretariat of the Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards 
Programme, 2010), p. 94. Hence, safety assessments by JECFA can be understood as specific 
risk assessments focusing on food additives and contaminants in foods.  
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incomplete scientific data. Instead, in such cases where scientific data are 
insufficient or incomplete for establishing scientifically-based limiting values 
and subsequent standards, Codex Committees should turn to the elaboration of 
related texts, for example codes of practice, guidelines or recommendations.  
 
Paragraph 11 of the Working Principles for Risk Analysis addresses scientific 
uncertainty in the context of precaution:  
 
“Precaution is an inherent element of risk analysis. Many sources of 
uncertainty exist in the process of risk assessment and risk 
management of food related hazards to human health. The degree of 
uncertainty and variability in the available scientific information 
should be explicitly considered in the risk analysis. Where there is 
sufficient scientific evidence to allow Codex to proceed to elaborate 
a standard or related text, the assumptions used for the risk 
assessment and the risk management options selected should reflect 
the degree of uncertainty and the characteristics of the hazard.” 934 
 
From this paragraph, firstly, one can learn that uncertainty – and precaution in 
response – may occur at any stage of the risk analysis process. Therefore, 
uncertainty – and precaution as its regulatory reflection – is a phenomenon not 
only occurring in the risk management phase but also in the risk assessment 
phase.  
 
Secondly, precaution is put forward by Codex for cases “where there is 
sufficient scientific evidence” for the elaboration of a standard or related text. 
Considering that the elaboration of a standard or related text implies that there is 
sufficient scientific evidence to conclude that a risk to human health exists, it 
can be said that according to Codex, precaution becomes an issue in cases where 
a risk to human health exists.  
 
Thirdly, Codex recommends that the assumptions underlying the risk assessment 
and risk management options selected “should reflect the degree of uncertainty 
and the characteristics of the hazard”. The decree of uncertainty, in turn, can be 
perceived as the room for manoeuvre for precaution. Precaution, thus, is 
understood as a tool for filling the gap between the certainty that a risk to human 
health exists and the uncertainty coming along with assumptions underlying the 
selected risk assessment and risk management options. 
 
                                                 
934 Paragraph 11 of the Working Principles for Risk Analysis for Application in the 
Framework of the Codex Alimentarius, in Section IV of the Procedural Manual of the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission, 19th edition (Secretariat of the Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards 
Programme, 2010), p. 87. 
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Fourthly, considering that the need for assumptions and estimates underlying 
risk assessment and risk management options is increasing in parallel with the 
degree of uncertainty and the hazardousness of the substance in question, one 
could perceive the relationship between the degree of uncertainty and the room 
for precaution as proportional: as higher the degree of uncertainty, reflected in a 
multiplicity of assumptions, the bigger the room for precaution becomes.  
 
Basing on these considerations, the following provisional conclusions can be 
drawn:  
 
Uncertainty – and precaution reflecting it – is a phenomenon not only occurring 
in the risk management phase but also in the risk assessment phase. According 
to Codex, precaution becomes an issue in cases where there is sufficient 
scientific evidence for the elaboration of a standard or related text, i.e., in cases 
where a risk to human health exists. Precaution, thus, is understood as a tool for 
filling the gap between the certainty that a risk to human health exists and the 
uncertainty coming along with assumptions underlying the selected risk 
assessment and risk management options. 
 
The relationship between the degree of uncertainty and the room for precaution 
is proportional: as higher the degree of uncertainty, reflected in rising numbers 
of assumptions underlying the risk assessment and risk management options 
selected, the bigger the room for precaution becomes. 
 
Addressing uncertainties in risk assessment in particular, paragraph 23 of the 
Working Principles for Risk Analysis recommends:  
 
“Constraints, uncertainties and assumptions having an impact on the 
risk assessment should be explicitly considered at each step in the 
risk assessment and documented in a transparent manner. Expression 
of uncertainty or variability in risk estimates may be qualitative or 
quantitative, but should be quantified to the extent that is 
scientifically achievable.” 935 
 
With regard to minority opinions and the responsibility to resolve uncertainties, 
paragraph 25 of the Working Principles for Risk Analysis state:  
 
“The report of the risk assessment should indicate any constraints, 
uncertainties, assumptions and their impact on the risk assessment. 
Minority opinions should also be recorded. The responsibility for 
                                                 
935 Paragraph 23 of the Working Principles for Risk Analysis for Application in the 
Framework of the Codex Alimentarius”, in Section IV of the Procedural Manual of the 
Codex Alimentarius Commission, 19th edition (Secretariat of the Joint FAO/WHO Food 
Standards Programme, 2010), p. 89. 
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resolving the impact of uncertainty on the risk management decision 
lies with the risk manager, not the risk assessors.” 936 
 
Turning to the example of the communication of risks deriving from food 
additives and contaminants between risk assessors, i.e., the Joint FAO/WHO 
Expert Committee on Food Additives (JECFA), and risk managers, i.e., the 
Codex Committees on Food Additives (CCFA) and on Contaminants in Foods 
(CCCF), respectively, paragraph 34 and 35 of the Risk Analysis Principles 
applied by the Codex Committee on Food Additives and the Codex Committee 
on Contaminants in Foods are of interest:  
 
“JECFA should communicate to CCFA/CCCF the magnitude and 
source of uncertainties in its risk assessments. When communicating 
this information, JECFA should provide CCFA/CCCF with a 
description of the methodology and procedures by which JECFA 
estimated any uncertainty in its risk assessment.” 937 
 
“JECFA should communicate to CCFA/CCCF the basis for all 
assumptions used in its risk assessments including default 
assumptions used to account for uncertainties.” 938 
 
These paragraphs show the important role of risk communication between risk 
assessors and risk managers also when it comes to estimates and assumptions 
used by risk assessors to address uncertainties.  
 
Marion Dreyer and Ortwin Renn drew attention to an additional relationship, 
that is, between scientific uncertainty and risk communication. In particular, 
Dreyer and Renn proposed “a default assumption that under the conditions of 
high levels of scientific uncertainty and/or socio-political ambiguity, a higher 
degree of participation is required”. 939 
 
Catherine Button pointed at the role of risk assessment policy for providing 
consistency. Button wrote: “When used consistently and explicitly, science 
                                                 
936 Paragraph 25 of the Working Principles for Risk Analysis for Application in the 
Framework of the Codex Alimentarius”, ibid. 
937 Paragraph 34 of the Risk Analysis Principles applied by the Codex Committee on Food 
Additives and the Codex Committee on Contaminants in Foods, in Section IV of the 
Procedural Manual of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, 19th edition (Secretariat of the 
Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme, 2010), p. 97.  
938 Paragraph 35 of the Risk Analysis Principles applied by the Codex Committee on Food 
Additives and the Codex Committee on Contaminants in Foods, ibid.   
939 Marion Dreyer and Ortwin Renn (eds.), Introduction to Food Safety Governance. 
Integrating Science, Precaution and Public Involvement (Springer-Verlag, 2009), p. 8.  
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policies and default assumptions at least ensure consistency in approach”.940 For 
Button, the real question is not the substantive question about boundaries 
between science and policy, but the procedural question about appropriate 
methodology. Button explained: “The real dialogue now concerns methods by 
which the extent of the conservatism that is built into risk estimates can be made 
clear to risk managers and the development of principles upon which science 
policies should be chosen”.941 Button fears that unless risk managers are 
informed about the conservatism and the risk estimates implied in risk estimates, 
they tend to “apply their own ‘safety factors’ and ultimately add an additional 
layer of conservatism which, because of the conservatism built-in to risk 
assessment, is not necessary”.942 Button argues that science policies and default 
assumptions are not alien to science, thus are not ‘extra-scientific’. Rather, she 
continues, “they constitute an indispensable part of the practice of scientific risk 
assessment”.943 Button seems to perceive that the real question is not a 
philosophical one, i.e., whether science should be a basis for regulatory action. 
Instead, Button seems to consider that the real problem are to find methods for 
informing risk managers about the safety margins built-in to risk assessments in 
order to avoid that risk managers add an “additional layer of conservatism” to 
risk estimates which “is not necessary”.  
 
Considering interactions between risk assessors and risk managers in risk 
assessment, the followings can be summarised:  
 
-  Interactions between risk assessors and risk managers are part of risk 
communication.  
 
-  For risk communication between risk assessors and risk managers, 
the following three elements are of particular importance: (i) Risk 
Assessment Policy, (ii) the question of policy options, and (iii) the 
handling of insufficient scientific evidence, uncertainties and 
precaution.  
 
                                                 
940 Catherine Button, The Power to Protect. Trade, Health, and Uncertainty in the WTO (Hart 
Publishing, 2004), p. 99.  
941 Catherine Button, ibid. Button’s emphasis on procedures and methods for risk estimates 
are in line with findings of the NRC. The NRC recognised that “interpretation of risk 
estimates involves an important element of judgment because of gaps in data and theoretical 
understandings (…)” (National Research Council, Understanding Risk. Informing Decisions 
in a Democratic Society (National Academy Press, 1996), p. 35. Therefore, the NRC 
concluded: “Methods of risk analysis can make only a limited contribution to improving such 
judgments. Progress can be made, however, by strengthening the processes, only some of 
which are analytical in nature, that are used for informing risk decisions” (NRC, ibid.).  
942 Catherine Button, ibid. 
943 Catherine Button, ibid. 
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-  To draft a risk assessment policy is an iterative step-by-step process, 
consisting of mutually calibrating “different risk management 
options” with “resulting changes in risk”. This iterative phase of risk 
analysis requires risk managers to enquire risk assessors for each risk 
policy option about the resulting level of risk.  
 
-  The determination of the range of policy options under consideration 
is the duty of risk managers and falls into the risk management phase 
of risk analysis. 
 
-  Codex distinguishes between situations where scientific evidence is 
sufficient for the elaboration of a standard, and situations where 
scientific evidence is insufficient for the establishment of a standard, 
but sufficient for the elaboration of a related text. 
 
As an overall conclusion with regard to the institutional separation, but practical 
interaction between risk assessment and risk management in the framework of 
the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the followings can be noted:  
 
Reconsidering the example of the elaboration of a proposed draft standard in 
Step 2 of the standard-setting procedures of Codex, the two critical building 
blocks can be viewed as a whole. On the one hand, it was shown that the 
separation of risk assessment and risk management is essential for ensuring the 
independence and integrity of scientific expert bodies assigned by FAO and 
WHO for carrying out risk assessments, in particular for Codex Committees. It 
was pointed out that the separation of risk assessment and risk management is 
primarily achieved by separating institutional ties and establish distinct sources 
of funding, hosting and logistical support. Roughly speaking, one could say that 
risk management, i.e., the Codex Alimentarius Commission (CAC) and its 
subsidiary bodies, are governed by Member countries. In particular, it was 
shown that the Codex Committees, e.g., the Codex Committees for Food 
Additives (CCFA) and for Contaminants in Foods (CCCF), are not only 
governed, but also hosted and logistically supported by Member countries 
willing and able for doing so. In contrast, scientific expert bodies assigned for 
carrying out risk assessments, for example the Joint FAO/WHO Expert 
Committee on Food Additives (JECFA), are administratively supported and 
funded by international organisations, namely FAO and WHO. It shall be noted 
that the separation of risk assessment and risk management seems to be 
appropriately addressed by provisions of the Procedural Manual of Codex.  
 
On the other hand, it was explained that the iterative character of risk analysis 
and the exigency for interaction between risk assessors and risk managers has to 
be understood in light of the third element of risk analysis, namely risk 
communication. Considering the eminent role of risk communication between 
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risk assessors and risk managers in the phase of elaborating a proposed draft 
standard in step 2 of the standard-setting process of Codex, risk communication 
appears as a constitutive element in the risk analysis process, on par with the 
other two elements risk assessment and risk management.944 It shall be noted 
that the eminent role of risk communication for fostering fruitful interaction 
between risk managers and risk assessor, without compromising the 
independence and scientific integrity of the latter, seems to be commensurably 
reflected by provisions of the Procedural Manual of Codex.  
 
 
CHAPTER 11 THE CARTAGENA PROTOCOL ON BIOSAFETY 
 
The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(henceforth: Cartagena Protocol) was adopted on 29 January 2000 and came into 
force on 11 September 2003. Compared with the SPS Agreement which was 
part of the Uruguay Round negotiation package and entered into force on 1 
January 1995, together with the other WTO treaties, the Cartagena Protocol is a 
younger legal document. Furthermore, it was not primarily developed in the 
realm of international trade laws, but within the context of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD), hence within the context of international 
environmental law. In the following, some distinctive features of the Cartagena 
Protocol shall be highlighted and compared with those of the SPS Agreement.  
 
The Cartagena Protocol is a supplementary protocol to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD). The CBD was adopted in 1992 under the auspices 
of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). The CBD has three 
objectives: the conversation of biodiversity, the sustainable use of biodiversity, 
and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits acquired by the use of genetic 
resources.  
 
The Cartagena Protocol was established with the purpose to make operational 
the objectives of the CBD with regard to biotechnology and was adopted on 29 
January 2000.945 In particular, the objective of the Cartagena Protocol is to 
achieve “an adequate level of protection in the field of the safe transfer, handling 
and use of living modified organisms946 resulting from modern biotechnology” 
(Article 1 of the Cartagena Protocol).  
                                                 
944 However, risk communication in the broader sense goes beyond interactions between risk 
managers and risk assessors and extends to the wide range of concerned stakeholders. 
945 Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, and Makane Moïse Mbengue, ‘GMOs and trade: issues 
at stake in the EC Biotech dispute.’ (2004) 13 Review of European Community & 
International Environmental Law, p. 298.  
946 The Cartagena Protocol uses the term „living modified organism“ (LMO). In the text at 
hand, the more popular term “genetically modified organism” (GMO) is used synonymously.   
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The scope of the Cartagena Protocol covers “the transboundary movement, 
transit, handling and use of all living modified organisms that may have adverse 
effects” on the environment or on human health (Article 4 of the Cartagena 
Protocol, emphasis added).  
 
The Cartagena Protocol distinguishes between two main categories of GMOs.947 
The first category contains GMOs intended for the deliberate released into the 
environment. Typically, these are GMOs destined to grow and multiply, thereby 
passing their modified genes to succeeding generations, e.g. genetically 
modified seeds, or genetically modified living fish. For this category, the 
Cartagena Protocol provides a rigorous procedure. Shipments of GMOs from the 
first category require exporters and importers to follow the rules of the 
Advanced Informed Agreement (AIA) procedure. Basically, the AIA procedure 
consists of a notification of the exporter prior to the shipment for enabling the 
importer to carry out a risk assessment and make an informed decision (Articles 
8 to 10 of the Cartagena Protocol). The requirements for carrying out risk 
assessments for GMOs are listed in Annex III of the Cartagena Protocol.  
 
The second category of GMOs consists of agricultural commodities intended for 
direct use as food or feed or for processing, e.g. genetically modified soybean, 
corn and cereals,948 in contrast to seeds for growing purposes which fall into the 
first category. For GMOs of the second category, i.e. GMOs intended for direct 
use as food, feed or for processing, a simplified procedure applies. Basically, the 
simplified procedure consists of mutual information by parties about their 
respective decisions on the approval of genetically modified commodities. The 
mutual information is channelled and organised through the Biosafety Clearing-
House mechanism (Article 11 of the Cartagena Protocol). The information 
requested by the simplified procedure also includes a risk assessment report 
which has to satisfy the requirements laid down by the Cartagena Protocol 
(Annex II of the Cartagena Protocol).  
 
The Cartagena Protocol separates risk assessment and risk management in two 
distinguished provisions. Furthermore, the Cartagena Protocol addresses risk 
communication in a separate provision. In other words, the Cartagena Protocol 
is an example of a framework following the three-stage model of risk 
                                                 
947 A third category of GMOs are those intended for “contained use” limiting their contact 
with, and their impact on, the external environment (Article 3(b) of the Cartagena Protocol).  
948 Derivative products which cannot transfer or reproduce genetic information, e.g. oil, flour, 
tomato sauce, eggs from hens fed with GM corn, etc., are excluded from the scope of the 
Cartagena Protocol (Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, and Makane Moïse Mbengue, ‘GMOs 
and trade: issues at stake in the EC Biotech dispute’ (2004) 13 Review of European 
Community & International Environmental Law, p. 298.  
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analysis.949 However, it is argued that the adoption of the risk analysis model by 
the Cartagena Protocol did not amount to a positivist separation of facts and 
values. Well to the contrary, several provisions are leading to the conclusion that 
the Cartagena Protocol reflects a certain degree of relativism. The notion of a 
certain degree of relativism is based on the observation that the Cartagena 
Protocol, as already mentioned, allows taking into account socio-economic 
considerations. Furthermore, the precautionary approach acknowledged by the 
Cartagena Protocol implies the recognition of scientific limitations in the face of 
scientific uncertainty. In effect, the Cartagena Protocol practically established 
two different regimes, one for conventional crops and another for genetically 
engineered crops. Therefore, despite the formal separation of risk assessment 
and risk management into distinct provisions, the Cartagena Protocol is 
characterised as ‘relativistic’ – all the more so in comparison with the single-
regime approach of the SPS Agreement.950 
 
A. Formal Separation of Risk Assessment and Risk Management 
 
The objective of risk assessment under the Cartagena Protocol is “to identify and 
evaluate the potential adverse effects of living modified organisms on the 
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity in the likely potential 
                                                 
949 On these grounds, Thomas Cottier argued that the SPS and the TBT Agreement “can 
‘learn’ from the [Cartagena] protocol, in particular from its categories of risk assessment, 
risks management and the precautionary approach”. By doing so, Cottier aimed at mitigating 
approaches of the Cartagena Protocol and the SPS Agreement and to reconcile multilateral 
environmental agreements (MEAs) with WTO trade regulation. Cottier noted:  
“And many still fail to see that the implementation and operation of MEAs 
depends, in the long run, on an effective multilateral system, which needs to go 
beyond the current fragmentation of traditional international law. MEAs 
exclusively building upon traditional concepts of national sovereignty, 
unchecked by effective and mandatory multilateral monitoring and dispute 
resolution, are not likely to bring about the shared goal of the WTO and MEAs: 
to foster global well-being, including that of the environment, and prosperity” 
(Thomas Cottier, ‘Implications for trade law and policy: towards convergence 
and integration,’ in Christoph Bail, Robert Falkner and Helen Marquard (eds.), 
The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety – Reconciling Trade in Biotechnology with 
Environment and Development? (Earthscan Publications, 2002), pp. 480-481). 
950 Considering the applicability of the Cartagena Protocol, the Panel in the Biotech case 
interpreted Article 31(3)(c) VCLT in a way requiring all WTO Member to be party of a treaty 
for applying this treaty to the case at issue. As a result, the Panel actually denied the 
applicability of the Cartagena Protocol in trade disputes over GMOs and treated biotech 
products equally with their conventional counterparts (EC – Biotech, Panel Reports, para. 
7.70). Albeit the Panel explicitly refrained from addressing the question “whether the biotech 
products at issue in this dispute are ‘like’ their conventional counterparts” (para. 8.3),  the fact 
that the Panel applied the SPS Agreement for conventional crops and GMOs alike may be 
seen as an expression of the positivist belief that the scientific method is applicable 
indiscriminately, yet universal. On the Biotech case, see also chapter 15.A. below.  
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receiving environment, taking also into account risks to human health” 
(paragraph 1 of Annex III of the Cartagena Protocol).  
 
As a general principle, risk assessment “should be carried out in a scientifically 
sound and transparent manner, and can take into account expert advice of, and 
guidelines developed by, relevant international organisations” (paragraph 3 of 
Annex III of the Cartagena Protocol).  
 
Paragraph 1 of Article 15 of the Cartagena Protocol also emphasises that risk 
assessments “shall be carried out in a scientifically sound manner … and taking 
into account recognised risk assessment techniques”.  
 
Specifically relevant for many developing countries, paragraph 2 and 3 of 
Article 15 of the Cartagena Protocol grants importing countries the right of 
requiring exporters to bear the burden of carrying out the risk assessment, either 
by carrying it out or bearing its costs. 951  
 
The emphasis in the Cartagena Protocol on “scientific soundness” is, however, 
not unlimited. Provisions addressing risk management, precaution, socio-
economic considerations and risk communication are counter-balancing the 
scientific rigour of risk assessment.  
 
Most fundamental, and as mentioned above, the Cartagena Protocol provides a 
separate article addressing risk management (Article 16 of the Cartagena 
Protocol).  
 
The term ‘risk management’ is described as the establishment and maintenance 
of appropriate “mechanisms, measures and strategies to regulate, manage and 
control risks identified in the risk assessment provisions of this Protocol 
associated with the use, handling and transboundary movement of living 
modified organisms” (paragraph 1 of Article 16 of the Cartagena Protocol).  
 
The objective of risk management is set forth as the prevention of “adverse 
effects of the living modified organism on the conservation and sustainable use 
of biological diversity, taking also into account risks to human health” 
(paragraph 2 of Article 16 of the Cartagena Protocol). Risk management 
measures have to “base on” risk assessments which, in turn, “shall be carried out 
in a scientifically sound manner” (paragraph 2 of Article 16 and paragraph 1 of 
Article 15 of the Cartagena Protocol).  
 
                                                 
951 Robert Andrén, and Bill Parish, ‘Risk assessment’, in Christoph Bail, Robert Falkner and 
Helen Marquard (eds.), The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety – Reconciling Trade in 
Biotechnology with Environment & Development? (Earthscan, 2002), p. 330.  
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Particular expressions of risk management are socio-economic factors and 
precaution.  
 
The preamble and article 1 of the Cartagena Protocol are reaffirming the 
“precautionary approach” contained in article 15 of the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development. The “precautionary approach” is of particular 
significance in cases where scientific knowledge is lacking. Accordingly, 
paragraph 4 of Annex III of the Cartagena Protocol specifies that circumstances 
where scientific knowledge or scientific consensus are lacking “should not 
necessarily be interpreted as indicating a particular level of risk, an absence of 
risk, or an acceptable risk”. Furthermore, Articles 10 paragraph 6 and Article 11 
paragraph 8 of the Cartagena Protocol provide that “lack of scientific certainty 
… shall not prevent that [importing] Party from taking a decision”. This 
provision enables importing countries to establish import bans on GMOs based 
on the fact that scientific evidence is lacking. With regard to the duration of such 
a ban, Simonetta Zarrilli observed:  
 
“The ban may last until the importing country decides that it has 
arrived at scientific certainty about the effects of the products on 
biodiversity and human health. However, since the importing 
country is not obliged to seek the information necessary to reach 
scientific certainty, a trade-restrictive measure may be in force 
without time limits”.952  
 
Third and most prominent, the Cartagena Protocol allows for taking into account 
socio-economic considerations in deciding on the importation of GMOs.  
 
Paragraph 1 of Article 26 of the Cartagena Protocol allows countries to take into 
account socio-economic considerations “arising from the impact of living 
modified organisms on the conservation and sustainable use of biological 
diversity, especially with regard to the value of biological diversity to 
indigenous and local communities”. Like non-scientific factors, socio-economic 
considerations are not an issue of the physical sciences.953 At least, governments 
taking into account socio-economic considerations have to do so “consistent 
with their international obligations” (paragraph 1 of Article 26 of the Cartagena 
Protocol).  
 
Paragraph 1 of Article 26 of the Cartagena Protocol addresses the issue of socio-
economic factors as follows:  
                                                 
952 Simonetta Zarrilli, ‘International trade in GMOs and GM products: National and 
Multilateral Legal Frameworks’ (UNCTAD, 2005) 29 Policy Issues in International Trade 
and Commodities Study Series, p. 27.  
953 Socio-economic considerations may be perceived as a subset of non-scientific factors, i.e. 
factors not ascertainable by the physical sciences in the first place.  
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“The Parties, in reaching a decision on import under this Protocol or 
under its domestic measures implementing the Protocol, may take 
into account, consistent with their international obligations, socio-
economic considerations arising from the impact of living modified 
organisms on the conservation and sustainable use of biological 
diversity, especially with regard to the value of biological diversity 
to indigenous and local communities.” 954 
 
In essence, the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Cartagena Protocol allows 
taking into account the impact of GMOs on society. Furthermore, it has to be 
noted that Article 26 of the Cartagena Protocol refers to the ‘impact’ of living 
modified organisms in general, not only to ‘adverse impacts’ of GMOs.955  
 
Without going deeper into the issue at this point, it can be said that socio-
economic considerations, as addressed by the Cartagena Protocol, are of broader 
coverage than ‘economic factors’ addressed by the SPS Agreement and ‘non-
scientific factors’ invoked by the Panel and the Appellate Body in EC – 
Hormones.  
 
In conclusion, there might be concerns coming to the fore which are related to 
agricultural production but are not covered by the notion of ‘economic factors’ 
in the SPS Agreement and ‘non-scientific factors’ invoked by the Panel and the 
Appellate Body in EC – Hormones. Such concerns, often referred to as non-
                                                 
954 Paragraph 1 of Article 26 of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (UNEP/CBD, 2000). The African Group provided the most exhaustive 
list of socio-economic considerations, comprising the following list:  
(a) “Anticipated changes in the existing social and economic patterns resulting from the 
introduction of the living modified organism or product thereof; 
(b) Possible threats to biological diversity, traditional crops or other products and, in 
particular, farmers’ varieties and sustainable agriculture; 
(c) Impacts likely to be posed by the possibility of substituting traditional crops, products and 
indigenous technologies through modern biotechnology outside of their agro-climatic 
zones; 
(d) Anticipated social and economic costs due to loss of genetic diversity, employment, 
market opportunities and, in general, means of livelihood of the communities likely to be 
affected by the introduction of the living modified organisms or products thereof; 
(e) Possible countries and/or communities to be affected in terms of disruptions to their social 
and economic welfare; 
(f) Possible effects which are contrary to the social, cultural, ethical and religious values of 
communities arising from the use or release of the living modified organism [or the 
product thereof].” 
 (See: UNEP/CBD/BSG/4/4, p. 73) 
955 An earlier version referring to ‘adverse impact’ was revised in the drafting process. See: 
The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety: A Record of the Negotiations (Secretariat of the CBD), 
p. 81.  
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trade concerns (NTCs), may be particularly acute where issues such as new 
technologies, impacts on the environment and animal welfare are at stake.  
 
The Cartagena Protocol varies significantly from the SPS Agreement with 
respect to factors and elements that can be taken into account in analysing risks. 
Whereas the Cartagena Protocol allows for taking into account socio-economic 
considerations, the SPS Agreement prescribes risk assessment as a procedure 
based on scientific principles. In other words, whereas the Cartagena Protocol 
provides space for non-scientific, i.e. policy considerations, the SPS Agreement 
confines the room for manoeuvre for governments to measures justified by 
science-based risk assessments. A prominent example for non-scientific 
considerations is the perception of consumers. Whereas consumers’ perception 
might be taken into account in procedures following the Cartagena Protocol,956 
consumers’ perception is not an issue of science-based risk assessments pursuant 
to the SPS Agreement. Unsurprisingly, consumers’ preferences are more and 
more reflected by private standards which are beyond the scope of WTO law.  
 
The provision on risk management, the recognition of socio-economic 
considerations and of the precautionary approach, are, in all, providing space for 
non-scientific, i.e. policy-considerations for concerned governments.957 This 
room for manoeuvre for governments to take into account non-scientific 
considerations confers a certain notion of relativism to the Cartagena Protocol, 
in particular when compared to the rather positivist SPS Agreement. In fact, 
subsequent to the Panel’s ruling in EC- Biotech, risks deriving from biotech 
products have to be assessed by the same restrictive ‘standards of scientificity’ 
than risks deriving from conventional products. In particular, a risk assessment 
for biotech products must, in any case, evaluate risks from GMOs to the 
environment and/or to human or animal health “based on” scientific principles. 
Scientific principles, in turn, are leaving little room for non-scientific 
considerations, e.g. socio-economic considerations or consumers’ perception.958 
Hence, it is appropriate to conclude that risk assessments under the SPS 
                                                 
956 Zeynep Kivilcim, for instance, argued that consumers’ perception and public concern 
might be taken into account in procedures following the Cartagena Protocol (Zeynep 
Kivilcim, ’The Legal Framework for Agrobiotechnology in Turkey: The Challenges to the 
Implementation of the Precautionary Principle,’ in Baris Karapinar, Fikret Adaman and 
Gokhan Ozertan (eds.), Rethinking Structural Reform in Turkish Agriculture: Beyond the 
World Bank’s Strategy (Nova Science Publishers, 2010) [p. 265-280] p. 273).  
957 Rajen Habib Khwaja, ‘Socio-economic considerations,’ in Christoph Bail, Robert Falkner 
and Helen Marquard (eds.), The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety – Reconciling Trade in 
Biotechnology with Environment & Development? (Earthscan, 2002), p. 365.  
958 Gareth Davies, ‘Morality clauses and decision making in situations of scientific 
uncertainty: the case of GMOs’, (2007) 6(2) World Trade Review [249-263] 259. Non-
scientific factors permitted for taking into account in Risk Assessments according to the SPS 
Agreement are listed in Article 5.2 and 5.3 of the SPS Agreement. 
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Agreement are more constrictive regarding the “remaining sovereignty”959 of 
national governments than risk evaluations under the Cartagena Protocol. 
 
B. Substantive Ties between Risk Assessment and Risk 
Management 
 
Considerations of socio-economic factors and precaution are part of risk 
management. However, socio-economic factors and precaution are also issues 
relevant for risk assessment. Socio-economic factors are requiring an assessment 
prior to management. For instance, risk managers would need to commission 
specific experts, e.g. experts for eco-labelling and organic farming, to assess 
whether the introduction of GMOs into Austria might compromise eco-labels 
bestowed to its Alpine regions. Precaution, in turn, influences the way 
inferential bridges in risk assessment are conceived. Based on the risk analysis 
concept, factors relevant for risk assessment should be addressed in risk 
assessment policies developed by risk managers. Therefore, it is clear that socio-
economic factors and precaution, as implemented in the Cartagena Protocol, are 
influencing both the risk assessment as well as the risk management stage. In 
other words, for being able to consider socio-economic factors and precaution in 
risk management, the former have to be taken into account already in the stage 
of risk assessment. That example shows again that the stages of risk assessment 
and risk management are not separable, but intertwined. The differentiation of 
the three stages risk assessment, risk management and risk communication 
applied in the Cartagena Protocol thus follows the formal concept of risk 
analysis theory; it cannot be interpreted in the positivist sense of a substantive 
and clear-cut separation of facts and values in risk analysis.  
 
In terms of an overall conclusion with respect to the analysis of case studies in 
part three of the study at hand, one may note that in none of the case studies 
examined, i.e., the Red Book, the White Paper, the Codex Alimentarius and the 
Cartagena Protocol, the doctrine of separating risk assessment and risk 
management was implemented in a positivist, that is, substantive manner.  
 
 
 
                                                 
959 Marsha A. Echols, Food Safety and the WTO. The Interplay of Culture, Science and 
Technology (Kluwer Law International, 2001), p. 3.  
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PART FOUR: THE SCIENCE-BASED APPROACH OF THE SPS 
AGREEMENT IN PARTICULAR 
 
In part three, the doctrine of separating risk assessment and risk management, 
was further examined. It was established that in none of the case studies 
examined, i.e., the Red Book, the White Paper, the Codex Alimentarius and the 
Cartagena Protocol, the doctrine of separating risk assessment and risk 
management was applied in a positivist manner, that is, to effectively separate 
facts and values in risk analysis.   
 
In part four, the science-based approach of the SPS Agreement will be 
examined. The science-based approach of the SPS Agreement is considered as a 
particular application of the doctrine of separating facts and values in risk 
assessment. The science-based approach of the SPS Agreement is perceived as 
an expression of the positivist belief that science is ‘objective’ and ‘value-
neutral’ and therefore an appropriate arbiter in trade disputes. Analysing the 
jurisdiction of panels and the Appellate Body in selected SPS cases, it is shown 
that panels have tried to establish a rather positivist interpretation of ‘science’ 
and ‘risk assessment.’ The Appellate Body, on the other hand, has tried to find 
some middle ground between a positivist and a relativist interpretation of SPS 
provisions. In terms of a conclusion, it is shown that the application of the 
science-based approach has led to a resurfacing of problems known from 
epistemology.  
 
 
CHAPTER 12 A PROMISE FOR OBJECTIVITY 
 
A. Freer Trade in Agricultural Products 
 
In historical perspective, the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) may be understood as a flanking 
element in the negotiations about the role of agriculture in the world trading 
system. In this respect, agriculture has always been a special issue in trade 
negotiations. Thomas Cottier and Matthias Oesch observed:  
 
“For cultural, political and other non-economic reasons, the farming 
sector of some industrialised counties has long failed to adapt its 
structure to the shift in the supply-demand relationship. Agricultural 
production in many countries, in particular Western Europe, largely 
remained in the hands of small family businesses. They tend to be 
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less efficient, more labour-intensive and more fraught with risk than 
the large scale production methods and corporate structures prevalent 
in other economic sectors. Often, nature and topography impose 
hardships and exert limitations on structural adjustment towards 
larger scale operations. Moreover, farmers’ political influence in 
most countries reflects longstanding traditions in society and has 
remained disproportionately high compared to their demographic and 
economic share.”960 
 
Although the GATT 1947 attempted to initiate trade liberalisation also in the 
field of agriculture, respective disciplines remained tenuous. Both big players, 
the European Economic Community (EEC) as well as the United States (US), 
pursued protectionist agricultural policies. The EEC established its heavily 
subsidised Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), and the US obtained a waiver 
virtually exempting US agricultural policies from GATT disciplines. 
Furthermore, the possibility to veto the establishment of panels, to inhibit the 
adoption of reports and to obstruct implementation, left agricultural policies 
under the GATT 1947 system weak. 961 
 
The WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), negotiated during the Uruguay 
Round, explicitly addresses agriculture as an issue of multilateral trade 
regulation. In essence, the AoA subdued agriculture under the same regulatory 
principles as other goods. This change of agriculture from a national prerogative 
to an issue of multilateral trade regulation is also referred to as 
“commodification” of agriculture and its products. The main legal tool for 
achieving the objective of commodification was the requirement to convert 
quantitative restrictions into bound tariffs, a process called “tariffication”.962 
Although states still have some room for manoeuvre within their respective 
tariff bands, the AoA significantly restricted the capacity of states to protect 
their agricultural markets. National stakeholders in agriculture found themselves 
virtually locked into a system whereby higher levels of protection for respective 
agricultural markets than those agreed on during the Uruguay Round had faded 
away. In this situation, the only safeguard for reintroducing protection for 
                                                 
960 Thomas Cottier, Matthias Oesch, International Trade Regulation. Law and Policy in the 
WTO, the European Union and Switzerland. Cases, Materials and Comments (Staempfli 
Publishers, 2005), p. 712.  
961 Thomas Cottier, Matthias Oesch, ibid. p. 713. Nevertheless, the GATT 1947 was not 
without any effect on agriculture. Attempts by GATT 1947 panels to address agricultural 
policies particularly influenced European attitudes towards international trade rules for 
agriculture. In this respect, Cottier and Oesch observed: “However, it is wrong to say that the 
GATT 1947 essentially excluded agriculture. A considerable number of GATT 1947 panels 
dealt with agricultural policies, and the EC oftentimes was on the receiving end – an 
experience which largely shaped the reserved European attitudes towards GATT law and in 
particular towards its direct effect” (Thomas Cottier, Matthias Oesch , ibid.).  
962 Thomas Cottier, Matthias Oesch, ibid. p. 714.  
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national agricultural markets are trade restrictions justified on sanitary or 
phytosanitary grounds.  
 
However, in order to avoid a shifting of quantitative restrictions in particular to 
protectionist measures disguised as sanitary and phytosanitary measures, the 
SPS Agreement was established in conjunction with the AoA. In this regard, 
Lukasz Gruszczynski noted that “[t]here was a compelling fear among the 
negotiators that liberalization of international trade in the agricultural sector, 
which was an important item of the Uruguay Round, could be undermined by 
the increased recourse of the countries to SPS measures”. 963 
 
The paramount objective of the SPS Agreement is to discern sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures (SPS measures) necessary for the protection of life and 
health of humans, animals and plants, on the one hand, from protectionist 
measures disguised as SPS measures, on the other hand. In other words, “[T]he 
SPS Agreement was considered necessary to avoid the replacement of the pre-
WTO agricultural protectionism with new protectionist measures, particularly 
health and sanitary requirements”.964 
 
The palpable fear of negotiators was that the specific objective of the Uruguay 
Round, namely to integrate agricultural products under the general GATT/WTO 
regime of tariff reductions and subsidy cutbacks by way of establishing the 
Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), could be jeopardised. As John Croome noted:  
 
“Imported agricultural products, like domestic produce, must be safe 
and free from diseases and pests. Moreover, its is accepted that 
countries should play safe: if there is real doubt whether imports 
might bring – for instance – a cattle disease or a plant pest into a 
country or region free from that disease or pest, then those imports 
may be banned. However, just because sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures are applied everywhere, and public fears about food safety, 
in particular, are easily aroused, they are open to misuse as barrier 
against competition from imports. With the Uruguay Round expected 
to reduce tariffs and subsidies affecting agricultural trade, there was 
a danger that countries would be tempted to make increased used of 
SPS measures as an alternative form of protection.” 965 
 
                                                 
963 Lukasz Gruszczynski, Regulating Health and Environmental Risks under WTO Law. A 
Critical Analysis of the SPS Agreement (Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 36.  
964 Marsha A. Echols, Food Safety and the WTO. The Interplay of Culture, Science and 
Technology (Kluwer Law International, 2001), pp. 3-4.  
965 John Croome, Reshaping the World Trading System. A history of the Uruguay Round 
(World Trade Organization Publication Services, 1995), pp. 235-236.  
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More specifically, with view on particular GATT disputes, there were also 
misgivings that governments could give in to pressure by consumer groups 
against technically modified foods, such as hormone-treated meat and 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs). In this respect, John Croome observed:  
 
“There was also concern, reinforced by some specific disputes 
brought to GATT that, in response to consumer of other pressures, 
governments might introduce SPS measures to ban imports produced 
with the use of particular techniques or ingredients about which fears 
had, without scientific justification, been aroused.” 966 
 
In a nutshell, the SPS Agreement may be perceived as a safeguard for the 
promise contained in the Agreement on Agriculture, that is, to improve market 
access for agricultural products. The relationship between liberalisation of trade 
in agriculture and the SPS Agreement was summarised by ministers at the Punta 
del Este meeting in 1986, launching the Uruguay Round. Considering 
agriculture, the Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round stated:  
 
“The CONTRACTING PARTIES agree that there is an urgent need 
to bring more discipline and predictability to world agricultural trade 
by correcting and preventing restrictions and distortions (…). 
Negotiations shall aim to achieve greater liberalization of trade in 
agriculture and bring all measures affecting import access and export 
competition under strengthened and more operationally effective 
GATT rules and disciplines, taking into account the general 
principles governing the negotiations, by:  
 
(i)  improving market access through, inter alia, the reduction of 
import barriers;  
(ii) …  
(iii) minimizing the adverse effects that sanitary and phytosanitary 
regulations and barriers can have on trade in agriculture, taking 
into account the relevant international agreements.”967 
 
Marsha Echols summarised the promise for more objective regulation of 
international food trade, as implied in the SPS Agreement, as follows:  
 
“The Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures (…) resolves the culture/commerce conflict in favor of 
commercial manufacturers, business consumers and many ordinary 
                                                 
966 John Croome, ibid. p. 236 (emphasis added).  
967 Ministerial Declaration on the Uruguay Round, (Punta del Este Declaration), cited from 
John Croome, Reshaping the World Trading System. A history of the Uruguay Round (World 
Trade Organization Publication Services, 1995), Annex, pp. 382-392, in particular p. 387.  
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purchasers by protecting tariff concessions, particularly those made 
in the Agreement on Agriculture. This balance benefits consumers 
and businesses alike, according to economists from David Ricardo 
through Paul Samuelson and others. Consequently, import bans, 
health-related product standards, quarantine, testing and other 
requirements based only on local perceptions of what is safe to eat 
are unacceptable. The balance in favor of commerce was hailed at 
the signing of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (…) and 
the 1995 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (…) 
by trade experts and others, including many developing countries 
that had faced sanitary restrictions on their exports of fish, peanuts 
and other products.” 968 
 
B.  Deference to Science  
 
The tool for achieving the objective of restricting food safety as a pretext for 
disguised protectionism was the deference to science. The SPS Agreement 
“makes scientific principles and analysis the only valid basis for a permanent 
food safety measure, thereby limiting the ability of a government to place its 
citizens’ cultural or religious beliefs about food above international 
commerce”.969 The requirement for scientific justification turns the SPS 
Agreement into a preservative for tariff concessions, “particularly those made in 
the Agreement on Agriculture”.970 
 
By invoking scientific principles for preserving tariff concessions, the SPS 
Agreement was characterised as being “a legal turning point”.971 Marsha Echols 
noted:  
 
“Its science-based rules displace centuries of food traditions and 
national attitudes toward food and food safety.  The extent of this 
legal incursion into the cultural, psychological and sociological arena 
continues to evolve, as governments struggle in various fora to test 
                                                 
968 Marsha A. Echols, Food Safety and the WTO. The Interplay of Culture, Science and 
Technology (Kluwer Law International, 2001), p. 2 (footnotes omitted).  
969 Marsha A. Echols, Food Safety and the WTO. The Interplay of Culture, Science and 
Technology (Kluwer Law International, 2001), p. 4.  
970 Marsha A. Echols, ibid., p. 2.  
971 Marsha A. Echols, ibid., p. 3. Stefan Zleptnig considered that the SPS Agreement reflects 
“a considerable shift” in international trade regulation, yet “a new regulatory philosophy” 
(Stefan Zleptnig, Non-Economic Objectives in WTO Law. Justification Provisions of GATT, 
GATS, SPS and TBT Agreements (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2010), p. 335).  
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and define the remaining sovereignty, as well as the nature and scope 
of the required underpinnings for food safety measures”.972 
 
The science-based approach, together with the requirement to base SPS 
measures on international standards (Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement) shifted 
regulatory powers to international standard setting organisations. In particular to 
the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the World Organisation for Animal Health 
(OIE),973 and the framework of the International Plant Protection Convention 
(IPPC). Because standards developed by these international bodies are presumed 
to be scientifically justified (Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement), it is rather 
difficult for national governments to introduce or maintain higher levels of 
protection (Article 3.3 of the SPS Agreement).  
 
The SPS Agreement marks a shift from the rule-based approach of the two-
pronged test of GATT Article XX to a science-based approach. Instead of 
asking whether an SPS measure is “necessary”, the first question under the SPS 
Agreement is whether the SPS measures is scientifically justified. Only if this 
first question is answered in the affirmative, a second set of questions asks 
whether the measure at issue is consistent with general GATT/WTO rules and 
principles (consistency, trade-restrictiveness, etc.).  
 
A prerequisite for scientific justification is that an SPS measure is “based on” a 
risk assessment. The SPS Agreement provides for two distinguished types of 
risk assessments, one considering pests and diseases, and the other focusing on 
food safety in the narrow sense. Additionally, the SPS Agreement provides for 
simplified risk assessment procedures in cases where scientific evidence is 
insufficient (Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement).  
 
The first type of risk assessment is addressing risks from animal diseases and 
plant pests. This first type of risk assessment is defined by the first clause of 
Annex A(4) of the SPS Agreement as follows:  
 
“Risk assessment – The evaluation of the likelihood of entry, 
establishment or spread of a pest or disease within the territory of an 
importing Member (…)” (emphasis added).  
                                                 
972 Marsha A. Echols, Food Safety and the WTO. The Interplay of Culture, Science and 
Technology (Kluwer Law International, 2001), p. 3.  
973 The acronym OIE stands for the French term Office Internationale des Epizooties. 
International standard setting also covers controversial issues. For instance, the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission established an “Ad hoc Intergovernmental Task Force on Foods 
Derived from Biotechnology (TFFDBT)” in 1999. An outcome of the work of the TFFDBT 
was the adoption of “Principles for the Risk Analysis of Foods Derived from Modern 
Biotechnology” by the Codex Alimentarius Commission in 2003 (see CAC/GL 44-2003, 
amended in 2008).  
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The Appellate Body in the case EC – Hormones clarified that “likelihood” has 
to be understood as “probability”, i.e. “a higher degree or a threshold of 
potentiality or possibility”. 974 
 
The Panel in the case Australia – Salmon found that a “risk assessment” in the 
sense of the first definition of Annex A(4) of the SPS Agreement  
 
“(…) not only has to state that there is a possibility of the disease of 
concern being introduced into Australia when imports of the salmon 
products further examined would be allowed, but also needs to 
provide some evaluation or estimation of the likelihood or 
probability, expressed either qualitatively or quantitatively, of these 
diseases thus being introduced and of the associated biological and 
economic consequences then occurring. In our view, the SPS 
Agreement does not require that such evaluation needs to be done 
quantitatively. Moreover, we consider that this requirement on how a 
risk assessment should evaluate risk does not at all imply that a risk 
assessment in accordance with Article 5.1 needs to demonstrate a 
certain magnitude or threshold level or degree of risk (expressed 
either quantitatively or qualitatively).”975 
 
The Appellate Body in the case Australia – Salmon agreed with the Panel that a 
risk assessment does not require a quantitative evaluation of the probability of 
adverse effects occurring and that the “likelihood may be expressed either 
quantitatively or qualitatively”.976 Furthermore and in line with the Panel, the 
Appellate Body confirmed its statement expressed in the case EC – Hormones 
“that there is no requirement for a risk assessment to establish a certain 
magnitude or threshold level of degree of risk”.977  
 
The second type of risk assessment is addressing food (and feed) safety risks in 
the narrow sense, i.e., so-called food-borne risks. This second type of risk 
assessment is defined by the second clause of Annex A(4) of the SPS 
Agreement as follows:  
 
                                                 
974 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 184.  
975 Australia – Salmon, Panel Report, para. 8.80 (original emphases); with reference to the 
Appellate Body Report on EC – Hormones, para. 186 (footnote 273). 
976 Australia – Salmon, Appellate Body Report, para. 124; with reference to paragraph 8.80 of 
the Panel’s Report in Australia – Salmon. By confirming the Panel’s notion that the 
evaluation of the probability “may be expressed either quantitatively or qualitatively”, the 
Appellate Body coevally rejected the dissenting opinion of one of the experts advising the 
Panel, namely Burmaster, who had argued that a “risk assessment” must be quantitative (see 
footnote no. 286 in paragraph 8.83 of the Panel’s Report in Australia – Salmon).  
977 Australia – Salmon, Appellate Body Report, para. 124; with reference to paragraph 186 of 
the Appellate Body’s report in EC – Hormones (footnote no. 76). 
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“Risk assessment – (…) the evaluation of the potential for adverse 
effects on human or animal health arising from the presence of 
additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms in food, 
beverages or feedstuffs” (emphasis added).  
 
The Appellate Body in the case EC – Hormones explained that “the ordinary 
meaning of ‘potential’ relates to ‘possibility’ and is different from the ordinary 
meaning of ‘probability’ ”.978 
 
However, beside the differences outlined in Annex A(4) of the SPS Agreement, 
both types of risk assessments are following the same principles of the SPS 
Agreement. These are, essentially, the requirements outlined in Article 5 of the 
SPS Agreement for proper “risk assessments”. Article 5 of the SPS Agreement, 
in turn, is based upon basic rights and obligations (Article 2 of the SPS 
Agreement). At the heart of the basic rules and obligations is paragraph 2 of 
Article 2 of the SPS Agreement, requiring, inter alia, “that any sanitary or 
phytosanitary measure … is based on scientific principles and is not maintained 
without sufficient scientific evidence…”  
 
Additionally, the SPS Agreement offers a presumption of justification for 
measures which “conform to” international standards.979 Literally, the SPS 
Agreement provides that SPS measures “which conform to international 
standards, guidelines or recommendations shall be deemed to be necessary to 
protect human, animal or plant life or health, and presumed to be consistent with 
the relevant provisions of this Agreement and the GATT 1994” (Article 3.2 of 
the SPS Agreement).980 In consequence, risk assessments are most critical in 
cases where governments intend to establish SPS measures resulting in higher 
levels of sanitary protection than would be achieved by measures based on the 
relevant international standard. For such cases, i.e. where governments are 
intending to establish higher levels of sanitary protection, the SPS Agreement 
requires, in essence, a scientific justification (Article 3.3 of the SPS 
Agreement).981 
                                                 
978 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 184. 
979 International standards form part of the cluster of public standards (see Sufian Jusoh, 
‘Standards and their Impacts on the Horticulture Trade,’ in Baris Karapinar, Fikret Adaman, 
and Gokhan Ozertan (eds.), Rethinking Structural Reform in Turkish Agriculture: Beyond the 
World Bank’s Strategy (Nova Science Publishers, 2010), pp. 356-357. 
980 The SPS Agreement explicitly recognises the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the World 
Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), and the framework of the International Plant 
Protection Convention (IPPC) as “relevant international organisations” (preamble, Article 3.4 
and Annex A(3) of the SPS Agreement).  
981 Marsha Echols called the way the SPS Agreement seeks to implement harmonisation of 
SPS measures as a “carrot and stick approach”:  
“The [SPS] Agreement uses a carrot and stick approach to encourage countries 
to harmonize their sanitary measures around the Codex standards. The carrot is 
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In the end, reliance on scientific principles and scientific justification is the 
underlying rationale of the SPS Agreement. Whether governments are basing 
SPS measures on international standards, or are opting for higher levels of 
protection: either way, “science” is chosen to determine whether an SPS 
measures is justified or not. In the first instance, international standards are 
presumed to be scientifically sound, and for higher levels of protection, 
scientific justification is required. Or, as Marsha Echols puts it:  
 
“The SPS Agreement obligates governments to rely on scientific 
evidence in the development of a sanitary measure and makes 
scientifically confirmed risk the only acceptable justification for a 
permanent SPS measure. A risk assessment is integral to these 
requirements. Scientific principles and science, as opposed to 
tradition, are assumed to provide certainty and objectivity”.982  
 
At first view, the text of the SPS Agreement seems to be quite clear. Any SPS 
measures must be ‘based on’ a risk assessment and on scientific evidence and 
not maintained without scientific justification. However, a closer look reveals 
some inherent ambiguities. For example, the text of the SPS Agreement did not 
express whether risk assessments must assess risks quantitatively or whether 
qualitative risk assessments are sufficient. And what does ’based on science’ 
really mean? What is the notion of science implied in the SPS Agreement? 
Because the negotiators of the SPS Agreement wisely refrained from defining 
basic terms such as science and risk, it was upon panels and the Appellate Body 
to do so. However, by approaching fundamental questions related to science and 
risk, panels and the Appellate Body were challenged by allegedly banned 
epistemological ambiguities.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
the presumption that accompanies measures conforming to international 
standards. They are ‘deemed’ to be necessary and ‘presumed’ to be consistent 
with the Agreement and the GATT 1994. When a Member has reason to believe 
that a sanitary measure not based on the international standard is constraining or 
has the potential to constrain its exports, it may request from and must be given 
an explanation by the importing Member. In addition, the notification 
procedures of Annex B to the Agreement are triggered by the failure of a 
government to adopt ‘substantially the same’ content as the international 
standard, if its ‘regulation’ might have a significant effect on trade” (Marsha A. 
Echols, Food Safety and the WTO. The Interplay of Culture, Science and 
Technology (Kluwer Law International, 2001), p. 99, footnotes omitted).  
982 Marsha A. Echols, ibid. p 44. In the context of the case EC – Biotech, Oren Perez 
commented that “the Panel’s submissive approach to science asks from science something it 
cannot deliver: complete determinacy” (Oren Perez, ‘Anomalies at the precautionary 
kingdom: reflections on the GMO Panel’s decision’ (2007) 6(2) World Trade Review, 278-
279).  
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C. Resurfacing Swamplands 
 
First, the SPS Agreement does not define the term ‘science’ directly.983 
However, from the wording of paragraph 1 of Annex A of the SPS Agreement, 
which circumscribes sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures and the hazards 
against which the SPS measures shall protect, one can draw some conclusions 
with regard to the scientific disciplines potentially involved in examining these 
hazards.  
 
Paragraph 1 of Annex A of the SPS Agreement specifies the following hazards:  
 
(a)  “(…) pests, diseases, disease-carrying organisms or disease-causing 
organisms”;  
(b)  “(…) additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms in 
foods, beverages or feedstuffs”;  
(c)  “(…) diseases carried by animals, plants or products thereof, or from 
the entry, establishment or spread of pests”,  
(d)  “(…) other damage … from pests”.  
 
Basically, paragraph 1 of Annex A of the SPS Agreement refers to animal 
diseases, plant pests and food additives and food-borne hazards, which can be 
summarised as ‘quarantine hazards’. Considering the scientific disciplines able 
for ascertaining such hazards, one has to refer to physical sciences in the field, 
e.g. chemistry, biochemistry, biology, molecular and microbiology, plant 
physiology, veterinary medicine, food sciences, etc. Henceforth, the range of 
physical sciences able for ascertaining quarantine hazards, as addressed by the 
SPS Agreement, is referred to as the numerus clausus of ‘quarantine sciences’. 
984 
 
Therefore, and referring to the wording of the Appellate Body in EC- 
Hormones,985 the hazards mentioned in paragraph 1 of Annex A of the SPS 
Agreement seem to be “matters (…) susceptible of quantitative analysis by the 
(…) the physical sciences”.  
 
                                                 
983 Marsha Echols observed that the language of the SPS Agreement uses the term ‘scientific’ 
rather than ‚science’ and found that the former term “refers not only to laboratory science but 
also to an approach or reasoning process that yields sound conclusions. Instead of the focus 
on (laboratory) ‘science’, the focus should be on objective decision making that considers all 
factors and views”  Marsha A. Echols, Food Safety and the WTO. The Interplay of Culture, 
Science and Technology (Kluwer Law International, 2001), p. 153).  
984 It is referred to ‘quarantine hazards’ for making reference to animal diseases, plant pests 
and food-borne hazards, and to ‘quarantine sciences’ for referring to the physical sciences 
used for ascertaining these quarantine hazards.  
985 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 187.  
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The Panel, on the one hand, revealed its perception of ‘science’ by contrasting 
the “scientific examination of data and factual studies” in a risk assessment 
procedure with the “policy exercise involving social value judgements made by 
political bodies” in the process of risk management.986 The Panel described the 
risk management phase as involving “non-scientific considerations, such as 
social value judgements”.987 
 
The contrasting of the scientific realm of risk assessment with the non-scientific 
policy space of risk management indicates that the Panel discerned ‘science’ 
from ‘policy’ and “scientific examinations of data and factual studies” from 
“non-scientific social value judgements”. 
 
Based upon its differentiation between scientific risk assessment and policy-
driven risk management, the Panel considered that reports of political bodies 
“which evaluate the scientific and other reports submitted to them, are not part 
of the risk assessment process, but of the risk management process (…)”.988 
Hence, the Panel did not recognise several reports of the European Parliament989 
and of the EC Economic and Social Committee990 as “risk assessments”.   
 
On the other hand, the reasoning of the Appellate Body seemed of having 
emanated from a broader view of ‘science’ compared to that of the Panel. In this 
respect, the following statement of the Appellate Body with regard on the 
Panel’s observations on risk assessment shall be recalled: “… [T]o the extent 
that the Panel purports to exclude from the scope of a risk assessment in the 
sense of Article 5.1 all matters not susceptible of quantitative analysis by the 
empirical or experimental laboratory methods commonly associated with the 
physical sciences, we believe that the Panel is in error”.991 The Appellate Body 
continued to explain that “[s]ome of the kinds of factors listed in Article 5.2 
such as ‘relevant processes and production methods’ and ‘relevant inspection, 
sampling and testing methods’ are not necessarily or wholly susceptible of 
investigation according to laboratory methods of, for example, biochemistry or 
pharmacology”.992 Then, the Appellate Body stressed “that the risk that is to be 
evaluated in a risk assessment under Article 5.1 is not only risk ascertainable in 
a science laboratory operating under strictly controlled conditions, but risk in 
human societies as they actually exist (…)”.993  
                                                 
986 EC – Hormones, Panel Report, para. 8.94 (emphases added).  
987 EC – Hormones, Panel Report, para. 8.97. 
988 EC – Hormones, Panel Report, para. 8.109 (emphases by the Panel).  
989 The Nielsen Report of 1981, the first and second Collins Report of 1985 and 1989 
respectively, and the Pimenta Report of 1989. 
990 Opinions of the EC Economic and Social Committee of 1981 and 1984.  
991 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 187.  
992 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 187. 
993 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 187. 
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It is this broader notion of science which might have contributed, among other 
reasons, to the Appellate Body’s rejection of the Panel’s concept of separating 
‘scientific’ risk assessment from policy-driven risk management. In line with its 
broader perception of science, the Appellate Body concluded that the Panel’s 
exclusion of general control problems, e.g. problems of abuse of veterinary 
drugs, from the scope of application of Article 5.1 and 5.2 of the SPS 
Agreement, amounted to “a fundamental legal error”.994 Hence, from the 
perspective of the Appellate Body, the Panel’s exclusion of problems related to 
the deficient administration of veterinary drugs from the scope of risk 
assessment in the sense of Article 5 of the SPS Agreement and their transferral 
to the risk management phase would effect in “a more restrictive interpretation 
of ‘risk assessment’ than is justified by the actual terms of Article 5.2, Article 8 
and Annex C of the SPS Agreement”.995  
 
From the diverging statements of the Panel, on the one hand, and the Appellate 
Body, on the other hand, one can conclude that the latter adopted a more 
inclusive approach towards the notion of science than the former. According to 
the Appellate Body, not only quantitative analysis provided by physical sciences 
should be considered in risk assessment, but also evaluation methods able to 
ascertain “risk in human societies as the actually exist”.996 
 
Similarly to the term ‘science’, the term ‘risk’ can also not be found in the SPS 
Agreement as such. The SPS Agreement only contains the term ‘risk 
assessment’.997 
 
The Panel in EC – Hormones gathered its notion of risk from interpreting the 
term ‘risk assessment’. The Panel considered that the procedure of risk 
assessment contains of the following two elements: (i) identification of the 
adverse effects on human health, and (ii) evaluation of “the potential or 
probability of occurrence of these effects”.998  
                                                 
994 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 206. 
995 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 206.  
996 However, from this statement of the Appellate Body, it remained open what kind of 
scientific disciplines might come into effective consideration. The reason for this particular 
caveat lies in paragraph 1 of Annex A of the SPS Agreement. The hazards mentioned in 
paragraph 1 of Annex A of the SPS Agreement are of a rather narrow range, not exceeding 
the scope of physical sciences and quarantine sciences, respectively. Hence, one could argue 
that the concept of the Appellate Body, considered by some as more inclusive and susceptive 
for non-scientific concerns, might be constrained by the narrow definition of science implied 
in paragraph 1 of Annex A of the SPS Agreement. Insofar, it will be interesting to see how the 
concept of the Appellate Body, commended by some as being broader as that of the Panel, 
will further materialise. 
997 Marsha A. Echols, Food Safety and the WTO. The Interplay of Culture, Science and 
Technology (Kluwer Law International, 2001), p. 82.  
998 EC – Hormones, Panel Report, para. 8.98 (emphases by the Panel).  
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From this interpretation of the term risk assessment by the Panel one can 
conclude that it understands risk as “the potential or probability of occurrence of 
adverse effects”. 
 
The Appellate Body in EC – Hormones noted that “the Panel’s use of 
‘probability’ as an alternative term for ‘potential’ creates a significant 
concern”.999  The Appellate Body pointed at differences of the ordinary 
meanings of the two words. The Appellate Body observed that “[T]he ordinary 
meaning of ‘potential’ relates to ‘possibility’ and is different from the ordinary 
meaning of ‘probability’. The Appellate Body found that the ordinary meaning 
of “potential” is “that which is possible as opposed to actual: a possibility”, 
whereas “probability” refers to “degrees of likelihood: the appearance of truth, 
or likelihood of being realized … a thing judged likely to be true, to exist, or to 
happen”.1000 From these ordinary meanings of words, the Appellate Body 
inferred that “[P]robability implies a higher degree or a threshold of potentiality 
or possibility. It thus appears that here the Panel introduces a quantitative 
dimension to the notion of risk”.1001  
 
With regard to the quantification of risk, Elizabeth Fisher observed that “there is 
a close relationship between how risk-problems are characterised and what is 
understood to be a legitimate role for public administration in addressing 
them”.1002 Unsurprisingly, though, different perceptions of risk in the case EC – 
Hormones by the Panel and the Appellate Body respectively led to different 
outcomes.  
 
The Appellate Body’s review of the appropriate notion of risk was prompted by 
a particular statement of a scientific expert and its interpretation by the Panel. 
The Appellate Body noted down the Panel’s reflections as follows:  
 
“In this respect, we note Dr. Lucier's statement that, according to his 
tentative estimates, between zero and one person in a million who eat 
500 grams of meat, treated with oestrogens for growth promotion 
                                                 
999 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 184. 
1000 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 184; with reference in footnote no. 164 to 
L. Brown (ed.), The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles, Vol. 2 
(Clarendon Press, 1993).  
1001 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 184 (emphasis added).  Therefore, by 
rejecting the Panel’s equation of potentiality and probability, the Appellate Body also rejected 
the Panel’s attempt for introducing a quantitative requirement into risk assessment.  
1002 Elizabeth Fisher, ‘Beyond the Science/Democracy Dichotomy: The World Trade 
organisation Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement and Administrative Constitutionalism’, in 
Christian Joerges and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (eds.), Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade 
Governance and Social Regulation (Hart Publishing, 2006), [pp. 327-349], p. 343. Fisher also 
confirmed that the Panel in EC – Hormones “was clearly influenced by quantitative 
understandings of risk while the Appellate Body was not” (Elizabeth Fisher, ibid.).  
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purposes in accordance with good practice, per day over their 
lifetimes, get cancer (…). This 0-1 in a million risk is caused by the 
total amount of oestrogens in treated meat (the amount of 
endogenous oestrogens being highly variable and, according to Dr. 
Lucier, already being carcinogenic), not by the small fraction thereof 
which is added for growth promotion purposes and which is relevant 
for the purposes of this dispute. Moreover, this estimate only 
represents a statistical range of 0 to 1 in a million, not a scientifically 
identified risk.” 1003 
 
The Appellate Body observed that the European Communities “protest[ed] 
vigorously” against the Panel’s interpretation.1004 The European Communities 
asserted that “by doing so, the Panel is in effect requiring a Member carrying out 
a risk assessment to quantify the potential for adverse effects on human 
health”.1005 The Appellate Body reasoned as follows:  
 
“It is not clear in what sense the Panel uses the term "scientifically 
identified risk". The Panel also frequently uses the term "identifiable 
risk", and does not define this term either. The Panel might arguably 
have used the terms "scientifically identified risk" and "identifiable 
risk" simply to refer to an ascertainable risk: if a risk is not 
ascertainable, how does a Member ever know or demonstrate that it 
exists? In one part of its Reports, the Panel opposes a requirement of 
an "identifiable risk" to the uncertainty that theoretically always 
remains since science can never provide absolute certainty that a 
given substance will not ever have adverse health effects. We agree 
with the Panel that this theoretical uncertainty is not the kind of risk 
which, under Article 5.1, is to be assessed. In another part of its 
Reports, however, the Panel appeared to be using the term 
"scientifically identified risk" to prescribe implicitly that a certain 
magnitude or threshold level of risk be demonstrated in a risk 
assessment if an SPS measure based thereon is to be regarded as 
consistent with Article 5.1. To the extent that the Panel purported to 
require a risk assessment to establish a minimum magnitude of risk, 
we must note that imposition of such a quantitative requirement finds 
no basis in the SPS Agreement.” 1006 
 
                                                 
1003 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 185 and footnote no. 166 with reference to 
the Panel Report in EC – Hormones, para. 8.124, footnote no. 331.  
1004 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 185. 
1005 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 185. 
1006 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 186 (emphases by the Appellate Body, 
footnotes omitted).  
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Interestingly, though, the conflict over whether the concept of risk implies 
“quantitative requirements” persisted over ten years, reappearing in the 
Continued Suspension case. In this case, the European Communities specifically 
claimed that “the Panel erred in requiring the quantification of the risks arising 
from the consumption of meat containing residues of oestradiol-17β”.1007 In 
particular, the European Communities argued that a specific question of the 
Panel to scientific experts could be understood as a quantitative requirement. 
The Panel has posed the following question to the scientific experts:  
 
“The Panel specifically asked the experts whether the [European 
Communities] Opinions identified the potential for adverse effects 
on human health, including the carcinogenic or genotoxic potential, 
of the residues of oestradiol-17β found in meat derived from cattle to 
which this hormone had been administered for growth promotion 
purposes in accordance with good veterinary practice and to what 
extent the Opinions evaluated the potential occurrence of these 
adverse effects.”1008 
 
The European Communities argued that if the phrase potential occurrence is 
understood as a quantitative requirement, i.e., “to specify in quantitative terms 
‘to what extent [it] evaluated the potential occurrence of these adverse effects,’ 
it would lead to an error in law”.1009 The European Communities asserted “that, 
by referring to ‘potential occurrence’ of adverse effects when asking questions 
to the experts, the Panel incorrectly ‘imposed a quantitative method of risk 
assessment on the European Communities borrowed from Codex Alimentarius 
and JECFA”.1010 
 
The Appellate Body began its examination of the European Communities’ claim 
by recalling its findings on the issue of quantifying risk in EC – Hormones. In 
particular with view on its earlier finding “that imposition of such a quantitative 
requirement finds no basis in the SPS Agreement”,1011 the Appellate Body in the 
Continued Suspension case added the following:  
 
“Although the definition of a risk assessment does not require WTO 
Members to establish a minimum magnitude of risk, it is 
                                                 
1007 US – Continued Suspension, Appellate Body Report, para. 566.  
1008 US – Continued Suspension, Appellate Body Report, para. 570 (emphasis added), with 
reference to the Panel Report in the same US – Continued Suspension case, para. 7.521 (ibid., 
footnote no. 1177).  
1009 US – Continued Suspension, Appellate Body Report, para. 571, with reference to the 
European Communities’ appellant’s submission, para, 344 (original emphasis, (ibid., footnote 
no. 1178). 
1010 US – Continued Suspension, Appellate Body Report, para. 566 (footnotes omitted).  
1011 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 186. 
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nevertheless difficult to understand the concept of risk as being 
devoid of any indication of potentiality. A risk assessment is 
intended to identify adverse effects and evaluate the possibility that 
such adverse effects might arise. This distinguishes an ascertainable 
risk from theoretical uncertainty. However, the assessment of risk 
need not be expressed in numerical terms or as a minimum 
quantification of the level of risk.” 1012 
 
With specific regard to the potential occurrence of adverse effects on human 
health of residues found in meat treated with the hormone oestradiol-17β, the 
Appellate Body noted:  
 
“As the European Communities acknowledges, “a quantitative 
dimension may not be immediately evident from the ordinary 
meaning of the words ‘potential occurrence’ ”. The terms “potential 
occurrence of adverse effects” can be understood as referring to the 
possibility that the adverse effects might occur, without necessarily 
requiring that this be expressed in numerical terms. This would be 
consistent with the definition of “risk assessment” in paragraph 4 of 
Annex A of the SPS Agreement, as interpreted by the Appellate 
Body. Moreover, it would be consistent with the Appellate Body’s 
view that “theoretical uncertainty” is not the kind of risk to be 
assessed under Article 5.1, but rather the risk to be assessed must be 
an “ascertainable” risk. In this sense, we agree with Canada that “to 
examine the ‘potential’ for adverse effects is to ask whether those 
adverse effects could ever occur”.” 1013 
 
In its attempt to define an ‘ascertainable risk’ somewhere between a 
‘quantitative notion of risk’ and ‘theoretical uncertainty’, the Appellate Body in 
Continued Suspension noted that the Panel was aware of the difference. The 
Appellate Body observed:  
 
“Other statements by the Panel confirm that it did not require that the 
possibility of the risks arising be expressed in numerical terms. For 
example, the Panel took note of the Appellate Body's finding that a 
risk assessment can take into account “matters not susceptible of 
quantitative analysis by the empirical or experimental laboratory 
methods commonly associated with the physical sciences.” The 
                                                 
1012 US – Continued Suspension, Appellate Body Report, para. 569. The Appellate Body 
added that it was “also mindful that the risk assessment at issue in this case concerns the 
potential for adverse effects under the second sentence of paragraph 4 of Annex A and not an 
evaluation of likelihood under the first sentence of paragraph 4” (ibid., original emphasis).  
1013 US – Continued Suspension, Appellate Body Report, para. 572 (original underlining, 
footnotes omitted).  
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Panel also stated that “it must determine whether the European 
Communities evaluated the possibility that the identified adverse 
effects came into being, originated, or resulted from the presence of 
residues of oestradiol-17β in meat or meat products as a result of the 
cattle being treated with the hormone for growth promotion 
purposes”.” 1014 
 
Finally, the Appellate Body turned to the additional argument of the European 
Communities that the Panel’s use of the term ‘magnitude’ was evidence for its 
misinterpretation of risk and risk assessment. The European Communities had 
pointed out the following paragraph where the Panel in US – Continued 
Suspension had used the term ‘magnitude’:  
 
“Indeed, whether a Member considers that its population should be 
exposed or not to a particular risk, or at what level, is not relevant to 
determining whether a risk exists and what its magnitude is. A 
fortiori, it should have no effect on whether there is sufficient 
evidence of the existence and magnitude of this risk.  
A risk-averse Member may be inclined to take a protective position 
when considering the measure to be adopted. However, the 
determination of whether scientific evidence is sufficient to assess 
the existence and magnitude of a risk must be disconnected from the 
intended level of protection. (emphasis added)” 1015 
 
In response to the European Communities’ claim, the Appellate Body in US – 
Continued Suspension firstly observed that the Panel made its statements in the 
context of its examination whether the provisional ban of the other five 
hormones was consistent or not. In that respect, the Appellate Body noted that 
the Panel’s statement at issue “was not made in the context of the Panel’s 
examination of the European Communities’ import ban on meat from cattle 
treated with oestradiol-17β”.1016 
 
Then, the Appellate Body reiterated that risk assessment implies a notion of 
potentiality:  
 
“However, we recall that a “risk assessment” involves an indication 
of potentiality, even though this need not be expressed in numerical 
terms or as a minimum quantification of the level of risk. In this 
                                                 
1014 US – Continued Suspension, Appellate Body Report, para. 573 (emphasis added by the 
Appellate Body, footnotes omitted).  
1015 US – Continued Suspension, Appellate Body Report, para. 574, with reference to the 
Panel Report in the same US – Continued Suspension case, paras. 7.611 and 7.612 (emphases 
by the Appellate Body, footnote omitted).  
1016 US – Continued Suspension, Appellate Body Report, para. 574.  
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sense, the Panel’s reference to “magnitude” is in our view not 
sufficient to establish that the Panel incorrectly interpreted Article 
5.1 and paragraph 4 of Annex A as requiring a quantitative risk 
assessment.” 1017 
 
Therefore, the Appellate Body considered that “the Panel’s reference to 
‘potential occurrence’ of adverse health effects could be read consistently with 
the definition of a risk assessment in paragraph 4 of Annex A of the SPS 
Agreement, as interpreted by the Appellate Body”.1018 In consequence, the 
Appellate Body dismissed the claim of the European Communities “that the 
Panel incorrectly interpreted Article 5.1 and paragraph 4 of Annex A of the SPS 
Agreement as requiring quantification of risk.”1019 
 
In the case Continued Suspension, the European Communities seemed of having 
overstated the Appellate Body’s line of argument in EC – Hormones. The 
Appellate Body in EC – Hormones was, in fact, concerned about the Panel’s 
equation of potentiality with probability and rejected a quantitative notion of 
risk. On the other hand, the Appellate Body drew a line of demarcation between 
risk and uncertainty already in the Hormones case, by posing the following 
rhetorical question: “The Panel might arguably have used the terms 
“scientifically identified risk” and “identifiable risk” simply to refer to an 
ascertainable risk: if a risk is not ascertainable, how does a Member ever know 
or demonstrate that it exists?” 1020 
 
Therefore, the European Communities’ implication in the Continued Suspension 
case that the rejection of a quantitative requirement in risk assessment amounts 
to a concept of risk “devoid of any indication of potentiality” went too far. The 
Appellate Body, considering the European Communities’ claim that the Panel’s 
requirement to evaluate the potential occurrence of adverse health effects is 
tantamount to a quantitative specification of the risk at issue, clarified as 
follows: “Although the definition of a risk assessment does not require WTO 
Members to establish a minimum magnitude of risk, it is nevertheless difficult to 
understand the concept of risk as being devoid of any indication of potentiality.” 
1021 Further working out the contours of “risk” vis-à-vis “uncertainty”, the 
Appellate Body continued: “A risk assessment is intended to identify adverse 
effects and evaluate the possibility that such adverse effects might arise. This 
                                                 
1017 US – Continued Suspension, Appellate Body Report, para. 574. 
1018 US – Continued Suspension, Appellate Body Report, para. 575.  
1019 US – Continued Suspension, Appellate Body Report, para. 575. 
1020 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 186.  
1021 US – Continued Suspension, Appellate Body Report, para. 569. The Appellate Body 
added that it was “also mindful that the risk assessment at issue in this case concerns the 
potential for adverse effects under the second sentence of paragraph 4 of Annex A and not an 
evaluation of likelihood under the first sentence of paragraph 4” (ibid., original emphasis).  
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distinguishes an ascertainable risk from theoretical uncertainty.” 1022 From the 
line of argument developed by the Appellate Body in EC – Hormones and 
Continued Suspension, one can draw the conclusion that risks requiring 
assessment under Article 5 of the SPS Agreement are ascertainable risks. 
Ascertainability, in turn, was discerned by the Appellate Body from 
quantification or numerical specification, on the one hand, and from theoretical 
uncertainty, on the other hand. In other words, risk assessment does not need to 
provide quantification in numerical terms, but require the establishment of some 
indication of potentiality different from theoretical uncertainty. The Appellate 
Body found it “difficult to understand the concept of risk as being devoid of any 
indication of potentiality.” 1023 Though, one may assume that the concept of risk, 
as developed by the Appellate Body, should be understood as being located 
somewhere within the wide range between quantifiability, on the one hand, and 
uncertainty on the other hand, yet necessarily coming along with some 
indication of potentiality and ascertainability.  
 
By looking deeper at different interpretations of panels and the Appellate Body 
of the same basic terms such as science and risk, one may perceive how 
allegedly banned ambiguities were resurfacing. However, instead of legal 
ambiguities, as may have been the case under the previous GATT Article XX 
approach, the new ambiguities were rather epistemological in nature. Hence, the 
promise for objectivity implied in the science-based approach of the SPS 
Agreement came along with epistemological questions surrounding the very 
notion of science. Thus, instead of being an objective arbiter in trade dispute, 
‘science’ turned out to be a new challenge for the WTO DSB. In fact, panels and 
the Appellate Body were challenged by the relative nature of science. That 
relative nature of science was once depicted by Karl Popper as “bold theoretical 
structures above swamplands”:  
 
“The empirical basis of objective science has thus nothing ‘absolute’ 
about it. Science does not rest upon solid bedrock. The bold structure 
of its theories rises, as it were, above a swamp. It is like a building 
erected on piles. The piles are driven down from above into the 
swamp, but not down to any natural or ‘given’ base; and if we stop 
driving the piles deeper, it is not because we have reached firm 
ground. We simply stop when we are satisfied that the piles are firm 
enough to carry the structure, at least for the time being.” 1024 
 
An analysis of SPS case law will show that panels and the Appellate Body tried 
hard to bring the promise of objectivity implied in the deference to science to 
                                                 
1022 US – Continued Suspension, Appellate Body Report, para. 569.  
1023 US – Continued Suspension, Appellate Body Report, para. 569.  
1024 Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, 2nd English edition (Hutchinson & Co 
Publishers, 1968), p. 111, footnote omitted.  
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life. Thereby, however, panels and the Appellate Body found themselves 
challenged by epistemological swamplands and “the muddled waters of 
Hegelian dialectics”. Later, it will be discussed whether and how legal 
approaches aiming at establishing absolute truth are able to cope with the 
relative nature of scientific endeavours. May legal bodies designed for 
establishing objective verdicts ever be capable for coping with the intrinsically 
non-objective, i.e. relative nature of science?  
 
First, however, it shall be shown that panels and the Appellate Body have 
chosen different positions on the epistemological spectrum for addressing new 
challenges posed by the science-based approach of the SPS Agreement.   
 
 
CHAPTER 13 THE PANEL’S POSITIVIST POSITION 
 
The first prominent WTO dispute decided under the SPS Agreement, the case 
EC – Hormones, was fundamental for the interpretation of the concept of ‘risk 
assessment’. Therefore, in the following, the underlying conceptual dichotomy 
between approaches of the Panel and the Appellate Body towards ‘risk 
assessment’ in the Hormones case shall be examined in more detail. Starting 
point for this examination is the notion that the different approaches of the Panel 
and the Appellate Body in EC – Hormones towards ‘risk assessment’ is the 
result of fundamentally different underlying concepts.  
 
The Panel in EC – Hormones, when interpreting Article 5 of the SPS 
Agreement, was obviously inspired by the concept of risk analysis. As 
mentioned above, the concept of risk analysis was developed and applied, most 
notably, by the Codex Alimentarius Commission. Hence, no wonder that the 
Panel explicitly referred to a ‘Report of the Joint FAO/WHO Expert 
Consultation on the Application of Risk Analysis to Food Standards Issues’.1025 
An essential feature of the concept of risk analysis is the separation of risk 
assessment and risk management. Obviously, the Panel also took over this 
element of the concept of risk analysis when interpreting Article 5 of the SPS 
Agreement and emphasising two separate aspects contained therein, i.e., ‘risk 
assessment’ on the one hand, and ‘risk management’ on the other hand.  
 
The Appellate Body, on the other hand, adhered to a textual interpretation of 
Article 5 of the SPS Agreement where, indeed, the term ‘risk management’ 
cannot be found. However, refusing a notion of risk management left the 
                                                 
1025 EC – Hormones, Panel Report, para. 8.103. In footnote no. 302, the Panel referred to a 
revised version of this report. In the meantime, the work on risk analysis was integrated in the 
Procedural Manual of the Codex Alimentarius Commission. See: “Working Principles for 
Risk Analysis” in Section IV of the Procedural Manual, 19th edition, 2010, pp. 86-91.  
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Appellate Body challenged by so-called non-scientific factors such as 
compliance and control problems. The Appellate Body was thus constrained to 
encompass non-scientific factors into the process of ‘risk assessment’.  
 
In the following, statements issued by the Panel in the case EC – Hormones 
shall be analysed in more detail.  
 
A. A Probabilistic Notion of Risk  
 
As showed initially, there are various notions of risk. Introduced by the SPS 
Agreement, it was upon panels and the Appellate Body to clarify the risk 
concept in the context of international trade regulation. In this respect, a telling 
example for showing different approaches of panels and the Appellate Body 
towards the notion of risk is the question about ‘zero risk’. In SPS case law, it 
was contested whether ‘zero risk’ is a scientific question or a policy issue, i.e., a 
question of risk management. From a scientific perspective, there is no such 
thing as ‘zero risk.’ From a policy perspective, however, ‘zero risk’ as a risk 
management measure is conceivable, for example by implementing an import 
ban on the hazardous items at issue.  
 
The Panel in the case EC – Hormones dealt with the concept of ‘zero risk’ from 
a scientific perspective. In particular, the Panel in the Hormones case examined 
the relationship between the notion of risk and statistical significance. In this 
respect, the Panel questioned scientific experts advising the Panel, in particular 
Dr. Lucier. Considering that some of the remarks of Dr. Lucier were “closely 
related” to the “concept of zero risk”, the Panel observed: “Dr. Lucier responded 
that, to his knowledge, there was no piece of scientific evidence to indicate that 
any of the six hormones in question had unequivocally caused adverse effects in 
humans when administered and used properly. However, there was some 
information available which raised concern for a slight effect on the incidence of 
human disease”.1026  In this respect, the Panel noted a statement of Dr. Lucier 
saying that, “according to his tentative estimates, between zero and one person 
in a million who eat 500 grams of meat, treated with oestrogens for growth 
promotion purposes in accordance with good practices, per day over their 
lifetimes, get cancer”.1027 The Panel reasoned that “[T]his 0-1 in a million risk is 
caused by the total amount of oestrogens in treated meat (the amount of 
endogenous oestrogens being highly variable and, according to Dr. Lucier, 
already being carcinogenic), not by the small fraction thereof which is added for 
growth promotion purposes and which is relevant for the purposes of this 
                                                 
1026 EC – Hormones, Panel Report, para. 8.124, footnote no. 331, referencing to a statement 
by Dr. Lucier (at para. 6.95) answering to a Panel’s question.  
1027 EC – Hormones, Panel Report, para. 8.124, footnote no. 331, with reference to the 
transcripts of the joint meeting with experts of 18 February 1997 (paras. 742 and 819).  
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dispute”.1028 Considering that “this estimate only represents a statistical range of 
0 to 1 in a million”, the Panel concluded that the risk expressed by this estimate 
is not sufficient for becoming recognised as ‘a scientifically identified risk’.1029  
 
The European Communities (EC), on the other hand, seemed to perceive ‘zero 
risk’ not primarily as an issue of statistical and probability calculations, but as a 
concept for setting the appropriate level of protection at a “zero residue” 
level.1030 The EC argued that “none of the studies it referred to as part of a risk 
assessment proves beyond doubt or concludes in an unqualified manner that the 
presence of residues of the hormones in dispute in meat or meat present no risk 
whatsoever”.1031 In particular, the EC referred to the conclusions of the 1988 
JECFA Report which stated “that residues arising from the hormones at issue 
used as growth promoters are only unlikely to pose a hazard to human health and 
to the basic premise of JECFA recommendations which aim at establishing 
standards which correspond to a no appreciable or no significant risk increase 
due to the exposure to the substances in question and not to a zero risk 
increase”.1032 The Panel reasoned that “this residual risk, albeit minute and not 
appreciable, constitutes the risk (derived from a risk assessment) on which the 
EC ban is based in accordance with Article 5.1, arguing that, according to EC 
risk management, risk other than zero is not acceptable”.1033  
 
The Panel, however, adhered to the notion of an ‘identifiable risk’ and found 
that “[T]he scientific conclusion reflected in the EC measures in dispute is thus 
that the use of the hormones in dispute for growth promotion purposes, even in 
accordance with good practise, poses an identifiable risk to human health”.1034 
The Panel further noted that, according to the experts advising it, “any use of the 
hormone in dispute will always leave some residue level, albeit a very small 
one, the administration of these hormones in accordance with good practice will 
also leave some residue and thus not achieve the EC ‘zero residue’ level of 
protection”.1035  
 
In a general observation, the Panel noted that, “according to scientists advising 
the Panel, science can never provide a certainty, i.e. exclude once and for all that 
a specific substance can ever have adverse health effects”.1036 
                                                 
1028 EC – Hormones, Panel Report, para. 8.124, footnote no. 331 (emphasis by the Panel). 
1029 EC – Hormones, Panel Report, para. 8.124, footnote no. 331.   
1030 EC – Hormones, Panel Report, para. 8.136. 
1031 EC – Hormones, Panel Report, para. 8.149 (emphasis by the Panel).  
1032 EC – Hormones, Panel Report, para. 8.149 (emphases by the Panel). 
1033 EC – Hormones, Panel Report, para. 8.149 (emphases by the Panel, footnote omitted). 
1034 EC – Hormones, Panel Report, para. 8.136 (emphasis by the Panel).  
1035 EC – Hormones, Panel Report, para. 8.136, footnote no. 350.  
1036 EC – Hormones, Panel Report, para. 8.152. The Panel further noted that the EC had not 
invoked Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement which “explicitly deals with situations where there 
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With regard to the identifiability of the risks invoked by the EC in particular, the 
Panel noted that these specific risks were “not identifiable and that, therefore, 
these risks can a priori not be assessed by scientists (as required in Article 
5.1)”.1037  “In this sense”, the Panel continued, “these potential risks, which are 
present for any substance (also for substances or uses of substances allowed in 
the European Communities), are only the consequence of science not being 
capable of assuring that no risks will ever arise from a substance”.1038  
 
The Panel finally noted that even by a total ban the EC could not achieve the 
objective of “zero risk”:  
 
“We finally note that the EC objective of ’zero risk’ cannot be 
achieved in practice; not even under the EC ban itself since the 
European Communities cannot guarantee that there is a zero 
probability that illegal use of the hormones at issue will occur. 
Moreover, this ‘zero risk’ objective cannot (…) in any case be 
achieved for the three natural hormones in dispute since the 
European Communities allows the ingestion of these same hormones 
occurring endogenously in meat and other foods as well as the use of 
these hormones for therapeutic or zootechnical purposes.” 1039 
 
To conclude, the Panel in the case EC – Hormones perceived “zero risk” not as 
part of the determination of the appropriate level of protection, i.e. as part of risk 
management, but as a scientific concept related to statistical significance and 
probability calculation. In this regard, the Panel observed that in the scientific 
realm, ‘zero risk’ does not exist and hence, rejected the concept of ‘zero risk’ as 
a scientific concept.  
 
In the Salmon case, the Panel started its considerations of the concept of “zero 
risk” by defining risk as “a possibility of an adverse effect occurring”. Deriving 
from this notion of risk, the Panel observed the following:  
 
“In this respect, we consider that a risk assessment, on which to base 
an import prohibition in accordance with Article 5.1, cannot be 
premised on the concept of ‘zero risk’. Otherwise, all import 
prohibitions would be based on a risk assessment, since there is a 
                                                                                                                                                        
is scientific uncertainty regarding risks related to a substance (…)” (footnote no. 366, 
emphasis added).  
1037 EC – Hormones, Panel Report, para. 8.153 (emphasis by the Panel).  
1038 EC – Hormones, Panel Report, para. 8.153 (emphasis added). 
1039 EC – Hormones, Panel Report, para. 8.154 (emphasis added, footnote omitted).  
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risk (i.e., a possibility of an adverse event occurring), however 
remote, associated with most (if not all) imports”.1040 
 
With regard to the case at hand, the Panel cited the following statement from the 
first submission of Australia: “Australia does not have a no risk policy with 
respect to imports of salmon products - imports of heat-treated salmon are 
permitted. Stopping the import of a particular product does not mean that there 
is a no risk policy, only that the risk is too high and that the product cannot be 
treated to reduce the risk to an acceptable level”.1041 The Panel further cited the 
following statement of the Australian government: “The Government accepts 
the strongly expressed view of the Quarantine Review Committee that a policy 
of ‘no risk’ would be impossible to implement. Such a policy would mean for 
example a ban on most products”.1042  
 
In sum, the Panel in Australia – Salmon followed the approach of the Panel in 
EC – Hormones observing that in the scientific realm, ‘zero risk’ does not exist. 
Hence, the concept of ‘zero risk’ was rejected again as unscientific. 
 
B. Separating Science and Policy  
 
Paragraph 4 of Annex A of the SPS Agreement contains two types of risk 
assessments. The risk assessment applied in the case EC – Hormones is the 
second type described in paragraph 4 of Annex A of the SPS Agreement. This 
second type of risk assessment is defined as “the evaluation of the potential for 
adverse effects on human or animal health arising from the presence of 
additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms in food, beverages 
or feedstuff.”  
 
From this definition, the Panel considered that a risk assessment should “(i) 
identify the adverse effects on human health (if any) arsing from the presence of 
the hormones at issue when used as growth promoters in meat or meat products, 
and (ii) if any such adverse effects exist, evaluate the potential or probability of 
occurrence of these effects”.1043  
                                                 
1040 Australia – Salmon, Panel Report, para. 8.81 (emphasis by the Panel, footnote no. 274 
mentioned hereafter).  
1041 Australia – Salmon, Panel Report, para. 8.81, footnote no. 274, citing from Australia, First 
Submission, para. 19.  
1042 Australia – Salmon, Panel Report, para. 8.81, footnote no. 274, citing from Australia, 
Rebuttals, para. 16. 
1043 EC – Hormones, Panel Report, para. 8.98 (original emphases). In the subsequent case 
United States – Continued Suspension, the Panel took into account the Appellate Body’s 
critique of the Panel’s equation of potentiality and probability in the first Hormones dispute. 
The Appellate Body had found that “the Panel’s use of ‘probability’ as an alternative term for 
‘potential’ creates a significant concern. The ordinary meaning of ‘potential’ relates to 
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With regard to Article 5 of the SPS Agreement, the Panel in EC – Hormones 
recognised “two separate aspects of a Member’s decision to enact or maintain a 
sanitary measure”.1044  
 
The first aspect, the Panel observed, “relates to the exercise of assessing the 
risks to human, animal or plant life or health against which a sanitary measure is 
intended to protect”.1045 This exercise, the Panel noted, “is referred to in the SPS 
Agreement as risk assessment”.1046 With respect to food safety in particular, the 
Panel found that “the potential adverse effects (if any) related to a specific 
substance are established together with the probability of occurrence of any such 
effects”.1047  
 
The Panel considered that the obligation of Article 5.1 SPS to base sanitary 
measures on a risk assessment may be viewed “as a specific application of the 
basic obligations contained in Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement (…)”.1048 The 
Panel further noted that Articles 5.1 to 5.3 SPS are summing up factors which 
need to be taken into account in making risk assessments.1049  
                                                                                                                                                        
‘possibility’ and is different from the ordinary meaning of ‘probability’. ‘Probability’ implies 
a higher degree or a threshold of potentiality or possibility” (EC – Hormones, Report of the 
Appellate Body, para. 184). In the case Australia- Salmon, the Appellate Body further worked 
out the difference between a risk assessment according to Annex A(4) first and second 
sentence, respectively: The Appellate Body found that the two types of risk assessment are 
“substantially different”. Specifically, the Appellate Body noted that “[…] the first type of 
risk assessment demands an evaluation of the likelihood of entry, establishment or spread of a 
disease, and of the associated potential biological and economic consequences”, whereas the 
second type of risk assessment “[…] requires only the evaluation of the potential for adverse 
effects on human or animal health”. And, with view on the Panel’s equation of potentiality 
with probability in the first Hormones dispute, the Appellate Body concluded: “In view of the 
very different language used in paragraph 4 of Annex A for the two types of risk assessment, 
we do not believe that it is correct to diminish the substantial differences between these two 
types of risk assessments …” (Australia – Salmon, Appellate Body Report, para. 123, 
footnote no. 69). Therefore, the Panel in United States – Continued Suspension considered 
“that it is necessary to clarify what constitutes a risk assessment as defined in Annex A(4), 
second sentence. The Panel considers that Annex A(4) requires a Member to (a) identify the 
additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms in food, beverages or feedstuffs 
at issue (if any); (b) identify any possible adverse effect on human or animal health; and (c) 
evaluate the potential for that adverse effect to arise from the presence of the identified 
additives, contaminants, toxins or disease-causing organisms in food, beverages or feedstuffs” 
(United States – Continued Suspension, Panel Report, para. 7.507, emphasis added).  
1044 EC – Hormones, Panel Report, para. 8.91 (underlining added).  
1045 EC – Hormones, Panel Report, para. 8.92.  
1046 EC – Hormones, Panel Report, para. 8.92 (original emphasis); with reference to Article 5 
and Annex A of the SPS Agreement in footnote no. 292.  
1047 EC – Hormones, Panel Report, para. 8.92; with reference to paragraph 4 of Annex A of 
the SPS Agreement in footnote no. 293.  
1048 EC – Hormones, Panel Report, para. 8.93.  
1049 EC – Hormones, Panel Report, para. 8.93 (footnote no. 294 omitted).  
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With respect to Article 5.1 SPS, the Panel noted that “[N]one of the parties 
suggest that there are ‘risk assessment techniques developed by the relevant 
international organizations’ (…) which have to be taken into account in a risk 
assessment for the hormones at issue”.1050 Nevertheless, the Panel made 
reference to the ‘Report of the Joint FAO/WHO Expert Consultation on the 
Application of Risk Analysis to Food Standards Issues’ drafted on request of 
Codex in March 1995. According to this report, risk assessment is defined as 
follows:  
 
“The scientific evaluation of known or potential adverse health 
effects resulting from human exposure to foodborne hazards. The 
process consists of the following steps: (i) hazard identification, (ii) 
hazard characterization, (iii) exposure assessment, and (iv) risk 
characterization. The definition includes quantitative risk 
assessment, which emphasizes reliance on numerical expressions of 
risk, and also qualitative expressions of risk, as well as an indication 
of the attendant uncertainties (p.6).” 1051 
 
Subsequently, the Panel noted a revised version of this definition which was 
adopted by the Committee on General Principles of the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission at its 12th session in November 1996, defining risk assessment as 
follows:  
 
“A scientifically based process consisting of the following steps: (i) 
hazard identification, (ii) hazard characterization, (iii) exposure 
assessment, and (iv) risk characterization”.1052 
 
Turning to Article 5.2 SPS, the Panel observed that only three of the factors 
listed in this paragraph were relevant for a risk assessment of the risks at issue, 
in particular available scientific evidence, relevant processes and production 
methods; and relevant inspection, sampling and testing methods.  
 
The Panel noted in particular “that none of the parties has argued that factors not 
listed in Article 5.2, such as consumer preference, can be taken into account in a 
risk assessment in accordance with Article 5”.1053 
 
Coming to Article 5.3, the Panel considered that the economic factors listed in 
this paragraph are relevant in cases related to animal or plant life or health. 
                                                 
1050 EC – Hormones, Panel Report, para. 8.103 (footnote no. 300 omitted).  
1051 EC – Hormones, Panel Report, para. 8.103.  
1052 EC – Hormones, Panel Report, para. 8.103. The footnote no. 302 refers to the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission’s document CX/GP96/3.  
1053 EC – Hormones, Panel Report, para. 8.105.  
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Because the scope of the Hormones case was limited to issues of human life or 
health, Article 5.3 SPS was not applicable.  
 
In a concluding remark on the notion of risk assessment, the Panel noted “that 
the parties agree that, for the purposes of the EC measures in dispute, a risk 
assessment in accordance with Article 5 is a scientific process aimed at 
establishing the scientific basis for the sanitary measure a Member intends to 
take”.1054 
 
Turning to the “second aspect of a Member’s decision to enact or maintain a 
sanitary measure”, the Panel considered that this second aspect “relates, inter 
alia, to the determination and application of the appropriate level of sanitary 
protection by that Member against the risks to human, animal or plant life or 
health which have been assessed in accordance with Articles 5.1 to 5.3”.1055 The 
Panel noted that this second aspect “is commonly referred to by the parties to 
this dispute as an essential part of risk management”.1056 According to the Panel, 
risk management or the determination of the appropriate level of protection 
consists in deciding “the extent to which (…) the potential adverse effects 
related to a specific substance which have been identified in the risk assessment” 
can be accepted.1057 
 
Commonly, risk management consists of regulatory activities and the setting of 
standards. In the SPS Agreement, the term risk management itself is not 
mentioned in any provision. However, the Panel in the case EC – Hormones 
perceived that the determination of the appropriate level of sanitary or 
phytosanitary protection (ALOP), as prescribed in Articles 5.4 to 5.6 of the SPS 
Agreement, is an expression of risk management.1058  
 
The Panel considered that “[A]rticles 5.4 to 5.6 are particularly relevant to the 
risk management decision”.1059 In detail, the Panel said that Article 5.4 SPS 
“establishes the objective of minimizing negative trade effects in the 
determination by a Member of its appropriate level of protection”.1060 Article 5.5 
SPS “aims at achieving consistency in the application of the concept of 
appropriate level of protection”.1061  Article 5.6 SPS, at last, “provides that the 
                                                 
1054 EC – Hormones, Panel Report, para. 8.107 (emphases by the Panel, footnote no. 304 
omitted).  
1055 EC – Hormones, Panel Report, para. 8.95 (emphases by the Panel).  
1056 EC – Hormones, Panel Report, para. 8.95 (emphasis by the Panel).  
1057 EC – Hormones, Panel Report, para. 8.95. 
1058 EC – Hormones, Panel Report, para. 8.96. 
1059 EC – Hormones, Report of the Panel, para. 8.96. 
1060 EC – Hormones, Panel Report, para. 8.96 (original emphasis). 
1061 EC – Hormones, Panel Report, para. 8.96 (original emphasis). 
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sanitary measure which is finally adopted shall not be more trade-restrictive than 
required to achieve the appropriate level of protection (…)”.1062  
 
In the same way as it did previously with Article 5.1 SPS (see above), the Panel 
also considered that Articles 5.4 to 5.6 may be viewed “as specific applications 
of the basic obligations provided for in Article 2.2 (…) and Article 2.3 (…)”.1063 
 
Summing up, the Panel perceived the “risk management” phase as involving 
“non-scientific considerations, such as social value judgements”.1064  
 
With view on the case at hand, the Panel applied the separation of the two 
aspects of risk assessment, on the one hand, and risk management, on the other 
hand, by considering, inter alia, “that the non-scientific reports and opinions of 
the European Parliament and the EC Economic and Social Committee, which 
evaluate the scientific and other reports submitted to them, are not part of the 
risk assessment process, but of the risk management process (…)”.1065 
 
The Panel further elaborated on its perception of risk management when 
examining risks related to the control or, in other words, the abuse of the 
hormones at issue. Here, the Panel distinguished between the “relevant 
inspection, sampling and testing methods” referred to in Article 5.2 SPS, on the 
one hand, and general problems of control, e.g. enforcing the observance of 
good veterinary practice, on the other hand.1066 Whereas the Panel considered 
the former as being “specific to a particular substance in a particular food”, the 
latter were considered of being related “to the economic or social incidence” of 
a substance and its particular use, e.g. incentives for defiance from good 
veterinary practices.1067 These economic or social incidences, identified by the 
Panel as “non-scientific factors”, should “not be taken into account in risk 
assessment but in risk management”.1068  
 
                                                 
1062 EC – Hormones, Panel Report, para. 8.96 (original emphasis).  
1063 EC – Hormones, Panel Report, para. 8.96. 
1064 EC – Hormones, Panel Report, para. 8.97 (original emphasis). 
1065 EC – Hormones, Panel Report, para. 8.109 (original emphases). 
1066 EC – Hormones, Panel Report, para. 8.146. 
1067 EC – Hormones, Panel Report, para. 8.146. 
1068 EC – Hormones, Panel Report, para. 8.146 (original emphasis). The Panel, however, 
added that “even if these factors could be taken into account in a risk assessment, we note that 
the European Communities had not provided convincing evidence that the control (or the 
prevention of abuse) of the hormones in dispute is more difficult than the control of other 
veterinary drugs the use of which it allows”. On these grounds, the Panel concluded that 
“banning the use of a substance does not necessarily offer better protection of human health 
than other means of regulating its use” (EC – Hormones, ibid.).  
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Beside the attribution of non-scientific factors to risk management, the Panel 
emphasised the role of social value judgements in determining the appropriate 
level of protection:  
 
“We recall that there is a distinction between risk assessment which 
is a scientific examination and risk management which involves 
social value judgements. Once the risks have been assessed, i.e., 
once the risks and their probability of occurrence identified, a 
Member will need to decide, on the basis of its own value 
judgement, whether it can accept these risks. In so doing a Member 
sets its ‘appropriate level of sanitary protection’. The determination 
and application of the appropriate level of protection by a Member is 
part of risk management.” 1069  
 
Based on the separation of risk assessment and risk management, the Panel in 
the Hormones case assigned factors non-accessible by the physical sciences to 
the risk management phase. In particular, the Panel differentiated between “risks 
arising from difficulties of inspecting, sampling or testing which are specific to a 
particular substance in a particular food”.1070 Such specific risks were 
considered by the Panel as being covered by Article 5.2 of the SPS Agreement, 
addressing, inter alia, “the relevant inspection, sampling and testing methods”, 
and thus being part of the risk assessment procedure. In contrast, the Panel was 
of the view that general control problems, e.g. problems of abuse of veterinary 
drugs and to ensure compliance with good veterinary practice, “do not seem to 
be specific to the substance at issue but to the economic or social incidence 
related to a substance or its particular use (such as economic incentives for 
abuse)”.1071 These general control problems, the Panel found, have to be taken 
into account in risk management, not in risk assessment.  
 
By transferring non-scientific factors to the risk management phase, the Panel in 
the case EC – Hormones was obviously inspired by the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission. In 1995, the Codex Alimentarius Commission adopted the 
Statements of Principle concerning the Role of Science in the Codex Decision-
Making Process and the Extent to which other Factors are Taken into Account 
(in the following: Statements of Principle). In 2001, the Statements of Principle 
were amended with additional criteria for the consideration of such ‘other’, i.e. 
non-scientific factors. Together, the Statements of Principle of 1995 and the 
amendment of 2001 aimed at balancing requirements for ‘sound science’ with 
the need for considering ‘other factors’ in risk assessment.  
 
                                                 
1069 EC – Hormones, Panel Report, para. 8.160 (emphases by the Panel). 
1070 EC – Hormones, Panel Report, para. 8.146.  
1071 EC – Hormones, Panel Report, para. 8.146.  
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With respect to the importance of ‘sound scientific principles’ for the 
assessment of food safety risks, paragraph 1 of the Statements of Principle laid 
down the following:  
 
“1. The food standards, guidelines and other recommendations of 
Codex Alimentarius shall be based on the principle of sound 
scientific analysis and evidence, involving a thorough review of all 
relevant information, in order that the standards assure the quality 
and safety of the food supply.”1072 
 
On the other hand, with respect to the consideration of non-scientific factors, the 
amendment by the decision of the 24th session of the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission in 2001 to the Statements of Principle concerning the Role of 
Science in the Codex Decision-Making Process and the Extent to which other 
Factors are Taken into Account established, inter alia, the following Criteria for 
the Consideration of the Other Factors Referred to in the Second Statement of 
Principle:  
 
• when health and safety matters are concerned, the Statements of 
Principle Concerning the Role of Science and the Statements of 
Principle Relating to the Role of Food Safety Risk Assessment should 
be followed; 
 
• other legitimate factors relevant for health protection and fair trade 
practices may be identified in the risk management process, and risk 
managers should indicate how these factors affect the selection of 
risk management options and the development of standards, 
guidelines and related texts; 
 
• consideration of other factors should not affect the scientific basis of 
risk analysis; in this process, the separation between risk assessment 
and risk management should be respected, in order to ensure the 
scientific integrity of the risk assessment; ( … )” 1073 
 
                                                 
1072 Paragraph 1 of the Statements of Principle concerning the Role of Science in the Codex 
Decision-Making Process and the Extent to which other Factors are Taken into Account, 
adopted by Decision of the 21st Session of the Codex Alimentarius Commission in 1995, in 
the Appendix on General Decisions of the Commission, at the end of the Procedural Manual, 
p. 180. 
1073 Decision of the 24th Session of the Codex Alimentarius Commission of 2001 amending 
the Statements of Principle concerning the Role of Science in the Codex Decision-Making 
Process and the Extent to which other Factors are Taken into Account, in the Appendix on 
General Decisions of the Commission, at the end of the Procedural Manual, pp. 180-181 
(emphasis added). 
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Together, the two Statements of Principle, i.e. the Statements of Principle 
Concerning the Role of Science in the Codex Decision-Making Process and the 
Extent to which other Factors are Taken into Account, including the Criteria for 
the Consideration of the Other Factors Referred to in the Second Statement of 
Principle, and the Statements of Principle Relating to the Role of Food Safety 
Risk Assessment, are winnowing factors assessable by natural sciences and 
science-based risk assessment, on the one hand, from ‘other legitimate factors’, 
on the other hand. And these other legitimate, but non-scientific factors are 
given over to the risk management process. Hence, the separation of risk 
assessment and risk management is not only essential for “ensuring scientific 
integrity, avoiding confusion over the functions of risk assessors and risk 
managers and for reducing conflicts of interest”, as laid down in paragraph 9 of 
the Working Principles for Risk Analysis,1074 but is also functional for an 
appropriate consideration of non-scientific factors. In this respect, Catherine 
Button noted: “While still not a model of clarity, the Criteria document clearly 
suggests that ‘other factors’ belong to risk management and should, as far as 
possible, not be allowed to interfere with the scientific integrity of risk 
assessment”.1075 
 
To summarise, Codex distinguishes between factors assessable by natural 
sciences and science-based risk assessment, on the one hand, from “other 
legitimate factors”, on the other hand.  
 
According to the concept of risk analysis applied by Codex, these other 
legitimate, but non-scientific factors have to be considered in the risk 
management process. And that concept of risk analysis was subsequently 
adopted by the Panel in the case EC – Hormones.  
 
Hence, the doctrine of risk analysis, as applied by the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission and the Panel in the Hormones case, assumes that  
 
a) the separation of risk assessment and risk management ensures 
scientific integrity, fosters clear repartition of respective functions of 
risk assessors and risk managers and reduces conflicts of interest, 
and  
b) scientific and non-scientific factors can be discerned, thereby 
assigning the latter to the risk management stage.  
 
Thus, it can be concluded that the Panel in the Hormones case, by adopting the 
scientific approach of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, implicitly also 
                                                 
1074 Working Principles for Risk Analysis for Application in the Framework of the Codex 
Alimentarius, in Section IV of the Procedural Manual, p.87.  
1075 Catherine Button, The Power to Protect. Trade, Health, and Uncertainty in the WTO 
(Hart Publishing, 2004), p. 106.  
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adopted the presumption that facts and values, science and policy can – and 
should – be separated.  
 
C. Universality of Scientific Standards 
 
An essential presumption of the science-based approach is the belief that levels 
of protection based on scientific principles are basically universal. An 
expression of the belief in universal applicability of health standards based on 
scientific principles is the objective of harmonisation, expressed in Article 3 of 
the SPS Agreement. In the following, it shall be shown how panels have tried to 
reinforce the harmonisation objective, as expressed in Article 3 of the SPS 
Agreement, in rather positivistic attempts. Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement 
reads as follows:  
 
“To harmonize sanitary and phytosanitary measures on as wide a 
basis as possible, Members shall base their sanitary or phytosanitary 
measures on international standards, guidelines or recommendations, 
where they exist, except as otherwise provided for in this Agreement, 
and in particular in paragraph 3.” 
 
The Panel in the case EC – Hormones observed that the SPS Agreement “does 
not explicitly define the words based on as used in Article 3.1”.1076 However, 
the Panel perceived that Article 3.2 SPS “equates measures based on 
international standards with measures which conform to such standards”.1077 In 
contrast, the Panel noted that Article 3.3 SPS “applies more specifically to 
measures ‘which result in a higher level of sanitary … protection than would be 
achieved by measures based on the relevant international standards’ or measures 
‘which result in a level of sanitary … protection different from that which would 
be achieved by measures based on international standards’ “.1078 From the 
equation of the terms ‘based on’ and ‘conform to’ in Articles 3.1 and 3.2 and the 
contrast to higher levels of protection according to Article 3.3, the Panel 
basically recognised two levels of protection reflected in Article 3 SPS. At the 
first and basic level, there are sanitary measures which “reflect the same level of 
sanitary protection as the standard”.1079 At the second and higher level, there are 
sanitary measures implying higher levels of protection than provided by the 
applicable international standard.1080 
 
                                                 
1076 EC – Hormones, Panel Report, para. 8.72 (italics by the Panel).  
1077 EC – Hormones, Panel Report, para. 8.72 (italics by the Panel). 
1078 EC – Hormones, Panel Report, para. 8.72 (italics by the Panel). 
1079 EC – Hormones, Panel Report, para. 8.73 (original emphasis, footnote omitted).  
1080 EC – Hormones, Panel Report, para. 8.72 (emphasis added).  
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The promotion of “the use of international standards, guidelines and 
recommendations” was considered by the Panel, referring to the corresponding 
recognition in the sixth paragraph of the preamble, as “[o]ne purpose of the SPS 
Agreement”.1081 In line with this consideration, the Panel reasoned that, for this 
purpose, “Article 3.1 imposes an obligation on all Members to base their 
sanitary measures on international standards except as otherwise provided for in 
the SPS Agreement, and in particular in Article 3.3 thereof”.1082 As a 
consequence of considering Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement as an obligation 
on all WTO Members, the Panel conceived Article 3.3 of the SPS Agreement as 
“an exception to the general obligation contained in Article 3.1”.1083  
 
D. Belief in Scientific Progress 
 
The SPS Agreement provides some room for manoeuvre for governments to 
address situations of ‘insufficient scientific evidence.’ In cases “where relevant 
scientific evidence is insufficient”, governments “may provisionally adopt 
sanitary or phytosanitary measures on the basis of available pertinent 
information…” (Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement). However, governments 
provisionally adopting SPS measures “shall seek to obtain the additional 
information necessary for a more objective assessment of risks … within a 
reasonable period of time” (Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement). In other words, 
the requirement for carrying out an “objective” risk assessment in fulfilment 
with the requirements of Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement and for providing 
sufficient scientific evidence for the established measure is only provisionally 
suspended, yet not abrogated. Failure to do so might lead to “undue delay” 
according to Annex C(1)(a) of the SPS Agreement, as was the case in EC – 
Biotech. The granting of only temporary suspensions of the obligation to carry 
out a risk assessment is perceived as a reflection of the positivist belief that 
additional scientific information is attainable in any case whatsoever.  
 
In the case Japan - Agricultural Products, the Panel came across the question 
whether Japan’s varietal testing requirements were a provisional measure 
pursuant to Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement. In this respect, the Panel observed 
that Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement provides for the following exception:  
 
“Members shall ensure that any … phytosanitary measure … is not 
maintained without sufficient scientific evidence, except as provided 
for in paragraph 7 of Article 5.” 1084 
 
                                                 
1081 EC – Hormones, Panel Report, para. 8.86.  
1082 EC – Hormones, Report of the Panel, para. 8.86.  
1083 EC – Hormones, Panel Report, para. 8.86 (emphasis by the Panel).  
1084 Japan – Agricultural Products, Panel Report, para. 8.48 (emphasis by the Panel).  
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Because Japan has invoked Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement, the Panel 
considered that it had, firstly, to examine whether Japan’s SPS measure, i.e., 
Japan’s varietal testing requirement, were meeting the requirements set forth by 
Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement. Secondly, “[i]f the varietal testing 
requirement meets these requirements, we cannot find that it violates Article 
2.2”.1085 
 
Turning to Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement, the Panel in the case Japan – 
Agricultural Products found that the two sentences of Article 5.7 SPS each 
contain two requirements respectively which have to be met in order to adopt 
and maintain a provisional measure. With regard to the first sentence of Article 
5.7 SPS, the first two requirements which the Panel found to be cumulative in 
nature are that a measure is adopted in a situation where “relevant scientific 
information is insufficient”; and “on the basis of available pertinent 
information”.1086  
 
With regard to the second sentence of Article 5.7 SPS, the third and fourth 
requirements are, in fact, obligations prescribing to WTO Members maintaining 
a provisional SPS measure to “seek to obtain the additional information 
necessary for a more objective assessment of risk”; and to “review” the SPS 
measure “accordingly within a reasonable period of time”.1087 
 
Based on this wording, the Panel found that even if it were to assume that the 
first and second requirements set forth by the first sentence of Article 5.7 of the 
SPS Agreement were met, it had to examine, in addition, whether the third and 
fourth requirements of the second sentence of Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement 
are met.  
 
With regard to the third requirement contained in the second sentence of Article 
5.7 of the SPS Agreement, i.e., whether Japan had met the obligation to “seek to 
obtain the additional information necessary for a more objective assessment of 
risk”, the Panel noted that Japan pointed at additional information provided by 
exporting countries applying for market access.1088 However, the Panel observed 
that the “additional information” provided by exporting countries are directed at 
complying with Japan’s varietal testing requirements and not at examining its 
adequacy.1089 Additionally, the Panel also found that the only two reports 
submitted not by exporting countries but by the research division of Japan’s 
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (MAFF) did not examine the 
                                                 
1085 Japan – Agricultural Products, Panel Report,  para. 8.48.  
1086 Japan – Agricultural Products, Panel Report,  para. 8.54.  
1087 Japan – Agricultural Products, Panel Report, para. 8.54. 
1088 Japan – Agricultural Products, Panel Report,  para. 8.56.  
1089 Japan – Agricultural Products, Panel Report, para. 8.56. 
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appropriateness of the varietal testing requirements.1090 As a matter of fact, the 
Panel noted that “not a single study before the Panel actually addresses the 
specific issue as to whether varietal characteristics cause a divergency in 
quarantine efficacy”.1091 As to the quality of the “additional information” 
required, the Panel held that this additional information must be “specific 
enough” for enabling a more objective assessment.1092 Moreover, the Panel 
recalled its finding, taken from the experts advising the Panel, that the requested 
additional studies for examining “whether varietal differences do matter for 
quarantine efficacy … could be carried out relatively easily”.1093 
 
With respect to the fourth requirement contained in the second sentence of 
Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement, i.e., whether Japan had met the obligation to 
“review the … SPS measure accordingly within a reasonable period of time”, 
the Panel looked at the time span of the varietal testing being an issue of Japan’s 
import regulation. Concerning this aspect, the Panel observed that it was already 
in 1969 when Japan first applied the variety-by-variety testing as a precondition 
for lifting the import ban, prescribed in Japan’s Plant Protection Act, on 
Hawaiian papayas of the Solo variety.1094 Concerning the products at issue, i.e., 
certain agricultural products from the United States where codling moth is 
widespread, the Panel noted that Japan first lifted the import ban in 1978. From 
these factual findings, the Panel inferred that “[t]he issue of varietal testing, and 
the question as to whether it can be scientifically justified, has thus been around 
for almost 30 years and, with respect to the specific products and pest at issue, 
for 20 years”.1095 The Panel was of the view that this period would have offered 
Japan enough time for seeking to “obtain additional information” and for 
reviewing its varietal testing “accordingly within a reasonable period of 
time”.1096 Additionally, the Panel added that “since the entry into force of the 
SPS Agreement on 1 January 1995, Japan has been under an explicit obligation 
                                                 
1090 Japan – Agricultural Products, Panel Report, para. 8.56. According to footnote no. 293, 
the two MAFF reports related to tests on three varieties of Japanese nectarines and to the 
sorption of methyl bromide in fruit varieties.  
1091 Japan – Agricultural Products, Panel Report, para. 8.56. In footnote no. 294, the Panel 
recalled its finding from paragraph 8.42 where it had found that “no evidence before this 
Panel makes the causal link between the differential in the test results and the presence of 
varietal differences”.  
1092 Japan – Agricultural Products, Panel Report, para. 8.56, with reference to paragraph 200 
of the Appellate Body Report in EC – Hormones.  
1093 Japan – Agricultural Products, Panel Report, para. 8.56. With footnote no. 296, the Panel 
referred back to footnote no. 278 (para. 8.41) where Dr. Ducom and Mr. Taylor recommended 
tests for examining differences in methyl bromide sorption.  
1094 Japan – Agricultural Products, Panel Report, para. 8.57.  
1095 Japan – Agricultural Products, Panel Report, para. 8.57. 
1096 Japan – Agricultural Products, Panel Report, para. 8.57. 
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to collect additional information to enable it to more objectively review the 
appropriateness of the varietal testing requirement”.1097 
 
Summarising its findings on Japan’s performance with regard to the third and 
fourth requirements, the Panel concluded that Japan had failed to meet the 
requirements contained in the second sentence of Article 5.7 of the SPS 
Agreement.1098 
 
As a conclusion, the Panel in Japan – Agricultural Products found that the 
relationship between Article 2.2 and 5.7 is that of an alternative: either Article 
2.2 is met or Article 5.7.  
 
With regard to the obligation to “review” the SPS measure, in casu Japan’s 
varietal testing requirement, “within a reasonable period of time”, the Panel 
considered that in the case Japan – Agricultural Products, time periods of 30 
and 20 years would have been sufficient for Japan to meet its obligation under 
Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement. In particular, the Panel weighted the fact that 
the SPS Agreement entered into force in 1995 from the perspective of the 
relatively long time the obligation for reviewing the SPS measure was 
mandatory for all WTO Members.1099 In effect, the Panel’s conclusions are 
perceived as reflections of the positivist belief that additional scientific 
information can and will be attained sooner or later and in any case whatsoever. 
On appeal, that positivist belief was subsequently upheld by the Appellate Body.  
 
 
CHAPTER 14 THE APPELLATE BODY’S QUEST FOR MIDDLE 
GROUND 
 
In the following, it shall be shown that the Appellate Body, by rejecting the 
Panel’s differentiation between risk assessment and risk management, also 
rebutted a notion of risk characterised as quantitative, i.e., probabilistic.  
 
In the form of a preliminary consideration, the Appellate Body addressed “the 
Panel’s efforts to distinguish between ‘risk assessment’ and ‘risk 
management’“.1100 In this respect, the Appellate Body “stress[ed] … that Article 
                                                 
1097 Japan – Agricultural Products, Panel Report, para. 8.57. 
1098 Japan – Agricultural Products, Panel Report, para. 8.59.  
1099 Albeit the Appellate Body noted that the obligation “to review” SPS measures was only 
established with the coming into force of the SPS Agreement in 1 January 1995, it 
subsequently “agree[d] with the Panel that Japan has not reviewed its varietal testing 
requirement ‘within a reasonable period of time’ “ (Japan – Agricultural Products, Appellate 
Body Report, para. 93).  
1100 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 181.  
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5 and Annex A of the SPS Agreement speak of ‘risk assessment’ only and that 
the term ‘risk management’ is not be found either in Article 5 or in any other 
provision of the SPS Agreement”.1101 Hence, the Appellate Body found that the 
Panel’s distinction between risk assessment and risk management has no textual 
basis. The Appellate Body further observed that the Panel “apparently” 
employed the distinction between risk assessment and risk management for 
achieving or supporting “what appears to be a restrictive notion of risk 
assessment”.1102  
 
A. Risk in Human Societies  
 
Turning to risk assessment, the Appellate Body started by recalling the Panel’s 
interpretation of that term:  
 
“We note in this connection that the Panel states that, for purposes of 
the EC measures in dispute, a risk assessment required by Article 5.1 
is ‘a scientific process aimed at establishing the scientific basis for 
the sanitary measure a Member intends to take’. To the extent that 
the Panel intended to refer to a process characterized by systematic, 
disciplined and objective enquiry and analysis, that is, a mode of 
studying and sorting out facts and opinions, the Panel’s statement is 
unexceptionable. However, to the extent that the Panel purports to 
exclude from the scope of a risk assessment in the sense of Article 
5.1 all matters not susceptible of quantitative analysis by the 
empirical or experimental laboratory methods commonly associated 
with the physical sciences, we believe that the Panel is in error. 
Some of the kinds of factors listed in Article 5.2 such as ‘relevant 
processes and production methods’ and ‘relevant inspection, 
sampling and testing methods’ are not necessarily or wholly 
susceptible of investigation according to laboratory methods of, for 
example, biochemistry or pharmacology. Furthermore, there is 
nothing to indicate that the listing of factors that may be taken into 
account in a risk assessment of Article 5.2 was intended to be a 
closed list. It is essential to bear in mind that the risk that is to be 
evaluated in a risk assessment under Article 5.1 is not only risk 
ascertainable in a science laboratory operating under strictly 
controlled conditions, but also risk in human societies as they 
actually exist, in other words, the actual potential for adverse effects 
                                                 
1101 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 181.  
1102 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 181 (emphasis added).  
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on human health in the real world where people live and work and 
die.” 1103 
 
As mentioned above, the distinction made by the Appellate Body between a 
“quantitative” notion of risk, on the one hand, and an understanding of risk as 
the “actual potential for adverse effects … in the real world”, on the other hand, 
was a prerequisite for subsuming non-scientific factors under the term risk 
assessment.  
 
The particular question how to address issues of control, i.e. the prevention of 
abuse of the hormones in dispute, was raised by the European Communities 
(EC) in the broader context of claims arguing that the Panel had failed to carry 
out its duty under Article 11 of the DSB, namely “to make … an objective 
assessment of the facts of the case”.  
 
With regard to the issue of control and the prevention of abuse in particular, the 
Appellate Body noted the claim of the EC that “the Panel failed to take into 
account the evidence submitted by the European Communities and ignored 
statements made by some of its own experts”.1104 Analysing the claim, the 
Appellate Body observed, in fact, that the Panel had neglected evidence 
concerning the issue of control on the basis of considering “that the risks related 
to the general problem of control should not be taken into account in risk 
assessment…” 1105  
 
The Appellate Body rejected the a priori exclusion of general control problems 
by the Panel on the ground that these problems should be addressed in the risk 
management phase. The Appellate Body reiterated that “the concept of ‘risk 
management’ is not mentioned in any provision of the SPS Agreement and, as 
such, cannot be used to sustain a more restrictive interpretation of ‘risk 
assessment’ than is justified by the actual terms of Article 5.2, Article 8 and 
Annex C of the SPS Agreement”.1106 
 
Based upon its rejection of a distinction between risk assessment and risk 
management, the Appellate Body in EC – Hormones also rejected the Panel’s 
exclusion of control problems from the scope of risk assessment. The Appellate 
Body began its considerations by recalling the text of Article 5.2 of the SPS 
Agreement as follows:  
 
                                                 
1103 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 187 (original emphases, footnotes 
omitted).  
1104 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 143 (footnotes omitted).  
1105 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 143.  
1106 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 206.  
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In the assessment of risks, Members shall take into account available 
scientific evidence; relevant processes and production methods; 
relevant inspection, sampling and testing methods; prevalence of 
specific diseases or pests; existence of pest- or disease-free areas; 
relevant ecological and environmental conditions; and quarantine or 
other treatment.1107 
 
Considering Article 5.2 of the SPS Agreement as a whole, the Appellate Body 
observed that ‘scientific evidence’ is only one element to be looked at in risk 
assessment. In particular, the Appellate Body noted that not all elements 
mentioned in Article 5.2 of the SPS Agreement are ascertainable by physical 
sciences:  
 
“Some of the kinds of factors listed in Article 5.2 such as "relevant 
processes and production methods" and "relevant inspection, 
sampling and testing methods" are not necessarily or wholly 
susceptible of investigation according to laboratory methods of, for 
example, biochemistry or pharmacology. Furthermore, there is 
nothing to indicate that the listing of factors that may be taken into 
account in a risk assessment of Article 5.2 was intended to be a 
closed list.” 1108 
 
The Appellate Body in EC – Hormones then turned to the question how the 
particular issue of misuse or abuse of hormones for beef production has to be 
considered. The Appellate Body noted:  
 
“[T]he scientific studies referred to by the European Communities, in 
respect of the five hormones involved here, concluded that their use 
for growth promotion purposes is "safe", if the hormones are 
administered in accordance with the requirements of good veterinary 
practice. Where the condition of observance of good veterinary 
practice (which is much the same condition attached to the standards, 
guidelines and recommendations of Codex with respect to the use of 
the five hormones for growth promotion) is not followed, the logical 
inference is that the use of such hormones for growth promotion 
purposes may or may not be "safe". The SPS Agreement requires 
assessment of the potential for adverse effects on human health 
arising from the presence of contaminants and toxins in food. We 
consider that the object and purpose of the SPS Agreement justify the 
examination and evaluation of all such risks for human health 
                                                 
1107 Article 5.2 of the SPS Agreement, as cited by the Appellate Body in EC – Hormones, 
para. 187.  
1108 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 187. 
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whatever their precise and immediate origin may be. We do not 
mean to suggest that risks arising from potential abuse in the 
administration of controlled substances and from control problems 
need to be, or should be, evaluated by risk assessors in each and 
every case. When and if risks of these types do in fact arise, risk 
assessors may examine and evaluate them. Clearly, the necessity or 
propriety of examination and evaluation of such risks would have to 
be addressed on a case-by-case basis. What, in our view, is a 
fundamental legal error is to exclude, on an a priori basis, any such 
risks from the scope of application of Articles 5.1 and 5.2. We 
disagree with the Panel's suggestion that exclusion of risks resulting 
from the combination of potential abuse and difficulties of control is 
justified by distinguishing between "risk assessment" and "risk 
management". As earlier noted, the concept of "risk management" is 
not mentioned in any provision of the SPS Agreement and, as such, 
cannot be used to sustain a more restrictive interpretation of "risk 
assessment" than is justified by the actual terms of Article 5.2, 
Article 8 and Annex C of the SPS Agreement.” 1109 
 
Mirroring the renewed controversy over risk assessment and risk management, 
the Panel and the Appellate Body in the case US – Continued Suspension also 
disagreed over the appropriate approach towards non-scientific factors.  
 
Starting point for renewed clashes between conflicting concepts of the Panel and 
the Appellate Body in the US – Continued Suspension case was the claim of the 
European Communities that the Panel’s approach failed to address problems on 
the ground properly. In particular, the European Communities asserted that the 
renewed distinction between risk assessment and risk management made by the 
Panel “improperly excluded the evidence concerning misuse or abuse and 
difficulties of control in the administration of hormones to cattle for growth 
promotion”.1110 
 
In particular, the European Communities stressed that “the Panel’s discussion of 
the potential misuse and abuse in the administration of hormones is in the wrong 
place, to the extent that this is an aspect of risk assessment, in the sense of 
                                                 
1109 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 206 (emphasis by the Appellate Body, 
footnotes omitted).  
1110 US – Continued Suspension, Appellate Body Report, para. 543 and footnote 1133, with 
reference to the European Communities’ appellant’s submission, para. 325. At the oral 
hearing, the Appellate Body observed the European Communities’ emphasis on problems on 
the ground, noting that “the European Communities confirmed that its appeal focuses on 
misuse and abuse in the administration of hormones only, and that it is not claiming that the 
Panel erroneously excluded other factors on the basis of its general distinction between ‘risk 
assessment’ and ‘risk management’.” (ibid., footnote 1133).  
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Article 5.1 to 5.3 of the SPS Agreement, that is applicable across all identified 
potential risks and for all six hormones”.1111 
 
The Panel in the Continued Suspension case, however, only agreed in the minor 
point and disagreed in the main point:  
 
“The Panel agrees with the European Communities that the question 
of misuse and abuse in the administration of hormones may apply to 
all six hormones at issue and is an element that can be taken into 
account in risk assessment, as set forth in Article 5.2 of the SPS 
Agreement and confirmed by the Appellate Body in EC – Hormones. 
However, the Panel did not deem it necessary to address this 
question in the section regarding the conformity with Article 5.1 of 
the definitive ban on oestradiol-17β, to the extent that the question 
whether misuse or abuse exists in the administration of hormones did 
not have an impact on the issues addressed by the Panel under 
Article 5.1. Indeed, the question of misuse or abuse in the 
administration of hormones is relevant to the extent that it can lead to 
higher concentrations of hormone residues in meat and meat 
products than would occur if good veterinary practices were applied. 
As stated by the 1999 Opinion, it is an aspect of exposure 
assessment. In this case, the Panel found that the European 
Communities had not evaluated specifically the possibility that the 
adverse effect that it had identified in its risk assessment come into 
being, originate, or result from the consumption of meat or meat 
products which contain veterinary residues of oestradiol-17β as a 
result of the cattle being treated with this hormone for growth 
promotion purposes. Therefore, whether the concentrations of 
hormone residues in meat and meat products could be higher as a 
result of misuse or abuse did not have to be addressed. The Panel 
does not deem it necessary to move this section to another part of its 
findings.” 1112 
 
On these grounds, “the Panel decided to delete the section regarding misuse or 
abuse in the administration of hormones from its final report (…)”.1113 
 
The Appellate Body in the Continued Suspension case conducted a thorough 
examination of the Panel’s arguments with regard to misuse and abuse of 
hormones for growth promotion purposes. The Appellate Body started by noting 
that the Panel seemed of having acknowledged that risks of misuse and abuse of 
                                                 
1111 US – Continued Suspension, Panel Report, para 6.164.  
1112 US – Continued Suspension, Panel Report, para 6.164 (footnotes omitted).  
1113 US – Continued Suspension, Panel Report, para 6.166.  
 364 
hormones are “an element that can be taken into account in risk assessment, as 
set forth in Article 5.2 of the SPS Agreement and confirmed by the Appellate 
Body in EC – Hormones”.1114 However, the Appellate Body observed that 
despite that initial acknowledgment, the Panel finally declined to consider 
problems of abuse and misuse of hormones under Article 5.1 of the SPS 
Agreement. The Appellate Body noted in particular:  
 
“Although the Panel does not seem to reject a priori the relevance of 
the potential risks of misuse or abuse, it then states that it was not 
necessary to address this question in its analysis, to the extent that it 
did not have an impact on the issue addressed by the Panel under 
Article 5.1.” 1115 
 
The Appellate Body, however, noticed that “some of the scientific experts 
consulted by the Panel indicated that risks arising from residues of oestradiol-
17β in bovine meat are likely to increase where good veterinary practices in the 
administration of this hormone are not followed”.1116 In particular, the Appellate 
Body observed:  
 
“Indeed, these experts agreed that their conclusions in relation to the 
risks posed by oestradiol-17β were predicated on good veterinary 
practices being followed. Accordingly, the abuse or misuse in the 
administration of oestradiol-17β has a bearing on the particular risks 
being assessed by the European Communities. The Panel's 
conclusion was thus premature because the Panel could not have 
decided whether the European Communities failed to evaluate 
specifically the possible adverse effects of residues of oestradiol-17β 
in meat before considering the evidence on abuse or misuse. The 
Panel's summary dismissal of the relevance of the evidence on 
misuse or abuse at the interim review stage gives the appearance of 
being an ex post rationalization of an earlier decision to exclude such 
risks from consideration.” 1117 
 
The Appellate Body further observed that risk assessments put forward by the 
European Communities did, in fact, address the issue of misuse or abuse of 
hormones for beef production. An exert committee convened under EC 
legislation, the Scientific Committee on Veterinary Measures relating to Public 
Health (SCVPH), published its opinion on the issue in a report entitled 
‘Assessment of Potential Risks to Human Health from Hormones Residue in 
Bovine Meat and Meat Products’ on April 30, 1999 (hereafter: the 1999 SCVPH 
                                                 
1114 US – Continued Suspension, Appellate Body Report, para. 547.  
1115 US – Continued Suspension, Appellate Body Report, para. 547. 
1116 US – Continued Suspension, Appellate Body Report, para. 547 (emphasis added).  
1117 US – Continued Suspension, Appellate Body Report, para. 547.  
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Opinion). The Appellate Body observed that the 1999 SCVPH Opinion 
particularly addressed the problem of misuse or abuse of so-called hormone 
implants. In its 1999 Opinion, the SCVPH “noted that misplaced implants and 
black market drugs comprise the risk that extremely high levels of residues of 
hormones remain in edible tissues of animals. In addition, it has to be noted that 
the contemporaneous use of growth promoting hormones and veterinary 
therapeutics drugs increases the prevalence of undesirable r[e]sidues in edible 
tissues of bovines”.1118 
 
Turning to risk assessments published by the SCVPH in 2002 (hereafter: the 
2002 SCVPH Opinion), the Appellate Body learnt that excessive use, misuse or 
abuse of a particular growth promoter, namely melengestrol acetate (MGA), 
could result in the violation of tolerance levels established by regulatory 
authorities. Specifically with regard to MGA, the SCVPH concluded that 
“[MGA] applied in concentrations exceeding the licensed doses by a factor of 3 
would result in a violation of the tolerance levels as proposed by US-FDA.” 1119 
And with respect to the particular technique of hormone implants, the SCVPH 
noted that “[m]odel calculations indicated that, depending on the actual 
implanted total dose, processing of such injection sites can contaminate tons of 
(minced) meat or meat products with hormone concentrations violating the 
ADI/MRL levels as proposed by JECFA and other regulatory bodies.”1120 
 
Again looking at the 2002 SCVPH Opinion, the Appellate Body also found that 
scientific experiments simulating the disregard of good veterinary practices had 
been carried out. In the 2002 Opinion, the SCVPH concluded that “(…) these 
experiments clearly identify a risk for excessive exposure of consumers to 
residues from misplaced or off-label used implants and incorrect dose regimes. 
In these cases, levels of oestradiol and its metabolites in muscle, fat, liver and 
kidney from hormone treated cattle may be 2-fold up to several hundred folds 
higher as compared to untreated meat. The level of increase depends on the 
treatment regime and the actual hormone levels in the implants used.”1121 
 
Having examined risk assessments put forward by the European Communities, 
the Appellate Body turned to testimonies of scientific experts for shedding 
additional light on the question whether misuse or abuse of hormones for beef 
production increases risks to human health. In particular, the Appellate Body 
                                                 
1118 US – Continued Suspension, Appellate Body Report, para. 548, with reference to the 1999 
SCVPH Opinion, p. 32 (ibid., footnote 1140).  
1119 US – Continued Suspension, Appellate Body Report, para. 549, with reference to the 2002 
SCVPH Opinion, p. 11 (ibid., footnote 1141). 
1120 US – Continued Suspension, Appellate Body Report, para. 549, with reference to the 2002 
SCVPH Opinion, p. 11 (ibid., footnote 1141). 
1121 US – Continued Suspension, Appellate Body Report, para. 549, with reference to the 2002 
SCVPH Opinion, pp. 11 and 12 (ibid., footnote 1142). 
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took a look at testimonies of Dr. Guttenplan and Dr. De Brabander. On the 
question whether the safety of hormone application in beef production is 
contingent upon observance of good veterinary practices, Dr. Guttenplan 
answered that adverse effects are “unlikely if good veterinary practices are 
followed”. However, Dr. Guttenplan added that, “[i]f good veterinary practices 
are not followed, the potential for adverse effects may be significant”. 1122 The 
Appellate Body observed that Dr. De Brabander responded in a similar manner, 
stating that “[i]mproper administration of implants or misplaced implants create 
potential hazards to human health”.1123 The Appellate Body further noted the 
opinion of Dr. De Brabander on the effect of misuse or abuse of hormones for 
beef production on the applicability of Codex standards. In particular, the 
Appellate Body pointed at the view of Dr. De Brabander that evidence 
“regarding misuse or abuse of the hormones at issue in the United States and 
Canada calls indeed into question the potential applicability of Codex standards 
with regard to imports of meat from cattle treated with hormones from the 
United States and Canada”.1124 
 
From its examination, the Appellate Body draw the conclusion that the Panel 
dismissed to address the problem of misuse or abuse of hormones in its analysis 
under Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement, despite evidence provided by the 1999 
and 2002 Opinions, i.e., the European Communities’ risk assessments, and 
testimonies by scientific experts. Specifically, the Appellate Body considered 
the Panel’s formal argument that evidence on misuse or abuse of hormones 
relates to the exposure assessment stage of risk assessment is, on its own, 
unconvincing:  
 
“The Panel summarily dismissed the relevance of the evidence on 
misuse or abuse stating that it relates to exposure assessment and 
adding that it is not necessary to address it given the finding that the 
European Communities had not evaluated specifically the possibility 
that the adverse effects arise from the consumption of meat from 
cattle treated with oestradiol-17β for growth-promotion purposes. 
We recognize that the 1999 Opinion examines the risks of misuse or 
abuse under the heading "Exposure considerations upon misuse". 
After discussing the evidence on misuse and abuse, the 2002 Opinion 
states that ‘these data have to be considered in any quantitative 
exposure assessment exercise.’ This, however, cannot justify the 
Panel's failure to address the evidence on misuse or abuse. The 
European Communities made it clear that the risks of abuse or 
misuse were a relevant consideration in its risk assessment. This is 
                                                 
1122 US – Continued Suspension, Appellate Body Report, para. 550 (footnote omitted).  
1123 US – Continued Suspension, Appellate Body Report, para. 550 (footnote omitted). 
1124 US – Continued Suspension, Appellate Body Report, para. 551 (footnote omitted). 
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confirmed in the 1999 and 2002 Opinions. At least two of the 
scientific experts consulted by the Panel recognized that the misuse 
or abuse in the administration of the hormones could give rise to 
adverse effects. The Panel had a duty to engage with this evidence 
and with the discussion of this evidence in the SCVPH Opinions. By 
summarily dismissing the evidence on the misuse or abuse in the 
administration of the hormones and the consequent conclusions in 
the SCVPH Opinions in the manner that it did, the Panel incorrectly 
applied Article 5.1 and the definition of ‘risk assessment’ in Annex 
A of the SPS Agreement, as interpreted by the Appellate Body.” 1125 
 
Accordingly, the Appellate Body in the Continued Suspension case arrived at 
the conclusion “that the Panel erred in its interpretation and application of 
Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement in relation to risks of misuse and abuse in the 
administration of hormones to cattle for growth-promotion purposes”.1126 
 
Summarising findings of Panels and the Appellate Body on the issue of non-
scientific factors in a nutshell, one can see the following:  
 
The Panel in EC – Hormones was of the view that general problems of 
compliance and control should be taken into account in risk management. This 
view was consistent with the doctrine of risk analysis, as applied by Codex. 
 
The Appellate Body’s broad concept of risk assessment also covering non-
scientific factors runs contrary to the doctrine of risk analysis deferring non-
scientific factors to the risk management phase. The Appellate Body’s concept 
rejects the notion of risk management. From an analytical point of view, one 
might question whether and how the Appellate Body’s broad concept of risk 
assessment, extending to non-scientific factors, e.g. general problems of control 
and compliance, may logically fit into the science-based approach of the SPS 
Agreement in general.  
 
Having refused the notion of risk management, the Appellate Body in EC – 
Hormones remained challenged by non-scientific factors, for example 
compliance and control problems. The Appellate Body was thus constrained to 
encompass non-scientific factors into the process of risk assessment.   
 
If non-scientific factors are to be included in a risk assessment, then, inevitably, 
the notion of ‘risk’ is affected. On these grounds, the Appellate Body in EC – 
Hormones and subsequent WTO legal practice had to adopt a ‘qualitative’ 
                                                 
1125 US – Continued Suspension, Appellate Body Report, para. 553 (footnotes omitted, 
emphasis on specifically by the Appellate Body). 
1126 US – Continued Suspension, Appellate Body Report, para. 555.  
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notion of risk. A qualitative notion of risk, i.e., a notion extending over “risk in 
human societies as they actually exist” implies, in turn, a broader notion of 
‘science’ able of assessing such risk. However, it was shown that a broader 
notion of science may pose questions with regard to the rather narrow definition 
of science implied in paragraph 1 of Annex A of the SPS Agreement. Insofar, it 
has to be seen whether the concept of the Appellate Body, commended by some 
of being broader than that of the Panel, may be able to really materialise under 
existing SPS provisions.  
 
The Panel in the case US – Continued Suspension apparently aimed at returning 
to a formal separation of risk assessment and risk management in ways similar 
to the attempt of the panel in EC – Hormones. The Appellate Body in the 
Continued Suspension case, however, insisted that questions about misuse and 
abuse of hormones must be dealt with under the scope of Article 5.1 of the SPS 
Agreement.  
 
The overarching conflict over the ‘correct’ interpretation of risk assessment did 
not end by the Appellate Body’s ruling in EC – Hormones. Ten years later, in 
the subsequent case United States – Continued Suspension of Obligations in the 
EC – Hormones Dispute (hereafter: US – Continued Suspension),1127 the 
Appellate Body felt prompted to recall its earlier findings and to upbraid an 
apostatising Panel.  
 
What prompted the Appellate Body for doing so were claims by the European 
Communities that the Panel in the Continued Suspension case had adopted “an 
extremely narrow and consequently erroneous interpretation of Article 5.1 and 
failed to take into account that risk assessment and risk management partly 
overlap in the SPS Agreement”.1128 According to the European Communities’ 
assertions, “the Panel’s restrictive interpretation of risk assessment led it to 
wrongfully exclude from the scope of its analysis under Article 5.1 evidence 
concerning misuse or abuse and difficulties of control in the administration of 
hormones to cattle for growth promotion”.1129 
 
The Appellate Body in US – Continued Suspension started its examination “by 
reviewing the Panel’s understanding of the Appellate Body’s interpretation of 
Article 5.1 in EC – Hormones and particularly its discussion of the relevance of 
risk management factors of the purposes of a risk assessment within the meaning 
                                                 
1127 In the US – Continued Suspension case, the EC complained about continued suspensions 
of obligations by the United States and Canada. Because of substantial overlaps, the same 
panellists were selected for examining both complaints and for issuing reports in both cases 
(United States: DS320, Canada: DS321).  
1128 US – Continued Suspension, Appellate Body Report, para. 537 and footnote no. 1125 with 
reference to the European Communities’ appellant’s submission, para. 308. 
1129 US – Continued Suspension, Appellate Body Report, para. 537.  
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of Annex A and Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement”.1130 The Appellate Body 
gave the following account of the Panel’s understanding of the Appellate Body’s 
ruling in EC – Hormones:  
 
“Although the Appellate Body [in EC – Hormones] disapproved of 
the original panel’s distinction between ‘risk assessment’ and ‘risk 
management because it had no textual basis in the Agreement, this 
Panel [i.e., the Panel in US – Continued Suspension] can find no 
statement by the Appellate Body confirming that what the European 
Communities describes as risk management is included within the 
definition of a risk assessment as set forth in Annex A(4) of the SPS 
Agreement. In fact, the Appellate Body stressed that Article 5 and 
Annex A speak of risk assessment only and that the term risk 
management is not to be found either in Article 5 or in any other 
provision of the SPS Agreement.  
The Panel agrees with the Appellate Body that its role as a treaty 
interpreter is to ‘read and interpret the words actually used by the 
agreement under examination, and not words which the interpreter 
may feel should have been used.’ The Panel takes note of the 
Appellate Body’s finding that a risk assessment can take into account 
‘matters not susceptible of quantitative analysis by the empirical or 
experimental laboratory methods commonly associated with the 
physical sciences.’ However, the Panel finds that neither that finding 
nor the text of the Agreement includes within the definition of a risk 
assessment the concept put forward by the European Communities as 
‘risk management’.” 1131 
 
The Appellate Body observed that the Panel, on these grounds, went on asking 
the experts whether the SCVPH Opinions, that is, the EC risk assessment, 
“identified the potential for adverse effects on human health of residues of 
oestradiol-17β in the meat of cattle treated with this hormone when applied in 
accordance with good veterinary practice.”1132 
 
The Appellate Body further observer that at the interim review stage, the 
European Communities objected that the Panel “misinterpret[ed]” what the 
Appellate Body had said in EC – Hormones.1133 As a response to the European 
                                                 
1130 US – Continued Suspension, Appellate Body Report, para. 538.  
1131 US – Continued Suspension, Appellate Body Report, para. 538; citing from the Panel 
Report in US – Continued Suspension, paras. 7. 519 and 7.520; and from the Panel Report in 
Canada – Continued Suspension, paras. 7.491 and 7.492 (footnotes omitted).  
1132 US – Continued Suspension, Appellate Body Report, para. 539.  
1133 US – Continued Suspension, Appellate Body Report, para. 540; with reference to the 
Panel Report in US – Continued Suspension, para. 6. 97; and to the Panel Report in Canada – 
Continued Suspension, para. 6.89. 
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Communities’ objection, the Appellate Body noted the following response of the 
Panel:  
 
“The Appellate Body [in EC – Hormones] disapproved of the panel’s 
use in the original EC – Hormones dispute of the distinction between 
‘risk assessment and ‘risk management because it hat no textual 
basis. However, this did not mean that the Appellate Body endorsed 
an interpretation of Article 5.1 or Annex A(4) of the SPS Agreement 
that included a risk management stage. In fact, it emphatically stated 
that the term ‘risk management’ is not to be found in Article 5 of any 
other provision of the SPS Agreement. The Panel, therefore, finds no 
basis for the European Communities’ assertion that the Appellate 
Body ‘confirmed that a risk assessment within the meaning of 
Article 5.1 includes a risk management stage which is the 
responsibility of the regulator to carry out and not the scientific 
bodies’.” 1134 
 
In an additional footnote, the Appellate Body in US – Continued Suspension 
further noted the following arguments put forward by the preceding Panel:  
 
“Nowhere in the texts of Article 5.1 and Annex A(4) does the Panel 
find support for the European Communities’ contention that a risk 
assessment within the meaning of the SPS Agreement includes 
‘weighing policy alternatives in light of the results of risk assessment 
and, if required, selecting and implementing appropriate control 
options, including regulatory measures.’ What the European 
Communities seems to be describing is how a government chooses 
an appropriate SPS measure based on a risk assessment. The Panel 
does not find that this is contemplated by the texts of Article 5.1 and 
Annex A(4) of the SPS Agreement.” 1135 
 
In similar perspective, the Appellate Body in US – Continued Suspension 
observed that the preceding Panel “did not address evidence on misuse or abuse 
in the administration of the hormones in its analysis under Article 5.7 of the SPS 
Agreement”.1136 In particular, the Appellate Body noted the following reasoning 
of the Panel with regard to the applicability of Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement. 
According to the Panel in US – Continued Suspension:  
                                                 
1134 US – Continued Suspension, Appellate Body Report, para. 540; with reference to the 
Panel Report in US – Continued Suspension, para. 6. 99; and to the Panel Report in Canada – 
Continued Suspension, para. 6.91 (footnote omitted).  
1135 US – Continued Suspension, Appellate Body Report, para. 540, footnote no. 1129; with 
references to the Panel Report in US – Continued Suspension, para. 6. 102; and to the Panel 
Report in Canada – Continued Suspension, para. 6.94.  
1136 US – Continued Suspension, Appellate Body Report, para. 540, footnote no. 1129.  
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“ … Article 5.7 is applicable when relevant scientific evidence is not 
sufficient to undertake a risk assessment in conformity with Article 
5.1. Whether instances of misuse or abuse in the administration of 
hormones exist or not is not as such a scientific issue likely to make 
a risk assessment within the meaning of Article 5.1 and Annex A(4) 
of the SPS Agreement impossible.”1137 
 
Concluding on the reasoning of the Panel on the issue of misuse or abuse of 
hormones and related control problems, the Appellate Body in US – Continued 
Suspension found it “difficult to reconcile the Panel’s understanding of EC – 
Hormones with what the Appellate Body held in that report”.1138 
 
The Appellate Body in US – Continued Suspension recalled that in the case EC 
– Hormones, the Appellate Body “rejected the rigid distinction drawn by the 
panel between ‘risk assessment’ and ‘risk management’ ”, explaining:  
 
“We must stress, in this connection, that Article 5 and Annex A of 
the SPS Agreement speak of ‘risk assessment’ only and that the term 
‘risk management’ is not to be found either in Article 5 of in any 
other provision of the SPS Agreement. Thus, the Panel’s distinction, 
which it apparently employs to achieve or support what appears to be 
a restrictive notion of risk assessment, has no textual basis.” 1139 
 
Furthermore, the Appellate Body in US – Continued Suspension reiterated the 
view of the Appellate Body in EC – Hormones that “the concept of ‘risk 
management’ is not mentioned in any provision of the SPS Agreement and, as 
such, cannot be used to sustain a more restrictive interpretation of ‘risk 
assessment’ than is justified by the actual terms of Article 5.2, Article 8 and 
Annex C of the SPS Agreement”.1140 
                                                 
1137 US – Continued Suspension, Appellate Body Report, para. 540, footnote no. 1129; with 
references to the Panel Report in US – Continued Suspension, para. 7.603; and to the Panel 
Report in Canada – Continued Suspension, para. 7. 578.  
1138 US – Continued Suspension, Appellate Body Report, para. 541.  
1139 US – Continued Suspension, Appellate Body Report, para. 541; with reference to the 
Report of the Appellate Body in EC – Hormones, para. 181.  
1140 US – Continued Suspension, Appellate Body Report, para. 541, with reference to the 
Report of the Appellate Body in EC – Hormones, para. 206 (emphasis on restrictive by the 
Appellate Body). With respect to Article 5.2, Article 8 and Annex C in particular, the 
Appellate Body in US – Continued Suspension pointed at its earlier observation that the text 
of Article 5.2 (“relevant processes and production methods; relevant inspection, sampling and 
testing methods”), Article 8 and Annex C (“control, inspection and approval procedures”) “is 
amply sufficient to authorize the taking into account of risks arising from failure to comply 
with the requirements of good veterinary practice in the administration of hormones for 
growth promotion purposes, as well as risks arising from difficulties of control, inspection 
and enforcement of the requirements of good veterinary practice”( US – Continued 
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As a consequence of its line of reasoning, the Appellate Body in US – Continued 
Suspension arrived at the following conclusion:  
 
“Therefore, in our view, the Panel’s interpretation of ‘risk 
assessment’ resulted in the same ‘restrictive notion of risk 
assessment’ that the Appellate Body found to be erroneous in EC – 
Hormones. The Panel sought in this case to rewrite the Appellate 
Body Report in EC – Hormones and to re-establish the rigid 
distinction between ‘risk assessment’ and ‘risk management’ that the 
Appellate Body had rejected in that case.” 1141 
 
Consequences of opposing views on the concept of risk assessment were, among 
others, diverging perspectives on the problem of misuse and abuse of hormones 
for beef production and related control problems. Such problems on the ground 
are commonly addressed under the heading of ‘non-scientific factors’ or ‘other 
legitimate factors’.  
 
B. Relativism in Standard-Setting 
 
In the Hormones case, the Appellate Body found “that the Panel has 
misconceived the relationship between Articles 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 [of the SPS 
Agreement]”.1142 The Appellate Body identified the “general rule – exception” 
relationship introduced by the Panel with regard to Article 3.1 of the SPS 
Agreement (the general rule) and Article 3.3 of the SPS Agreement (the 
exception) as a main cause for the established misconception.1143  
 
More into detail, the Appellate Body observed “three legal interpretations” made 
by the Panel “en route” of developing the “general rule – exception” 
relationship.1144 The first interpretative point related to the equation of ‘based 
on’ in Article 3.1 with ‘conform to’ in Article 3.2 of the SPS Agreement. The 
second interpretative point related to the “misconceived” relationship between 
Articles 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 of the SPS Agreement. The third interpretative point 
pertained to the requirements of Article 3.3 of the SPS Agreement. Between 
these three interpretative points suggested by the Panel, the Appellate Body 
perceived some sort of “intertwined” relation.1145 
                                                                                                                                                        
Suspension, Appellate Body Report, para. 541, footnote no. 1131; with reference to the 
Report of the Appellate Body in EC – Hormones, para. 205).  
1141 US – Continued Suspension, Appellate Body Report, para. 542 (footnote omitted, 
underlining added).  
1142 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 104.  
1143 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, paras. 104 and 158. 
1144 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 159. 
1145 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 1159. 
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The Appellate Body “read the Panel’s interpretation that Article 3.2. ‘equates’ 
measures ‘based on’ international standards with measures which ‘conform to’ 
such standards, as signifying that ‘based on’ and ‘conform to’ are identical in 
meaning”.1146 Hence, the Appellate Body understood that “[T]he Panel is thus 
saying that, henceforth, SPS measures of Members must ‘conform to’ Codes 
standards, guidelines and recommendations”.1147  
 
However, the Appellate Body disapproved the interpretation of the Panel (1) on 
textual grounds, i.e. because of the ordinary meaning of the terms, (2) because 
of systematic reasons, namely the respective placing, use and function of the 
terms ‘based on’ and ‘conform to’ in the system of the three paragraphs of 
Article 3 of the SPS Agreement, (3) and because of the object and purpose of 
Article 3 of the SPS Agreement in general.  
 
First, applying a grammatical interpretation, the Appellate Body observed that 
the ordinary meanings of ‘based on’, on the one hand, and ‘conform to’, on the 
other hand, are different. Something is commonly considered to be ‘based on’ 
another thing, the Appellate Body noted, “when the former ‘stands’ or is 
‘founded’ or ‘built’ upon or ‘is supported by’ the latter”.1148 
 
On the other hand, the Appellate Body noted, “much more is required before 
one thing may be regarded as ‘conform[ing] to’ another: the former must 
‘comply with, yield or show compliance’ with the latter”.1149 Quite different 
from the ordinary meaning of ‘based on’, the reference of ‘conform to”’ the 
Appellate Body found, “is to ‘correspondence in form or manner’, to 
‘compliance with’ or ‘acquiescence’, to ‘follow[ing] in form or nature”.1150 
 
Perceiving the term ‘based on’ broader and more open than the term ‘conform 
to’, the Appellate Body concluded that, on the one hand, a measure ‘conforming 
to’ a standard is naturally also ‘based on’ that standard. On the other hand and in 
contrast, a measure ‘based on’ a standard might not qualify for being considered 
as ‘conforming to’ that standard, “as where only some, not all, of the elements 
of the standard are incorporated into the measure”.1151  
 
Second, with respect to the systematic in which the terms ‘based on’ and 
‘conform to’ were used, the Appellate Body observed that the terms were used 
                                                 
1146 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 162.  
1147 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 162 (emphasis by the Appellate Body).  
1148 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 163; with reference to The New Shorter 
Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles.  
1149 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 163.  
1150 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 163; with reference to The New Shorter 
Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles. 
1151 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 163. 
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in different articles, in different contexts’ and even in differing paragraphs of the 
same article. From this finding, the Appellate Body concluded “that the choice 
and use of different words in different places in the SPS Agreement are 
deliberate (…)”.1152 
 
Third and finally, the Appellate Body took into consideration the object and 
purpose of Article 3 of the SPS Agreement. In this respect, the Appellate Body 
noted that the purpose of Article 3 of the SPS Agreement, as indicated in its title 
and its first paragraph, is “[t]o harmonize sanitary and phytosanitary measures 
on as wide a basis as possible …”. In addition, the Appellate Body referred to 
the preamble of the SPS Agreement which, inter alia, states that WTO Members 
“[d]esir[e] to further the use of harmonized [SPS]sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures between Members on the basis of international standards, guidelines 
and recommendations developed by the relevant international organizations 
…”.1153 Furthermore, the Appellate Body noted that Article 12 of the SPS 
Agreement established a Committee on SPS measures with the task of, inter 
alia, “furtherance of its objectives, in particular with respect to harmonization” 
(Article 12.1 of the SPS Agreement) and to “encourage the use of international 
standards, guidelines or recommendations by all Members” (Article 12.2 of the 
SPS Agreement). Predicating on these findings, the Appellate Body was of the 
view “that harmonization of SPS measures of Members on the basis of 
international standards is projected in the Agreement, as a goal, yet to be 
realized in the future”.1154 On the other hand, the Appellate Body perceived the 
approach of the Panel of equating ‘based on’ with ‘conform to’ as requiring 
WTO Members to harmonise their SPS measures “in the here and now”.1155 The 
approach of the Panel, the Appellate Body noted, would, in effect, “vest such 
international standards, guidelines and recommendations (which are by the 
terms of the Codex recommendatory in form and nature) with obligatory force 
and effect”, transforming them into “binding norms”.1156 At this point, the 
Appellate Body invoked the interpretative principle of in dubio mitius which 
instructs treaty interpreters to opt for the interpretation the least onerous if the 
meaning of a term is ambiguous. In light of the principle of in dubio mitius, the 
Appellate Body rejected the assumption of the Panel “that sovereign states 
intended to impose upon themselves the more onerous, rather than the less 
burdensome, obligation by mandating conformity or compliance with” 
international standards, guidelines and recommendations.1157 Hence, the 
                                                 
1152 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 164.  
1153 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 165 (emphasis by the Appellate Body).  
1154 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 165 (emphases by the Appellate Body). 
1155 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 165 (emphases by the Appellate Body).  
1156 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 165 (emphases by the Appellate Body, 
footnote omitted).  
1157 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 165 (emphases by the Appellate Body); 
with reference to the principle of in dubio mitius in footnote no. 154.  
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Appellate Body concluded that for sustaining “such an assumption and to 
warrant such a far-reaching interpretation, treaty language far more specific and 
compelling than that found in Article 3 of the SPS Agreement would be 
necessary”.1158  
 
Thus, the Appellate Body rejected the Panel’s notion that the term ‘based on’ in 
Article 3.1 can be equated to the term ‘conform to’ in Article 3.2 of the SPS 
Agreement.  
 
Having rejected the Panel’s perception of a ‘general rule – exception’ 
relationship in Article 3 of the SPS Agreement, the Appellate Body embarked 
on its own examination of the relationship between Articles 3.2, 3.2 and 3.3 of 
the SPS Agreement.  
 
The Appellate Body started its examination by recalling that, generally 
speaking, Article 3 of the SPS Agreement covers situations “where a relevant 
international standard, guideline or recommendation exists”.1159  
 
Turning to Article 3 of the SPS Agreement in detail, the Appellate Body 
observed that the three paragraphs of that Article offer three distinct approaches 
for WTO Members establishing their respective SPS measures.  
 
First, a WTO Member may choose to adhere to international standards, 
guidelines or recommendations without reservation. In this case, the WTO 
Member may opt for the approach offered by the second paragraph of Article 3 
of the SPS Agreement. With regard to Article 3.2 of the SPS Agreement, the 
Appellate Body noted that an SPS measure that ‘conforms to’ an international 
standard virtually “would embody the international standard completely and, for 
practical purposes, converts it into a municipal standard”.1160 An SPS measure 
‘conforming to’ international standards “enjoys the benefit of a presumption 
(albeit a rebuttable one) that it is consistent with the relevant provisions of the 
SPS Agreement and of the GATT 1994”.1161  
 
Second, a WTO Member may choose to adopt some, but not all elements of an 
international standard, guideline or recommendation. In this case, the WTO 
Member may opt for the approach offered by the first paragraph of Article 3 of 
the SPS Agreement. With respect to Article 3.1 of the SPS Agreement, the 
Appellate Body observed that an SPS measure ‘based on’ an existing 
international standard “may adopt some, not necessarily all, of the elements of 
                                                 
1158 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 165. 
1159 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 169.  
1160 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 170. 
1161 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 170. 
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the international standard”.1162 The consequences of deciding to ‘base’ an SPS 
measure ‘on’ international standards is twofold. A WTO Member ‘basing’ its 
SPS measure ‘on’ an existing international standard does, on the one hand, “not 
benefit from the presumption of consistency set up in Article 3.2” of the SPS 
Agreement.1163 On the other hand, this WTO Member is “not penalized by 
exemption of a complaining Member from the normal burden of showing a 
prima facie case of inconsistency with Article 3.1 or any other relevant article of 
the SPS Agreement or of the GATT 1994”.1164 
 
Third, a WTO Member may choose to adopt SPS measures resulting in levels of 
protection different than those implicit in the respective international standards, 
guidelines or recommendations. With view on Article 3.3 of the SPS 
Agreement, the Appellate Body explicitly noted that the WTO Member’s 
appropriate level of protection resulting from SPS measures not ‘based on’ 
international standards “may be higher than that implied in the international 
standard”.1165 The right of WTO Members to determine their respective 
appropriate levels of protection was considered by the Appellate Body as “an 
important right”. At this point, the Appellate Body recalled the sixth preambular 
paragraph of the SPS Agreement which reads as follows:  
 
“Members, 
(…) Desiring to further the use of harmonized sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures between Members, on the basis of 
international standards, guidelines and recommendations, developed 
by the relevant international organizations, including the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission, the International Office of Epizootics, 
and the relevant international and regional organizations operating 
under the framework of the International Plant Protection 
Convention, without requiring Members to change their appropriate 
level of protection of human, animal or plant life or health.” 1166 
 
On these grounds, the Appellate Body concluded:  
 
“[T]his right of a Member to establish its own level sanitary 
protection under Article 3.3 of the SPS Agreement is an autonomous 
right and not an ‘exception’ from a ‘general obligation’ under Article 
3.1”.1167 
 
                                                 
1162 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 171.  
1163 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 171. 
1164 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 171. 
1165 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 172.  
1166 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 172 (underlining by the Appellate Body). 
1167 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 172 (emphasis by the Appellate Body).  
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Briefly worded, the Appellate Body rejected the Panel’s notion of a “general 
rule- exception” relationship between Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of the SPS 
Agreement, on the one hand, and Article 3.3 of the SPS Agreement, on the other 
hand. Instead, the Appellate Body stated that the right of a WTO Member to 
establish its own level of protection is an autonomous right and not an 
exception.  
 
Considering the case Australia – Salmon, the Appellate Body initially recalled 
that the Panel had erroneously considered the heat-treatment requirement as the 
SPS measure in question, whereas, in fact, it was the import prohibition which 
has to be analysed.1168 The Appellate Body, however, agreed with the Panel that 
Article 5.6 and the footnote to this provision require a three-pronged test for 
examining the ‘trade-restrictiveness’ of an SPS measure.1169 
 
Coming to the essential second element of the three-pronged test of Article 5.6 
of the SPS Agreement and its footnote, the Appellate Body disagreed with the 
Panel basically on grounds concerning the question how the appropriate level of 
protection should actually be determined. In this respect, the Appellate Body 
observed that the Panel’s approach for examining whether Article 5.6 is violated 
was “based on the Panel’s premise that ‘the level of protection implied or 
reflected in a sanitary measure or regime imposed by a WTO Member can be 
presumed to be at least as high as the level of protection considered to be 
appropriate by that Member’ ”.1170  
 
In contrast to the Panel, the Appellate Body was of the view that Australia had, 
in fact, determined its appropriate level of protection, putting it at “high” or 
“very conservative” levels, though not at a “zero-risk” level.1171 However, in 
situations where a WTO Member had actually determined its appropriate level 
of protection, the Appellate Body perceived the substitution of the level of 
protection expressed by that Member with own reasoning of Panels or the 
Appellate Body as a breach of competence.1172 Or, in the Appellate Body’s own 
words:  
                                                 
1168 Australia – Salmon, Appellate Body Report, para. 191.  
1169 Australia – Salmon, Appellate Body Report, para. 194.  
1170 Australia – Salmon, Appellate Body Report, para. 196 (original emphases).  
1171 Australia – Salmon, Appellate Body Report, para. 197, with reference to paragraph 8.107 
of the Panel’s Report in Australia – Salmon). 
1172 Australia – Salmon, Appellate Body Report, para. 199. The Panel had reached the 
conclusion that it had to complement Australia’s inchoate determination of its appropriate 
level of protection by interpreting Article 11 of the DSU in the following way:  
“Our examination under Article 5.6 is not aimed at a de novo review of what 
sanitary measure Australia should have chosen to achieve its appropriate level of 
protection. On the other hand, we cannot completely defer this decision to 
Australia and thus not give effect to Article 5.6. Our mandate under Article 11 of 
the DSU requires us to ‘make an objective assessment of the matter before [us], 
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“The determination of the appropriate level of protection … is a 
prerogative of the Member concerned and not of a Panel or of the 
Appellate Body.” 1173 
 
Then, the Appellate Body went in for an outline of general remarks on the 
relationship between the determination of the appropriate level of protection 
(ALOP), on the one hand, and measures for sanitary or phytosanitary protection, 
on the other hand. In the following, the reasoning of the Appellate Body on the 
determination of the appropriate level of protection (ALOP) shall be 
comprehensively displayed.  
 
The Appellate Body commenced its reflections with the following fundamental 
statement:  
 
“The ‘appropriate level of protection’ established by a member and 
the ‘SPS measure’ have to be clearly distinguished. They are not one 
and the same thing. The first is an objective, the second is an 
instrument chosen to attain or implement that objective.” 1174 
 
From the provisions of the SPS Agreement, the Appellate Body “deduced … 
that the determination by a Member of the ‘appropriate level of protection’ 
logically precedes the establishment or decision on maintenance of an ‘SPS 
measure’ ”.1175 In particular, the Appellate Body pointed at the following 
provisions of the SPS Agreement clarifying the chronology of (1) the 
determination of the appropriate level of protection, and (2) the subsequent 
establishment of the SPS measure:  
 
Article 3.3 of the SPS Agreement, which reads, in part, as follows:  
 
“Members may introduce or maintain sanitary or phytosanitary 
measures which result in a higher level of sanitary or phytosanitary 
protection than would be achieved by measures based on the relevant 
international standards … as a consequence of the level of sanitary 
                                                                                                                                                        
including an objective assessment of the facts of the case’ ” (Panel Report on 
Australia – Salmon, para. 8.172, with reference to the Appellate Body Report on 
EC – Hormones, paras. 110-119, in particular para. 117). 
1173 Australia – Salmon, Appellate Body Report, para. 199 (emphasis by the Appellate Body). 
1174 Australia – Salmon, Appellate Body Report, para. 200 (emphasis by the Appellate Body). 
In an additional footnote (no. 160), the Appellate Body noted “[t]hat the level of protection 
and the SPS measure applied have to be clearly distinguished results already from our Report 
in European Communities – Hormones … para. 214”.  
1175 Australia – Salmon, Report of the Appellate Body, para. 201.  
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or phytosanitary protection a Member determines to be appropriate 
…” 1176  
 
Article 5 of the SPS Agreement on the Assessment of Risk and Determination of 
the Appropriate Level of Sanitary or Phytosanitary Protection stipulates in its 
third paragraph, inter alia:  
 
“In assessing the risk to animal or plant life or health and 
determining the measure to be applied for achieving the appropriate 
level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection from such risk …” 1177  
 
Paragraph 4 of Article 5 of the SPS Agreement addresses, in particular, the 
determination of the appropriate level of protection, stating that:  
 
“Members should, when determining the appropriate level of sanitary 
or phytosanitary protection, take into account the objective of 
minimizing negative trade effects.” 1178  
 
Finally, Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement indicates a sequencing, whereby the 
level of protection is determined at first, followed by the subsequent 
implementation of the SPS measure: 
 
“… when establishing or maintaining sanitary or phytosanitary 
measures to achieve the appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary 
protection, Members shall ensure that such measures are not more 
trade-restrictive than required to achieve their appropriate level of 
sanitary or phytosanitary protection …” 1179  
 
With respect to Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement, the Appellate Body 
concluded:  
 
“The words of Article 5.6, in particular the terms ‘when establishing 
or maintaining sanitary … protection’, demonstrate that the 
determination of the level of protection is an element in the decision-
making process which logically precedes and is separate from the 
establishment or maintenance of the SPS measure”. It is the 
appropriate level of protection which determines the SPS measure to 
be introduced or maintained, not the SPS measure introduced or 
maintained which determines the appropriate level of protection. To 
imply the appropriate level of protection from the existing SPS 
                                                 
1176 Australia – Salmon, Appellate Body Report, para. 202 (emphasis by the Appellate Body).  
1177 Australia – Salmon, Appellate Body Report, para. 202 (emphasis by the Appellate Body). 
1178 Australia – Salmon, Appellate Body Report, para. 202 (emphasis by the Appellate Body). 
1179 Australia – Salmon, Appellate Body Report,, para. 203 (emphasis by the Appellate Body).   
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measure would be to assume that the measure always achieves the 
appropriate level of protection determined by the Member. That 
clearly cannot be the case.” 1180 
 
Having established that the Panel’s implication from the SPS measure to the 
appropriate level of protection is wrong, the Appellate Body went on with 
general remarks on whether the SPS Agreement imposes an obligation on WTO 
Members to effectively determine their respective ‘appropriate levels of 
protection (ALOP)’. In this regard, the Appellate Body concurred with the Panel 
that the SPS Agreement “does not contain an explicit provision which obliges 
WTO Members to determine the appropriate level of protection”.1181 However, 
and in contrast to the Panel, the Appellate Body perceived that an obligation to 
determine the appropriate level of protection is “implicit in several provisions of 
the SPS Agreement, in particular, in paragraph 3 of Annex B, Article 4.1, 
Article 5.4 and Article 5.6 of the SPS Agreement”.1182 This implicit obligation 
to determine the appropriate level of protection is, according to the Appellate 
Body, not an obligation to determine the appropriate level of protection “in 
quantitative terms”.1183 On the other hand, the Appellate Body emphasised in 
general terms that “[t]his does not mean, however, that an importing Member is 
free to determine its level of protection with such vagueness or equivocation that 
the application of the relevant provisions of the SPS Agreement, such as Article 
5.6, becomes impossible”.1184 Paving the way for Panels to establish the 
appropriate level of protection of WTO Members failing to do so themselves, 
the Appellate Body declared it as “obviously wrong” to interpret the SPS 
Agreement “in a way that would render nugatory entire articles or paragraphs … 
of this Agreement and allow Members to escape from their obligations under 
this Agreement”.1185 As a consequence, the Appellate Body believed “that in 
cases where a Member does not determine its appropriate level of protection, or 
does so with insufficient precision, the appropriate level of protection may be 
established by panels on the basis of the level of protection reflected in the SPS 
measure actually applied”.1186 Otherwise, the Appellate Body recalled its 
general remarks, “a Member’s failure to comply with the implicit obligations to 
determine its appropriate level of protection – with sufficient precision – would 
                                                 
1180 Australia – Salmon, Appellate Body Report, para. 203 (emphases by the Appellate Body).  
1181 Australia – Salmon, Appellate Body Report, para. 205. Similar considerations of the 
Panel are expressed in paragraph 8.107 of the Panel’s Report on Australia – Salmon). 
1182 Australia – Salmon, Appellate Body Report, para. 205 (footnote no. 161 omitted). In 
footnote no. 162, the Appellate Body additionally referred to Articles 5.8 and 12.4 of the SPS 
Agreement.  
1183 Australia – Salmon, Appellate Body Report, para. 206.  
1184 Australia – Salmon, Appellate Body Report, para. 206.  
1185Australia – Salmon, Appellate Body Report, para. 206.  
1186 Australia – Salmon, Appellate Body Report, para. 207.  
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allow it to escape from its obligations under this Agreement and, in particular, 
its obligations under Articles 55 and 5.6”.1187 
 
However, in the case Australia – Salmon, things were different. Refocusing on 
the case at hand, the Appellate Body found that “Australia determined its 
appropriate level of protection, and did so with sufficient precision to apply 
Article 5.6 (…)”.1188 In the Salmon case, the two problems were that (1) the 
Panel substituted Australia’s determination of its appropriate level of protection 
with the assumption that this level is reflected in the SPS measures actually 
applied and (2) that the Panel erroneously took the heat-treatment requirement 
as the SPS measure at issue, whilst it was the import prohibition which should 
have been taken under consideration. The first problem was a legal question 
addressed and clarified by the Appellate Body (see above).  
 
The second problem, however, was a factual issue which would have required 
the Appellate Body “to examine whether any of the possible alternative SPS 
measures […] [i.e., the five alternative quarantine policy options mentioned in 
Australia’s evaluation Report from 1996] would achieve Australia’s appropriate 
level of protection”.1189 Such an examination would presuppose that the 
Appellate Body would “know what level of protection could be achieved by 
each of these alternative SPS measures”.1190 In this respect, however, the 
Appellate Body recalled the factual findings of the Panel indicating that 
Australia’s evaluation report, i.e., Australia’s 1996 Final Report, “does not 
substantively evaluate the relative risks associated with these different options 
[i.e., the five quarantine policy options mentioned in the 1996 Final Report] …” 
1191 Hence, the Appellate Body was facing a situation within which it was 
“impossible to verify in an objective manner on the basis of the 1996 Final 
Report, whether any of the alternative policy options discussed in this report 
would achieve Australia’s appropriate level of protection (…)”.1192  
 
Summarising interpretations of the appropriate level of protection (ALOP) in the 
case Australia – Salmon, one may observe that the Panel perceived the concept 
of the determination of the appropriate level of protection (ALOP) as a 
reflection of, and thus implied in, the SPS measure at issue. The Appellate Body 
                                                 
1187 Australia – Salmon, Appellate Body Report, para. 207. 
1188 Australia – Salmon, Appellate Body Report, para. 207. 
1189 Australia – Salmon, Appellate Body Report, para. 208 (emphases by the Appellate Body).  
1190 Australia – Salmon, Appellate Body Report, para. 208.  
1191 Australia – Salmon, Appellate Body Report, para. 209, with reference to paragraph 8.90 
of the Panel’s Report on Australia – Salmon (emphasis already in the Panel’s version, 
brackets added by the Appellate Body).  
1192 Australia – Salmon, Appellate Body Report, para. 210. This problem was accentuated by 
the fact that the Panel had examined the alternative quarantine options “only in comparison to 
the erroneous yardstick of the level of protection implied from the heat-treatment 
requirement” (paragraph 211 of the Appellate Body’s Report on Australia – Salmon).  
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disagreed. In contrast, the Appellate Body clearly separated and recognised (1) 
the determination of the appropriate level of protection (ALOP) as a policy 
objective from (2) the subsequent implementation of an SPS measure as an 
instrument for achieving the policy objective. Hence, one may conclude that the 
Appellate Body in the Salmon case acknowledge the role of policy in the 
process of determining appropriate levels of protection (ALOP).  
 
 
CHAPTER 15 PANELS AND THE APPELLATE BODY BETWEEN 
EPISTEMOLOGICAL ANTIPODES 
 
Comparing the different approaches of panels and the Appellate Body, 
respectively, one may note that the former follows the concept of risk analysis 
more closely, whereas the latter follows a textual interpretation of the SPS 
Agreement. The rather objectivist approach of panels is correct in following the 
concept of risk analysis, but exceeds text and presumable intention of WTO 
Members, as the Appellate Body recalled. The contextualist interpretation of the 
Appellate Body, on the other hand, is according to the text and presumably 
according to the intention of WTO Members. But by refuting a notion of risk 
management, the Appellate Body’s approach runs in conflict with the concept of 
risk analysis.  
 
Opposing interpretations of risk and risk assessment by Panels and the Appellate 
Body, respectively, are conveying the impression of a ‘hither and thither’. 
However, considering that at the heart of the controversy are lying different 
philosophical approaches and epistemological concepts, then the flip-flopping 
interpretation may be better conceived as an oscillation between two opposing 
poles, namely positivism and relativism: whereas Panels adopted a rather 
positivist approach, the Appellate Body, on the other hand, tried to find some 
middle way between positivist and relativist risk conceptions. 1193 
                                                 
1193 It shall be noted that there are other views expressing more conciliatory rather than 
antithetic understandings of the diverging interpretations put forward by panels and the 
Appellate Body respectively. Lukasz Gruszczynski, for instance, perceived “the approach of 
the Appellate Body not as a general rejection of the concept of risk management within the 
SPS Agreement, but rather as a dismissal of restrictive, and in fact incorrect, formulation of 
risk assessment” (Lukasz Gruszczynski, Regulating Health and Environmental Risks under 
WTO Law. A Critical Analysis of the SPS Agreement (Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 
223). On such grounds, but without textual basis, Gruszczynski suggested the recognition of 
risk management within the existing SPS Agreement, arguing that such a move would not 
alter rights and obligations of WTO members, but “helps to conceptualize SPS disciplines in a 
clear and more consistent manner” (Lukasz Gruszczynski, ibid., p. 225). The view 
underpinning the paper at hand locates both panels and the Appellate Body between the 
antipodes positivism and relativism. However, whereas panels particularly in early SPS cases 
are considered of having adopted a rather positivist approach, the Appellate Body seems of 
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Sungjoon Cho perceived the Hormones dispute as a ‘conflict of paradigms’ in 
the Kuhnian sense. From a paradigmatic perspective, the Panel’s findings 
represented ‘mainstream science’:  
 
“First of all, it may be useful to capture this interpretive fissure as a 
conflict of “paradigms” in the Kuhnian sense. Here, two paradigms 
clashed over the safety of hormones in food. One paradigm, which 
the U.S. and the panel adopted, focuses on the level of hormone 
residue in the human body regardless of its pathway or metabolites. 
Under this paradigm, there is no significant regulatory difference 
between naturally-occurring hormones in foods (such as hormones in 
milk or broccoli) and artificially-injected hormones (such as 
hormones in cattle). This paradigm represents the mainstream view 
or the “normal science,” according to Kuhn, which is incorporated in 
the international standards (the Codex standards). Therefore, the 
panel ruled that the EC violated the WTO norms (the SPS 
Agreement) by treating like situations (naturally-occurring hormones 
and artificially-injected hormones) in an unlike manner (no 
regulatory intervention v. a total ban).” 1194 
 
In contrast, the ruling of the Appellate Body reflected an alternative paradigm, 
coming along as a more inclusive, rather non-technical approach:  
 
“The AB de facto substituted its own version of science for the 
conventional version of science when it identified a “fundamental 
difference” between these two situations. The AB observed that any 
attempt to compare them would lead to “absurdity.” The AB 
replaced techne, which is represented by the laboratory science, with 
                                                                                                                                                        
having struggled for some middle position from the outset. Because the science-based 
approach of the SPS Agreement restricts the potential discretion of legal interpreters 
significantly, the Appellate Body could barely have gone farther to the left end of the 
spectrum, i.e. to the relativist end, but had to confine itself to the quest for some middle 
course. Joanne Scott commented on such inbuilt constraints of the SPS Agreement as follows:  
“Though the AB speaks soft words of Member State autonomy, qualitative 
modes of risk assessment, and deference to minority opinion, the science-based 
obligations have a hard edge. They constitute numerous benchmarks according 
to which legality will be assessed (…) All in all soft words should not be 
allowed to obscure the searching nature of the risk assessment inquiry” (Joanne 
Scott, The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (Oxford 
University Press, 2007), pp. 137-138).  
On these grounds, the Appellate Body’s approach is not perceived as being relativist, but as 
seeking some kind of middle position between the positivist and the relativist end of the 
spectrum.  
1194 Sungjoon Cho, ‘From Control to Communication: Science, Philosophy and World Trade 
Law’ (2010) Cornell International Law Journal, forthcoming (original emphasis, footnotes 
omitted). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1583023 (visited December 5, 2010).  
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phronesis, which is based on common sense-based science befitting 
the “real world where people live and work and die.” Under this 
interpretation, the EC did not violate Article 5.5 of the SPS 
Agreement since these two situations were not comparable in the 
first place.” 1195 
 
On the basis of the concept of administrative constitutionalism, Elizabeth Fisher 
provided a convincing explanation for diverging concepts of risk contrived by 
panels and the Appellate Body respectively. Starting point of Fisher’s analysis is 
the distinction between two paradigms in administrative constitutionalism: one 
the one hand, there is the rational-instrumental paradigm of administrative 
constitutionalism, and on the other hand there is the deliberative-constitutive 
understanding of administrative constitutionalism (see chapter 1 above). 
Interestingly, Fisher related diverging concepts of risk contrived by panels and 
the Appellate Body to these different paradigms of administrative 
constitutionalism. With regard to the Panel’s approach in the case EC – 
Hormones in particular, Fisher observed:   
 
“For the Panel, the task of a member’s regulatory body in setting a 
standard was to apply the facts to a normative prescription by using 
an analytical methodology, and its decision is a perfect example of 
defining risk assessment in RI [i.e. rational-instrumental] terms. 
Standard-setting was largely characterised as a compartmentalised 
process in which the standard-setter identified the facts and then 
applied those facts to a pre-ordained normative prescription. As this 
was the case, the process of assessing the EU’s compliance wit the 
SPS Agreement was understood as requiring the scrutiny of the 
analytical methodology of the risk assessment and the 
methodological rigour of the scientific basis. (…) Risk assessment 
was not complicated by scientific uncertainty or socio-economic 
complexity.” 1196 
 
In contrast, the approach of the Appellate Body towards risk assessment was 
characterised by Fisher as more inclusive, complex and differentiated:  
 
“Implicit in the Appellate Body’s approach is an appreciation of the 
complexities in assessing risk and the problems of scientific 
uncertainty. The Appellate Body was not being ‘scientific’ or ‘anti-
                                                 
1195 Sungjoon Cho, ibid. (original italics, footnotes omitted).  
1196 Elizabeth Fisher, ‘Beyond the Science/Democracy Dichotomy: The World Trade 
organisation Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement and Administrative Constitutionalism’, in 
Christian Joerges and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (eds.), Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade 
Governance and Social Regulation (Hart Publishing, 2006), [pp. 327-349] 341-342 (footnotes 
omitted).  
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scientific’ but was instead requiring the assessment of risk to be on a 
broader basis than understanding risk assessment as an analytical 
straitjacket would allow. In other words, the Appellate Body was 
conceptualising standard-setting and risk assessment more as 
reasoning processes than as fact-finding processes. (…) The 
Appellate Body’s approach can be treated as being underpinned by a 
DC [i.e. deliberative-constitutive] approach. Standard-setting was 
understood to be a complex enterprise not easily kept within the 
boundaries of stringent risk-assessment methodologies. Instead, the 
Appellate Body assessed the compatibility of the EU’s measures 
with the Agreement by determining whether the EU had carried out a 
coherent process of reasoning.” 1197 
 
As the reason underlying different approaches towards risk and risk assessment 
by the Panel and the Appellate Body in EC – Hormones, Fisher identified 
different opinions about the very purpose of the SPS Agreement. For the Panel, 
the SPS Agreement was an instrument for the harmonisation of SPS measures 
following international standards. For the Appellate Body, in contrast, the 
objective of the SPS Agreement was the identification and invalidation of 
protectionist measures camouflaged as SPS measures. According to Fisher, the 
difference of approach of the Panel and the Appellate Body towards risk 
assessment in EC – Hormones  
 
“… can be understood as a product of the fact that the Panel and the 
Appellate Body understood the SPS Agreement as serving different 
purposes. The Panel largely characterised the Agreement as being a 
means for reducing regulatory heterogeneity. As this was the case, 
the Agreement was understood to require the harmonisation of 
standards on the basis of international standards. The imposition of 
an RI [i.e. rational-instrumental] approach would seem to provide a 
greater guarantee of this occurring, because it would appear to give a 
lesser role for discretion by placing the same analytical burden on 
decision-makers. In contrast, the Appellate Body understood the 
Agreement as being far more about ensuring that bogus SPS 
measures were invalidated. As this was the case, it was not so much 
concerned with ensuring that standards were consistent, as concerned 
that they were ‘genuine’ SPS measures. The DC [i.e. deliberative-
constitutive] approach is entirely consistent with this, and the 
complexity of risk as recognised by this paradigm is a major reason 
why different members may legitimately have different measures.” 
1198 
                                                 
1197 Elizabeth Fisher, ibid. p. 343 (footnote omitted, emphasis added).   
1198 Elizabeth Fisher, ibid. p. 344 (footnotes omitted).  
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Drawing on this considerations, one may characterise the Panel’s approach 
rather as offensive, whereas the Appellate Body’s approach seems to be rather 
defensive; whereas the Appellate Body seems to content itself to the purpose of 
detecting disguised protectionism, the Panel’s approach seems to go further, 
following some kind of rather offensive market-opening agenda. Such an 
interpretation is supported by scholars emphasising economic implications of 
different interpretative approaches. Sungjoon Cho, for instance, pointed at 
distributive effects coming along with different interpretative paradigms:  
 
“For example, the European paradigm against the hormone-treated 
beef tends to protect European cattle growers who mainly produce 
hormone-less beef from the influx of American hormone-treated 
beef. Therefore, it is in the vital interest of the American farmers to 
shift the European paradigm in a way which may permit their 
products to circulate in the European market”.1199 
 
Catherine Button suggested a more pragmatic explanation for the fact that 
panels and the Appellate Body put forward different risk assessment concepts. 
Button considered that the intention of the Appellate Body for refusing to 
discern between risk assessment and risk management “does not appear to have 
been to reject the general scheme of risk regulation (…) or to suggest that risk 
assessment may be overtly policy-driven at the expense of scientific risk 
assessment”.1200 As Button remarked, the intention of the Appellate Body was 
rather to indicate “that risk assessment can and should extend beyond the 
laboratory, into evaluating ‘risk in human society as they actually exist’”.1201 
Notably, Button pointed at another intention which may have motivated the 
Appellate Body to avoid the risk assessment – risk management distinction. 
Button considered that in case the traditional distinction between risk assessment 
and risk management would be transposed into the SPS Agreement, “it could be 
argued that, absent reference to risk management, risk management decisions 
not explicitly mentioned in the Agreement are beyond the WTO’s jurisdiction”. 
Accordingly, Button observed that the Appellate Body’s refusal “to confine 
references to risk assessment in the SPS Agreement to the activities which fall 
                                                 
1199 Sungjoon Cho, ‘From Control to Communication: Science, Philosophy and World Trade 
Law’ (2010) Cornell International Law Journal, forthcoming (footnote omitted). Available at 
SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1583023 (visited December 5, 2010).  
1200 Catherine Button, The Power to Protect. Trade, Health, and Uncertainty in the WTO 
(Hart Publishing, 2004), p. 101. In this respect, however, Button observed that other authors, 
namely Crawford-Brown, Pauwelyn and Smith, as well as Trebilcock and Soloway, voiced 
concerns that the Appellate Body’s “elision of risk assessment and risk management allows 
more scope for policy decisions to creep into risk assessment processes” (ibid., footnote no. 
42).  
1201 Catherine Button, ibid., p. 101, with reference to the report of the Appellate Body in EC – 
Hormones, para. 187 (emphasis added by Button).  
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within risk assessment in regulatory practice, the Appellate Body has opened up 
the possibility of reviewing a wider range of risk management decisions”.1202  
 
In a nutshell, the conflicting approaches to risk assessment by panels and the 
Appellate Body, respectively, effected in the following established unresolved 
issues:  
 
First, there was confusion how to address non-scientific factors: should non-
scientific factors be considered in a stage separated from risk assessment, 
namely in the risk management stage, as suggested by the objectivist approach 
of the panel? Or should non-scientific factors be considered in a comprehensive 
attempt covering both risk assessment and risk management aspects, as 
prescribed by the rather constructivist approach of the Appellate Body?  
 
Sue Davis, for instance, noted a gap between theory and practice with regard to 
the recognition of ‘other legitimate factors’ under the SPS Agreement. On the 
one hand, Davis noted that ‘other legitimate factors’ have been recognised by 
EU food safety regulation, as well as by the Codex Alimentarius Commission. 
Davis noted:  
 
“The role of ‘other legitimate factors’ has been recognized in EU 
legislation including the General Food Law Regulation and the GM 
food and feed regulations. They are also explicitly referred to in the 
Codex Working Principles for Risk Analysis for Food Safety for 
Application by Governments (Codex Alimentarius Commission 
2007). In a UK context, the Food Standards Agency has 
responsibility for protecting the health of consumers, but also for 
protecting other consumer interests in relation to food (UK Food 
Standards Act 1999), although this responsibility has remained 
poorly defined.” 1203 
 
On the other hand, however, Davis observed a gap specifically between 
regulatory announcing and scientific risk assessment. Notably, Davis stressed 
that “it remains unclear how much weight will be given to these ‘other 
legitimate factors’ in practice, particularly if they are at odds with the scientific 
risk assessment”.1204 
 
                                                 
1202 Catherine Button, ibid., p. 102.  
1203 Sue Davis, ‘A Consumers’ Association’s Perspective on the Governance Framework,’ in 
Marion Dreyer and Ortwin Renn (eds.) Food Safety Governance. Integrating Science, 
Precaution and Public Involvement (Springer-Verlag, 2009), p. 224.  
1204 Sue Davis, ‘A Consumers’ Association’s Perspective on the Governance Framework,’ in 
Marion Dreyer and Ortwin Renn (eds.) Food Safety Governance. Integrating Science, 
Precaution and Public Involvement (Springer-Verlag, 2009), p. 224. 
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With respect to the problem of non-scientific factors, Catherine Button noted:  
 
“When it comes to the role of social and cultural factors, the waters 
are even muddier. The Appellate Body refused to draw a firm 
distinction between risk assessment and risk management under the 
SPS Agreement. This decision exacerbated the confusion already 
surrounding the question of whether such factors have a legitimate 
role in risk assessment, and continues to undermine the emerging 
international consensus on this question – the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission adopted a statement identifying reference to ‘other 
legitimate factors’ as part of the risk management process.” 1205 
 
Second, different approaches by panels and the Appellate Body towards risk and 
risk assessment led to diverging view on the determination of appropriate levels 
of protection (ALOP): is the determination of higher levels of protection an 
exception, as suggested by the positivist panel approach? Or is the determination 
of ALOP in any case a ‘sovereign right,’ as ruled by the Appellate Body?  
 
With regard to the provisions of the SPS Agreement addressing the 
determination of appropriate levels of protection (ALOP) vis-à-vis the 
paramount objective of harmonisation, Catherine Button established a lack of 
clarity:  
 
“At a broader level, there seems to be a lack of real clarity on the 
nature of the system that the SPS Agreement’s harmonisation 
provisions envisage. There is no indication of how the world trading 
system is to move beyond the disharmony of a formal obligation to 
‘base’ measures on international standards coupled with an 
autonomous right to enact higher standards to full harmonisation. 
This lack of clarity and vision contributes to the tension between 
international supervision and national regulatory power. A far-
reaching examination of the harmonisation question is in order. Such 
an examination should address the broader question of where 
decision-making power over health standards should be located – 
with Members, with international bodies or with WTO 
adjudicators?” 1206 
                                                 
1205 Catherine Button, The Power to Protect. Trade, Health, and Uncertainty in the WTO 
(Hart Publishing, 2004), p. 231. Button anticipated negative consequences of the Appellate 
Body’s handling of non-scientific factors by arguing that, “[i]f other factors are considered as 
part of risk assessment, it will lose its claim to be as free from politics and policy as is 
practicable. If this happens, even the ideal of scientific risk assessment will have been 
sacrificed and, as a consequence, the value of scientifically-based methods of risk regulation 
will be called into question” (Catherine Button, ibid., p. 107).  
1206 Catherine Button, ibid., pp. 63-64 (footnote omitted).  
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For Lukasz Gruszczynski, Article 3 “is probably on of the most obscure 
provisions in the whole SPS Agreement”.1207 Gruszczynski explained that 
obscurity with an initial disagreement among the drafters of the Agreement, 
“with one group of countries supporting the establishment of strict 
harmonization disciplines and others seeking guarantees for rather unrestrained 
national regulatory freedom in the area of SPS risk”.1208 Gruszczynski further 
confirmed the notion that the Panel particularly in the case EC – Hormones 
followed the objective of establishing ‘strict harmonisation disciplines’, whereas 
the Appellate Body, by applying the principle of in dubio mitius, left some room 
for ‘national regulatory freedom’:  
 
“If on considers this lack of precision [of Article 3 of the SPS 
Agreement], the approach taken by the Appellate Body appears to be 
fully understandable. In accordance with the principle of in dubio 
mitius, and in the absence of the proof to the contrary, one may 
rationally assume that WTO Members impose on themselves less 
burdensome obligations rather than more onerous. Consequently, 
Article 3.1 and 3.3 apply to different situations with Article 3.2 
operating as some kind of reward for complying with international 
standards. Conceptualizing Article 3.1 and 3.3 as a rule and an 
exception would strengthen the harmonization objective of the SPS 
Agreement, without a clear indication of such an intent in the text of 
the relevant provision, and would further constrain the ability of 
WTO Members to set their own levels of protection … ” 1209 
 
Third, there was vagueness surrounding the issue of ‘zero risk’: should attempts 
to achieve ‘zero-risk’ be refuted on the ground that they are scientifically 
impossible, as suggested by the rather objectivist panel? Or should attempt for 
achieving ‘zero-risk’ be allowed as viable policy options, as decided by the 
rather constructivist Appellate Body?  
 
Fourth and finally, there was uncertainty on how to consider provisional 
measures and issues of precaution: are provisional measures some sort of 
extended inference bridges in risk assessments, as seemed to be the finding of 
panels and the Appellate Body alike? Or shall precaution be addressed as a risk 
management measure in its own right, as suggested by certain constructivist risk 
theorists based on uncertainty considerations? What shall be the role of the 
precautionary principle in WTO law in general?  
 
                                                 
1207 Lukasz Gruszczynski, Regulating Health and Environmental Risks under WTO Law. A 
Critical Analysis of the SPS Agreement (Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 104.  
1208 Lukasz Gruszczynski, ibid., pp. 104-105.  
1209 Lukasz Gruszczynski, ibid., p. 105 (footnote omitted).  
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An example for showing legal implications of the jurisprudence of panels and 
the Appellate Body between the two poles of the epistemological spectrum are 
legal problems surrounding GMOs.  
 
A. The Biotech Case   
 
Taken literally, the SPS Agreement covers foodborne hazards, animal diseases, 
and plant pests (paragraph 1(a)-(d) and paragraph 4 of Annex A of the SPS 
Agreement).  
 
However, in the case EC – Biotech, the question appeared whether the SPS 
Agreement or another WTO Agreement, for example the Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT Agreement), applies to the biotech products at 
issue1210 and the respective safeguard measures of certain EC Member States. In 
this regard, the Panel examined the EC Member States safeguard measures and 
the respective risks which they addressed. Essentially, the safeguard measures of 
certain EC Member States (Austria, France, Germany, Greece, Italy and 
Luxembourg) fall in two broad categories: some of the safeguard measures were 
addressing “classical” food safety risks from biotech products to consumers, 
whereas others were addressing risks from biotech products to the environment. 
The Panel, after a thorough examination, considered that both categories of 
safeguard measures were covered by the scope of Annex A(1) of the SPS 
Agreement which, obviously, extents to a wide range of measures protecting 
human, animal or plant life or health.1211 
 
At the same time, the panel in the Biotech case denied the applicability of the 
Cartagena Protocol. With regard to the applicability of the Cartagena Protocol, 
the Panel interpreted Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (VCLT) in a way requiring all WTO Member to be party of a treaty for 
applying this treaty to the case at issue.1212 This interpretation of the Panel 
effectively excludes the Cartagena Protocol from applicability in WTO disputes, 
as long as not all WTO Members are parties to it.1213  
 
                                                 
1210 The biotech products at issue were: cotton, e.g. Monsanto Bt cotton (Bt-531) and 
Monsanto Roundup Ready cotton (RRC1445); maize, e.g. Syngenta glufosinate tolerant and 
Bt resistant maize (Bt-11), Pioneer Bt maize (MON809); oilseed rape, e.g. Bayer hybrid 
oilseed rape (MS8/RF3); soybeans, e.g. Pioneer/Dupont high-oleic soybeans (260-05); and 
various other crops, e.g. transgenic chicory, potato, and tomato.  
1211 EC – Biotech, Panel Reports, paras. 7.2561-7.2922.  
1212 EC – Biotech, Panel Reports, para, 7.70, emphasis added.  
1213 However, the Panel explicitly did not take a position on whether it would take the 
Cartagena Protocol into account if all parties to the dispute – in contrast to all WTO Members 
– would also be parties of the Cartagena Protocol (EC – Biotech, Reports of the Panel, para. 
7.72).  
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Taking a closer look at the line of arguments considered by the panel in the 
Biotech case, the followings may be noted. The Panel in the Biotech case started 
its considerations by looking at Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties (VCLT). Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT basically reads that for 
interpreting a treaty, “any relevant rules of international law applicable in the 
relations between the parties” shall be taken into account. The Panel interpreted 
the term “the parties” in Article 31(3)(c) VCLT as signifying “that the rules of 
international law to be taken into account in interpreting the WTO agreements at 
issue in this dispute are those which are applicable in the relations between the 
WTO Members”.1214 By equating the term “the parties” in Article 31(3)(c) 
VCLT with “all parties to the treaty which is being interpreted”, the Panel, in 
fact, required all WTO Members to be party of a treaty for applying this treaty 
to a case under consideration.1215    
 
Applying this interpretation of Article 31(3)(c) VCLT to the case EC - Biotech, 
the Panel questioned whether the Convention on Biological Diversity and the 
Cartagena Protocol are applicable.  
 
On the question whether the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) is 
applicable, the Panel noted that “like most other WTO Member, Argentina, 
Canada and the European Communities have ratified the Convention on 
Biological Diversity and are thus parties to it”.1216 On the other hand, the Panel 
observed that the United States (US) has signed the CBD in 1993, but has 
subsequently not ratified it. Considering that the US, therefore, is not a party to 
the CBD, the Panel found that “the Convention on Biological Diversity is not 
‘applicable’ in the relations between the United States and all other WTO 
Members”.1217 On these grounds, the Panel concluded that it was not required to 
take into account the CBD in interpreting the WTO agreement relevant in the 
dispute at issue.1218 
 
On the question whether the Cartagena Protocol is applicable, the Panel 
observed that the European Communities are among the WTO Members which 
are party of it. On the other hand, the Panel noted that Argentina and Canada 
have signed the Cartagena Protocol, but have not ratified it so far. Moreover, the 
                                                 
1214 EC – Biotech, Reports of the Panel, para. 7.68, emphasis added. 
1215 EC – Biotech, Reports of the Panel, para. 7.70, emphasis added. The approach of the 
Panel for interpreting Article 31(3)(c) VCLT did not remain unquestioned. For a critical 
review see, for example, Benn McGrady, ‘Fragmentation of International Law or “Systemic 
Integration” of Treaty Regimes: EC – Biotech Products and the Proper Interpretation of 
Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties’(2008) 42(4) Journal of 
World Trade, 589-618.  
1216 EC – Biotech, Panel Reports, para. 7.74. 
1217 EC – Biotech, Panel Reports, para. 7.74.  
1218 EC – Biotech, Panel Reports, para. 7.74.  
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US has not even signed the Cartagena Protocol. Considering that neither 
Argentina or Canada nor the US are parties to the Cartagena Protocol, the Panel 
deduced from this “that the Biosafety Protocol is not ‘applicable’ in the relations 
between these WTO Members and all other WTO Members”.1219 Therefore, the 
Panel concluded that it was not required to take into account the Cartagena 
Protocol in interpreting the WTO provisions relevant for the dispute at stake.1220  
 
The fact that the Cartagena Protocol is, at least for the time being, not applicable 
in WTO disputes, has several consequences. First, the Panel applied the SPS 
Agreement not only to risks related to GMOs in food, but also to risks related to 
environmental impacts of GMOs. In other words, food safety risks as well as 
environmental risks from biotech products are falling under the broad scope of 
the SPS Agreement. Second, from the finding that biotech products fall under 
the scope of the SPS Agreement, it follows that risk assessments also have to 
fulfil the respective requirements laid down in the SPS Agreement. These 
requirements essentially consist of the obligation to “base” risk assessments 
“on” scientific principles and to provide, in turn, scientific justification for SPS 
measures through science-based risk assessments. Third, as outlined above, the 
Cartagena Protocol and the SPS Agreement are varying in respect to factors and 
elements taken into account in analysing risks.1221 Whereas the Cartagena 
Protocol allows for taking into account socio-economic considerations and for 
adopting a precautionary approach in assessing and managing risks, the SPS 
Agreement prescribes risk assessment as a procedure based on scientific 
principles. In other words, whereas the Cartagena Protocol provides space for 
non-scientific, i.e. policy considerations, the SPS Agreement confines the room 
for manoeuvre for governments to measures justified by science-based risk 
assessments. A prominent example for non-scientific considerations is the 
perception of consumers. As noted by Zeynep Kivilcim,1222 public concern and 
consumers’ perception might be taken into account in procedures following the 
Cartagena Protocol. However, consumers’ perception is not an issue of science-
based risk assessments according to the SPS Agreement. Unsurprisingly, 
consumers’ preferences are more and more reflected by private standards 
                                                 
1219 EC – Biotech, Panel Reports, para. 7.75.  
1220 EC – Biotech, Panel Reports, para. 7.75. Commented by, inter alia, Jacqueline Peel, ‘A 
GMO by any other name … might be an SPS Risk!: Implications of expanding the scope of 
the WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement’ (2007) 17(5) The European 
Journal of International Law, 1029.  
1221 Simonetta Zarrilli, ‘International Trade in GMOs and GM products: National and 
Multilateral Legal Frameworks’ (UNCTAD, 2005) 29 Policy Issues in International Trade 
and Commodities Study Series, p. 29. 
1222 Zeynep Kivilcim, ’The Legal Framework for Agrobiotechnology in Turkey: The 
Challenges to the Implementation of the Precautionary Principle,’ in Baris Karapinar, Fikret 
Adaman, and Gokhan Ozertan (eds.), Rethinking Structural Reform in Turkish Agriculture: 
Beyond the World Bank’s Strategy (Nova Science Publishers, 2010) [p. 265-280] p. 273. 
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beyond the scope of WTO law.1223 Fourth, a WTO dispute where scientific 
evidence – in particular with regard to risks from biotech products – is 
insufficient would be subject to Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement, hence 
requiring concerned governments to complement the insufficient scientific 
evidence and to carry out a risk assessment within “a reasonable period of time”. 
This interpretation of Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement leaves little room for 
applying the broader concept of the precautionary principle, as embodied in the 
Cartagena Protocol.1224 Fifth, in WTO disputes under the SPS Agreement, it is 
upon the party defending its sanitary measure against a complaining party to 
provide scientific justification and to carry out the underlying risk assessment. 
Under the SPS Agreement – and in contrast to the Cartagena procedures – a 
respondent has no right to require the complainant to carry out the risk 
assessment instead or to bear the costs of the risk assessment, a point 
particularly important from a developing country perspective.1225 
 
Hence, in light of the findings of the panel in EC – Biotech, the lesson can be 
drawn that the scope of the SPS Agreement not only covers food safety risks in 
the narrow sense, but extents to environmental risks and in particular to 
environmental risks deriving from GMOs.1226 On the other hand, the Panel in the 
Biotech case made it clear that rules of international law other than WTO 
                                                 
1223 For instance, Bonsi et. al. observed that “[I]n the Unites States, for example, lack of 
government supported eco-labeling programs has led to a profusion of more than 40 US eco-
labels (excluding all the food labels)” (Richard Bonsi et al., ‘Eco-labels and International 
Trade: Problems and Solutions’ (2008) 42(3) Journal of World Trade [407-432] 418). For 
further details on private standards see Sufian Jusoh, ‘Standards and their Impacts on the 
Horticulture Trade,’ in Baris Karapinar, Fikret Adaman, and Gokhan Ozertan (eds.), 
Rethinking Structural Reform in Turkish Agriculture: Beyond the World Bank’s Strategy 
(Nova Science Publishers, 2010), pp. 355-369. 
1224 In contrast to the precautionary principle of the Cartagena Protocol allowing countries to 
impose import bans for GMOs in cases scientific certainty is lacking virtually without time 
limits, the SPS Agreement obliges countries to seek the additional scientific information 
“necessary for a more objective assessment of risk and review the sanitary or phytosanitary 
measure accordingly within a reasonable period of time” (Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement) 
(Simonetta Zarrilli, ‘International Trade in GMOs and GM products: National and 
Multilateral Legal Frameworks’ (UNCTAD, 2005) 29 Policy Issues in International Trade 
and Commodities Study Series, p. 27.  
1225 Simonetta Zarrilli, ibid. p. 29. 
1226 Jacqueline Peel observed that the Panel extended, in fact, the scope of the SPS Agreement 
on “the entire EC legislative scheme relating to the environmental release of GM crops, and a 
substantial portion of its regulations of dealing with novel food authorizations” (Jacqueline 
Peel, ‘A GMO by any other name … might be an SPS Risk!: Implications of expanding the 
scope of the WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement’ (2007) 17(5) The 
European Journal of International Law, 1024). The decision of the Panel in EC – Biotech to 
solely apply the SPS Agreement has provoked intense discussions among scholars. See, 
among many others, Christiane R. Conrad, ‘The EC – Biotech dispute and applicability of the 
SPS Agreement: are the panel’s findings built on shaky ground? (2007) 6(2) World Trade 
Review, 233-248.  
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provisions are only taken into account in SPS disputes if all WTO Members 
have ratified the respective treaty.1227  
 
The Panel’s refusal to apply the Cartagena Protocol in the case EC – Biotech has 
to be considered in light of the non-applicability of the precautionary principle 
in WTO law. In the following, it shall be shown that panels and the Appellate 
Body have constantly refused to apply the precautionary principle in SPS cases. 
This line of argument was upheld by the Panel in the Biotech case.  
 
B. How to Assess Uncertainties? 
 
It was shown above that the significance of the notion of precaution, as 
expressed by Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement, is limited. In particular, it was 
shown that SPS measures established under Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement 
are only provisionally exempted from the obligations of Article 2.2 of the SPS 
Agreement. In these cases, the “reasonable period of time”, i.e., the deadline set 
for seeking and obtaining additional scientific information is subject to a case-
by-case appraisement by Panels and the Appellate Body. Hence, it was 
concluded that the lack of scientific evidence does not disburden WTO 
Members to seek to obtain scientific justification for provisionally adopted SPS 
measures.  
 
Such an interpretation of Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement leaves little room for 
applying the broader concept of the precautionary principle, as embodied in the 
Cartagena Protocol.1228 In this respect, Thomas Cottier observed:  
 
                                                 
1227 The Center for International Environmental Law (CIEL) criticised the approach of the 
Panel towards Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) with the following words: 
“The attitude of the Panel to ignore the importance of internationally negotiated instruments 
outside the WTO runs counter to the notion of mutual supportiveness” (Bernasconi-
Osterwalder, Nathalie; Oliva, Maria Julia; EC-Biotech: Overview and Analysis of the Panel’s 
Interim Report (CIEL/FOEE/FOEI, March 2006), p. 50). Suppan qualified the approach of the 
Panel as reinforcing “the schism between the WTO and the United Nations system” (Steve 
Suppan, The WTO’s EC – Biotech Products ruling and the Cartagena Protocol (IATP 2006), 
p. 1.   
1228 In contrast to the precautionary principle of the Cartagena Protocol allowing countries to 
impose import bans for GMOs in cases scientific certainty is lacking virtually without time 
limits, the SPS Agreement obliges countries to seek the additional scientific information 
“necessary for a more objective assessment of risk and review the sanitary or phytosanitary 
measure accordingly within a reasonable period of time” (Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement). 
See also Simonetta Zarrilli. ‘International trade in GMOs and GM products: National and 
Multilateral Legal Frameworks’ (UNCTAD, 2005), 29 Policy Issues in International Trade 
and Commodities Study Series, p. 27.  
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“True, there is limited scope to apply the precautionary principle 
under the SPS Agreement. Yet, the requirements of Article 5.7 of the 
SPS Agreement are termed in a more restrictive manner. They are of 
a temporary nature and do not allow states to invoke precaution in 
order to support permanent measures.”1229 
 
In the following, it shall be shown how panels and the Appellate Body have 
refused to apply the precautionary principle in SPS cases.  
 
In its basic expression, the precautionary principle “embodies the central 
injunction that lack of scientific certainty should not be used as reasons to delay 
appropriate action”.1230 
 
The European Court of Justice (ECJ), in the case National Farmers’ Union, 
framed the precautionary principle in the following broad way: 
 
“[w]here there is uncertainty as to the existence or extent of risks to 
human health, the institutions may take protective measures without 
having to wait until the reality and seriousness of those risks become 
fully apparent”. 1231 
 
In particular, the precautionary principle empowers risk managers to introduce 
appropriate measures in cases of scientific uncertainty. In such respect, David 
Magnus observed:  
 
“Ignoring uncertainty was simply not sufficient for adequate risk 
management. The precautionary principle provided managers or 
regulators with a new tool what would allow them to reasonably 
move forward when there was clearly sufficient evidence to warrant 
concern, but not sufficient evidence to establish risks with a high 
                                                 
1229 Thomas Cottier, ‘Implications for trade law and policy: towards convergence and 
integration,’ in Christoph Bail, Robert Falkner and Helen Marquard (eds.), The Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety – Reconciling Trade in Biotechnology with Environment and 
Development? (Earthscan Publications, 2002), p. 471.  
1230 Adrian Ely, Andy Stierling, Marion Dreyer, Ortwin Renn, Ellen Vos, and Frank Wendler, 
‘The Need for Change’, in Marion Dreyer and Ortwin Renn (eds.) Food Safety Governance. 
Integrating Science, Precaution and Public Involvement (Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 
2009), p. 12, with reference to Principle 15 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development.  
1231 Ellen Vos and Frank Wendler, ‘Legal and Institutional Aspects of the General 
Framework’, in Marion Dreyer and Ortwin Renn (eds.), Food Safety Governance. Integrating 
Science, Precaution and Public Involvement (Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2009), p. 
100, citing from the case C-157/96, The Queen v Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food 
[1998] ECR I-02211, para. 63.  
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degree of certainty. Sometimes we know what we don’t know – and 
the precautionary principle turned ignorance into knowledge.” 1232 
 
In the WTO context, however, the debate continues whether the precautionary 
principle has to be recognised as a general principle of customary international 
law.  
 
As such, the precautionary principle is not explicitly mentioned in the SPS 
Agreement. Nevertheless, in several SPS cases panels and the Appellate Body 
have been prompted to reflect upon the applicability of the precautionary 
principle because parties had invoked it.  
 
In the case EC – Hormones, the European Communities (EC), for supporting its 
claim that its measures in dispute were based on a risk assessment, invoked the 
precautionary principle as a general principle of customary international law.1233 
On the other hand, the EC explicitly renounced invoking the specific provision 
of Article 5.7 SPS.1234  
 
Examining the precautionary principle and its relevance for interpreting the SPS 
Agreement in general, the Panel in the Hormones case noted the following:  
 
“To the extent that this principle could be considered as part of 
customary international law and be used to interpret Article 5.1 and 
5.2 on the assessment of risks as a customary rule of interpretation of 
public international law (as that phrase is used in Article 3.2 of the 
DSU), we consider that this principle would not override the explicit 
wording of Articles 5.1 and 5.2 outlined above, in particular since 
                                                 
1232 David Magnus, ‘Risk Management versus the Precautionary Principle. Agnotology as a 
Strategy in the Debate over Genetically Engineered Organisms,’ in Robert N. Proctor and 
Londa Schiebinger (eds.), Agnotology. The Making and Unmaking of Ignorance (Stanford 
University Press, 2008), p. 253.  
1233 EC – Hormones, Panel Report,  para. 8.157. 
1234 EC – Hormones, Panel Report, para. 8.157. Previously, whilst addressing the concept of 
‘zero risk’, the Panel referred to Article 5.7 as a provision explicitly dealing “with situations 
where there is scientific uncertainty regarding risks related to a substance (…)” (see footnote 
no. 1036 above). In risk analysis, the precautionary principle is conventionally associated 
with the risk management phase. The European Commission, for instance, conceived 
precaution as a risk management principle, noting that “the precautionary principle is 
particularly relevant to the management of risk. The principle, which is essentially used by 
decision-makers in the management of risks should not be confused with the element of 
caution that scientists apply in their assessment of scientific data” (Ellen Vos and Frank 
Wendler, ‘Legal and Institutional Aspects of the General Framework’, in Marion Dreyer and 
Ortwin Renn (eds.), Food Safety Governance. Integrating Science, Precaution and Public 
Involvement (Springer-Verlag, 2009), p. 100, citing from the European Commission’s 
Communication on the Precautionary Principle of 2000 [CEC 2000a: summary, para 4]). 
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the precautionary principle has been incorporated and given a 
specific meaning in Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement.” 1235 
 
Subsequently, the Appellate Body in the Hormones case confirmed the findings 
of the Panel with regard to the precautionary principle. Starting point of the 
analysis of the Appellate Body in the Hormones case was the request of the 
European Communities (EC) to reverse the finding of the Panel concerning the 
precautionary principle. In this regard, the Appellate Body noted that the EC 
have submitted “that the precautionary principle is, or has become, ‘a general 
customary rule of international law’ or at least ‘a general principle of law’ ”.1236 
In view of the EC, applying the precautionary principle to the case at hand 
means “that it is not necessary for all scientists around the world to agree on the 
‘possibility or magnitude’ of the risk, nor for all or most of the WTO Members 
to perceive and evaluate the risk in the same way”.1237 Furthermore, the EC 
“stressed that Articles 5.1 and 5.2 do not prescribe a particular type of risk 
assessment and do not prevent Members from being cautious in their risk 
assessment exercise”.1238 Referring to their precautionary nature, the EC held 
that its measures were in line with the requirements of Articles 2.2 and 2.3, as 
well as of Articles 5.1, 5.2, and 5.5 to 5.6 SPS.1239 
 
Next, the Appellate Body reviewed the submissions of the United States (US) 
and of Canada, respectively. The US argued that the “precautionary principle” is 
more an “approach” rather than a “principle”, thus not representing customary 
international law.1240  
 
Canada, at least, “concedes that the ‘precautionary approach’ or ‘concept’ is ‘an 
emerging principle of law’ which may in the future crystallize into one of the 
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations’ within the meaning of 
Article 38(19(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice”.1241 
 
The Appellate Body embarked on discussing the role of the precautionary 
principle in international law in general and in WTO law in particular by 
looking at the state of the debate in academia, courts and legislative processes. 
The Appellate Body found that the precautionary principle is considered “by 
some” as “having crystallized into a general principle of customary international 
                                                 
1235 EC – Hormones, Panel Report, para. 8.157 (emphasis by the Panel).  
1236 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 121. Footnote no. 86 refers to the EC’s 
appellant’s submission, para. 91,  
1237 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 121 (original emphasis).  
1238 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 121 (footnote omitted).  
1239 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 121 (footnote omitted).  
1240 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 122 (footnote omitted).  
1241 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 122 (original emphasis, footnote omitted).  
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environmental law”.1242 In contrast, the Appellate Body considered it “less than 
clear” “[w]hether it has been widely accepted by Members as a principle of 
general or customary international law”.1243  
 
In footnote no. 92 of paragraph 123, the Appellate Body shed light on the state 
of the debate among leading scholars. As a first grouping, the Appellate Body 
gathered authors arguing that the precautionary principle, although still 
evolving, has achieved the status of a principle of customary international law. 
Exponents of this group were identified by the Appellate Body as authors like P. 
Sands, J. Cameron and J. Abouchar.1244 The second grouping of authors 
considered it, at least, doubtful whether the “precautionary principle” has yet 
reached the status of a principle of international law. Proponents of this second 
position were singled out by the Appellate Body as authors like P. Birnie and A. 
Boyle, L. Gündling, A. deMestral, and D. Bodansky.1245  
 
Challenged by this ambiguous state of the debate about the status of the 
precautionary principle in international law, the Appellate Body considered it 
“unnecessary, and probably imprudent … to take a position on this important, 
but abstract, question”.1246 Nevertheless, the Appellate Body found it important, 
on the other hand, to note four aspects of the status of the precautionary 
principle vis-à-vis the SPS Agreement. 
 
First, the Appellate Body observed “that the precautionary principle has not 
been written into the SPS Agreement as a ground for justifying SPS measures 
that are otherwise inconsistent with the obligations of Members set out in 
particular provisions of that Agreement”.1247  
 
Second, the Appellate Body noted that the precautionary principle is reflected in 
several provisions of the SPS Agreement. Foremost, the precautionary principle 
is reflected in Article 5.7 SPS.1248 In this respect, the Appellate Body agreed 
                                                 
1242 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 123 (emphasis by the Appellate Body). 
Further reflecting on the role of the precautionary principle in international environmental 
law, the Appellate Body noted, however, that in the case concerning the Gabcikovo-
Nagymaros Project between Hungary and Slovakia, the International Court of Justice did not 
recognise the precautionary principle as being part of a set of new norms and standards which 
have been developed in a number of new instruments for environmental protection and in 
international environmental law  (ibid., para. 123, footnote no. 93).  
1243 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 123 (emphases by the Appellate Body, 
footnote no. 92 addressed in main text).  
1244 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 123, footnote no. 92. 
1245 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 123, footnote no. 92. 
1246 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 123.   
1247 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 124.  
1248 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 124.  
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with the European Communities “that there is no need to assume that Article 5.7 
exhausts the relevance of a precautionary principle”.1249  
 
Additionally, the precautionary principle was found by the Appellate Body to be 
reflected in the sixth paragraph of the preamble of the SPS Agreement and in 
Article 3.3 SPS. With regard to the latter provisions, the Appellate Body noted 
that “[t]hese explicitly recognize the right of Members to establish their own 
appropriate level of sanitary protection, which level may be higher (i.e., more 
cautious) than that implied in existing international standards, guidelines and 
recommendations”.1250  
 
Third, the Appellate Body advised panels to “bear in mind that responsible, 
representative governments commonly act from perspectives of prudence and 
precaution where risks of irreversible, e.g. life-terminating damage to human 
health are concerned”.1251  
 
Fourth and lastly, the Appellate Body issued the fundamental statement that “the 
precautionary principle does not, by itself, and without a clear textual directive 
to that effect, relieve a panel from the duty of applying the normal (i.e. 
customary international law) principles of treaty interpretation in reading the 
provisions of the SPS Agreement”. 1252 
 
On the question whether the precautionary principle has to be taken into account 
in the dispute at hand, the Panel in the case EC – Biotech first referred to the 
statement of the Appellate Body in EC – Hormones reflecting on the role of the 
Precautionary Principle.  
 
The Appellate Body in EC – Hormones once observed that the precautionary 
principle was considered “by some” as “having crystallized into a general 
principle of customary international environmental law”. However, the 
Appellate Body considered it “less than clear” “[W]hether it has been widely 
accepted by Members as a principle of general or customary international 
law”.1253  
 
The Panel in EC – Biotech, noting that the Appellate Body had made its 
statement in 1998, perceived that “the legal debate over whether the 
precautionary principle constitutes a recognized principle of general or 
                                                 
1249 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 124. 
1250 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 124. 
1251 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 124. 
1252 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 124. 
1253 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 123 (emphasis by the Appellate Body, 
footnote omitted.  
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customary international law is still ongoing”.1254 With respect to international 
jurisprudence, the Panel observed that “there has, to date, been no authoritative 
decision by an international court or tribunal which recognizes the precautionary 
principle as a principle of general or customary international law”.1255 On the 
other hand, with regard to rule-making at the international level, the Panel 
considered that “provisions explicitly or implicitly applying the precautionary 
principle have been incorporated into numerous international conventions and 
declarations, although, for the most part, they are environmental conventions 
and declarations”.1256 Finally, with view on legal doctrine, the Panel noted that, 
on the one hand, “many authors have expressed the view that the precautionary 
principle exists as a general principle in international law”, whereas, “[A]t the 
same time, … others have expressed scepticism and consider that the 
precautionary principle has not yet attained the status of a general principle in 
international law”.1257   
 
Concluding that the legal status of the precautionary principle “remains 
unsettled”, the Panel in the Biotech case did as the Appellate Body in EC – 
Hormones had done and refrained from taking a position on this issue. The 
Panel justified its decision for not attempting “to resolve this complex issue” 
with prudence and the lack of necessity to do so in the case at hand.1258 Hence, 
the decision of the Panel in the Biotech case for not reconsidering the issue of 
the precautionary principle effected in the confirmation of the previous 
jurisprudence. Therefore, the legal situation remained as has been the case so 
far, i.e. the DSB continued not to apply the precautionary principle in SPS cases.  
Thus, as far as GMOs are concerned, the SPS Agreement is applicable, but not 
the precautionary principle. Yet, the SPS Agreement only provides Article 5.7 as 
a basis for the introduction of SPS measures in cases of insufficient scientific 
evidence. However, as explained above, Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement only 
provisionally suspends the requirement for carrying out an “objective” risk 
assessment in fulfilment with the requirements of Article 5.1 of the SPS 
Agreement and for providing sufficient scientific evidence “within a reasonable 
period of time”. Failure to do so might lead to “undue delay” according to 
Annex C(1)(a) of the SPS Agreement, as was the case in EC – Biotech. As 
mentioned above, the only temporary suspension of the obligation to carry out a 
                                                 
1254 EC – Biotech, Panel Reports, para. 7.88.  
1255 EC – Biotech, Panel Reports, para, 7.88 (footnote omitted).  
1256 EC – Biotech, Panel Reports, para. 7.88. With footnote no. 263, the Panel explicitly 
referred to the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the Convention on 
Biological Diversity and the Cartagena Protocol.  
1257 EC – Biotech, Panel Reports, para. 7.88. In footnotes no. 266 and 267, the Panel listed 
various authors with respective diverging positions on the issue.  
1258 EC – Biotech, Panel Reports, para. 7.89; and Oren Perez, ‘Anomalies at the precautionary 
kingdom: reflections on the GMO Panel’s decision’, in: World Trade Review (2007), 6:2, 
265-280, p. 267. 
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risk assessment may be seen as a reflection of the positivist belief that in any 
case additional scientific information can be obtained. In this respect, Catherine 
Button found it “fair to suggest that the Appellate Body would not allow WTO 
Members to take precautionary action based solely on wholly unsubstantiated 
concerns about possible negative health effects”. However, at the same time, 
Button acknowledged that the relevant provisions of the SPS Agreement are 
expressions of the belief that scientific uncertainties are remediable sooner or 
later – hence a rather positivist assumption:  
 
“An additional, and more significant, problem is that the structure of 
Article 5.7 supposes that all types of uncertainty can be remedied by 
further research. Uncertainty does not always take the form of a gap 
which can be filled at all, or within any predictable period of time. 
By conditioning recourse to Article 5.7 on the obligation to ‘seek to 
obtain the additional information necessary for a more objective 
assessment of risk and review the sanitary or phytosanitary measure 
accordingly within a reasonable period of time’, the SPS Agreement 
does not provide any avenue for action in the face of enduring or 
irremediable uncertainty.”1259 
 
However, in the case of GMOs, it is precisely such an “avenue for action in the 
face of enduring or irremediable uncertainty” which might be required. With 
regard to “enduring or irremediable uncertainty”, Ulrich Beck’s expression of 
manufactured uncertainties may be recalled. Especially with respect to biotech 
products, Beck noted that “[t]he victory of science once again imposes on us the 
burden of making crucial decisions which may affect our very survival without 
any proper foundations in knowledge. Thus this is a matter not of risk but of 
uncertainty”.1260 
 
C. In Need for Alternative Assessments 
 
In terms of a reminder, the following three features established by looking at 
risk and risk assessment shall be recalled.  
 
The first basic feature was the distinction between hazard and risk. That 
distinction showed that risk assessment is an intellectual process, transforming 
‘given’ facts (i.e. hazards) into measurements indicating probabilities (i.e. risks).  
 
                                                 
1259 Catherine Button, The Power to Protect. Trade, Health, and Uncertainty in the WTO 
(Hart Publishing, 2004), p. 116 (footnotes omitted).  
1260 Ulrich Beck, World Risk Society, (Polity Press, 1999/2005), p. 105. 
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A second basic feature of risk assessment was the requirement of inferential 
bridges. Inferential bridges are necessary for overcoming data gaps and theory 
gaps. The requirement for inferential bridges in risk assessment underlines the 
theoretical character of risk assessment, resembling to ‘bold theoretical 
structures over swamps of ignorance.’  
 
A third issue discussed in risk theory is the distinction between risk and 
uncertainty. As bigger the time span for anticipating future events, as more an 
SPS risk assessment will reach its limits. Whereas laboratory sciences may be 
appropriate for overcoming short inference bridges, they seem inappropriate 
where long-term forecasts are required. The practical question suggested by 
Ulrich Beck, that is to question whether an endeavour is able to attract insurance 
coverage or not, may be indicative for discerning between situations of risk and 
situations of uncertainty. The latter, by not being able to attract coverage by 
private insurers, are considered uncertain, thus justifying precautionary 
measures.  
 
Applying the three features identified above, it can be shown that variable forms 
of assessments have been developed. In particular, short-term oriented safety 
assessments can be distinguished from longer-term assessments analysing 
security-related questions such as food security or global warming. In the 
following, applications of conventional risk assessments for evaluating GMO 
risks, so-called biosafety assessments, shall be compared with a long-term 
oriented food security assessment, namely the International Assessment of 
Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development (IAASTD).  
 
The controversy about biotechnology applications in agricultural production 
(‘green biotechnology’)1261 largely remained a safety debate. Biosafety 
assessments are usually centring on the one-dimensional question ‘whether 
biotech products in general are safe or not’.1262 Within the biosafety debate, two 
questions are of particular interest. On the one hand, there are food safety issues, 
i.e., whether GMOs are safe for human consumption. On the other hand, there is 
the question whether GMO seeds may cause adverse effects to the environment. 
Both issues, i.e., the food safety issue as well as questions about adverse 
environmental effects, remained within the limits of a classical safety debate. In 
other words, the focus of the biotech controversy largely remained on questions 
about direct effects of GMOs. As a consequence, inference bridges for 
overcoming gaps in scientific data or scientific theory were rather narrow. The 
GMO controversy was barely linked to questions related to sustainable 
                                                 
1261 In this paragraph, the discussion focuses on biotech applications in agriculture (‘green 
biotechnology’). The reason is that biotechnology applications are more controversial in 
agriculture than in pharmaceuticals (‘red biotechnology’) and that green biotechnology is at 
the heart of WTO trade disputes. 
1262 EC – Biotech, Panel Report, para. 8.3.  
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agriculture. In particular, the question whether green biotechnology is 
sustainable commonly remained outside the scope of typical GMO biosafety 
assessments. Unsurprisingly though, the question about the insurability of 
biotechnologies remained largely unaddressed and the debate was diverted to 
issues of precaution. With respect to the applicability of the precautionary 
principle in the GMO debate, David Magnus observed:  
 
“Some scientists continue to raise concerns about the safety and 
environmental impact of GEOs.1263 However, the mainstream view 
(expressed by leading scientific bodies such as the National Research 
Council of the National Academics of Science) is that most GEOs 
are safe and that, in principle, the technology can be safely utilized. 
However, opponents of biotechnology appeal to the fact that there 
are minority scientific views and to the inherently unknowable nature 
of biological entities as grounds for claiming that GEOs have not 
been proved safe ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’. At this point, 
continued creation of uncertainty becomes a viable strategy to avoid 
introduction of biotechnology.” 1264 
 
In contrast, an example for an alternative approach is the International 
Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for 
Development (IAASTD). The IAASTD was mandated to evaluate prospects for 
future food security from a broad perspective.1265 Hereby, one of the issues was 
the question whether biotechnology applications in agriculture (‘green 
biotechnology’) is a building bloc or a stumbling bloc for sustainable 
agriculture.1266 The IAASTD panel adopted a broad approach and embarked on 
                                                 
1263 David Magnus used the term genetically engineered organisms (GEOs) synonymic with 
the term genetically modified organisms (GMOs). 
1264 David Magnus, ‘Risk Management versus the Precautionary Principle. Agnotology as a 
Strategy in the Debate over Genetically Engineered Organisms,’ in Robert N. Proctor and 
Londa Schiebinger (eds.), Agnotology. The Making and Unmaking of Ignorance (Stanford 
University Press, 2008), p. 258.  
1265  “The main goal of IAASTD is to provide decision makers with the information 
they need to reduce hunger and poverty, improve rural livelihoods, and facilitate 
equitable, environmentally, socially and economically sustainable development 
through the generation of, access to and use of agricultural knowledge, science 
and technology (AKST). IAASTD uses a conceptual framework that enables 
systematic analysis and appraisal of the above challenges based on common 
concepts and terminology” (International Assessment of Agricultural 
Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development, Agriculture at a 
Crossroads, Global Report (IAASTD, 2009), p. 3).  
1266 With respect to sustainability as a concept, Elisabeth Bürgi Bonanomi observed that 
“although the concept of sustainability as a normative tool of international law is still vague 
and its precise content contentious, it has been widely accepted that it aims at the integration 
of economic, social and environmental concerns” (Elisabeth Bürgi Bonanomi, ‘Agricultural 
Trade: Taking Integration Seriously,’ published in 7/17/2007 SEIN Environmental Impacts of 
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a comprehensive assessment of the state of world agriculture and prospects for 
future development. Adopting a long-term perspective, the IAASTD went as far 
as questioning the very basis of industrial agriculture, that is, its dependency on 
non-renewable inputs such as oil. 
 
The IAASTD had to deal with a range of scientific uncertainties. Assumptions 
underlying predictions about population growth, extrapolations of consumption 
patterns, and the availability of exhaustible resources are examples for such 
gaps. As a consequence, inference bridges underlying the IAASTD report are 
rather long.  
 
The findings of the IAASTD report, as already indicated by its title Agriculture 
at a Crossroads, are well balanced. They avoid taking position in favour or 
against industrial agriculture in the short term.1267 The IAASTD report 
acknowledged the capacity of industrialised agriculture to provide 
unprecedented quantities of food in particular for supplying growing populations 
in Developing Countries. In a long-term perspective, however, the IAASTD 
report provided scientific data indicating that industrial agriculture is 
unsustainable due to its reliance on exhaustible resources. It was in that context 
that the IAASTD considered green biotechnology. Experts assembled in 
IAASTD working groups went further than to question whether biotechnology 
applications in agriculture “are safe or not”. Interestingly, the presumption that 
GMOs ‘are safe’ enabled the IAASTD to recall the basic question of world 
agriculture: how can we feed a growing population not only in twenty years, but 
in generations to come? A shift of perspective, from short-term economic 
objectives to the long-term question of common survival, enabled the IAASTD 
to re-launch the discussion about objectives and priorities: is the biotech dispute 
about market access? Or are GMOs a tool for climate change mitigation? One 
merit of the IAASTD review is that it opened the field for discussion beyond the 
narrow frame of short-term risk assessment. In contrast to positivist approaches 
towards risks, the IAASTD report enabled to refocus on what the fundamental 
questions really are; such as whether biotechnology is part of the solution or part 
of the problem, i.e. to refocus on food security considerations instead of 
reductionist safety assessments. Though, the IAASTD emphasised the 
                                                                                                                                                        
Business eJournal and Social Science Research Network SSRN, p. 13. In another paper, Bürgi 
Bonanomi defined ‘sustainability’ as the ‘carefully balancing’ of the three dimensions 
‘economy,’ ‘ecology,’ and ‘social solidarity’ (Elisabeth Bürgi Bonanomi, ‘Was wäre 
nachhaltige Aussenwirtschaftspolitik?’ in Neue Zürcher Zeitung, June 3, 2010, p. 28 
1267  “The IAASTD does not advocate specific policies or practices; it assesses the 
major issues facing AKST [agricultural knowledge, science and technology] and 
points towards a range of AKST options for action that meet development and 
sustainability goals. It is policy relevant, but not policy prescriptive” 
(International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology 
for Development (IAASTD, 2009), Agriculture at a Crossroads, Global Report, 
p. x). 
 405 
requirement for weighing, balancing and putting into context acquired 
information and scientific data:  
 
“A key point is that an assessment is not simply a review of the 
relevant literature; it can be based, in part, on a literature review, but 
also needs to provide an assessment of the veracity and applicability 
of the information and the uncertainty of outcomes in relation to the 
context of the identified questions or issues within a specified 
authorizing environment.” 1268 
 
With regard to underlying epistemological issues, it is noteworthy that the 
IAASTD discerned between scientific review and assessment. In this respect, a 
table provided by the IAASTD shall be reproduced below:1269 
 
 Scientific Reviews  Assessment  
Audience  Undertaken for scientists  Undertaken for decision-makers from a specified authorizing environment  
Conducted by  One or a few scientists  
A larger and varied group based on 
relevant geographic and disciplinary 
representation  
Issues/Topics  Often deal with a single topic  Generally a broader and complex issue  
Identifies gaps in  Research issues generally driven by scientific curiosity  
Knowledge for implementation of 
outcomes; problem-driven  
Uncertainty 
statements  Not always required  Essential  
Judgment  Hidden; a more objective analysis  Required and clearly flagged  
Synthesis  Not required, but sometimes important  Essential to reduce complexity  
Coverage  Exhaustive, historical  
Sufficient to deal with main range of 
uncertainty associated with the identified 
issues  
 
Asking the question whether biotechnology is a building bloc for sustainable 
agriculture, the answer of the IAASTD was, again, nuanced. The IAASTD 
acknowledged that biotechnology may contribute for increasing yields in the 
short term. On similar grounds, the IAASTD report also recognised that 
biotechnology might help to maintain yields in cases of climatic disruptions. On 
the other hand, the IAASTD report did not consider biotechnology as the 
panacea to achieve sustainability in agricultural production:  
 
                                                 
1268 International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for 
Development (IAASTD), Agriculture at a Crossroads, Global Report, p. 3.  
1269 International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for 
Development (IAASTD), Agriculture at a Crossroads, Global Report, p. 5 (with reference to 
Watson and Gitay, 2004)  
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“Crops derived from GE technologies have faced a myriad of 
challenges stemming from technical, political, environmental, 
intellectual-property, biosafety, and trade-related controversies, none 
of which are likely to disappear in the near future. Advocates cite 
potential yield increases, sustainability through reductions in 
pesticide applications, use in no-till agriculture, wider crop 
adaptability, and improved nutrition (Huang et al., 2002b; Christou 
and Twyman, 2004). Critics cite environmental risks and the 
widening social, technological and economic disparities as 
significant drawbacks (Pengue, 2005). Concerns include gene flow 
beyond the crop, reduction in crop diversity, increases in herbicide 
use, herbicide resistance (increased weediness), loss of farmer’s 
sovereignty over seed, ethical concerns on origin of transgenes, lack 
of access to IPR held by the private sector, and loss of markets 
owing to moratoriums on GMOs, among others. Finally, because 
new genetic technologies are not the only hurdle between resource-
poor farmers and secure livelihoods (Tripp, 2000), GM technology 
can be only one component of a wider strategy including 
conventional breeding and other forms of agricultural research to 
provide a series of structural, regulatory, and economic evaluations 
that relate economic, political, and scientific context of GE crops to 
their region of adoption.” 1270  
 
Because the IAASTD experts concluded that biotechnology applications in 
agriculture ‘can be only one component of a wider strategy’, at best, 
representatives of the biotech industry finally stepped out from further IAASTD 
                                                 
1270 International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for 
Development (IAASTD, 2009), Agriculture at a Crossroads, Global Report, p. 95). One of 
the editors of the report, professor Robert Watson, summarised the finding that green 
biotechnology, in the long run, might be rather part of the problem than part of the solution, in 
an interview with Sean Poulter from the Daily Mail:  
“Professor Watson and his team made clear that GM or transgenics - moving 
genes between plant species - was not the solution to providing plentiful cheap 
food. He said: "Are transgenics the simple answer to hunger and poverty? I 
would argue, no." He said much more research was needed to establish whether 
they offer benefits and do not harm the environment. Professor Watson said the 
industrialisation of agriculture, of which GM is a part, has led to the heavy use 
of artificial fertilisers and other chemicals. These have harmed the soil structure 
and polluted water ways. The leeching of the soil of essential minerals means 
food is less healthy than 60 years ago. The professor, a renowned expert on 
climate change and chief scientist at the UK food and farming department 
DEFRA, suggested organic farming practices offer many benefits” (Sean 
Poulter, ‘GM foods not ‘not the answer’ to world’s food shortage crisis, report 
say’, in the Daily Mail, 16 April 2008).  
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proceedings, and the United States, Canada and Australia refused to approve the 
final IAASTD report without reservations.1271 
 
Because, so far, the GMO largely remained a safety debate, opponents of 
biotechnology applications in agriculture were forced to rely on the 
precautionary principle to make their point. In this respect, David Magnus 
observed:  
 
“The precautionary principle originated as a tool to assist in science-
based risk assessment, one that would allow regulation in the face of 
uncertainty. In the hands of some NGOs, it became an 
epistemological hurdle that led to an agnotological strategy that 
ironically mirrored the agnogenesis1272 strategy on the part of 
industry that had necessitated in the creation of the precautionary 
principle. In response, industry has reinforced its appeal to science 
and developed a strategy that valorizes science-based risk as real to 
the exclusion of all value-based considerations. This construction of 
ignorance in the realm of values has led to a clash between the ways 
in which regulators assess and the public experiences risk.”1273 
 
Comparing safety assessments, e.g., GMO safety assessments, and alternative 
(food) security assessments, e.g., the IAASTD assessment, the following 
findings can be made:  
 
Different risk assessment approaches provide different outcomes: biosafety risk 
assessments typically answer to one-dimensional ‘yes or no’-questions (are 
GMOs safe or not?), whereas (food) security assessments usually try to find 
                                                 
1271 John Vidal, environment editor of the newspaper the Guardian, observed:  
“The GM industry, which helped fund the report, together with the UN's Food 
and Agriculture Organisation, the World Health Organisation and the British and 
US governments, abandoned talks last year after heated debate.  
The scientists said they saw little role for GM, as it is currently practised, in 
feeding the poor on a large scale. "Assessment of the technology lags behind its 
development, information is anecdotal and contradictory, and uncertainty about 
possible benefits and damage is unavoidable," said the report” (John Vidal, 
‘Change in farming can feed world – report’, in The Guardian, 16 April 2008).  
1272 In Agnotology. The Making and Unmaking of Ignorance (2008), Robert Proctor and 
Londa Schiebinger established the terms agnotology, meaning the study of ignorance, and 
agnogenesis for characterising strategies for the deliberative production of ignorance (Robert 
N. Proctor, ‘Agnotology. A Missing Term to Describe the Cultural Production of Ignorance 
(and Its Study),’ in Robert N. Proctor and Londa Schiebinger (eds.), Agnotology. The Making 
and Unmaking of Ignorance (Stanford University Press, 2008), pp. 27-28 and 11. 
1273 David Magnus, ‘Risk Management versus the Precautionary Principle. Agnotology as a 
Strategy in the Debate over Genetically Engineered Organisms,’ in Robert N. Proctor and 
Londa Schiebinger (eds.), Agnotology. The Making and Unmaking of Ignorance (Stanford 
University Press, 2008), p. 264. 
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answers to multi-dimensional questions (what is the way to sustainable 
agriculture?). Safety assessments resemble to scientific review, whereas (food) 
security assessments are more inclusive enterprises. Whereas safety assessments 
commonly shy from value judgements, pretending objectivity, (food) security 
assessments require the weighing and balancing of information and scientific 
data, provided judgements are clearly flagged.  
 
Safety risk assessments and (food) security risk assessments differ in the way 
they approach scientific uncertainty: safety assessments try to establish cause-
and-effect relationships in positive ways (does a certain hazard cause adverse 
effects?). (Food) security assessments, on the other hand, aim at providing risk 
scenarios and options for dealing with such scenarios. To this purpose, scientific 
theories, applied through computer modelling, are indispensable tools. Marsha 
Echols, for example, pointed at deficiencies of conventional risk assessment 
approaches, in particular scientific uncertainties and enlarged time horizons:  
 
“Science itself is not completely objective. For example, a risk 
assessment involves many subjective decisions, such as whether to 
base conclusions on incomplete data, the acceptance or rejection of 
data involving different populations and the choice of methodology. 
In addition science can be incorrect or uncertain, as occurred with 
‘mad cow disease’ and the dioxin scare. Science itself has at times 
proven itself to be markedly inadequate to make judgments that 
withstand time.”1274 
 
The SPS Agreement does not provide a basis for longer-term security 
assessments, such as food security assessments. This may become a problem 
when long-term risks are not covered by GATT Article XX but are falling under 
the SPS Agreement. In this regard, one may think, for example, of implications 
of climate change and global warming on international food trade, e.g. import 
restrictions on certain air-freighted products with high ‘carbon footprints’. In 
this respect, the rather binary approach of the SPS Agreement might become 
problematic. In this respect, Catherine Button observed:  
 
“In this respect, the structure of the SPS Agreement raises some 
problems as it posits a clear line between circumstances in which 
there is a scientific justification and circumstances in which there is 
not. This binary division is problematic because scientific evidence 
is constituted in a spectrum, with greater or lesser degrees of 
uncertainty. Who is to say at what point the uncertainties are so 
                                                 
1274 Marsha A. Echols, Food Safety and the WTO. The Interplay of Culture, Science and 
Technology (Kluwer Law International, 2001), p. 150.  
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pervasive or so significant that a scientific justification for regulatory 
action does not exist?” 1275 
 
Different risk assessment approaches differ in their impact on public opinion. 
Safety assessments concluding whether a certain object is safe or not, are 
carrying with them an aura of scientific ‘objectivity’. Findings of alternative 
(food) security assessments, on the other hand, remain prone to critique from 
various directions. For example, there are still scientist questioning the existence 
of global warming and potential adverse effects.1276 Hence, impacts of security 
assessments rely on their respective reception by the public, in particular by 
regulators and policy-makers. Not only scientific thoroughness decides upon 
further proceedings of security assessments, but also public perception. 
Therefore, security assessments are more dependent on transparency and 
legitimacy than safety assessments.1277 
 
The assessment reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) and the IAASTD assessment are examples of different public receptions 
of security assessments. Whereas the IPPC assessments got huge public 
attention, resulting in many high-level events and initiatives under the umbrella 
of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
                                                 
1275 Catherine Button, The Power to Protect. Trade, Health, and Uncertainty in the WTO 
(Hart Publishing, 2004), p. 231.  
1276 For example, in an article entitled ‘Global Warming: A Convenient Lie’, Andrew Gavin 
Marshall did not question scientific data showing an increase in temperature and CO2, but 
questioned the cause-and-effect relationship between temperature increase and rising CO2-
emissions, claiming that implicit assumptions underlying the majority’s opinion are wrong 
(Andrew Gavin Marshall, ‘Global Warming: A Convenient Lie’, Global Research, March 15, 
2007). In his article, Marshall also made reference to a documentary of Martin Durkin called 
‘The Great Global Warming Swindle’, first aired by UK’s Channel 4 in March 2007. On the 
occasion of the UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen in December 2009 (COP 15), 
Robert M. Carter, research professor at James Cook University and the University of 
Adelaide, summarised major arguments of the so-called climate change deniers in an article 
entitled ‘Copenhagen and Global Warming: Ten Facts and then Myths on Climate Change’ 
(Global Research, December 9, 2009).  
1277 With respect to transparency and legitimacy, the drafters of the IAAST report observed:  
“To be effective and legitimate, the assessment process was designed to be open, 
transparent, reviewed, and widely representative of stakeholders and relevant 
experts, and the resulting documents to be broadly reviewed by independent 
experts from governments, private and nongovernmental organizations, as well 
as by representatives of the participating governments. Obtaining a balance of 
opinions in a global assessment based on a literature review and relevant 
expertise is an ongoing and iterative challenge to ensure that it encompasses a 
broad range of disciplinary and geographical experience and different 
knowledge systems. The IAASTD has been designed in a way that attempts to 
ensure effectiveness and legitimacy” (International Assessment of Agricultural 
Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development (IAASTD, 2009), 
Agriculture at a Crossroads, Global Report, p. 4). 
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and the Kyoto Protocol,1278 the IAASTD assessment received relatively little 
public attention. The difference can be made that a safety assessment comes 
along with the credibility of being scientifically ‘objective’, it carries along the 
presumption of being ‘true’. On the other hand, the impact of a security 
assessment depends on the public support it enjoys. For example, the impact of a 
security assessment depends on whether its findings are supported by vocal 
segments of public opinion,1279 as was the case with the assessment reports of 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), in contrast to the 
IAASTD assessment.  
 
In terms of a conclusion, it was shown that the two forms of assessments may 
provide different outcomes by answering different questions on the same 
subject. For instance, although biosafety assessments may arrive at the 
conclusion that GMOs are ‘safe,’ security assessments may continue to raise 
objections with regard to long-term effects of GMO applications in agriculture. 
Whereas biosafety assessments are usually considering GMOs on a product-
specific basis, security assessments are also looking at the way GMOs are 
produced. If, for instance, a security assessment establishes that genetically 
modified seeds are produced in ways not reproducible on the ground, this 
finding has to be taken into account in the final decision. Hence, the requirement 
for political guidance extends to the choice between different forms of 
assessment. Proponents of ‘empirical’, i.e., industrial agriculture rely on safety 
assessments also in the case of GMOs. From the perspective of ‘empirical’, i.e., 
commercial agriculture, genetic engineering is nothing new, but the continued 
application of technology applications in agriculture. From an anthropocentric 
perspective, it is sufficient to ask the question whether GMOs ‘are safe or not.’ 
Supporters of ‘rational’, i.e., sustenance agriculture, on the other hand, are 
inclined to long-term security assessments such as the IAASTD assessment, for 
instance. From the perspective of ‘rational’, i.e., ecological agriculture, 
biotechnology is a new technology whose ramifications need to be assessed in 
the broader context. From an ecocentric perspective, the question is whether 
GMOs ‘are contributing to long-term sustenance or not.’1280 Not only answers to 
the latter question, but also fundamental choices among different types of 
assessment are influenced by underlying worldviews of those who decide. 
Having shown that various decisions have to be taken prior to risk assessment, 
                                                 
1278 The IPCC was created by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the 
World Meteorological Organization (WMO). 
1279 One remembers, for example, Davis Guggenheim’s film An Inconvenient Truth (2006) 
about Al Gore’s global warming awareness campaign.  
1280 Therefore, long-term oriented food security assessments can arrive at the general 
conclusion that the application of GMOs in agriculture may pose a risk to food security in the 
long run, despite safety assessments have proven that specific GMOs are ‘safe.’ This is an 
additional argument backing the prognosis that the GMO controversy cannot be concluded by 
strengthening the role of science.  
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the question arises how these decisions shall be taken, and by whom. In terms of 
a working hypothesis, it is argued that more inclusive approaches are required, 
following the model of the IAASTD.  
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PART FIVE:  FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR REGULATION 
 
In part four, it was shown that panels have tried to establish a rather positivist 
interpretation of ‘science’ and ‘risk assessment.’ The Appellate Body, on the 
other hand, has tried to find some middle ground between a positivist and a 
relativist interpretation of SPS provisions. However, it was pointed at new legal 
questions deriving from the middle position taken up by the Appellate Body. 
Essentially, the SPS jurisprudence did not achieve of resolving transatlantic 
trade conflicts for good, especially not those over hormones and GMOs. Despite 
deference to science and scientific principles, trade disputes continue. The key 
question why trade disputes are ongoing despite the SPS measures at issue are – 
or should be – ‘based on science’ is addressed in the following part five on 
future prospects for regulation which concludes the study at hand.  
 
From a theoretical perspective, the fact that disputes about the appropriateness 
of certain levels of protection continue to occur at the international level despite 
a ‘science-based approach’ is applied can be interpreted in two ways:  
 
First, it may be the case that scientific rigour, albeit defining appropriate levels 
of protection to a large extent, has not (yet) become the sole and determining 
yardstick in every case. Particularly in politicised issues, such as hormones and 
GMOs, levels of protection seem to be determined by political means, at the end 
of the day. Thus, from an objectivist perspective, the main problem seems to be 
that risk assessments at national levels are “contaminated” by national policy 
considerations. 
 
A second, more profound interpretation of the fact that disputes over sanitary 
and phytosanitary protection persist at international levels may question the 
objectivity of science itself. Whereas the first alternative presumes that science 
is objective in principle, the second alternative considers that science – and 
scientists – are intrinsically embedded in, and part of, the society within which 
they operate. The first approach, in consequence, must advocate for a separation 
of scientific and political procedures and assign primacy to the former. Because 
of its belief in the ability of science to establish the facts of the matter in a 
definite, i.e. ‘positive’ way, the first approach is called positivist or objectivist. 
The second approach, on the other hand, conceives science as part and parcel of 
respective societies and performing before the background of a specific 
historical, cultural and economic context. Because the societal matrix upon 
which a specific scientific apparatus is operating is considered unique and 
distinguished from others, the outcome of respective scientific endeavours is 
thus relative to that particular society it is operating in. Therefore, the latter 
approach is termed relativist, contextualist or constructivist.  
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Looking from an epistemological footing, two alternative attempts are 
conceivable in principle: the first alternative aims at accomplishing the 
objectivist attempt of the science-based approach of the SPS Agreement. This is 
the positivist proposal of pursuing and further enforcing the harmonisation of 
SPS standards at the global scale. The second alternative attempts to achieve a 
return to a more sovereignty-oriented approach, as was the case under the 
previous GATT Article XX regime. This is the rather contextualist, 
constructivist or relativist proposal for an abandonment of harmonisation as a 
main objective of the SPS Agreement. Instead of science, deliberation and 
negotiation at international levels shall address fundamental cultural, 
philosophical and political conflicts underlying trade disputes. However, 
following such a contextualist approach implies that panels and the Appellate 
Body must continue to rely upon consistency examinations – similar to the 
previous GATT Article XX considerations –  for examining whether an SPS 
measures is justified or not. Hence, the contextualist approach may attenuate the 
promise for considerable openings of agricultural markets implied in the 
science-based approach of the SPS Agreement.  
 
The two alternative proposals for reforming the SPS Agreement are discussed in 
the following paragraphs.   
 
 
CHAPTER 16 THE POSITIVIST SOLUTION 
 
From a positivist perspective in the proper sense of the word, the jurisdiction of 
the Appellate Body may be seen as a misconception of the science-based 
approach of the SPS Agreement. Positivists may claim that the Appellate Body 
did not interpret the science-based approach of the SPS Agreement ‘positivistic’ 
enough: despite of relying on science and scientific evidence, as expressed by 
international standards, the Appellate Body recognised the determination of 
appropriate levels of protection (ALOP) as a sovereign right of WTO Members 
(and not as an exemption, as found by the Panel), thus counterbalancing the 
objective of worldwide harmonisation of SPS measures (Article 3.1 of the SPS 
Agreement). Therefore, and with view on the cases of hormones and GMOs, 
objectivists would claim that the promise of market-opening for agricultural 
products was jeopardised by the rather contextualist approach of the Appellate 
Body.  
 
Positivists may criticise the softening of the harmonisation objective in Article 3 
of the SPS Agreement by the Appellate Body in EC – Hormones. From a 
positivist perspective, the objective of harmonising SPS measures should rather 
become compulsory. Considering the fact that ‘science’ has been established as 
‘objective yardstick’ by the SPS Agreement, positivists question whether there 
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is room for manoeuvre for national governments to decide upon health 
protection and safety issues. Essentially, positivists may argue that science is 
universal and has therefore little to do with politics and national boundaries.1281 
 
John Jackson, for instance, wondered whether calls for ‘zero risk’ can be 
contained as long as there are remnants of national sovereignty in risk 
evaluation. Jackson noted:  
 
“An interesting ‘sovereignty’ aspect of the SPS Agreement is the 
language related to ‘risk’ when products can cause certain health 
dangers, such as taken up in the WTO Beef Hormones case 
(evaluating the risk of artificial growth hormones causing cancer) 
and the Asbestos case (relating to GATT Article III national 
treatment, and implicating but not deciding about the TBT 
Agreement). The SPS Agreement contains tortured negotiated 
language trying to reconcile international goals of liberalizing trade 
and thus requiring scientific evidence of potential harm (to avoid 
barriers that are really due to protectionist motives), while still giving 
each member the ‘sovereign’ right to determine the level of risk 
which should be tolerated in its society. Since science often declares 
that there is no such thing as totally risk-free circumstances, to allow 
a society to determine that only risk-free products can be imported is 
to deliver a blow to trade liberalization. This is clearly one of the 
most interesting (and perplexing) issues in the perpetual tug-of-war 
between national and international authority and the question of 
which government level will have the authority to make the 
determination of acceptable science and some minimal threshold of 
the risk requirement.” 1282 
 
                                                 
1281 The absurdity of a national connotation of science was best demonstrated by attempts of 
German scientists to develop “German Physics” (“Deutsche Physik”) or “German 
Mathematics” (“Deutsche Mathematik)” during the “Third Reich” in Nazi Germany. For 
example, the “aether theory” (“Äther-Theorie”) of the physician Philipp Lenards, or the 
“Intuitionism” (Intuitionismus”) of the mathematician Ludwig Bieberbach not even gained 
acceptance within the streamlined German scientific community after 1933 and disappeared 
together with national socialist rule in 1945 (see Steffen Richter, ‘Die ‘Deutsche Physik’’, in 
Herbert Mehrtens and Steffen Richter (eds.), Naturwissenschaft, Technik und NS-Ideologie. 
Beiträge zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte des Dritten Reiches (suhrkamp taschenbuch, 1980), pp. 
116-141; and Helmut Lindner, ‘’Deutsche’ und ‘gegentypische’ Mathematik. Zur 
Begründung einer ‘arteignen Mathematik’ im ‘Dritten Reich’ durch Ludwig Bieberbach’, in 
Herbert Mehrtens and Steffen Richter (eds.), Naturwissenschaft, Technik und NS-Ideologie. 
Beiträge zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte des Dritten Reiches (suhrkamp, 1980), pp. 88-115. 
1282 John H. Jackson, Sovereignty, the WTO and Changing Fundamentals of International 
Law (Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 247; with reference to the Appellate Body 
Reports concerning the cases EC – Hormones, para. 124, and Australia – Salmon, para. 125.  
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John Jackson summarised challenges caused by internationalised health and 
safety issues as follows:  
 
“(…) the subject of health clearly demands attention at an 
international level, for several reasons. First, as recognised at least a 
century and half ago, various health issues transgress national 
borders, and by at least 1920 it was recognised that increased world 
trade created added dangers of transmittal of communicable diseases. 
Much more recently the scourge of HIV-AIDS, and the scare caused 
by the possible SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) epidemic, 
as well as the current potential disaster of avian influenza 
demonstrated poignantly the importance of the WHO (World Health 
Organization) and actually led that organization to begin work on 
revising its International Health Regulations (IHRs) to better 
accommodate international activity.” 1283 
 
Considering the global nature of contemporary health and safety risks such as 
avian influenza, swine flu and the issue of GMOs, positivists tend to argue that 
responses to such risks should also be global. In particular, positivists question 
why risk assessment and risk management should remain in respective national 
domains. Insofar, national sovereignty in risk assessment and risk management 
seems to duplicate endeavours of international organisations such as WHO, the 
Codex Alimentarius Commission, IPPC and OIE. Therefore, a positivist solution 
to identified problems with risk assessment and risk management in the context 
of the SPS Agreement might consist in a clear attribution of the whole process 
of risk analysis, i.e. risk assessment and risk management, to international 
organisations.1284 That path is already sketched out in Articles 3.1. and 3.2 of the 
SPS Agreement, reading as follows:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1283 John H. Jackson, ibid.  p. 245 (footnotes omitted).  
1284 However, it has to be recalled that international standards are not developed according to 
scientific principles only. In this respect, Lee Ann Jackson and Marion Jansen emphasised:  
“Codex standards are the outcome of multilateral negotiations based upon risk 
assessment. It is important to communicate this fact to the public and thus signal 
that scientific evidence is only one of the determinants of Codex international 
food safety standards, albeit a very prominent one” (Lee Ann Jackson and 
Marion Jansen, ‘Risk assessment in the international food safety policy arena. 
Can the multilateral institutions encourage unbiased outcomes?’ (2010) 35 Food 
Policy [538-547] 546). 
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Article 3 
 
Harmonization 
 
1. To harmonize sanitary and phytosanitary measures on as wide 
a basis as possible, Members shall base their sanitary or 
phytosanitary measures on international standards, guidelines or 
recommendations, where they exist, except as otherwise provided for 
in this Agreement, and in particular in paragraph 3. 
 
2. Sanitary or phytosanitary measures which conform to 
international standards, guidelines or recommendations shall be 
deemed to be necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health, and presumed to be consistent with the relevant provisions of 
this Agreement and of GATT 1994. 
 
3. Members may introduce or maintain sanitary or phytosanitary 
measures which result in a higher level of sanitary or phytosanitary 
protection than would be achieved by measures based on the relevant 
international standards, guidelines or recommendations, if there is a 
scientific justification, or as a consequence of the level of sanitary or 
phytosanitary protection a Member determines to be appropriate in 
accordance with the relevant provisions of paragraphs 1 through 8 of 
Article 5.1285   Notwithstanding the above, all measures which result 
in a level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection different from that 
which would be achieved by measures based on international 
standards, guidelines or recommendations shall not be inconsistent 
with any other provision of this Agreement.   
 
However, the objective of harmonisation, as expressed in Articles 3.1 and 3.2 of 
the SPS Agreement, is relativised by the permission granted to WTO members 
to opt for higher levels of protection (Article 3.3 of the SPS Agreement). 
Therefore, a positivist solution to the problem of risk controversies in SPS 
disputes would consist in declaring conformity of SPS measures to international 
standards mandatory and abrogating Article 3.3 of the SPS Agreement. Hence, 
Article 3 of the SPS Agreement, after a positivist revision, would read as 
follows:  
 
                                                 
1285 Footnote no. 2 to this paragraph explains the following: “For the purposes of paragraph 3 
of Article 3, there is a scientific justification if, on the basis of an examination and evaluation 
of available scientific information in conformity with the relevant provisions of this 
Agreement, a Member determines that the relevant international standards, guidelines or 
recommendations are not sufficient to achieve its appropriate level of sanitary or 
phytosanitary protection.” 
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Article 3 
 
Harmonization 
 
1. To harmonize sanitary and phytosanitary measures on as wide 
a basis as possible, Members shall base their sanitary or 
phytosanitary measures on international standards, guidelines or 
recommendations, where they exist, except as otherwise provided for 
in this Agreement, and in particular in paragraph 3. 
 
2. Sanitary or phytosanitary measures which conform to 
international standards, guidelines or recommendations shall be 
deemed to be necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health, and presumed to be consistent with the relevant provisions of 
this Agreement and of GATT 1994. 
 
[3. Deleted]  
 
In effect, the positivist proposal would address problems established in SPS case 
law by internationalising risk management: national governments would no 
longer be able to exercise discretion in determining levels of protection deemed 
appropriate, but would have to align respective SPS measures to international 
standards.  
 
Substantive harmonisation of SPS measures at the global scale would mark the 
final triumph of what Marsha Echols called the new paradigm of food as 
commerce. From this perspective, the SPS Agreement, applying principles of 
the physical sciences, provides the basis for the application of principles of the 
economic sciences in international food trade, in particular David Ricardo’s law 
of comparative advantage. In other words, the positivist attempt for substantive 
harmonisation of SPS measures would fulfil the promise for objective regulation 
of international food trade implied in the science-based approach of the SPS 
Agreement. Marsha Echols once encapsulated the positivist dream of an 
objective regulatory framework for international food trade as follows:  
 
“The Uruguay Round’s agricultural negotiators, in their effort to 
prevent such use of food safety standards, rejected the deeply held 
historical, cultural and religious justifications. To limit the use of 
protectionist food safety measures, the Agreement [on the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures] makes 
scientific principles and analysis the only valid basis for a permanent 
food safety measure, thereby limiting the ability of a government to 
place it’s citizens’ cultural or religious beliefs about food above 
international commerce. Food safety is cast neutrally in the 
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perceived certainty of chemistry, biology and applied economics.” 
1286 
 
 
CHAPTER 17 THE RELATIVIST RESPONSE 
 
From the perspective of relativists and subjectivists, SPS cases are proving that 
science is not objective and that the science-based approach does not work. 
Relativists and subjectivists would particularly point at the Hormones and the 
Biotech cases where scientific experts rallied in opposing camps, contradicting 
each others.  
 
Hence, in view of subjectivists, the main problem is the expectation elicited by 
the SPS Agreement that science and scientific risk assessments are appropriate 
yardsticks for assessing risks and for evaluating the legitimacy of SPS measures.  
 
Beside the problem of diverging scientific views and scientific uncertainty, 
subjectivists focus on the inappropriateness of science to address non-scientific 
factors, for example control issues or legitimate ethical concerns.  
 
In this respect, relativists and subjectivists note that the Appellate Body 
interpreted the term risk assessment in the SPS Agreement in a context-sensitive 
and holistic way, thus rejecting the Panel’s objectivistic approach in the two 
Hormones cases.  
 
In addition, relativists and subjectivists observe that the Appellate Body rejected 
the Panel’s view that the right to opt for higher levels of protection is an 
exception. Hence, if the determination of higher levels of protection is 
considered a sovereign right, then the objective of global harmonisation of SPS 
measures should be abandoned. By criticising objectivistic attempts of panels, 
relativists might thus agree with the approach of the Appellate Body to a large 
extent. For relativists, contextualists/constructivists, the objectivistic approach of 
certain panels went too far. In contrast, relativists tend to suggest that the 
sovereign right of WTO Members to determine the level of protection deemed 
appropriate should be made explicit, to the detriment of the objective of 
harmonisation.  
 
On these grounds, relativists and subjectivists hold that the prospect for future 
regulation lies in a revision of the SPS Agreement in line with relativist 
arguments. The focus of a relativists’ attempt to revise the SPS Agreement 
                                                 
1286 Marsha A. Echols, Food Safety and the WTO. The Interplay of Culture, Science and 
Technology (Kluwer Law International, 2001), p. 4 (footnotes omitted).  
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would be to abandon science and scientific risk assessments as principal arbiter 
for evaluating SPS risks. The recognition that science is not objective and risks 
are social constructs forbids the assignment of a particular role to science above 
other considerations, in particular legal reason. Ultimately, subjectivist would 
advocate for a re-assignment of SPS measures under the GATT Article XX 
jurisprudence, or under a similar, law-driven regime.  
 
Paragraph 2 of Article 2 of the SPS Agreement contains the fundamental 
prescription that any sanitary or phytosanitary measures must be “based on 
scientific principles” and can only be maintained with “sufficient scientific 
evidence”.  
 
The full text of Article 2 of the SPS Agreement reads as follows:  
 
Article 2 
 
Basic Rights and Obligations 
 
1. Members have the right to take sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures necessary for the protection of human, animal or plant life 
or health, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with the 
provisions of this Agreement.   
 
2. Members shall ensure that any sanitary or phytosanitary 
measure is applied only to the extent necessary to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health, is based on scientific principles and is 
not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence, except as 
provided for in paragraph 7 of Article 5. 
 
3. Members shall ensure that their sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures do not arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between 
Members where identical or similar conditions prevail, including 
between their own territory and that of other Members.  Sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures shall not be applied in a manner which 
would constitute a disguised restriction on international trade. 
 
4. Sanitary or phytosanitary measures which conform to the 
relevant provisions of this Agreement shall be presumed to be in 
accordance with the obligations of the Members under the provisions 
of GATT 1994 which relate to the use of sanitary or phytosanitary 
measures, in particular the provisions of Article XX(b). 
 
Paragraph 2 of Article 2 expresses the basic principle of the science-based 
approach of the SPS Agreement. Together with Article 5.1, with which Article 
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2.2 should ‘constantly be read together’,1287 are forming the backbone of an 
objectivist interpretation of the SPS Agreement. A relativist attempt for 
reforming the SPS Agreement would aim to cancel the second and the last 
clause of paragraph 2 of Article 2 of the SPS Agreement, at least:  
 
Article 2 
 
Basic Rights and Obligations 
 
1. [Original text] 
 
2. Members shall ensure that any sanitary or phytosanitary 
measure is applied only to the extent necessary to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health [2nd and 3rd clause cancelled]. 
 
3. [Original text] 
 
4. [Original text] 
 
Article 3 of the SPS Agreement projects the objective of harmonising sanitary 
and phytosanitary measures of WTO Members in line with international 
standards (the full text of paragraphs 1-3 of Article 3 of the SPS Agreement was 
displayed in the previous paragraph). The harmonisation objective is laid down 
in paragraph 1 of Article 3. The harmonisation objective is further amplified by 
the presumption in paragraph 2 that national SPS measures conforming to 
international standards are consistent with relevant provisions of the SPS 
Agreement and of GATT 1994. Paragraph 3 of Article 3 finally makes the 
option for higher levels of protection that those provided by international 
standards contingent upon scientific justification. In sum, paragraphs 1-3 of 
Article 3 of the SPS Agreement are limiting national sovereignty considerably.  
 
From a relativist point of view, one would emphasise the inappropriateness of 
harmonisation as paramount objective. Whereas relativists might agree that 
harmonisation can be used as a tool for trade facilitation, they would reject 
harmonisation as final purpose. Relativists, taking differences of perception as a 
starting point, would partake in the idea that international standards could serve 
as guidelines for risk policies, at best. But constructivists would refute the idea 
that international standards are becoming quasi-mandatory, as happened through 
the SPS Agreement. Therefore, from a constructivistic perspective, 
harmonisation as a tool for trade facilitation is subordinate to the right of people 
                                                 
1287 EC –Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 180.  
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to determine the level of protection they consider appropriate.1288 Robert Howse, 
for instance, suggested an alternative to harmonisation:  
 
“Where there is a concern that domestic regulations may constitute 
protectionist cheating on negotiated trade concessions, an alternative 
to harmonization may well be to enhance confidence in the ability to 
distinguish legitimate domestic regulations from protectionist 
cheating. Requiring that regulations be defensible in a rational, 
deliberative public process of justification may well enhance such 
confidence, while at the very same time serving, not frustrating, 
democracy.” 1289 
 
At first, subjectivist would suggest a wording consistent with the sixth clause of 
the preamble. Second, subjectivists would turn down the privilege for SPS 
measures conforming to international standards, as contained in paragraph 2 of 
Article 3. Third, constructivist would reformulate paragraph 3 of Article 3 as a 
truly “sovereign right” of Members, hence abrogating the requirement for 
scientific justification. From a relativists’ point of view, paragraphs 1-3 of 
Article 3 of the SPS Agreement should be rephrased as follows:  
 
Article 3 
 
Harmonization 
 
1. [Members shall further the use of harmonized sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures, on the basis of international standards, 
guidelines and recommendations developed by the relevant 
international organizations, including the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission, the International Office of Epizootics, and the relevant 
international and regional organizations operating within the 
framework of the International Plant Protection Convention, without 
                                                 
1288 The question how broad the term “concerned people” has to be understood is at the heart 
of the debate about global sustainability. Whereas traditional concepts were focusing on 
consumers and importing countries, both of implicit Western origin, new approaches are 
pointing at vital interests of producers, in particular small-scale agricultural producers in 
developing countries (see, for instance, Elisabeth Bürgi, ‘Trade Law and Responsible 
Investment,’ 2nd chapter of the study of Elisabeth Bürgi, Katja Gehne and Simone Heri on 
Legal Instruments to foster responsible Investment in Agriculture: A human Rights, 
Agricultural Trade and Investment Law Perspective, commissioned by the International Land 
Coalition in cooperation with the NCCR Trade Regulation, World Trade Institute (Draft, 
forthcoming), pp. 2-3.  
1289 Robert Howse, ‘Democracy, Science, and Free Trade: Risk Regulation on Trial at the 
World Trade Organization’ (June 2000) 98 Michigan Law Review, 2329 et seq. (emphasis 
added).  
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requiring Members to change their appropriate level of protection of 
human, animal or plant life or health.] 
 
2. [Deletion] 
 
3. Members may introduce or maintain sanitary or phytosanitary 
measures which result in a higher level of sanitary or phytosanitary 
protection than would be achieved by measures based on the relevant 
international standards, guidelines or recommendations [rest 
deleted]. Notwithstanding the above, all measures which result in a 
level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection different from that 
which would be achieved by measures based on international 
standards, guidelines or recommendations shall not be inconsistent 
with any other provision of this Agreement. 
 
In sum, relativist proposals are aiming to nullify the science-based approach of 
the SPS Agreement, as well as the harmonisation objective implied. Ultimately, 
relativist attempts may strive for a return to some kind of GATT Article XX 
jurisprudence, or to a similar regime based on human judgement rather than 
science. Its relativism is expressed by the notion that food is intrinsically 
different from other products:  
 
“Food is culture and, in other ways, is different from most other 
subjects of trade. Cars, legal services and patents are neither physical 
necessities nor ingested so as to become a physical building block for 
each human being. Seattle also sent the message that global is not 
always good in the minds of the vocal public. The potential global 
impact of genetic modifications on the food supply is a target for 
those who oppose the current economics/science focus of what we 
eat.” 1290 
 
 
CHAPTER 18 A CRITICAL APPROACH  
 
Either proposal sketched out in the previous chapter, i.e. the positivist attempt as 
well as the relativist response, seem untenable. Reasons for this finding are as 
follows.  
 
The relativist struggle against the science-based approach and the objective of 
harmonisation particularly expressed by Articles 2 and 3 of the SPS Agreement 
                                                 
1290 Marsha A. Echols, Food Safety and the WTO. The Interplay of Culture, Science and 
Technology (Kluwer Law International, 2001), p. 6.  
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is leading to legal uncertainty. If any WTO member is free to introduce levels of 
protection at random and no objective yardstick is provided for detecting 
protectionist intent, international trade would be unpredictable. In fact, 
following the relativist suggestion would expose international trade to the 
arbitrariness of conflicting national interests. Under such arbitrariness and 
lawlessness, weaker and less influential states would suffer in particular. For 
exemplifying the issue, a case study is provided showing how a rational, 
science-based approach might eventually strengthen positions of DCs and LDCs 
in particular. The case study tells about EU import bans of Nile perch from Lake 
Victoria.1291 Andrew Mold provided the following story:  
 
“East African fish exporters have been adversely affected by 
frequent bans in the EU markets. Between 1994 and 1999, a total of 
four bans were imposed on fish exports from the three countries over 
SPS standards. (…) In 1997, for instance, the EU responded to a 
cholera outbreak in East Africa by imposing a ban on fish imports 
from any country in the region, without first investigating the 
potential dangers involved. Following the intervention of the WHO, 
which pointed out that fish were an unlikely means of transmitting 
cholera, the ban was rescinded.  
Because of the ban, capacity utilization at fish processing plants fell 
to barely 50 per cent and, in the case of the United Republic of 
Tanzania, the workforce in the fish processing plants was reduced by 
about 40 per cent. The issue of frequent bans by the EU has caused 
severe adverse social and economic effects for the three countries, 
leading to unemployment, depressed prices and the loss of export 
earnings, losses which Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania 
can least afford. With regard to public health concerns, in particular 
cholera outbreaks, which triggered some of the bans, the WHO 
Director-General stressed “the almost non-existent risk to countries 
importing food from cholera-affected countries”. 
Another ban was imposed on 16 January 1998 by the European 
Commission on the importation of fresh, frozen and processed 
fishery products from the United Republic of Tanzania, Kenya, 
Uganda and Mozambique, again on grounds of concern for public 
health. Nevertheless, it was reported that over 2,000 tests and 
inspections by the European Commission of the United Republic of 
Tanzania’s fish processing establishments before 6 January 1998 had 
failed to produce positive tests of any of the alleged bacteria. 
Moreover, the EU notification, G/SPS/N/EEC/4, circulated on 4 
                                                 
1291 Nile perch (Lates niloticus) is a freshwater fish widespread in African waters. Lake 
Victoria, located in East Africa, is the second largest freshwater lake on earth and is shared by 
Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.  
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March 1998, conceded that no international standard, guideline, or 
recommendation existed on the subject (although there are specific 
recommendations by both WHO and FAO). In its complaints to the 
WTO regarding the ban, the United Republic of Tanzania questioned 
its consistency with Articles 2.2 and 5.7 of the SPS Agreement. 
Recommendations by Codex and the International Commission on 
Microbiological Specifications for Food (ICMSF) did not consider 
import prohibition as an appropriate response to the alleged public 
health concern.” 1292 
 
The case study on the EU import bans of Nile perch is all the more telling when 
compared with the reaction of Japan in face of the very same questions. Japan, 
similarly known for high food safety standards, adopted a much more reasonable 
approach. In fact, a World Bank report found that the key problem of Japanese 
importers was not sanitary or quality issues, but the name and the origin of the 
fish:  
 
“Japanese importers do not have any problems with regard to 
sanitary conditions and the quality of the products. The key problem 
is the naming of the fish, which had to be changed after the 
adjustment of the Japanese labeling regulation. Retailers experienced 
this marketing problem for the fist time in 2002. Japanese consumers 
are not familiar with this fish that used to be called and labeled in 
Japan shiro-suzuki (“white sea-bass”). The English name “Nile 
Perch” and the origin (Africa) does not appeal to them. (…)” 1293 
 
“Most of the Japanese buyers have longstanding business relations 
with the suppliers of Nile Perch from Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. 
The Japanese buyers have confidence in the suppliers, because the 
latter work according to HACCP standards and the EU hygiene 
directive (91/493/EEC). The suppliers have their own laboratories 
and always present inspection data of the export lots to the buyers. 
(…) Because Nile Perch is consumed after cooking, the regulations 
of the Food Sanitation Law do not require a sampling inspection on 
imports, but only an examination of the documents. However, since 
Nile Perch is a product from the tropics, all importers carry out 
private inspections for general bacteria count, Coliform organisms, 
Vibrio Parahaemolyticus, Salmonella, and Staphylococcus, on every 
import. (…) Toward the end of 1998, an item appeared on the 
                                                 
1292 Andrew Mold, Non-Tariff Barriers – Their Prevalence and Relevance for African 
Countries. African Trade Policy Centre (ATPC), Work in Progress No. 25, October 2005, p. 
13.  
1293 Theo H. Jonker, Hiroshi Ito, Hiroji Fujishima, Food Safety and Quality Standards in 
Japan. Compliance of Suppliers from Developing Countries (The World Bank, 2004), p. 32.  
 425 
internet that a pesticide that paralyzes fish was being used in 
Uganda. The EU set a temporary import ban on Uganda that was 
lifted in the first half of 1999. The Japanese importers acted quickly 
to carry out private inspections on every import of Ugandan Nile 
Perch to check for this pesticide. All inspections found that no such 
pesticide was present. Also, the Ugandan authorities issued 
certificates that there is no residue of such pesticide. The unease was 
resolved without any big damage to the demand, and Japan did not 
set an import ban.” 1294 
 
The case study of EU import bans on Nile perch from Lake Victoria shows that 
irrational fears may prevail over rational scientific assessment particularly in 
cases concerning toxins such as pesticides and potentially contagious diseases 
such as cholera, avian influenza, etc. In this case, significantly, scientific 
rationality was upheld by international organisations such as the WHO and the 
ICMSF, whereas EU authorities, facing public excitement and cautious retailers, 
took political rather than science-based decisions.1295 
 
Looking into the future, other potential controversies with the potential for 
eruption into open trade disputes are already glowing. Issues coming along with 
climate change such as the ‘food miles’ controversy seem particularly sensitive 
with regard to a blurring between legitimate concern and protectionist impulse. 
The food miles controversy began with British retailers, e.g. Tesco and Marks & 
                                                 
1294 Theo H. Jonker, Hiroshi Ito, Hiroji Fujishima, ibid. pp. 36-37.  
1295 It has to be noted, however, that rules and regulations based on science and rational 
argument alone are no guarantee for fair practice. In the case study on Nile perch, for 
instance, politics prevailed over rational arguments at the end of the day. Andrew Mold 
observed:  
“Yet despite all this evidence in favour of the affected countries, none felt in a 
position to be able to use the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Mechanism against the 
EU. Commenting on the limited possibilities of taking legal action in this case, 
an anonymous WTO delegate from one of the countries implicated stated that 
‘the WTO formally objected to this notion [that the fish were infected with 
cholera] because there was no scientific proof that our fish was infected. Yet we 
could not afford to go through the dispute settlement process with the EC for 
various reasons. We eventually settled the matter bilaterally with the EC after 
suffering huge losses of fish exports. Really, the power of enforcement of the 
rulings coming out of the dispute settlement system is based on your capacity to 
retaliate against a country that has bent the rules. As a small country, however, 
the impact of retaliating against a big country is virtually nil, though some 
developing [countries] have been able to do this with some amount of success’ ” 
(Andrew Mold, Non-Tariff Barriers – Their Prevalence and Relevance for 
African Countries. African Trade Policy Centre (ATPC), Work in Progress No. 
25, October 2005, p. 13).   
(A different explication for East African countries forgoing formal dispute settlement 
proceedings was provided by Joanne Scott, see chapter 18.C. below).  
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Spencer,1296 applying plane symbols1297 to air-freighted products, in particular 
fresh produce from Kenya and various agricultural products from New Zealand. 
Whereas the trade minister of New Zealand, Phil Goff, accepted the plane 
symbols as “legitimate information for consumers”, he argued that the food 
miles concept is too narrow for addressing sustainability issues. Phil Goff noted 
that by considering the “ecological footprint” in total, it is shown that lamb meat 
from New Zealand requires only 25% of the energy input needed for British 
lamb products even if transportation is taken into account. Kenya’s High 
Commissioner in Britain, Joseph Muchemi, initiated a “Grown under the Sun” 
campaign, highlighting that despite air-freighting, carbon emissions for 
producing, packaging and transportation of horticultural products are still 
favourable for Kenyan products grown under the African sun instead of being 
produced in energy-intensive greenhouses in the United Kingdom. Scientists 
from the UK have joined the debate, questioning the scientific basis of the 
carbon prints approach, thus conflicting with various British NGOs, the National 
Farmers Union (UK) and its “buy local” campaign.1298 
 
In light of such examples, the relativist suggestion resembles the opening of the 
Pandora’s box: it virtually derails any rule-based trading system. Might replaces 
rules, and arbitrariness replaces the discursive settlement of disputes. In the end, 
epistemological pluralism results in a plurality of rules without recognised 
scientific method and no accepted standards. The spirit underlying the relativist 
proposal was best depicted by Shrader-Frechette, noting:  
 
“At the left end of the spectrum, the pluralist end, are 
epistemological anarchist Paul Feyerabend and others who believe 
                                                 
1296 Albeit an initiative of private retailers so far, the food and carbon miles debate has the 
potential of becoming a WTO issue. A former British minister has already expressed the idea 
of a new tax on agricultural imports depending on the number of miles the product was 
transported. Similar initiatives for declaring application of plane symbols on air-freighted 
products mandatory are foreseeable. The view that private standards are being promoted by 
retailers and various NGOs in the name of pretended consumer interests, but in fact bolster 
the less altruistic interests of the promoters, was also expressed by Robert Falkner from the 
Center for European Studies at Harvard University in a workshop on ‘Government 
Regulation, Identity Preservation and Private Standards – GM-products in the Food Chain’, 
held at the World Trade Institute in Berne, Switzerland, May 4th and 5th, 2007.  
1297 The plane symbol would probably fall under the TBT Agreement. Because a risk of some 
sort must be ascertainable both under the SPS Agreement as well as under the TBT 
Agreement, basic questions about scientific evidence seem to be comparable anyway.  
1298 See, for instance, Catherine Riungu, ‘UK farming lobby seeks ban on airfreighted organic 
imports’, in  The East African, June 18, 2007; Catherine Riungu, ‘Strong shilling hurting us, 
say Kenya flower farmers’, in  The East African, July 23, 2007; and Rudolf Hermann, 
‘Neuseeländische Kiwis unter Klima-Sünder-Verdacht. „Foodmiles“-Debatte bereitet 
Kopfschmerzen in Wellington’, in Neue Zürcher Zeitung, August 3, 2007. See also The 
Economist, lead story on ‘Good food? Why ethical shopping harms the world’, December 9, 
2006.  
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that there is no scientific method, that ‘anything goes’, and that ‘no 
system of [scientific] rules and standards is ever safe’.” 1299 
 
The positivist attempt, however, seems untenable as well.  
The positivist solution to declare conformity of SPS measures to international 
standards mandatory and to abrogate Article 3.3 of the SPS Agreement nullifies 
the room for manoeuvre for national sovereigns in risk analysis procedures. In 
particular, mandatory alignment to international standards renders the latter 
virtually unquestionable. Under a positivist regime of risk governance, WTO 
members would no longer dare to deviate from international standards. By the 
same token, there would be no incentive for carrying out risk assessments 
suggesting different levels of protection than those established international 
standards. Hence, the positivist attempt would practically monopolise scientific 
knowledge in the field of action of international standard setting organisations. 
Standards issued by international organisations, in particular the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission, IPPC and OIE would come along with the aura of 
scientific verity. Yet, international SPS standards bestowed with paramount 
scientific authority would come along with a notion of absolute sanctity.   
 
However, as noted by Karl Popper, absolute and irrefutable scientific verdicts 
impede scientific debate and monopolise ‘scientific truth’. In this respect, 
Popper emphasised that “[t]he empirical basis of objective science has thus 
nothing ‘absolute’ about it.”1300 Popper further approached the epistemological 
                                                 
1299 Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, Risk and Rationality. Philosophical Foundations for 
Populist Reforms (University of California Press, 1991), p. 7 (footnote omitted). From a legal 
and economic point of view, regulatory spillover effects were addressed as gaps between 
‘jurisdiction’ and ‘impact’ or as ‘external accountability gap’. Precisely with regard to the 
profound socio-economic impact of EU safety regulations on the Lake Victoria area, Joanne 
Scott noted:  
“In the context of a globalizing market for agricultural products, a familiar gap 
has emerged between ‘jurisdiction’ and ‘impact’. Political fragmentation co-
exists with deep market integration. It may be the EU which regulates, but the 
EU’s trading partners also pay an economic price, and undergo far-reaching 
societal transformations in a bid to secure compliance. It is this disjuncture 
between regulatory jurisdiction and regulatory impact which is said by some to 
constitute one of the most pressing normative problems of our time, particularly 
when it comes to the actions of powerful states. It is said to generate an ‘external 
accountability gap’, or an absence of ‘accountability to people outside of the 
acting entity, whose lives are affected by it’ (Joanne Scott, The WTO Agreement 
on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 
43-44, footnotes omitted).  
1300 Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, 2nd English edition, (Hutchinson & Co 
Publishers, 1968), p. 111.  
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conundrum contained in the two opposites objective – relative and subjective – 
absolute.1301 Citing Hermann Weyl, Popper explained:  
 
“ ‘… this pair of opposites, subjective – absolute and objective – 
relative seems to me to contain one of the most profound 
epistemological truths which can be gathered from the study of 
nature. Whoever wants the absolute must get subjectivity – ego-
centricity – into the bargain, and whoever longs for objectivity 
cannot avoid the problem of relativism.’ And before this we find, 
‘What is immediately experienced is subjective and absolute …; the 
objective world, on the other hand, which natural science seeks to 
precipitate in pure crystalline form … is relative’.” 1302 
 
And with reference to Robert Reininger, Popper observed that “although the 
absolute is indeed experienced, and for that reason can be intuitively felt, it yet 
refuses to be expressed in words.”1303 
 
The first opposite, objective – relative, is the characterising feature of the critical 
scientific method. As explained by Popper, scientific knowledge is never 
absolute, but relative; it must be accessible to others and their critique. This is 
what neopositivists of the Vienna Circle once called intersubjectivity.  
 
In a nutshell, such a model of scientific stimulation can best be described in the 
allegoric language put forward by Karl Popper in The Logic of Scientific 
Discovery in his metaphor of bold theoretical structures erected above 
                                                 
1301 In fact, Popper referred to, and cited from, the works of Hermann Weyl, Max Born, 
Immanuel Kant and Robert Reininger.  
1302 Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, 2nd English edition, (Hutchinson & Co 
Publishers, 1968), p. 111, footnote no. 4; citing Hermann Weyl (German edition) Philosophie 
der Mathematik und Naturwissenschaft (1927), p. 83; (English edition) Philosophy of 
Mathematics and Natural Science (Princeton, 1949), p. 116).  
1303 Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, 2nd English edition, (Hutchinson & Co 
Publishers, 1968), p. 111, footnote no. 4; citing Robert Reininger, Das Psycho-Physische 
Problem (1916), p. 29. The fact that the opposite absolute – subjective cannot be captured in 
words was put in the following poetic verse (in German): Spricht die Seele, so spricht, ach! 
schon die Seele nicht mehr”; (in English): “If the souls speaks then alas it is no longer the soul 
that speaks” (Karl R. Popper, ibid., original emphasis). The reference to the soul and the 
psyche recalls the tremor of the rational idea of man caused by psychoanalytical sciences, in 
particular by Sigmund Freud (1856-1939). In contrast to Romanticism, psychoanalysis 
questioned rational conceptions of man on scientific grounds. Inspired by new 
psychoanalytical science, for instance Sigmund Freud’s work Die Traumdeutung (1899; in 
English: The Interpretation of Dreams), artist Max Ernst (1891-1976) expressed the tension 
between reason and psyche by a telling painting entitled When Reason Sleeps, the Sirens Sing 
(1960; in German: Wenn die Vernunft schläft, singen die Sirenen). For the influence of 
psychoanalytical science on arts see, for example, Ulrich Bischoff, Max Ernst 1891-1976. 
Jenseits der Malerei (TASCHEN, 2005), pp. 14-15.  
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swamplands, representing scientific endeavour. In pursue of this metaphor, 
Malachi Hacohen noted:  
 
“Where they can, scientists should endeavor to construct as solid a 
building as the moving sands under them would allow. Of course, the 
structure cannot hold indefinitely. Eventually, it will collapse, nay, 
scientists will demolish it when they find they can build a better one. 
But the uncertainty of the structure did not inhibit the growth of 
knowledge. If decisions on whether, where, and how to build were 
not always possible, and the solidity of the different structures 
controversial – indeed even the condition of the moving sands may 
not be a consensus – criticism of existing and proposed structures 
was always possible. Openness to criticism helped eliminate error. 
Conventions set the rules of debate, and traditions set its terms, but 
they, too, were subject to change.”1304 
                                                 
1304 Malachi Hacohen, ‘Critical Rationalism, Logical Positivism, and the Poststructuralist 
Conundrum: Reconsidering the Neurath-Popper Debate’, in Michael Heidelberger, Friedrich 
Stadler (eds.), History of Philosophy of Science. New Trends and Perspectives (Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 2002), p. 319 (footnote omitted). However, Hacohen also pointed at 
some critical points of Popper’s concept of scientific criticism, noting that “Popper may have 
been over-confident about methodology’s capacity to guide critical debate and produce a 
consensus” (Malachi Hacohen, ibid.). In particular, Hacohen called attention to the following 
problem:  
“As Popper discarded foundationism, intersubjective criticism became 
objectivity’s new grounds. Criticism and testing operated by consensus and 
convention. How did intersubjective criticism really work? It was not clear that 
access was available to the whole public, certainly not equal access. Once ideas 
entered the public sphere, who won? Did the logic (or methodology) of science 
really set the rules of discussion? Without a sociology of science, public 
criticism remained a regulative ideal at best. Moreover, Paul Feyerabend and 
Thomas Kuhn charged that Popper could not account for most ‘correct’ 
historical decisions in favor of better theories. If the key to scientific progress 
was the psychology, sociology, and routine of scientific communities, not 
criticism and testing, then Popper’s efforts to erect a rational edifice of science 
and explain the growth of knowledge as a rational process was problematic” 
(Malachi Hacohen, ibid. p. 320). 
However, with respect of social conditions of rational deliberative processes, Hacohen noted 
that some of the students of Popper had started to research on social conditions amenable for 
open criticism and rational discourse. Hacohen considered such inquiries, focusing on societal 
requirements for rational deliberation as most promising:  
“We may discover that a particular polity is optimal for Popperian science, and it 
may require democratization of all spheres of life – state and economy, academy 
and laboratory. Such inquiry need not undermine Popper’s belief in learning 
from error; indeed, such belief is a prerequisite. Our ability to learn from error is 
the issue dividing Popper from both positivists and poststructuralists. Popper 
was as instructive in refusing ‘poststructuralism’ as he was in reshaping the 
legacy of the Viennese late enlightenment” (Malachi Hacohen, ibid. p. 320, 
emphasis added).  
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Thus, surprisingly, critical scientific method is intrinsically dialectical. From a 
procedural point of view, the critical scientific method resembles to legal 
systems based on the principle of adversary proceedings.1305 
 
The other opposite, subjective – absolute, is the characterising feature of 
arithmomorphic concepts. It is recalled that Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen 
introduced the term arithmomorphic concept to betoken scientific concepts 
expressing reality in real numbers. Georgescu-Roegen worked out the antinomy 
between arithmomorphic concepts and dialectical concepts of science; between 
concepts based on the idea that reality is scientifically ascertainable and 
reducible to one single number, on the one hand, and concepts emphasising the 
continuous flow of things requiring iterative approaches for grasping reality. 
The positivistic critique of dialectical concepts is encapsulated in the sentence of 
“the muddled waters of Hegelian dialectics”.1306 
 
By pointing at its arithmomorphic and anti-dialectic position, Georgescu-
Roegen revealed an essential feature of positivism, namely its belief in final 
truth. In this respect, Georgescu-Roegen observed, the position of positivism 
resembles that of the Catholic Church: from a positivistic point of view, 
dialectic concepts of science “are antagonistic to science: knowledge proper 
exists only to the extent to which it is expressed in arithmomorphic concepts. 
                                                 
1305 A fundamental difference between common law and civil law systems is the way trials are 
conducted. Whereas in common law systems the adversary method is applied, civil law 
systems are applying accusatorial (in criminal law cases) and interrogative (in civil law cases) 
methods. The difference between the two systems lies in the roles assumed by judges and 
lawyer in respective trial proceedings. With view on adversary systems, Sharon Byrd 
observed:  
“In England and the United States it is the parties themselves, through their legal 
representatives, who present their conflicting views of the facts of the case. Each 
is permitted to portray the story behind the dispute as he or she sees it, with the 
jury left to determine the ‘real’ facts of the case and to apply the law as the judge 
has instructed to those facts when reaching its verdict. The common law judge 
acts more as a referee over the courtroom debate, determining what the lawyers 
may and may not present as evidence to the jury and generally keeping order 
throughout the legal process” (B. Sharon Byrd, Introduction to Anglo-American 
Law & Language, 2nd edition / Einführung in die anglo-amerikanische 
Rechtssprache, 2. Auflage (Verlag C.H. Beck, 2001), p. 78. 
Rules of adversary procedures are also characterised as systems based on procedural justice, 
defining justice “as the result of the process” (B. Sharon Byrd, ibid., p. 79).  
1306 Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, Analytical Economics. Issues and Problems (Harvard 
University Press, 1967, Massachusetts), pp. 21-35. Dialectical concepts, on the other hand, 
may be traced back to the sentence of Herakleitos considering that “one cannot step twice into 
the same river”. 
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The position recalls that of the Catholic Church: holy thought can be expressed 
only in Latin.” 1307 
 
Hence, surprisingly again, the positivistic approach towards scientific truth, as 
suggested by the positivist proposal at hand, is intrinsically arithmomorphic and 
anti-dialectical. From a procedural point of view, the positivistic method 
resembles to legal systems based on the principle of accusatorial or interrogative 
proceedings.1308  
 
The scientific method proposed by Popper is fundamentally different from the 
binary approach towards ‘the truth’ applied by arithmomorphic concepts. In fact, 
the scientific method is characterised by the opposite objective – relative. With 
reference to Karl R. Popper, a critical scientific method can be characterised as  
 
“a method of trial and the elimination of errors, of proposing theories 
and submitting them to the severest tests we can design. If, because 
of some limiting assumptions, only a finite number of competing 
theories are regarded as possible, this method may leas us to single 
out the true theory by eliminating all its competitors. Normally – that 
is to say in all cases in which the number of possible theories is 
infinite – this method cannot ascertain which of the theories is true; 
                                                 
1307 Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, Analytical Economics. Issues and Problems (Harvard 
University Press, 1967, Massachusetts), p. 27, italics added. Georgescu-Roegen’s comparison 
between positivism and the Catholic Church is revealing in two respects: first, it explains that 
both ideologies are sharing a faith in absolute truth; second, it shows that the Catholic Church 
and positivism are sharing the belief that inquisitorial procedures are appropriate for the 
search for truth.   
1308 In civil law systems, accusatorial (in criminal law cases) and interrogative (in civil law 
cases) methods are applied. With view on the role of the judge in civil law systems, Sharon 
Byrd observed:  
“In continental European nations, the judge plays the more active role in 
questioning of witnesses and taking of evidence. (…) Perhaps, one reason why 
this system dominates in continental Europe is because it is the judge who is the 
factfinder at trial. Consequently, it is he who must be convinced of the truth of 
certain facts before being able to apply the law to those facts in reaching his 
judgement” (B. Sharon Byrd, Introduction to Anglo-American Law & Language, 
2nd edition / Einführung in die anglo-amerikanische Rechtssprache, 2. Auflage 
(Verlag C.H. Beck, 2001), p. 78, emphasis added.  
Rules of accusatorial and interrogative procedures are also characterised as systems based on 
substantive justice, defining justice “as the ability of a highly trained expert, in the person of 
the judge, to find the truth and establish justice in some higher sense of the word” (B. Sharon 
Byrd, ibid., p. 79, emphasis added).  
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nor can any other method. It remains applicable, though 
inconclusive.” 1309 
 
Popper also pointed at the fact that it is not upon scientists to be ‘objective’ in 
the first instance. Rather, it is the result, the findings of scientific research, 
which must be able to withstand critical inquiry. Popper noted:  
 
“It should be obvious that the objectivity and the rationality of 
progress in science is not due to the personal objectivity and 
rationality of the scientist. Great science and great scientists, like 
great poets, are often inspired by non-rational intuitions. So are great 
mathematicians. As Poincaré and Hadamard have pointed out, a 
mathematical proof may be discovered by unconscious trials, guided 
by an inspiration of a decidedly aesthetic character, rather than by 
rational thought. This is true, and important. But obviously, it does 
not make the result, the mathematical proof, irrational. In any case, a 
proposed proof must be able to stand up to critical discussion: to its 
examination by competing mathematicians.”1310 
 
The very difference between a critical scientific method, on the one hand, and 
the positivistic concept is contained in the opposites objective – relative and 
subjective – absolute. Whereas the scientific method is inherently self-critical 
and conscious about its own inconclusiveness, thus following the opposite 
objective – relative, the positivist concept is founded upon the belief that an 
absolute, genuine scientific ‘truth’ can be found some day. In the context of a 
broader discussion of belief versus (critical) knowledge, Popper observed:  
 
“I used to take price in the fact that I am not a belief philosopher: I 
am primarily interested in ideas, in theories, and I find it 
comparatively unimportant whether or not anybody ‘believes’ in 
them. And I suspect that the interest of philosophers in belief results 
                                                 
1309 Karl R. Popper, Objective Knowledge. An Evolutionary Approach (Oxford University 
Press, 1973), p. 16 (original emphases). In this context, Popper introduced the famous 
allegory of Einstein and the amoeba: 
„The main difference between Einstein and an amoeba (…) is that Einstein 
consciously seeks for error elimination. He tries to kill his theories: he is 
consciously critical of his theories which, for this reason, he tries to formulate 
sharply rather than vaguely. But the amoeba cannot be critical vis-à-vis its 
expectations or hypotheses; it cannot be critical because it cannot face its 
hypotheses: they are part of it. (Only objective knowledge is criticizable: 
subjective knowledge becomes criticizable only when it becomes objective. And 
it becomes objective when we say what we think; and even more so when we 
write it down, or print it.)” (Karl R. Popper, ibid. pp. 24-25, original emphases). 
1310 Karl R. Popper, The Myth of the Framework. In defence of science and rationality. Edited 
by M.A. Notturno (Routledge, 1994), p. 13 (footnotes omitted).  
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from that mistaken philosophy which I call ‘inductivism’. They are 
theorists of knowledge, and starting from subjective experience they 
fail to distinguish between objective and subjective knowledge. This 
leads them to believe in belief as the genus of which knowledge is a 
species (‘justification’ or perhaps a ‘criterion of truth’ such as clarity 
and distinctness, or vivacity, or ‘sufficient reason’, providing the 
specific difference).”1311 
 
As Popper explained, the critical approach is inevitably broader than mere 
collections of ‘true’ facts, attempts which Popper disqualified as ‘subjective 
knowledge’ or ‘inductivism’. At the heart of critical knowledge, Popper 
explained, stands the criterion of falsifiability, or refutability:  
 
“This criterion of demarcation between empirical and non-empirical 
theories I have also called the criterion of falsifiability or the 
criterion of refutability. It does not imply that irrefutable theories are 
false. Nor does it imply that they are meaningless. But it does imply 
that, as long as we cannot describe what a possible refutation of a 
certain theory would be like, that theory may be regarded as lying 
outside the field of empirical science.” 1312 
                                                 
1311 Karl R. Popper, Objective Knowledge. An Evolutionary Approach (Oxford University 
Press, London, 1973), p. 25, footnote omitted. Popper concluded: “This is why (…) I do not 
believe in belief” (ibid.).  
1312 Karl R. Popper, The Myth of the Framework. In defence of science and rationality. Edited 
by M.A. Notturno (Routledge, 1994), p. 88. It has to be noted that Popper’s criterion of 
falsifiability or refutability has to be discerned from the principle of verification, as usually 
applied in scientific theory and advocated by logical positivists in particular. With view on the 
latter, Stump observed that “Logical Positivists, and especially Alfred Ayer, championed the 
principle of verification as the tool for removing metaphysical nonsense from philosophy and 
leaving a scientific core” (see David J, Stump, ‚From the Values of Scientific Philosophy to 
the Value Neutrality of the Philosophy of Science’, in Michael Heidelberger, Friedrich Stadler 
(eds.), History of Philosophy of Science. New Trends and Perspectives (Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 2002), pp. 153-154). On the other hand, attention should be paid to the fact that 
Popper’s concept of critical rationalism is counter to positivism in the same way as it takes up 
position against relativism:  
“For I want to say a few words against the widespread doctrine of sociological 
relativism, often unconsciously held, especially by sociologists who study the 
ways of scientists and who think that they thereby study science and scientific 
knowledge. Many of these sociologists do not believe in objective truth, but 
think of truth as a sociological concept. Even a former scientist such as the late 
Michael Polanyi thought that truth was what the experts believe to be true – or, 
at least, the great majority of the experts. But in all sciences, the experts are 
sometimes mistaken. Whenever there is a breakthrough, a really important new 
discovery, this means that the experts have been proven wrong, and that the 
facts, the objective facts, were different from what the experts expected them to 
be. (…)  
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The argument of Popper in favour of a critical method in science is based on his 
finding that “there is no such thing as induction.”1313 Based on his refutation of 
induction, Popper went on reasoning that inductive “inference to theories, from 
singular statements which are ‘verified by experience (whatever that may mean), 
is logically inadmissible.”1314 On these grounds, Popper concluded:  
 
“Theories are, therefore, never empirically verifiable. If we wish to 
avoid the positivist’s mistake of eliminating, by our criterion of 
demarcation, the theoretical systems of natural science, then we must 
choose a criterion which allows us to admit to the domain of 
empirical science even statements which cannot be verified.” 1315 
 
That criterion is falsifiability. According to Popper, it is the criterion of whether 
a theory can be falsified rendering that theory ‘scientific’. Succinctly, Popper 
explained the criterion of falsifiability and, by the same token, delivered a 
critique on the positivist dogma as follows:  
 
“… I shall certainly admit a system as empirical or scientific only if 
it is capable of being tested by experience. These considerations 
suggest that not the verifiability but the falsifiability of a system is to 
be taken as criterion of demarcation. In other words: I shall not 
require of a scientific system that it shall be capable of being singled 
out, once and for all, in a positive sense; but I shall require that its 
logical form shall be such that it can be singled out, by means of 
                                                                                                                                                        
I guess, indeed, that it is the suppressed sense of our own fallibility that is 
responsible for our despicable tendency to form cliques and to go along with 
whatever seems to be fashionable: that makes so many of us howl with the 
wolves. Alls this is human weakness, which means it ought not to exist. But it 
does exist, of course; it is even to be found among some scientists. And as it 
exists, we ought to combat it; first in ourselves, and then, perhaps, in others. For 
I hold that science ought to strive for objective truth, for truth that depends only 
on the facts; on truth that is above human authority and above arbitration, and 
certainly above scientific fashions. Some sociologists fail to understand that this 
objectivity is a possibility towards which science (and therefore scientists) 
should aim. Yet science has aimed at truth for at least 2,500 years.” (Karl R. 
Popper, ‘Towards an Evolutionary Theory of Knowledge’, in Karl R. Popper, A 
World of Propensities (Thoemmes Antiquarian Books, 1990), pp. 33-34 
(original emphasis). 
1313 Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, 2nd English edition, (Hutchinson & Co 
Publishers, 1968), p. 40. As a reminder: Popper called “an inference ‘inductive’ if it passes 
from singular statements (sometimes also called ‘particular’ statements), such as accounts of 
the results of observations or experiments, to universal statements, such as hypotheses or 
theories” (Karl R. Popper, ibid., p. 27).  
1314 Karl R. Popper, ibid. p. 40. 
1315 Karl R. Popper, ibid. p. 40 (original emphasis, footnote omitted).  
 435 
empirical tests, in a negative sense: it must be possible for an 
empirical scientific system to be refuted by experience.” 1316 
 
From a sociological point of view, Ulrich Beck analysed effects of the 
application of the critical method on society. In effect, the critical method does 
not only stimulate scientific discussion, but may translate into broader discourse 
in the ‘risk society.’ For this phenomenon, Ulrich Beck introduced the terms 
‘self-critical society’ and ‘discursivity.’ Beck noted:  
 
“In other words, risk society is by tendency also a self-critical 
society. Insurance experts (involuntarily) contradict safety engineers. 
While the latter diagnose zero risk, the former decide: uninsurable. 
Experts are undercut or deposed by opposing experts. Politicians 
encounter the resistance of citizens’ groups, and industrial 
management encounters morally and politically motivated organized 
consumer boycotts. Administrations are criticized by self-help 
groups. Ultimately, even polluter sectors (for instance, the chemical 
industry in the case of sea pollution) must count upon resistance 
from affected sectors (in this case the fishing industry and the sectors 
living from seashore tourism). The latter can be called into question 
by the former, monitored and perhaps even corrected.” 1317 
 
With respect to biotechnology in particular, Beck emphasised the need for 
scientists to be able to express doubts and uncertainties freely:  
 
“[S]cientists must above all reflect, respect and confess their 
ignorance. It is up to them to make their uncertainties clear, whatever 
the professional, financial and political implications are. They should 
feel free to express their doubts in the broader public. There have 
been far too many attempts to evade this responsibility. This, of 
course, would not bring risk conflict to an end, but lead to a new one 
in which the relationship between science, the economy and 
democracy must be readjusted.” 1318 
 
The observation of Ulrich Beck that critical science and adversarial discourse 
may stimulate self-reflexivity at national levels leads to the reasoned expectation 
that similar stimulating effects might also occur in the broader, international 
context. In particular, it is argued that scientific dissent, expressed openly at 
international fora, e.g. those provided by the WTO dispute settlement body 
                                                 
1316 Karl R. Popper, ibid., pp. 40-41 (original emphases, footnote omitted).  
1317 Ulrich Beck, ‘The Reinvention of Politics: Towards a Theory of Reflexive 
Modernization’, in Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens and Scott Lash, Reflexive Modernization. 
Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order. Polity Press, 1994), p. 11. 
1318 Ulrich Beck, World Risk Society (Polity Press, 1999/2005), p. 107. 
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(DSB) for instance, may also stimulate critical discourse at respective national 
levels of parties involved in the dispute. Contrariwise, scientific dissent at 
national levels may translate into critical debate at international bodies, such as 
the Codex Alimentarius Commission. Alexia Herwig, for instance, explicitly 
applied criteria of self-reflexivity and meta-scientific contextualisation to 
transnational risk governance:  
 
“Only a continuous questioning of scientific findings and an 
exploration of its contingency on power or interest and underlying 
normative understandings can help validate science. In other words, 
in order to be of use in the legitimate regulation of risk, science has 
to be anchored in communicative spheres with regard to normative 
issues outside its own system of reference.” 1319 
 
On such grounds, it is considered that the positivist approach is inappropriate for 
epistemological reasons. Sharing the emphasis on philosophical foundations of 
conflicting positions in international trade, the following conclusion of Sungjoon 
Cho shall be cited:  
 
“Philosophical discussions on hermeneutics have important 
ramifications on the current debate on international trade and risk 
science. At present, there is little shared understanding among WTO 
members on the very meaning of science or scientific justification as 
to the health risks of various food additives or other food 
modification technologies. Given this situation, any impulsive legal-
regulatory attempt in the international level to impose a specific 
paradigm of science in a specific trade dispute is likely to invite 
more disputes, rather than resolving them. In this regard, the theory 
of philosophical hermeneutics tends to offer some practical 
suggestions.” 1320 
 
Therefore, it is abstained from suggesting an “impulsive legal-regulatory attempt 
in the international level to impose a specific paradigm of science”, i.e. to 
further increase the positivist notion of risk and science already existing in the 
current SPS Agreement. By the same token, however, also relativist attempts for 
unlimited regulatory discretion are refuted. In fact, positivist and relativist 
attempts are considered to represent the two extremes of the same 
                                                 
1319 Alexia Herwig, ‘Transnational Governance Regimes for Foods Derived from Bio-
Technology and their Legitimacy’, in Christian Joerges, Inger-Johanne Sand, and Gunther 
Teubner (eds.), Transnational Governance and Constitutionalism (Hart Publishing, 2004), 
[pp. 199-222], p. 221.  
1320 Sungjoon Cho, ‘From Control to Communication: Science, Philosophy and World Trade 
Law’ (2010). Cornell International Law Journal, forthcoming. Available at SSRN:  
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1583023 (visited December 5, 2010). 
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epistemological spectrum: on the one end, the subjective end, there are relativist 
proposals for unlimited regulatory discretion of national sovereigns. At the other 
end of the spectrum, the absolute end, there are positivist attempts for 
establishing international regulatory frameworks based on allegedly ‘objective’ 
and ‘sound’ science. In contrast, a proposal shall be developed based on the 
epistemological opposite objective – relative. The proposed approach is 
inherently critical and based on contradictory procedures.1321 The critical 
approach, as suggested, shall stimulate scientific self-reflexivity and 
competition. A critical approach is considered preferable to a positivistic system 
enforcing ultimate ‘scientific truth’ by means of quasi-mandatory international 
standards, and preferable to a relativistic approach suggesting an ‘anything 
goes’- attitude in risk regulation.  
 
A.  Multilayered Risk Governance  
 
It was shown how various attempts tried to find ways for discerning legitimate 
from illegitimate SPS measures. Many of these attempts focused on separating 
factual considerations from political judgement, i.e. risk assessment from risk 
management (see part three above). It was also shown that the SPS Agreement 
tried to achieve a distinction between SPS measures motivated by legitimate 
health concerns and illegitimate protectionist intent by referring to scientific 
principles (see part four above). However, discussions reviewed above showed 
that the real objective for separating risk assessment and risk management, 
namely to ensure scientific integrity, was sometimes overshadowed by 
philosophical and political arguments.  
 
The critical approach, as developed in the following, aims at refocusing on the 
core question of applied risk analysis: how can we ensure scientific integrity?  
 
In the current setting provided by the SPS Agreement, risk issues are addressed 
at various governance levels. Typically, risks are assessed at national levels, or 
in the case of the EU, at regional levels. On the other hand, national risk 
managers have to take into account standards developed by international 
organisations such as Codex, IPPC and OIE. In this light, one may conceive that 
actually, risk analysis procedures are taking place in a multilayered setting, 
ranging from national to international dimensions.  
 
                                                 
1321 With its focus on procedural aspects, the critical approach suggested here shows 
similarities with Shrader-Frechette’s scientific proceduralism, defined as “a ‘middle position’ 
on the methodological spectrum of views about how to guarantee the rationality of risk 
evaluation” (Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, Risk and Rationality. Philosophical Foundations 
for Populist Reforms (University of California Press, 1991), p. 8). 
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The critical approach developed in the study at hand aims at addressing the 
multilayered character of contemporary risk analysis. The approach outlined 
hereafter is informed, in particular, by a proposal suggested by Thomas Cottier. 
Before the background of a risk landscape encompassing several layers of 
governance, Cottier suggested a vertical separation of risk assessment and risk 
management. With regard to risk assessment and risk management of GMOs, 
Cottier noted:  
 
“The book [i.e. When Cooperation Fails] also encourages studying 
the topic in terms of multi-level governance and as a matter of 
allocating appropriate powers to appropriate levels. It is not a matter 
of uniformly addressing biotechnology in international law, but of 
identifying those elements that need regulation on this level in order 
to avoid unjustified barriers to access and trade.” 1322 
 
Because the approach put forward here is inspired by the theory of multi-level 
governance, it appears to be necessary to outline some basics of the said 
theory.1323 
 
The theory of multi-level governance basically considers that “the erosion of 
territorially-bound sovereignty – due to the weakening of state borders as well as 
to the increasing supra-nationalization of policy areas crucial for the 
effectiveness and ‘output-oriented’ legitimation of welfare states in face of 
structural deficit of ‘input-oriented’ legitimation – defines a new challenging 
conditions for post-Westphalian nation states: the blurring the external 
differentiation calls for an increasing internal differentiation as a condition for 
                                                 
1322 Thomas Cottier, review of Mark A. Pollack’s and Gregory C. Shaffer’s, When 
Cooperation Fails. The International Law and Politics of Genetically Modified Foods 
(Oxford University Press, 2009), in 9(2) World Trade Review (2010), p. 394. Earlier, but 
without addressing multilayered governance, Cottier argued for “a clear distinction between 
risk assessment based on scientific evidence and risk management” (see Thomas Cottier, 
‘Risk Management experience in WTO dispute settlement’, in David Robertson and Aynsley 
Kellow, Globalization and the Environment. Risk Assessment and the WTO (Edward Elgar, 
2001), p. 57).  
1323 A renewed interest in governance theories in general, e.g., regulation theory, new-
institutionalism and policy network analysis, was attributed to changing relationships between 
states and markets in the era of globalisation. As an alternative term for hierarchical forms of 
governance, Panos Getimis and Grigoris Kafkalas suggested the term heterarchy for 
characterising “a network of horizontal relationships among a growing number of collective 
and individual actors (e.g. public, private, NGOs, associations, etc.), which participate in 
overlapping partnerships and cooperation initiatives” (Panos Getimis and Grigoris Kafkalas, 
‘Empirical Evidence and Comparative Analysis of Policy-Making in the Pursuit of Innovation 
and Sustainability’, in Hubert Heinelt, Panagiotis Getimis, Grigoris Kafkalas, Randall Smith, 
Erik Swyngedouw (eds.), Participatory Governance in Multi-Level Context. Concepts and 
Experience (Leske + Budrich, 2002), p. 157. 
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policy effectiveness and legitimacy”. 1324 Therefore, approaches of multi-level 
governance are sometimes also called post-Westphalian or post-Weberian 
approaches. 
 
Precursors of the theory of multilayered governance have been developed in 
debates about federalism in the United States, as well as in reflection of 
increasing “constitutionalisation” of governance structures of the emerging 
European Communities.1325 
 
In the field of international relations, a particular expression of multi-level 
governance distinct from federalism can be observed. Gary Marks and Liesbet 
Hooghe described expressions of multi-level governance different from 
federalism as forms “in which jurisdictions are aligned not on just a few levels, 
but operate at numerous territorial scales; in which jurisdictions are task-specific 
rather tan general-purpose; and where jurisdictions are intended to be flexible 
rather than durable”.1326 
 
Cottier and Hertig drew the analogy of a five storey house for characterising the 
theory of multilevel governance.1327 The five storey house basically consists of a 
communal level (where it enjoys a certain degree of autonomy), a state level, a 
federal or national level, a level of regional integration and an international 
level. Of course, these levels are of a model character and dependent on the state 
of the respective constitutional setting. Cottier emphasises the importance of 
interplay between different levels of governance. Although the supremacy of 
“higher” levels of governance is considered necessary for maintaining some 
degree of coherence, Cottier and Hertig also stress independent functions of 
respective levels of governance. In sum, the five storey house of multilayered 
governance is characterised as “a relation of mutual communication, not 
subordination (…)”.1328 
 
                                                 
1324 Enrico Gualini, Multi-level Governance and Institutional Change. The Europeanization of 
Regional Policy in Italy (Ashgate Publishing, 2004), p. 44 (original emphasis, footnote 
omitted).  
1325 Gary Marks and Liesbet Hooghe discerned between two types of multi-level governance, 
type I and type II. According to Marks and Hooghe, forms of type I multi-level governance 
are commonly found in federalist entities and the European Union, whereas forms of type II 
multi-level governance are typically found in international organisations (see Gary Marks and 
Liesbet Hooghe, ‘Contrasting Visions of Multi-level Governance’, in Ian Banche and 
Matthew Flinders (eds), Multi-level Governance (Oxford University Press, 2004), in 
particular pp. 217-22).  
1326 Gary Marks and Liesbet Hooghe, ibid. p. 20.  
1327 Thomas Cottier and Maya Hertig, ‘The Prospects of 21st Century Constitutionalism’, in 
Georg Kohler and Urs Marti (eds.), Konturen der neuen Welt(un)ordnung (De Gruyter, 2003), 
pp. 120-162.  
1328 Thomas Cottier and Maya Hertig, ibid. p. 162. 
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In a similar approach, Arthur Benz recognised “political interdependencies” as 
the characterising feature of multilevel governance.1329 Political and other 
interdependencies are also a characterising feature of modern, i.e. ‘fabricated’, 
risks.  
 
Bop Jessop emphasised the relationship between expanding markets and the 
transnational nature of modern risks. Jessop argued that regionalisation of 
production processes in particular diminishes regulatory powers of nation 
states.1330 
 
Christoph Rehmann-Sutter, Hansjörg Seiler, and Adrian Vatter observed that the 
areas where risks may materialise (areas of effect) are no longer corresponding 
with the areas of control, the latter still being prescribed by national boundaries. 
Therefore, Rehmann-Sutter, Seiler and Vatter proposed a reshuffle of areas of 
effect and areas of control in order to realign them congruently. In particular, 
Rehmann-Sutter, Seiler and Vatter laid stress on the need for new forms of 
international cooperation which are not contingent upon the prior establishment 
of “a global republic”.1331 
 
With respect to GMOs in particular, Ulrich Beck considered that the major issue 
raised by biotechnology is the question about governance in a global context. 
For Beck, “the globality of the phenomenon” is at the heart of the problem, 
because it raises “serious questions about the sovereignty of national politics and 
its limits”: 
 
“Underlying all this the question arose: who actually is governing 
our lives? Genetically modified food is a global business and anxiety 
about the unknown consequences and for the planet are a world-wide 
concern. Moreover, it is the globality of the phenomenon which 
explains why it is to hard to deal with. No single country can avoid 
genetically modified food and crops without bucking the system of 
free trade. If a government seeks to delay the introduction of 
genetically manipulated food it will face opposition from the food 
                                                 
1329 Arthur Benz ‘Multilevel Governance – Governance in Mehrebenensystemen’, in Arthur 
Benz (ed.), Governance – Regieren in komplexen Regelsystemen. Eine Einführung (VS 
Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften/GWV Fachverlage, 2004), p. 127. Arthur Benz uses the 
German word “Politikverflechtung”. However, the English term “intergovernmental 
relations”, as developed in the US debate about Federalism, does not sufficiently encompass 
meanings surpassing respective national contexts. Therefore, “Politikverflechtung” is 
translated with “political interdependencies”.  
1330 Bernd Röttger, and Victor Rego Diaz (eds.), Bob Jessop. Kapitalismus, Regulation, Staat. 
Ausgewählte Schriften (Argument Verlag, 2007), p. 228.  
1331 Christoph Rehmann-Sutter, Adrian Vatter, Hansjörg Seiler, Partizipative Risikopolitik 
(Westdeutscher Verlag, 1998), p. 20.  
 441 
giants, who want uniform standards to apply across the world – that 
is, if those standards favour them.” 1332 
 
In essence, the theory of multilayered governance was characterised “a 
graduated concept of constitutionalism which puts more emphasis on process 
and interaction than on strict conceptual boundaries and momentous events of 
constitution making, focusing on how the constitutional functions can be 
secured, considering the different levels of governance as forming part of an 
overall constitutional system”.1333 In other words, the focus of the theory of 
multilevel governance is on governmental functions as they are effectively 
executed instead of centring on formal constitutional texts which were written 
mainly before regional and international layers of governance have emerged.  
 
Guy Peters and Jon Pierre used the term “Faustian bargain” for describing the 
dilemma with the multi-level governance approach. Peters and Pierre observed 
that multi-level governance “needs to be critically assessed in order to facilitate 
a debate regarding its outcomes. Clearly, there is much in multi-level 
governance suggesting that it has a high problem-solving capacity and that it is 
likely to generate efficient outcomes. That said, multi-level governance also has 
features, which, call its democratic nature into question.” 1334 
 
The theory of multilayered governance aims to allocate powers, tasks and 
obligations to the various layers of governance according to respective functions 
and in rational ways.  This focus on governmental functions1335 is taken as a 
model and employed for re-allocating risk analysis procedures.  
 
The core idea of the theory of multilayered governance, i.e. its focus on function 
but not on form, meets Codex’ ‘functional separation’ of risk management and 
risk assessment. As outlined above, the approach of Codex to “functionally 
separate” risk management and risk assessment basically consists in a separation 
                                                 
1332 Ulrich Beck, World Risk Society (Polity Press, 1999/2005), p. 107. 
1333 Thomas Cottier and Maya Hertig, ‘The Prospects of 21st Century Constitutionalism’, in 
Georg Kohler and Urs Marti (eds.), Konturen der neuen Welt(un)ordnung (De Gruyter, 2003), 
pp. 161-162. 
1334 Guy Peters and Jon Pierre, ‘Multi-level Governance and Democracy: A Faustian 
Bargain?’ in Ian Bache and Matthew Flinders (eds.), Multi-level Governance (Oxford 
University Press, 2004), p. 88.  
1335 According to Gerald Allan Cohen, functional approaches are trying to explain a cause by 
their consequence: “To establish that a social practice A exists in order to do B, we must 
establish a law that relates A’s disposition to do B with A’s existence. In short, we must show 
that it is a law that when A would be useful (or serve its function), A comes to exist.” Thus, 
functional approaches are relying on “consequence law” (Harold Kincaid, Philosophical 
Foundations of the Social Sciences. Analyzing Controversies in Social Research (Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), p. 109, with reference to Gerald A. Cohen, Karl Marx’s Theory of 
History: A Defence (Princeton University Press, 1978).  
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of the two distinct functions of risk managers, on the one hand, and risk 
assessors, on the other hand. Codex achieves a separation of risk management 
and risk assessment by assigning their respective functions to different 
organisational structures. Essentially, the function of managing risks in the 
framework of Codex is assigned to respective Codex Committees and finally to 
the Commission of the Codex Alimentarius (CAC). On the other hand, the 
function of assessing risks is assigned to Committees and meetings of individual 
experts selected and assembled by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations (FAO) and the World Health Organisation (WHO). In particular, 
these scientific expert bodies are the Joint FAO/WHO Expert Committee on 
Food Additives (JECFA), the Joint FAO/WHO Meetings on Pesticide Residues 
(JMPR.), and the Joint Meetings on Microbiological Risk Assessment 
(JEMRA). Whereas the Codex Committees and the Commission of the Codex 
Alimentarius are driven by initiatives of representatives of Member Countries, 
the scientific experts assembled in JECFA, JMPR and JEMRA are working 
under the auspices of international organisations, namely the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Health 
Organisation (WHO). In other words, the function of managing risks at the 
international level is assigned to Codex bodies driven by Member country 
interests, whereas the function of scientifically assessing risks is sourced out into 
the realm of international organisations. Simplified, international risk 
management, i.e. negotiating international standards, guidelines and 
recommendations, is a function carried out by delegates of Member countries, 
whereas risk assessment, i.e. the scientific evaluation of risks, is sourced out to 
specialised expert bodies beyond the reach of Codex members.  
 
The theory of multilayered governance seems particularly well suited for 
addressing transboundary health and safety concerns. GMOs, SARS, avian 
influenza and swine flu are examples of global threats which can only be 
addressed by regional and international organisations transcending national 
sovereignty. John Jackson summarised challenges caused by internationalised 
health and safety issues as follows:  
 
“(…) the subject of health clearly demands attention at an 
international level, for several reasons. First, as recognised at least a 
century and half ago, various health issues transgress national 
borders, and by at least 1920 it was recognised that increased world 
trade created added dangers of transmittal of communicable diseases. 
Much more recently the scourge of HIV-AIDS, and the scare caused 
by the possible SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) epidemic, 
as well as the current potential disaster of avian influenza 
demonstrated poignantly the importance of the WHO (World Health 
Organization) and actually led that organization to begin work on 
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revising its International Health Regulations (IHRs) to better 
accommodate international activity.” 1336 
 
With respect to transboundary challenges to health and safety, the theory of 
multilayered governance, sometimes also called post-Westphalian or post-
Weberian approaches, provides appropriate response. The theory of multi-level 
governance basically considers that “the erosion of territorially-bound 
sovereignty – due to the weakening of state borders as well as to the increasing 
supra-nationalization of policy areas crucial for the effectiveness and ‘output-
oriented’ legitimation of welfare states in face of structural deficit of ‘input-
oriented’ legitimation – defines a new challenging conditions for post-
Westphalian nation states: the blurring the external differentiation calls for an 
increasing internal differentiation as a condition for policy effectiveness and 
legitimacy”. 1337 
 
In fact, legitimacy and scientific integrity are challenged by various sources of 
interferences. Examples are directives from superior administrative units, as was 
the case in Australia – Salmon, lobbying or other sorts of political or economic 
interventions. Challenged by such cases, the theory of multilevel governance 
suggests to assign risk assessment to levels beyond the reach of stakeholders 
involved in risk analysis procedures at respective national levels. In other words, 
because an outsourcing of risk assessment within national governmental 
structures does not ensure unbiased outcomes, the theory of multilevel 
governance suggests an assignment of risk assessment to other levels of 
governance beyond national reach. In this respect, one might think about 
regional or international levels. In fact, a survey on SPS cases shows that only 
risk evaluations carried out at the regional or at the international level were 
accepted as “proper risk assessments” in the sense of Article 5.1 of the SPS 
Agreement by Panels and the Appellate Body (EC – Hormones, EC – Biotech). 
On the other hand, in none of the prominent SPS cases was a risk evaluation 
carried out at the national level accepted as a ‘proper risk assessment’ (Australia 
– Salmon, Japan – Agricultural Products).  
 
In the case EC – Hormones, risk assessments were carried out by various 
scientific committees at the regional1338 and at the international1339 level, in 
particular JECFA. The regional and international risk assessments were 
                                                 
1336 John H. Jackson, Sovereignty, the WTO and Changing Fundamentals of International 
Law (Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 245 (footnotes omitted).  
1337 Enrico Gualini, Multi-level Governance and Institutional Change. The Europeanization of 
Regional Policy in Italy (Ashgate Publishing, 2004), p. 44 (original emphasis, footnote 
omitted).  
1338 The Lamming Report, the EC Scientific Conference.  
1339 The OIE Symposium, the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC) 
Monographs, the 1988 and 1989 JECFA Reports.  
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subsequently accepted as ‘proper risk assessments’ by the Panel and by the 
Appellate Body. All these risk evaluations carried out at the regional or at the 
international level came to the conclusion that the hormones in question are 
‘safe’ if administered according to good agricultural practices.1340 On the other 
hand, risk evaluation reports put forward by the European Communities for 
justifying their import ban on hormone treated meat were not accepted as proper 
risk assessments in the sense of Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement by the Panel 
and the Appellate Body.   
 
In the case Australia – Salmon, the alleged risks for the Australian Atlantic 
salmon were assessed at national levels, i.e., by Australia, a procedure which 
was not accepted by the panel and the Appellate Body as a proper risk 
assessment in the sense of Article 5.1 SPS. In this case, the Panel observed a 
“rather substantial change in conclusions” between a risk evaluation report 
issued in May 1995 by Australia’s Quarantine and Inspection Service (AQIS) 
approving the importation of salmon under certain conditions, and a later report 
published in May 1996 by Australia’s Department of Primary Industries and 
Fisheries recommending an uphold of the import prohibition.1341 Although 
Australia claimed that the reversal was based on new scientific data and 
considerations, the experts advising the Panel all declined that new scientific 
evidence had been originated with regard to the questions at issue.1342 Therefore, 
the Panel considered that “the decisive reason for reversing the 1995 Draft 
Report’s conclusions – that the salmon products further examined should be 
allowed into Australia under specific conditions – might well have been inspired 
by domestic pressures to protect the Australian salmon industry against import 
competition”.1343 In this respect, the Panel also pointed at a statement made by 
Canada arguing that Tasmanian salmon producers “lobbied furiously” against 
the report issued in May 1995 by Australia’s Quarantine and Inspection Services 
(AQIS) and “even hired a lobby firm … to reverse the conclusion…”1344 
Obviously, thought, the Australian risk assessment1345 was influenced by the 
                                                 
1340 EC –Hormones, Panel Report, para. 8.124.  
1341 Australia –Salmon, Panel Report, para. 8.154. The risk evaluation report issued by 
Australia’s Quarantine and Inspection Service (AQIS) in May 1995 was entitled “Draft 
Import Risk Analysis – Disease risks associated with the importation of uncooked, wild, 
ocean-caught salmon product from the USA and Canada”. Hence, the Panel called it the 
“1995 Draft Report”. Because the report published in May 1996 by Australia’s Department of 
Primary Industries and Fisheries was the final version of Australia’s Import Risk Analysis, the 
Panel called it the “1996 Final Report”.  
1342 Australia –Salmon, Panel Report, para. 8.154. In footnote no. 424, the Panel cited one of 
the scientific experts, Rogers, stating that the 1996 Final Report “seems to consider the 
scientific advice but then reaches a political decision, following public consultation”.  
1343 Australia –Salmon, Panel Report, para. 8.154. This finding of the Panel was uphold by the 
Appellate Body in its Report on Australia – Salmon, para. 173.  
1344 Australia –Salmon, Panel Report, para. 8.154, footnote 425. 
1345 The 1996 Final Report.  
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Department of Primary Industries and Fisheries so as to justify the intended 
measure, i.e., to ban the importation of salmon.1346  
 
In the case Japan – Agricultural Products II, the risk of the introduction of the 
codling moth into Japan was assessed at the national level, i.e., by Japanese 
authorities in a “1996 Pest Risk Assessment of Codling Moth,” a procedure 
which was not accepted by the Appellate Body as a proper risk assessment in the 
sense of Article 5.1 SPS. Therefore, both the Panel and the Appellate Body 
found that the measure to address the alleged risks, i.e., the varietal testing 
requirement, was adopted without a “proper risk assessment” on which it should 
have been based.  
 
In the case EC – Biotech, the Panel only accepted the risk evaluations conducted 
at the regional level, i.e., by the leading competent authority1347 and by the EC 
scientific committees1348 as ‘proper risk assessments’. In contrast, the Panel 
refused to accept the various documents produced at national levels, i.e., by 
individual EC Member States,1349 as ‘proper risk assessments’.  
 
The survey reveals that the inconsistencies between the outcome of the risk 
assessment and the risk management measures, which were supposed to be 
based upon the outcome of the risk assessment, were most striking in the cases 
EC – Hormones and EC – Biotech where the risk assessment was undertaken at 
a different level (regional or international) from the risk management (national 
and regional level, respectively).  
 
In the Biotech case, the discrepancies between the risk assessments undertaken 
by the leading competent authority, i.e., the authority of the EC Member State to 
which the product applications were originally submitted, and the EC scientific 
committees and the reasons given by EC Member States to justify their 
individual safeguard measures were apparent. Against the findings of the proper 
risk assessments undertaken by the leading competent authority and the EC 
                                                 
1346 The Panel observed that “the decisive reason for reversing the 1995 Draft Report’s 
conclusion – that the salmon products further examined should be allowed into Australia 
under specific conditions – might well have been inspired by domestic pressures to protect the 
Australian salmon industry against import competition” (Australia – Salmon, Panel Report, 
para 8.154; finding upheld by the Appellate Body Report, paras. 170, 173). The 1995 Draft 
Report was written by the Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service (AQIS), whereas the 
1996 Final Report was published by the Department of Primary Industries and Fisheries 
(Australia – Salmon, Panel Report, paras. 2.28, 2.30).  
1347 That is, the competent authority (CA) of the EC Member State to which the product 
applications were originally submitted.  
1348 EC Scientific Committee on Plants (SCP), EC Scientific Committee on Food (SCF), EC 
Scientific Committee for Pesticides (SCPE), EC Scientific Committee on Animal Nutrition 
(SCAN).  
1349 The Reasons Documents, the Hoppichler Study, the Hilbeck study, the BEC reports, etc.  
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scientific committees that there was “no evidence” that the biotech products in 
question presented any greater risk for human health or the environment than its 
conventional counterparts, some EC Member States went on banning certain 
biotech products. 
 
In the Biotech case, the panel examined and rebutted a wide range of documents 
put forward by EC Member States for justifying their respective safeguard 
measures as either not constituting proper risk assessments or as not being 
‘based on’ a proper risk assessment pursuant to Annex A(4) and Article 5.1 of 
the SPS Agreement.1350. The reasons for this verdict of the Panel varied for each 
document. For example, the Panel noted that  
 
- documents put forward by Austria1351 to justify its safeguard measure 
against the importation of T25 maize lacked of “evaluation of 
likelihood” of gene flows from GMOs; 1352 
- documents put forward by France for justifying its safeguard 
measure against the importation of MS1/RF1 oilseed rape did “not 
‘evaluate’ the likelihood of the risks of establishment, entry or spread 
of a pest (in casu, hybrid plants)…”; 1353 
- a document put forward by Germany1354 for justifying its safeguard 
measure against the importation of Bt-176 maize “asserts that there 
is a potential for adverse effects on human or animal health” from 
the presents of antibiotic resistance marker genes (ARMG), but the 
study “does not determine likelihoods”; 1355  
- some documents put forward by Greece 1356 for justifying its 
safeguard measure against the importation of Topas oilseed rape 
addressed herbicide tolerant GM crops (GMHT crops) “in general 
rather than focusing specifically on the Topas oilseed rape, and none 
of these studies evaluates the likelihood of adverse effects from the 
entry, establishment or spread of GMHT crops according to the SPS 
measures which might be taken by Greece to reduce any potential 
risks”; 1357 
                                                 
1350 Oren Perez, ‘Anomalies at the precautionary kingdom: reflections on the GMO Panel’s 
decision’ (2007), 6(2) World Trade Review, 271. 
1351 E.g. the “Hoppichler study”.  
1352 EC – Biotech, Panel Reports, para. 7.3046.  
1353 EC – Biotech, Panel Reports, para. 7.3116. 
1354 E.g. a study from the Öko-Institut e.V. on the „Therapeutical relevance of antibiotics in 
connection with the use of antibiotic resistance genes in transgenic plants“.   
1355 EC – Biotech, Panel Reports, para. 7.3151.  
1356 Several reports resulting from the Farm Scale Evaluations (FSEs) conducted in the United 
Kingdom.  
1357 EC – Biotech, Panel Reports, para. 7.3170. 
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- a document put forward by Italy1358 for justifying its safeguard 
measure against the importation of T25 maize, MON810 maize, 
MON809 maize and Bt-11 maize “constitutes, not a complete, self-
contained, scientific evaluation of the potential for adverse effects on 
human or animal health due to toxicity and the development of 
antibiotic resistance, but only part of such an evaluation”; 1359 
- a document put forward by Luxembourg for justifying its safeguard 
measure against the importation of Bt-176 maize “calls for, but does 
not itself provide, further evaluation of the mechanism of gene 
transfer which might lead to the development of antibiotic resistance 
and of the risk of development of insects resistant to Bt toxin”; 1360 
 
On the other hand, the Panel recognised risk assessments carried out at the EC 
Community level as complying with the requirements of Annex A(4) and 
Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement. In this respect, the Panel observed “that the 
assessments carried out by the lead CA1361 and by the EC scientific 
committees1362 constitute ‘risk assessments’ within the meaning of Annex A(4) 
and Article 5.1. of the SPS Agreement”.1363 In contrast to the EC Member States 
evaluations rebutted by the Panel for not constituting proper risks assessments, 
the Panel admitted that the evaluations carried out at the EC Community level 
“evaluated the likelihood of potential adverse effects on human health and/or the 
environment, as well as the associated potential consequences, according to the 
proposed use of the specific biotech product under consideration”.1364 
 
In cases where risk assessments were carried out entirely at national levels, these 
risk assessments were not accepted as proper risk assessments in the sense of 
Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement (Australia – Salmon, Japan – Agricultural 
Products II). On the other hand, it can be observed that Panels and the Appellate 
Body accepted risk evaluations carried out at regional and international levels 
(EC – Hormones, EC – Biotech). However, in these cases, proper risk 
assessments carried out at regional and international levels drew different 
conclusions than reports and studies put forward by the respective respondents 
                                                 
1358 The opinion by the Italian Superior Institute of Health of July 2000.  
1359 EC – Biotech, Panel Reports, para. 7.3188. 
1360 EC – Biotech, Panel Reports, para. 7.3205. 
1361 The competent authority of the EC Member State where the GMO at issue is to be placed 
on the market for  the first time. 
1362 In the case EC – Biotech, the EC Scientific Committee on Food (SCF) and the EC 
Scientific Committee on Plants (SCP) were involved in risk assessment.  
1363 EC – Biotech, Panel Reports, para. 7.3027, footnotes added.  
1364 EC – Biotech, Panel Reports, para. 7.3027, footnote omitted. The EC scientific 
committees found that the biotech products in question did not present any risk. See, inter 
alia, Oren Perez, ‘Anomalies at the precautionary kingdom: reflections on the GMO Panel’s 
decision’ (2007), 6(2) World Trade Review, 265-280.  
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for justifying their respective SPS measures in the WTO disputes in question 
(EC – Hormones, EC – Biotech). 
 
Considering the cases EC – Hormones and EC – Biotech, it was shown that 
reports and studies put forward by respondents for justifying their respective 
SPS measures in the WTO disputes at issue were objected by other, 
scientifically more ‘objective’ risk assessments carried out at regional and 
international levels. Such findings challenge the scientific integrity of risk 
assessments carried out at respective national levels. In the same way, questions 
arise with regard to the clarity about respective functions of risk assessors and 
risk managers and potential conflicts of interest among national authorities. 
Hence, the concept of the Appellate Body to merge risk assessment and risk 
management into one operation, i.e., the ‘SPS risk assessment’, may educe the 
sort of problems the doctrine of risk analysis tries to avoid by establishing a 
‘function separation’ of risk assessment and risk management. Or, as Codex put: 
“There should be a functional separation of risk assessment and risk 
management, in order to ensure the scientific integrity of the risk assessment, to 
avoid confusion over the functions to be performed by risk assessors and risk 
managers and to reduce any conflict of interest.”1365 However, corruption of 
scientific integrity, confusion over the role of risk assessors and risk managers, 
and conflicts of interests could be observed in several SPS cases. In the case 
Australia – Salmon, scientific integrity was corrupted by the Australian 
Department of Primary Industries and Energy reversing the scientific findings of 
its Quarantine and Inspection Service for protectionist motives.1366 Confusion 
over the functions of risk assessors and risk managers became apparent in the 
EC – Hormones case.1367 Conflicts of interests were found by the Appellate 
Body in the Continued Suspension cases, considering that institutional 
affiliations of scientific experts with JECFA “compromised the adjudicative 
independence and impartiality of the Panel”.1368 
 
On the basis of the theory of multilevel governance, it is suggested to engage in 
a clear vertical separation of powers and functions. Hereby, risk assessment 
would be assigned to those international bodies already concerned with the 
elaboration of international standards in the relevant fields, i.e., Codex, OIE and 
IPPC. For making the system operational, the task of providing risk assessments 
                                                 
1365 Paragraph 9 of the ‘Working Principles for Risk Analysis for Application in the 
Framework of the Codex Alimentarius’, Section IV of the Procedural Manual of the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission, 19th edition, 2010, p. 87.  
1366 Australia – Salmon, Panel Report, para 8.154; finding upheld by the Appellate Body, 
Appellate Body Report, paras. 170, 173.  
1367 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 206. 
1368 US/Canada – Continued Suspension, Appellate Body Reports, paras. 456-482, in 
particular para. 481; reversing Panel's findings in US – Continued Suspension, paras. 6.22, 
6.62-6.63 and 7.85 / Canada – Continued Suspension, paras. 6.21, 6.57-6.58 and 7.83. 
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in individual cases could be assigned to bodies already established by Codex, 
OIE and IPPC, in particular the respective scientific expert committees and 
working groups. For instance, in the Codex system, the most prominent 
scientific expert committees are the Joint FAO/WHO Expert Committee on 
Food Additives (JECFA), the Joint FAO/WHO Expert Meetings on Pesticide 
Residues (JMPR), and the Joint FAO/WHO Expert Meetings on Microbiological 
Risk Assessment (JEMRA). Expert committees and working groups of scientific 
experts convening under the auspices of the three mentioned international 
organisations, i.e., Codex, OIE and IPPC, could be used as nuclei for 
establishing international networks for risk assessments on the basis of specific 
mandates by individual WTO members wishing to introduce an SPS measure. 
Such an international risk assessment network open for all interested countries 
would be of particular value for developing and least developed countries 
currently prevented from fully participating in SPS procedures owing to limited 
scientific resources.  
 
A vertical separation of risk assessment and risk management would resolve one 
of the major problems of the current SPS Agreement, that is, the question where 
and how to address non-scientific factors. As explained above, it remains 
unclear up to now in which stage of the risk analysis process non-scientific 
factors should be addressed: should non-scientific factors be considered in the 
risk management stage and separated from scientific risk assessment, as 
suggested by the rather objectivist approach of the panel? Or should non-
scientific factors be considered in a comprehensive attempt covering both risk 
assessment and risk management aspects, as prescribed by the rather 
constructivist approach of the Appellate Body?  
 
With respect to the problem of non-scientific factors, the solution offered by the 
proposal suggested here follows the objectivist attempt of the panels in the EC – 
Hormones and Continued Suspension cases. By vertically separating scientific 
questions from risk management issues, it is clear that non-scientific factors 
belong to the risk management phase which shall be dealt with at respective 
national levels. The assignment of non-scientific questions to risk management 
corresponds with the majority opinion in the risk analysis circle. The Codex 
Alimentarius Commission, for instance, issued ‘Statements of Principle 
Concerning the Role of Science in the Codex Decision-Making Process and the 
Extent to which other Factors are taken into Account’ (in the following: 
Statements of Principle) which were adopted in 1995. The second principle of 
the Statements of Principle made it clear that Codex, in principle, takes into 
account non-scientific factors:   
 
“2.  When elaborating and deciding upon food standards Codex 
Alimentarius will have regard, where appropriate, to other 
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legitimate factors relevant for the health protection of consumers 
and for the promotion of fair practices in food trade.” 1369 
 
However, this “rather obscure provision”, as Button1370 called it, kept silent how 
and to what extent ‘other legitimate factors’ have to be taken into account by 
Codex. Therefore, Codex’ Statements of Principle were subsequently clarified 
by ‘Criteria for the consideration of the Other Factors Referred to in the Second 
Statement of Principle’, adopted in 2001. The amendment clarified that  
 
“other legitimate factors for health protection and fair trade 
practices may be identified in the risk management process, and 
risk managers should indicate how these factors affect the selection 
of risk management options and the development of standards, 
guidelines and related texts. “1371 
 
By the same token, the 2001 amendment reconfirmed that “consideration of 
other factors should not affect the scientific basis of risk analysis; in this 
process, the separation between risk assessment and risk management should be 
respected, in order to ensure the scientific integrity of the risk assessment”.1372 
From this wording, it is clear that ‘other legitimate factors’ have to be 
considered in the risk management phase. Obviously, though, the Statements of 
Principle were drafted with view on today’s organisation of Codex, that is, with 
Codex committees such as CCFA and the CCCF acting as risk managers and 
scientific committees and expert meetings such as JECFA, JEMRA and JMPR 
functioning as risk assessors. However, there is nothing that speaks against the 
application of rules developed for separating risk assessment and risk 
management in standard setting procedures at the international level to 
individual SPS risk assessments. Whereas risk assessors would basically remain 
the same, i.e. international expert bodies, risk managers would be authorities 
from WTO members intending to establish an SPS measure. Hence, the 
                                                 
1369 Codex Alimentarius Commission, ‘Statements of Principle Concerning the Role of 
Science in the Codex Decision-Making Process and the Extent to which other Factors are 
taken into Account’, in the Procedural Manual, 19th edition (Secretariat of the Joint 
FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme, 2010), p. 180.  
1370 Catherine Button, The Power to Protect. Trade, Health, and Uncertainty in the WTO 
(Hart Publishing, 2004), p. 106.  
1371 Codex Alimentarius Commission, ‘Statements of Principle Concerning the Role of 
Science in the Codex Decision-Making Process and the Extent to which other Factors are 
taken into Account’, in the Procedural Manual, 19th edition (Secretariat of the Joint 
FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme, 2010), p. 180.  
1372 Codex Alimentarius Commission, ‘Statements of Principle Concerning the Role of 
Science in the Codex Decision-Making Process and the Extent to which other Factors are 
taken into Account’, in the Procedural Manual, 19th edition (Secretariat of the Joint 
FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme, 2010), p. 180.  
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coverage of the relevant ‘Criteria for the consideration of the Other Factors 
Referred to in the Second Statement of Principle’ could be expanded as follows:  
 
Other legitimate factors for health protection and fair trade practices 
may be identified in the risk management process, and risk managers 
should indicate how these factors affect the selection of risk 
management options and the development of standards, guidelines 
and related texts [and SPS measures]. 
 
By establishing a clear institutional separation between risk assessment and risk 
management, the proposal at hand may also help to clarify problems 
surrounding precaution. Actually, it would be an issue for discussion between 
risk assessors and risk managers how and to what extent considerations of 
precaution may be factored into a concrete risk assessment policy at issue.  The 
requirement for discussion issues of precaution openly and thoroughly in the 
process of establishing a risk assessment policy may clarify whether there is 
enough scientific foundation for justifying a provisional measure in the sense of 
Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement or not. That line of argument follows, in fact, 
the current Codex policy with regard to precaution. Paragraph 11 of the 
‘Working Principles for Risk Analysis for Application in the Framework of the 
Codex Alimentarius’ points at the threshold of ‘sufficient scientific evidence’ 
for further proceedings:   
 
“Precaution is an inherent element of risk analysis. Many sources of 
uncertainty exist in the process of risk assessment and risk 
management of food related hazards to human health. The degree of 
uncertainty and variability in the available scientific information 
should be explicitly considered in the risk analysis. Where there is 
sufficient scientific evidence to allow Codex to proceed to elaborate 
a standard or related text, the assumptions used for the risk 
assessment and the risk management options selected should reflect 
the degree of uncertainty and the characteristics of the hazard.” 1373 
 
Albeit in a vertical setting where risk assessors would operation at the 
international level and risk managers at respective national levels, the questions 
would remain rather similar. In cases where there is “sufficient scientific 
evidence”, risk managers at respective national levels might proceed to 
introduce provisional SPS measures according to Article 5.7 of the SPS 
Agreement. If, however, risk assessors are unable to provide “sufficient 
scientific evidence” even for justifying a provisional measure, it would remain 
                                                 
1373 Working Principles for Risk Analysis for Application in the Framework of the Codex 
Alimentarius, in Section IV of the Procedural Manual of the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission, 19th edition (Secretariat of the Joint FAO/WHO Food Standards Programme, 
2010), p. 87.  
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upon respective national risk managers to decide whether or not to introduce 
SPS measures solely on the basis of the precautionary principle.  
 
The focus of a reform of the SPS Agreement in line with the above 
considerations is, at first view, on Article 5. In its current form, Article 5 of the 
SPS Agreement implies that risk assessments are carried out at respective 
national levels. Paragraph 1 of Article 5 of the SPS Agreement, entitled 
Assessment of Risk and Determination of the Appropriate Level of Sanitary or 
Phytosanitary Protection, reads as follows:  
 
1. Members shall ensure that their sanitary or phytosanitary 
measures are based on an assessment, as appropriate to the 
circumstances, of the risks to human, animal or plant life or health, 
taking into account risk assessment techniques developed by the 
relevant international organizations. 
 
Cornerstone of a reform of the SPS Agreement following the above 
considerations would be a reformulated paragraph 1 of Article 5 of the SPS 
Agreement. The following wording may serve as starting point for such a 
discussion:1374 
 
Article 5 (new) 
 
Risk Assessment 
 
1. Members shall ensure that their sanitary or phytosanitary 
measures are based on an [international] assessment, as appropriate 
to the circumstances, of the risks to human, animal or plant life or 
health [determined by respective international organisations and 
accredited specialised scientific research institutions].  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1374 At a workshop entitled Food Safety Risk Assessment at the International Level: Do 
Existing Mechanisms Ensure Unbiased Outcomes? held at the World Trade Institute in Bern, 
Switzerland, October 3, 2007, distinguished experts had been invited to discuss risk 
assessment problems from different angles. The proposed wording is a synthesis of reform 
proposals developed by hosts and workshop participants. A special thank goes to Philippe 
Verger, head of the research unit Met@risk of the National Institute for Agricultural Research 
(INRA) in Paris, for his valuable and dedicated contributions, and to Susan Plattner, scientific 
editor of the World Trade Institute, for revising the draft of article 5.1.  
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B. The Criterion of Falsifiability 
 
A vertical separation of risk assessment from risk management would most 
likely free the former from the grip of respective national authorities. Thus, by 
assigning risk assessment to organisations operating at the international level, 
i.e., Codex, IPPC and OIE, the danger of political interferences would most 
likely decrease. Hence, the internationalisation of risk assessment, as suggested 
by a reformulated Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement, seems to be appropriate for 
addressing the predominant fear of disguised protectionism. The attempt for 
reformulating Article 5.1 of the SPS Agreement, however, seems inappropriate 
to ensure scientific integrity vis-à-vis corporate influence. Whereas political 
influence of national governments over risk assessors operating at the 
international level is likely to decrease, similar positive effects are not expected 
with regard to potential influence exerted by corporate interests. For shedding 
light on the issue, the example of the tobacco industry’s influence on WHO is 
presented.  
 
In 1999, the then Director General of the World Health Organisation, Gro 
Harlem Brundtland, appointed a committee of experts to investigate efforts of 
the tobacco industry to undermine WHO’s tobacco prevention policies and 
related research. The committee of experts was chaired by Thomas Zeltner, the 
then director of the Swiss Federal Office of Public Health (FOPH).1375 The 
report of the committee of experts, entitled Tobacco Company Strategies to 
Undermine Tobacco Control Activities at the World Health Organization was 
released in August 2000. For illustration, some excerpts from that report shall be 
displayed without further comment: 1376 
 
“Evidence from tobacco industry documents reveals that tobacco 
companies have operated for many years with the deliberate purpose 
of subverting the efforts of the World Health Organization (WHO) to 
control tobacco use. The attempted subversion has been elaborate, 
well financed, sophisticated, and usually invisible.” 
 
“That top executives of tobacco companies sat together to design and 
set in motion elaborate strategies to subvert a public health 
organization is unacceptable and must be condemned.” 
 
                                                 
1375 The other experts involved were Dr David Kessler, Dean, Yale School of Medicine, USA; 
Dr Anke Martiny, Executive Director of Transparency International, Germany; and Dr Fazel 
Randera, Inspector General of Intelligence, South Africa.  
1376 All quotes are taken from the report of Thomas Zeltner et. al., Tobacco Company 
Strategies to Undermine Tobacco Control Activities at the World Health Organization. 
Report of the Committee of Experts on Tobacco Industry Documents (World Health 
Organisation, July 2000), p. iii. 
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“… the documents show that tobacco companies sought to divert 
attention from the public health issues, to reduce budgets for the 
scientific and policy activities carried out by WHO, to pit other UN 
agencies against WHO, to convince developing countries that 
WHO’s tobacco control program was a “First World” agenda carried 
out at the expense of the developing world, to distort the results of 
important scientific studies on tobacco, and to discredit WHO as an 
institution.” 
 
“…the documents show that tobacco companies hid behind a variety 
of ostensibly independent quasi-academic, public policy, and 
business organizations whose tobacco industry funding was not 
disclosed. The documents also show that tobacco company strategies 
to undermine WHO relied heavily on international and scientific 
experts with hidden financial ties to the industry.” 
 
A telling example of a ‘scientific expert’ with ‘hidden financial ties to the 
industry’ was Professor of medicine Ragnar Rylander who for years was on the 
payroll of the tobacco industry and disseminated research findings on the 
innoxiousness of smoking.1377 
 
‘Hidden financial ties to the industry’ were again established when expert advice 
to the World Health Organisation (WHO) with regard to the pandemic flu 
A/H1N1 was investigated. For example, it was established that an expert 
involved in the elaboration of guidelines for the application of antiviral drugs 
received money from GlaxoSmithKline and Roche, the manufacturers of the 
antiviral drugs ‘Relenza’ and ‘Tamiflu’, respectively.1378 
 
Alexia Herwig pointed at structural aspects of industry’s interference with 
international scientific bodies, in particular at the problem of inadequate 
funding:  
 
                                                 
1377 Eduard Kaeser, Pop Science. Essays zur Wissenschaftskultur (Schwabe Verlag Basel, 
2009), pp. 40-41. The report of the inquiry commission of the University of Geneva of 
September 6, 2004 about the hidden activities of Professor Ragnar Rylander in the service of 
the tobacco industry, in particular of Philip Morris, can be accessed following this link: 
http://www.rauchenschadet.ch/m/mandanten/179/download/Bericht_Rylander_d.pdf (visited 
November 19, 2010).  
1378 The main report establishing conflicts of interests at WHO was jointly drafted by Deborah 
Cohen, editor of the British Medical Journal (BMJ), and Philip Carter, a journalist working 
with the Bureau of Investigative Journalism in London; see: Deborah Cohen and Philip 
Carter, ‘Conflicts of Interest. WHO and the pandemic flu ‘conspiracies’,’ in British Medical 
Journal (BMJ), June 3 2010. The report was commented, among others, by Alan Niederer, 
‘Neue Kritik an der WHO,’ in Neue Zürcher Zeitung no. 127, June 5, 2010, p. 26.  
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“The tobacco industry was able to hire a former Executive and 
Technical Secretary of JMPR as a consultant, who was the 
approached by the WHO to act as temporary adviser to the JMPR 
without disclosing his source of funding. There was also evidence 
suggesting some scientists evaluating milk hormones in 1997 in the 
JECFA were sponsored by industry. While the real impact of ‘hired’ 
scientists on the final evaluation is hard to assess, the possibility of 
capture cannot be ruled out. Although the WHO has a roster of 
experts, financial constraints have forced scientific committees to 
rely on outside experts. The FAO and the WHO meet the attendance 
costs of experts, but do not pay honoraria, thus giving experts an 
incentive to accept industry contributions.” 1379 
 
A major problem of scientific risk assessment is the fact that risk assessors are 
usually not establishing scientific data themselves but are relying on publicly 
available research data. Considering the generation – or fabrication – of 
scientific data, the example of the Tobacco Industry Research Council (TIRC) 
shall be provided. Robert Proctor observed that the tobacco industry applied 
various strategies for “disestablishing facts”. One of these disestablishing 
strategies of the tobacco industry was  
 
“…to fund research that would seem to be addressing tobacco and 
health, while really doing nothing of the sort. The chief instrument 
for this was the Tobacco Industry Research Council (TIRC), 
established in 1954, with great fanfare in full-page ads published in 
448 of the national’s leading newspapers. The TIRC (later renamed 
the Council for Tobacco Research) eventually funded hundreds of 
millions of dollars of research, very little of which had anything to 
do with smoking. Little of it ever addressed the question supposedly 
in doubt: whether and to what extent cigarettes are bad for your 
health. The political value of research of this kind (mostly basic 
biochemistry) was the fact of its being funded – which allowed the 
industry to say it was “studying the problem.” Industry researchers 
knew from the beginning what they were supposed to find (and not 
find): per instructions from the Tobacco Institute, the TIRC was 
supposed to manifest confidence that “we do not now know what 
causes lung cancer or any other kind of cancer.” Press releases and 
publications from the industry beat this drum pretty hard. In lawyerly 
                                                 
1379 Alexia Herwig, ‘Transnational Governance Regimes for Foods Derived from Bio-
Technology and their Legitimacy’, in Christian Joerges, Inger-Johanne Sand, and Gunther 
Teubner (eds.), Transnational Governance and Constitutionalism (Hart Publishing, 2004), 
[pp. 199-222], p. 220 (footnotes omitted).  
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fashion, health implications were thought of as “charges” to be 
refuted rather than as topics to be honestly investigated.” 1380 
 
Indeed, the question of the financing of scientific research is at the heart of the 
risk assessment problem. Lee Ann Jackson and Marion Jansen, analysing the 
issue thoroughly, described the state of play as follows:  
 
“If relevant scientific evidence was provided by independent 
scientists whose empirical work is driven by a pure interest in 
making science progress, chances would be high that the party 
providing the largest amount of evidence is indeed defending the 
paradigm that will ultimately be proven to be ‘correct’, in the sense 
that it supports standards that impede the sale of unsafe products 
while they allow for the global circulation of safe products. But in 
practice private sector players with commercial interests in one or 
the other outcome of the empirical evidence race have an important 
role in the generation of relevant scientific evidence and there is 
reason to believe that this creates a bias in the persuasion game.” 1381 
 
At this point, it is essential to remind that scientific expert bodies such as 
JECFA, JEMRA and JMPR working in the field of food safety, i.e. with 
committees of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, are not generating 
scientific data themselves, nor do they commission scientific work by third 
parties. Rather, scientific expert bodies working in the field of food safety, i.e. 
JECFA, JEMRA and JMPR, are relying on existing scientific data generated by 
third-party sources.1382 By issuing a ‘call for information’, scientific expert 
bodies working on food safety, e.g. JECFA, are collecting research data and 
studies on the substances at issue from all available sources preceding their 
respective meetings. In this respect, the role of unpublished data is of interest. 
                                                 
1380 Robert N. Proctor, ‘Agnotology. A Missing Term to Describe the Cultural Production of 
Ignorance (and Its Study),’ in Robert N. Proctor and Londa Schiebinger (eds.), Agnotology. 
The Making and Unmaking of Ignorance (Stanford University Press, 2008), p. 14 (original 
emphasis, footnote omitted).  
1381 Lee Ann Jackson and Marion Jansen, ‘Risk assessment in the international food safety 
policy arena. Can the multilateral institutions encourage unbiased outcomes?’ (2010) 35 Food 
Policy [538-547] 540. 
1382 It is important to note that the observed dependency on third-party data applies to food 
safety issues, first of all.  The time-honoured World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) for 
instance, runs a network of collaborating centres and reference laboratories all over the world. 
Founded already in 1924 in Paris and operating outside UN structures, OIE issues 
international standards in the forms of the International Animal Health Code and the 
International Aquatic Animal Health Code respectively (See, for instance, Tim Josling, Donna 
Roberts and David Orden, Food Regulation and Trade. Toward a Safe and Open Global 
System (Institute for International Economics, 2004), p. 42; and the OIE website:  
http://www.oie.int/eng/OIE/organisation/en_structure.htm?e1d1 (visited November 25, 2010).  
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There is no mechanism to ensure that unpublished data are coming to the eyes of 
risk assessors, regardless whether they are operating at national or at the 
international level.1383 Manufacturers, for example, are only “expected to submit 
all relevant published and unpublished data”.1384 But also providers of scientific 
data operating in the public domain, such as governments, NGOs, research 
institutes and universities, are just invited, but not obligated to submit relevant 
scientific data.1385 Considering this state of play, Lee Ann Jackson and Marion 
Jansen concluded:  
 
“JECFA risk assessment only relies on studies carried out by 
external laboratories. The scientific evidence used by JECFA, i.e. 
Codex, is therefore only as neutral as the evidence generated by 
external laboratory, i.e. through R&D generated with private sector 
or national public sector funding.” 1386 
 
As long as scientific expert bodies operating at the international level are 
supplied by research data provided by various different sources, in particular 
private sector funded as well as public sector funded research data, a critical 
assessment of such data by comparison seems possible. In reality, however, 
provision of scientific data is contingent upon respective financial, technological 
and institutional resources. The problem of insufficient scientific data from 
developing countries is widely acknowledged.1387 A rather new phenomenon, at 
                                                 
1383 The problem of no access to company data is also of concern in the field of drug testing. 
Recently, the British Medical Journal (BMJ) revealed that risk assessments for the drug 
oseltamivir (Tamiflu) have been based on questionable scientific data. According to the BMJ 
editorial, the Tamiflu case shows that the whole system of drug control is not working 
because scientific evidence “remains shrouded in secrecy”: 
“The current system isn’t working. Worse than that, it gives a false sense of 
security. The system’s failures have left a legacy of drug evaluations for which, 
in the absence of better information, we must assume the same levels of 
confusion and uncertainty as for oseltamivir. The drug industry directly or 
indirectly undertakes the majority of all drug evaluations, so most of the 
evidence used to support drug policy and treatment remains shrouded in secrecy. 
In only a minority of cases will the data have been subject to full independent 
analysis and interpretation. In many if not most cases, the only people who have 
seen the entire dataset are company employees” (Fiona Godlee, Mike Clarke, 
‘Why don’t we have all the evidence on oseltamivir?’ in British Medical 
Journal, December 8, 2009).  
1384 Lee Ann Jackson and Marion Jansen, ‘Risk assessment in the international food safety 
policy arena. Can the multilateral institutions encourage unbiased outcomes?’ (2010) 35 Food 
Policy [538-547] 542.  
1385 Lee Ann Jackson and Marion Jansen, ibid.  
1386 Lee Ann Jackson and Marion Jansen, ibid. 543.  
1387 See, for instance, Lee Ann Jackson and Marion Jansen, ‘Risk assessment in the 
international food safety policy arena. Can the multilateral institutions encourage unbiased 
outcomes?’ (2010) 35 Food Policy [538-547] 543.  
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least in the European context, is the incremental permeability of boundaries 
between public and private funding sources for scientific research. The 
underlying rationale for blurring boundaries between public and private research 
funding are ‘innovation policies’ reducing the role of science to a promoter of 
economic growth. In this respect, Helga Nowotny introduced the term 
‘propertization’ of scientific data and scientific knowledge in general.1388 
Nowotny noted: “Once science could claim to have several, perhaps 
contradictory functions. Today, its overriding function is to initiate, sustain, and 
be the main driving force behind innovation.” 1389 
 
As Nowotny indicated, impacts of innovation policies fostering cooperation 
models between the private sector and public research institutions, e.g. public-
private partnerships, joint ventures, third-party funds, technology transfer, spin-
off companies, etc. are far reaching. At this point, the single aspect of data 
control through corporate influence shall be further discussed. As an example, it 
is pointed at a cooperation agreement between the then Novartis Agro Discovery 
Institute (Nadi, today Syngenta) and the University of Berkeley of 1998. For 
five million US-Dollars per year, Novartis got the option to buy all licences of 
the Faculty of Biology of the University of Berkeley. Additionally, the 
corporation was entitled to delegate two of the five members of the board 
deciding over the distribution of research funds. Finally, university employees 
could get access to additional Novartis funds provided that they agreed to seek 
for the company’s approval before publishing research data.1390 Whereas such 
direct control of scientific data might be exceptional, indirect influencing of 
research data is on the increase. Typically coming along as private donations or 
sponsoring, indirect influencing of public research institutions does not aim at 
influencing concrete research data, but the research agenda. In this respect, 
Marcel Hänggi put in figuratively, saying that it would be rather unlikely that 
companies such as Syngenta or Novartis would ever sponsor professorships for 
mediaeval studies and glaciology: “Sponsoring influences the agenda of 
research”, Marcel Hänggi observed.1391 
                                                 
1388 Helga Nowotny, ‘The Changing Nature of Public Science’, in Helga Nowotny et al., The 
Public Nature of Science under Assault. Politics, Markets, Science and the Law (Springer 
Verlag, 2005) [1-28] 1.   
1389 Helga Nowotny, ibid. 12.  
1390 The example was taken from Marcel Hänggi, ‘Unterwegs zu McScience?’ in Die 
Wochenzeitung, Nr. 50, December 15, 2005, pp. 6-7.  
1391 Marcel Hänggi, ibid. A recent example confirms Hänggi’s observations. In November 
2010, it was announced that the company Syngenta sponsors a professorship for ‘sustainable 
agroecosystems’ within in the new centre of competence ‘World Food System’ of the Swiss 
Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich (ETHZ). See ‘ETH Zürich und Syngenta lancieren 
neue Professur’, in ETH Life, published November 11, 2010, web access:  
http://www.ethlife.ethz.ch/archive_articles/101111_Syngenta_MM (visited November 21, 
2010). Another example of agenda-setting through sponsoring was the donation of 25 million 
Swiss Francs by food giant Nestlé to the Brain Mind Institute of the Swiss Federal Institute of 
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Considering this state of play, two approaches seem conceivable. An ambitious 
approach might propose to equip international scientific bodies with the 
resources necessary to probe and compile scientific data themselves. Albeit 
enticing at first glance, the ambitious proposal is discarded in the following. The 
dismissal, however, is not motivated by the enormous political, financial and 
organisational challenges the ambitious proposal would bring about. At first, the 
reluctance is based on epistemological demur. Depicting international 
organisations equipped with proper research infrastructure such as laboratories 
with permanently-employed scientific staff and commissioned to execute risk 
assessments for WTO members on a mandatory basis, one may easily see the 
emergence of a powerful scientific superstructure. In addition, one has to bear in 
mind that the same international organisations would continue to function as 
reference points for the setting of international standards. Recalling Article 3.2 
of the SPS Agreement and the presumption of GATT/WTO compatibility of 
SPS measures conforming to international standards, one may well perceive the 
joint effect of mandatory assignments or risk assessments to international 
organisations and the legal bias towards levels of protection set by the very same 
international organisations.  
 
In this respect, considerations of the Appellate Body in the Continued 
Suspension case shall be recalled. In this case, the Appellate Body agreed to the 
European Communities’ argument that the panel infringed due process 
requirements by consulting with JECFA experts. In particular, the Appellate 
Body considered   
 
“… that there was an objective basis to conclude that the institutional 
affiliation with JECFA of Drs. Boisseau and Boobis, and their 
participation in JECFA's evaluations of the six hormones at issue, 
was likely to affect or give rise to justifiable doubts as to their 
independence or impartiality given that the evaluations conducted by 
JECFA lie at the heart of the controversy between the parties. The 
appointment and consultations with Drs. Boisseau and Boobis 
compromised the adjudicative independence and impartiality of the 
Panel. Therefore, we find that the Panel infringed the European 
Communities' due process rights as a result of the Panel having 
consulted with Drs. Boisseau and Boobis as scientific experts.” 1392 
 
That statement of the Appellate Body refers to the fact that risk assessment 
experts are rare and often active in various fora, for example in research 
                                                                                                                                                        
Technology in Lausanne (EPFL), as announced in November 2006 (see Marcel Hänggi, 
‘Liaisons dangereuses’, in Die Wochenzeitung, December 7, 2006).  
1392 US/Canada – Continued Suspension, Appellate Body Reports, para. 481; reversing 
Panel's findings in US – Continued Suspension, paras. 6.22, 6.62-6.63 and 7.85 / Canada – 
Continued Suspension, paras. 6.21, 6.57-6.58 and 7.83. 
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institutions at national levels and in expert committees at the international level. 
Quite similar to the Continued Suspension case, it is unlikely to assume that 
scientific experts active in the standard-setting process of international 
organisations would easily revise preceding findings when commissioned by an 
individual WTO member to conduct a particular risk assessment later one. If 
scientific resources and excellent scientific personnel in particular would be 
available in abundance, the ambitious approach might be further explored. But 
considering the ‘human factor’ leading to some kind of subjective bias in favour 
of scientific data in whose finding one was personally involved, scepticism 
seems advisable. In addition to that inherent bias towards existing levels of 
protection defined by international standards, the legal bias of Article 3.2 has to 
be taken into account. In the current setting of the existing SPS Agreement, the 
option for higher levels of protection is disqualified by the presumption 
contained in Article 3.2 of the SPS Agreement privileging SPS measures 
‘conform to’ international standards. Hence, without a simultaneous reform of 
Article 3.2 of the SPS Agreement, the inherent bias towards predefined levels of 
protection, as explained above, would continue to be reinforced by the legal 
presumption of Article 3.2 of the SPS Agreement.  
 
Finally, with respect to standard-setting processes conducted by international 
organisations, that is, risk management at the international level, one has to take 
into account additional structural imbalances. Taken the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission for example, one has to note that close links to industry are one of 
its characterising features. With regard to Codex-industry links, Thorsten Hüller 
and Matthias Leonhard Maier observed:  
 
“For one thing, close links with industry have deep roots in Codex 
history; in early years, the practice was even for member delegations 
to be directly sponsored by industry. For another, consumer 
organisations themselves acknowledge that ‘the food industry 
employs the best scientists’, which is clearly an important asset in 
the science-centred Codex process – notwithstanding the emphasis 
that is constantly put upon the distinction between (scientific) risk 
assessment and (political) risk management. Last but not least, there 
are also close personal ties between the food industry and public 
officials in this field, so that, in some cases, industry organisations 
with observer status at the Codex also employ former governmental 
officials and even former delegates to Codex meetings.” 1393 
 
                                                 
1393 Thorsten Hüller and Matthias Leonhard Maier, ‘Fixing the Codex? Global Food-Safety 
Governance Under Review’, in Christian Joerges and Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (eds.), 
Constitutionalism, Multilevel Trade Governance and Social Regulation (Hart Publishing, 
2006), [pp. 268-299], pp. 279-280 (footnotes omitted).  
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Structural biases are particularly well reflected in imbalances regarding 
organisations accompanying national delegations at meetings of international 
standard setting organisations. Taking Codex for example, the following 
observations have been made:  
 
“[A]mong the 156 NGOs currently in observer status at the Codex, 
more than 100 can clearly be categorised as representing the interests 
of food producers (agriculture and industry) or traders. The 
remainder mainly comprise scientific and professional organisations, 
while only 10 organisations represent consumer, health or 
environmental interests. If we look more specifically at the NGOs 
which actually attend CAC meetings, the pattern is similar. The bias 
is, in fact, even stronger if we take into account the size of 
delegations. Only one consumer organisation sent more than one 
person to the 2005 session of the CAC, while the same was true of 
about half the industry organisations, seven of which had three or 
more people on their teams and thus more than most national 
delegations.” 1394 
 
Taken together, the scientific upgrading of international organisations with 
physical equipment and the legal bias towards levels of protection (pre)defined 
by standards set by the same international organisations would render the latter 
virtually untouchable. Therefore, a rather similar conclusion is put forward as 
was the case with regard to the positivist proposal. Regarding attempts for 
enforced harmonisation of international standards, the conclusion was drawn 
that such positivist proposals would practically monopolise scientific knowledge 
in the field of action of international standard setting organisations such as the 
Codex Alimentarius Commission, the IPPC and the OIE. Assigning 
international organisations with both scientific (risk assessment) and regulatory 
(standard-setting) powers resembles to the council of scientific experts forming 
the supreme intellectual institution in Comte’s positivist conception of the 
world.  
 
For these reasons, the ambitious approach for equipping international 
organisations with physical research facilities as a solution to the problem of 
private corporate influence and for achieving ‘scientific neutrality’ is finally 
considered inappropriate. Albeit in favour for additional research facilities at the 
disposal of international organisations in general, the ambitious approach is not 
considered a panacea for achieving the specific goal in question, i.e. to 
effectively contain corporate interference. Given the manifold and complex 
ways of corporate influence, only an approach taking into account findings from 
epistemology seems to be effective in the long run. However, albeit moderate in 
                                                 
1394 Thorsten Hüller and Matthias Leonhard Maier, ibid., p. 279 (footnotes omitted).  
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terms of physical resources, an approach based on epistemology may turn out to 
be demanding in other, more fundamental respects.  
 
Following Popperian epistemology, scientific knowledge should centre on the 
opposite objective – relative. In this sense, paradoxically, objectivity is 
achievable only for the price of some sort of relativity: an argument is ‘true’ 
only as long as nobody puts forward a better argument refuting the former. In 
this regard, the Appellate Body’s emphasise on minority or dissenting scientific 
opinions is of particular importance. In EC – Hormones, the Appellate Body 
stated: 
 
“The “scientific basis” of SPS measures cannot be confined to the 
formalized conclusions of committees called upon to review or 
analyze the risks a substance may pose. Those conclusions are just 
one of the elements to be taken into account. The “available 
scientific evidence”, referred to in Article 5.2, includes both 
generally held or majority scientific views as well as minority, or 
dissenting, scientific opinion (often first expressed by individual 
scientists).” 1395 
 
The importance of minority or dissenting scientific opinion becomes all the 
more manifest if considered not only with view on individual cases, but in a 
systemic perspective. Assuming a positivist setting, submissions of minority or 
dissenting scientific opinions in SPS disputes would be rather unlikely. The new 
monopoly to carry out risk assessments for WTO members, combined with the 
de facto power of standards issued by the same international organisations 
would basically impede WTO members to introduce minority or dissenting 
scientific arguments in SPS disputes. Therefore, an alternative, yet truly critical, 
approach is outlined in the following, aiming at making the epistemological 
opposite objective – relative work at the international level.  
 
Cornerstone of the critical approach is the focus on scientific integrity. First and 
rather classical, reliable science is seen as an effective tool for detecting 
protectionist motives underpinning the establishment or maintenance of SPS 
measures. Second and more innovative, scientific integrity is seen as an essential 
prerequisite for the disclosure of biases in scientific arguments in favour of 
commercial interests and implicit market-opening agendas.  
 
As discussed above, scientific integrity may be imperilled both by political as 
well as by economic forces. As a shelter against political influence, i.e. 
protectionist intent, it was suggested to assign scientific risk assessment 
procedures to international organisations. Internationalisation of risk assessment 
                                                 
1395 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 27. 
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procedures is considered the objective element of the critical approach. 
Internationalisation alone, however, was found insufficient to shield scientific 
risk assessment from corporate influence. Furthermore, also a positivist solution 
to the problem of private sector influence, i.e. the establishment of scientific 
superpowers at the international level, was considered inappropriate for 
containing corporate interference. Therefore, a relative element is required, 
allowing and even fostering a permanent scrutiny of scientific knowledge in the 
WTO context. Hence, a critical approach is contingent upon mobilisation and 
open discourse of all available sources of scientific knowledge. On these 
grounds, firstly, WTO members should not be obliged to rely on risk 
assessments conducted by international organisations. However, there should be 
a strong incentive for relying on such international risk assessments. Secondly, 
the presumption of GATT/WTO compatibility for SPS measures which conform 
to international standards, as implied in Article 3.2 of the SPS Agreement, is 
perceived as an obstacle to the competition of scientific arguments on equal 
terms.  In fact, Article 3.2 of the SPS Agreement, as it stands today, is an 
impediment to free choice of different levels of protection deemed appropriate 
by respective WTO members. Thus, in epistemological perspective, incentives 
are provided for scientific conformity, not for scientific competition. Taking 
together, the critical approach put forward in the following consists of 
combining the internationalisation of risks assessment with the presumption of 
GATT/WTO compatibility, as currently provided by Article 3.2 of the SPS 
Agreement. Thereby, risk assessments carried out by international organisations 
shall be privileged by the presumption of GATT/WTO compatibility. Following 
the critical approach proposed here, a reformulated Article 3.2 of the SPS 
Agreement would thus read as follows:  
 
 
2. Sanitary or phytosanitary measures [based on risk assessments 
carried out by international organisations] shall be deemed to be 
necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, and 
presumed to be consistent with the relevant provisions of this 
Agreement and of GATT 1994. 
 
 
Other provisions of the SPS Agreement, in particular Articles 3.1, 3.3 and 5, 
would remain unchanged.  
 
A reform of Article 3.2 of the SPS Agreement in line with the critical approach 
suggested would basically provide two results.  
 
First, a reformulated Article 3.2 of the SPS Agreement would lead to the 
harmonisation of risk assessment procedures. The presumption of GATT/WTO 
compatibility, as expressed by a reformulated Article 3.2 of the SPS Agreement, 
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would be a strong incentive for WTO members to commission international 
organisations with the task of carrying out their respective risk assessments. The 
internationalisation of risk assessment procedures would not only guarantee 
state-of-the art risk assessments, but also release the latter from political 
influence exerted by individual WTO members. Procedural harmonisation forms 
the objective element of the critical approach.  
 
The second element of the critical approach consists of an opening up of policy 
space for national risk managers. That purpose shall be achieved by a gradual 
model, offering a range of policy options to risk managers. In most common 
cases, WTO members may contentedly agree to levels of protection provided by 
international standards. This is the case foreseen in Article 3.1 of the SPS 
Agreement which shall remain unchanged. A difference to the status quo, 
however, would be that compliance with international standards would become 
truly voluntary again. As already mentioned, the abrogation of the presumption 
of GATT/WTO compatibility for SPS measures conforming to international 
standards in Article 3.2 of the SPS Agreement would restore the voluntary 
character of international standards.1396 In effect, risk managers of WTO 
members would be disburdened from that legal presumption and free to opt for 
higher levels of protection (Article 3.3 of the SPS Agreement). However, 
because risk assessment shall be carried out by international organisations, risk 
managers could not introduce SPS measures arbitrarily and deliver scientific 
justification in addition, that is, only on request in the event of a dispute. Rather, 
national risk managers would be requested to put forward risk assessment 
policies on behalf of international risk assessors, eventually resulting in higher 
levels of protection. The critical approach, suggesting an increased used of risk 
assessment policies as a joint exercise of international risk assessors and risk 
managers operating at respective national levels, corresponds with the proposal 
made by Lee Ann Jackson and Marion Jansen. In their lucid paper on the 
question whether risk assessment in the international food safety policy arena 
may provide unbiased outcomes, Lee Ann Jackson and Marion Jansen argued 
for more policy options in risk analysis procedures. In particular, Jackson and 
Jansen suggested that risk assessors should analyse a range of policy options and 
that risk managers should choose from a whole ‘,menu of policy options’.  
Enlarging the range of policy options evaluated by risk assessors, Jackson and 
                                                 
1396 Before the coming into force of the SPS Agreement and its presumption of GATT/WTO 
compatibility of SPS measures conforming to international standards, the latter were 
conceived as voluntary standards.  Marsha Echols considered that the SPS Agreement, with 
its harmonisation provisions, “elevates the Codex Alimentarius Commission from an obscure 
role to one of potentially immense importance in international food trade. Codex was selected 
as the principal relevant international organization because of its technical and scientific 
expertise and because the ‘clear overarching purpose of the work of the Commission is 
international harmonization of standards’…“ (Marsha A. Echols, Food Safety and the WTO. 
The Interplay of Culture, Science and Technology (Kluwer Law International, 2001), p. 100).  
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Jansen argued, ‘would provide policy makers with a more complete assessment 
of the risk implications of the policy basket at their disposal’:1397  
 
“Codex standards are the outcome of multilateral negotiations based 
upon risk assessment. It is important to communicate this fact to the 
public and thus signal that scientific evidence is only one of the 
determinants of Codex international food safety standards, albeit a 
very prominent one. The possible trade-offs between economic and 
political interests on the one hand and public health interests on the 
other hand, could become more tangible if the outcome of Codex 
risk assessment was a ‘menu of policy options’. Existing Codex 
procedures already allow for this and we encourage the increased use 
of this practice. We also propose that risk assessors play a more 
important role in defining the range of policy options to be analysed. 
One advantage of the suggested set-up could be that countries 
deviating from the internationally agreed standards may choose one 
of the other options analysed by the Codex risk assessors.” 1398 
 
Importance and functioning of risk assessment policies can be demonstrated by 
looking at the example of aflatoxins. Concerning aflatoxins as a trade issue, a 
major question centred on whether the European Communities could introduce 
higher levels of protection than recommended by JECFA and how such stricter 
EU standards could be scientifically justified. Whereas JECFA recommended 
limit values for total aflatoxin at 15ppb (parts per billion), the EC introduced 
limit values for total aflatoxin at 4ppb. Looking at the EC standards, JECFA 
considered that a hypothetical downward adjustment of the standard for 
aflatoxin from 20 parts per billion (ppb) to 10ppb would reduce the cancer risk 
by only approximately 2 cancer cases annually per 1 billion people. Albeit the 
risk effects might be considered rather small, a cause-and-effect relationship was 
nevertheless scientifically ascertained. Applying suggestions for enlarging 
policy space for risk managers to the aflatoxin example, risk assessment policies 
issued by risk managers may commission risk assessors to elaborate ‘menus’ of 
available policy options, ranging from JECFA’s standards down to ‘zero risk’.  
 
The idea of enlarging the scope of policy options at the disposal of risk 
managers is at   the heart of the proposal based on the epistemological opposite 
objective –relative; in fact, it is the centrepiece of its relativistic component. 
However, as already indicated, the provision of a full ‘menu of policy options’ 
requires to abandon the preference of SPS measures conforming to international 
standards, expressed by Article 3.2 of the existing SPS Agreement. Otherwise, 
                                                 
1397 Lee Ann Jackson and Marion Jansen, ‘Risk assessment in the international food safety 
policy arena. Can the multilateral institutions encourage unbiased outcomes?’ (2010) 35 Food 
Policy [538-547] 542. 
1398 Lee Ann Jackson and Marion Jansen, ibid. 546.  
 466 
the bias towards SPS measures conforming to international standards, as 
established by the presumption of GATT/WTO conformity in Article 3.2 of the 
SPS Agreement, would nullify attempts for enlarging the policy space for 
national risk managers. In fact, by providing more policy space for national risk 
managers, the critical approach aims at neutralising inherent biases of the 
current SPS Agreement. As Lee Ann Jackson and Marion Jansen observed, a 
major bias of the SPS Agreement stems from the fact that the SPS Agreement 
deals with ‘credence’ goods. As explained above (see chapter 4 above), the term 
‘credence’ indicates an information bias concerning certain product 
characteristics. This is obviously the case with regard to food safety 
characteristics where producers have an information advantage over consumers. 
At the international level, however, the information bias of food producers 
translates into a bias in favour of export interests built into the SPS framework. 
The main reason for this state of play is the fact that food products are credence 
goods. Implications of a globalised market for food products, i.e. credence 
goods, were explained by Lee Ann Jackson and Marion Jansen as follows:  
 
“We have argued that in the case of food additives or products that 
are often characterized by credence good characteristics, exporting 
firms can be expected to take a more lenient stance towards food 
safety than consumers, while importing firms can be expected to take 
a more stringent stance towards food safety than consumers. We 
have also argued that in a globalized world, exporting firms can 
expect very large profits from introducing new products and that it is 
therefore in their commercial interest to provide scientific evidence 
that supports product standards they consider appropriate. For 
importers, instead, it is rather less likely to be profitable to generate 
scientific evidence in support of stringent standards. Increasing the 
role of scientific evidence for the setting of international food safety 
standards or the ruling of international trade disputes may thus lead 
to an inherent bias in favour of export interests in the absence of 
appropriate checks and balances.” 1399 
 
As a means for checking and balancing scientific data provided by interested 
private sector players, it was suggested to equip international organisations with 
the means necessary to generate scientific data themselves. I personally do not 
oppose to such proposals provided that the new data sources are seen as 
additional check instruments. However, I argue that equipping international 
organisations with scientific hardware alone does not solve the problem how to 
ensure scientific integrity at the international level. As the example of corporate 
infiltration of WHO’s work on tobacco prevention showed, corporate interest 
                                                 
1399 Lee Ann Jackson and Marion Jansen, ibid.  
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always finds ways for influencing scientific enterprise. And if out of the current 
international safety organisation Codex, IPPC and OIE a scientific 
superstructure would emerge, agency capture by corporate interests would 
become an even bigger threat. As outlined above, scientific superstructures 
assigned to carry out mandatory risk assessments for individual WTO members 
as well as to set general safety standards would virtually monopolise scientific 
knowledge. Obviously, such a scientific ‘Supreme Court’ would attract 
corporate interest even more. A critical approach, in contrast, aims at ensuring 
scientific integrity by encouraging scientific critique. For stimulating scientific 
critique, it is suggested to abrogate the presumption of GATT/WTO 
compatibility expressed by the current Article 3.2 of the SPS Agreement and to 
facilitate the development of alternative risk assessment policies and the 
establishment of levels of protection deviating from international standards.  
From the perspective of epistemology, the encouragement to come up with 
alternative levels of protection provides a systemic safeguard against ‘uniform 
thinking’ (pensée unique) in risk assessment. Because new levels of protection 
of individual WTO members deviating from those provided by international 
standards inevitably question the latter, there will be a constant scientific 
discourse about the appropriateness of certain levels of protection. The relative 
element of the critical approach, namely the enlargement of policy space for 
national risk managers, thus ensures critical scientific discourse and, in the long 
run, scientific objectivity.  
 
However, there might be cases were the above suggestions are not sufficient to 
ensure independent and unbiased risk assessment. In this respect, one might 
think of cases where national risk managers suspect risk assessors of 
international organisations to be biased considering their previous involvement 
in standard setting procedures. Such was the case in the Continued Suspension 
dispute where the Appellate Body held  
 
“… that there was an objective basis to conclude that the institutional 
affiliation with JECFA of Drs. Boisseau and Boobis, and their 
participation in JECFA's evaluations of the six hormones at issue, 
was likely to affect or give rise to justifiable doubts as to their 
independence or impartiality given that the evaluations conducted by 
JECFA lie at the heart of the controversy between the parties.” 1400  
 
Personal biases of risk assessors towards conclusions previously achieved in 
standard setting procedures may be particularly crucial in cases where there are 
majority and minority scientific opinions. Imagine that a majority scientific view 
                                                 
1400 Appellate Body Reports in US/Canada – Continued Suspension, para. 481; reversing 
Panel's findings in US – Continued Suspension, paras. 6.22, 6.62-6.63 and 7.85 / Canada – 
Continued Suspension, paras. 6.21, 6.57-6.58 and 7.83. 
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is expressed by a certain international standard, a WTO member relying on 
minority scientific opinion may reasonably commission other risk assessors than 
those involved in the setting of the international standards at issue. One might 
further think of situations where national risk managers distrust procedures 
conducted in the realm of international organisations on political grounds, e.g. 
because the international organisation in question may be biased towards 
Westerners, whereas the risk managers were from a non-Western country. 
Finally, one might think about constellations where risk managers suspect 
international risk assessors of ideological or personal biases, for example of 
being industry-friendly, or anti-business, and the like.   
 
For such rather extreme cases, an ultimate safeguard is proposed. In case a 
certain WTO member refuses to rely on a risk assessment carried out by an 
international organisation, that WTO member shall be free to do so. Instead, the 
concerned WTO member may rely on a risk assessment conducted by its own 
risk assessors and by its own means. This is actually the reason for suggesting 
that Article 5 of the SPS Agreement shall remain unchanged. However, unlike 
today, there would be a strong disincentive for WTO members to rely on risk 
assessments conducted at respective national levels. Considering the suggested 
presumption of GATT/WTO compatibility of SPS measures based on 
international risk assessments, expressed by a reformulated Article 3.2 of the 
SPS Agreement, reliance on a national risk assessment would become rather 
unattractive. But, in terms of ultima ratio, WTO members shall have the 
possibility to rely on the safeguard of basing their SPS measures on a national 
risk assessment provided, of course, that all other obligations of the SPS 
Agreement, in particular the requirement for scientific justification, are met.  
 
Reforming the SPS Agreement in line with the proposal suggested here would 
resolve another major problem, namely the question how to determine 
appropriate levels of protection. As shown earlier, the SPS Agreement in its 
current form led to confusion how to consider appropriate levels of protection 
(ALOP): is the determination of higher levels of protection an exception, as 
suggested by the positivist panel approach? Or is the determination of ALOP in 
any case a ‘sovereign right,’ as ruled by the Appellate Body? In similar respect, 
it was unclear whether ‘zero risk’ might be an option either in risk assessment or 
in risk management: should attempts to achieve ‘zero-risk’ be refuted on the 
ground that they are scientifically impossible, as suggested by the rather 
objectivist panel? Or should attempts for achieving ‘zero-risk’ be allowed as 
viable policy options, as decided by the rather constructivist Appellate Body? Or 
is ‘zero risk’, logically seen, unattainable anyway?  
 
The proposal for a critical approach towards SPS risk analysis suggests a 
graduation and fine tuning of levels of protection. The graduation suggested 
shall replace the rather coarse differentiation between privileged SPS measures 
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conforming to international standards, on the one hand, and other SPS measures. 
Instead, the proposal suggests an extension of the privilege of GATT/WTO 
compatibility to all SPS measures which are based on a risk assessment carried 
out by an international organisation. The proposal aims at encouraging state-of-
the art risk assessments, thereby fostering scientific integrity vis-à-vis political 
interferences. An expanded coverage of GATT/WTO compatibility would 
extend to SPS measures achieving higher levels of protection, given that the 
corresponding risk assessments have been conducted by international 
organisations. Hence, a differentiation would no longer be made between SPS 
measures conforming to international standards, on the one hand, and other SPS 
measures. Instead, a differentiation would exist between SPS measures based on 
risk assessments carried out by international organisations, on the one hand, and 
SPS measures based on risk assessments conducted at respective national levels, 
on the other hand. Therefore, the reform proposal put forward by the critical 
approach can be summarised as a shift from the objective of substantive 
harmonisation of SPS measures to the objective of a procedural harmonisation 
of SPS measures. The strong incentive for WTO members to commission 
international organisations with the task to carry out risk assessments shall 
ensure state-of-the art risk assessments and scientific integrity. This is the 
objective element of the proposal, preventing a relativistic ‘anything goes’ in 
SPS trade regulation. The enlargement of policy space for national risk 
managers, on the other hand, represents the relative element of the critical 
approach. Taken together, the objective and the relative element of the proposed 
critical approach shall encourage critical scientific discourse, thereby auto-
correcting inherent biases in international risk regulation in the long run. In 
effect, to follow the critical approach suggested here would imply an expansion 
of the very objective of the SPS Agreement. The objective of the SPS 
Agreement would no longer be only to guard over fair competition in 
agricultural trade. A reformed SPS Agreement, in conjunction with associated 
international organisations such as Codex, OIE and IPPC, shall assume the 
additional role of a guardian for open competition of scientific opinions at the 
international level.  
 
C. Outlook  
 
Albeit the critical approach seems to be far more modest than farther-reaching 
relativist or positivist proposals, its implementation implies changes in various 
respects. Institutionally, the rather ephemeral structure of scientific expert 
bodies convening at the international level might turn out to be insufficient. For 
example, scientific expert bodies such as JECFA, JEMRA and JMPR are only 
convening for specific meetings, hence on part-time basis. Increasing workload, 
however, may require more permanent structures. For example, one could think 
of a paramount scientific committee, jointly established by WHO and FAO, 
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organising scientific advice at the international level. It has to be noted that 
proposals for reforming the scientific apparatus at the international level are 
under consideration anyway.  For instance, the Report of the Evaluation of the 
Codex Alimentarius and other FAO and WHO Food Standards Work 
recommended 
 
“…that FAO and WHO establish a scientific committee of eminent 
scientists to provide to Codex and the two Organizations, over-
arching scientific advice, including on emerging challenges and to 
provide guidance and quality control to JECFA, JEMRA, JMPR and 
ad hoc committees. A joint FAO/WHO Secretary to the Scientific 
Committee and Coordinator for Risk Assessment and Food Safety 
and Health Scientific Advice should be appointed and housed in 
WHO. The secretariats to the existing JECFA, JEMRA and JMPR 
should continue as at present. (…)” 1401 
 
Workload increase is mainly due to the link the SPS Agreement established 
between international trade rules and previously voluntary standards of 
international organisations, in particular Codex, IPPC and OIE. Therefore, it 
seems that requirements for institutional reform of international organisations 
such as Codex, IPPC and OIE for accommodating new tasks and responsibilities 
are established either way.  
 
However, political and economic implications coming along with the suggested 
critical approach seem to be much more sensitive.  
 
By many of its critics, as well as by some of its supporters, the SPS Agreement 
was perceived as an instrument for increased market opening.  In fact, the SPS 
Agreement shows certain features indicating a bias towards a market opening 
agenda. Yet, the science-based approach of the SPS Agreement is a powerful 
tool excelling the objective of containing protectionism. The requirement for 
scientific justification does not only focus on protectionist measures, but also 
implies a normative judgement whether an SPS measures is necessary or not. In 
this respect, Catherine Button noted that the aim of the SPS Agreement is 
“broader than to eliminate sham health measures”:  
 
“By impugning SPS measures without a proper scientific basis, the 
SPS Agreement not only identifies instances of protectionism 
parading as health protection, it also identifies instances in which 
markets are unnecessarily closed by scientifically unsupported health 
                                                 
1401 W. Bruce Traill, Rachel Bedouin, Katharine Gourlie, Jerri Husch, Alicia Lustre (eds.), 
Report of the Evaluation of the Codex Alimentarius and other FAO and WHO Food 
Standards Work (FAO/WHO, November 15, 2002), Executive Summary, finding no. 23.  
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measures. The SPS Agreement seeks to eliminate a whole set of 
trade barriers that do not result from protectionism per se, but may 
exist simply because of domestic regulatory resource limitations, or 
because consumer fears gave rise to demands for regulation. By 
seeking to limit health barriers to trade on a scientific basis, the SPS 
Agreement has a distinct (if limited) market-opening agenda.” 1402 
 
The market-opening agenda of the SPS Agreement, as an effect of the 
requirement for scientific justification, is accentuated by data and information 
asymmetries on the globalised market for ‘credence’ goods. As Lee Ann 
Jackson and Marion Jansen explained, producers of novel foods in particular 
have an information advantage with regard to the ‘credence’ characteristics of 
their respective products. Accordingly, transnational corporations are major 
producers of scientific data and are able, to a certain extent, to control the 
publication and non-publication of scientific data. Such data and information 
asymmetries on globalised food markets may thus lead, as Jackson and Jansen 
noted, “to an inherent bias in favour of export interests in the absence of 
appropriate checks and balances.” 1403 
 
However, considering the SPS Agreement as an instrument for trade promotion 
is not the only approach possible. In the alternative, one might perceive the SPS 
Agreement in the role of arbitrator between conflicting producer and consumer 
interests at the global level, hence between food exporting and food importing 
countries. Such an alternative approach would build upon the requirement for 
appropriate checks and balances to address inherent biases of the SPS 
Agreement in favour of export interests. The critical approach aims at 
implementing checks and balances into the SPS framework. In particular, the 
proposed reformulated Article 3.2 of the SPS Agreement shall encourage 
expressions of diverging scientific opinions in the WTO context. Thus, a re-
balance of inherent biases in the SPS architecture shall not be achieved by 
authoritative scientific verdicts, but by recognising that scientific ‘truth’ is 
transient and therefore only achievable at the price of scientific pluralism. 
Recognition of scientific pluralism, however, might effect in a wider range of 
safety regulations permissible under renewed SPS rules. Obviously though, 
critics may point at potential economic losses such as higher transaction costs 
due to increased complexity in multilateral safety regulation. The potential 
occurrence of such economic losses, albeit difficult to estimate hypothetically, is 
not denied. Nevertheless, it is argued that potential economic disadvantages 
                                                 
1402 Catherine Button, The Power to Protect. Trade, Health, and Uncertainty in the WTO 
(Hart Publishing, 2004), p. 45 (original emphasis, footnote omitted).  
1403 Lee Ann Jackson and Marion Jansen, ‘Risk assessment in the international food safety 
policy arena. Can the multilateral institutions encourage unbiased outcomes?’ (2010) 35 Food 
Policy [538-547] 546.  
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must be weighed against expected advantages. Several advantages are expected 
to come along with the implementation of the critical approach. First and 
broadly, a general relaxation of the SPS framework is expected. Currently, for 
instance, many issues with the potential for erupting into real trade disputes are 
relocated to international organisations such as the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission, the IPPC and the OIE. Such proxy-wars may cause significant 
delays in the standard setting process of the said international organisations. An 
interesting case is the example of Aflatoxin M1 in milk where it took Codex a 
decade to come up with a standard:   
 
“The Committee on Food Additives and Contaminants (CCFAC) 
started work on elaborating a maximum level for Aflatoxin M1 in 
milk in 1990. At its session in 1991, CCFAC was informed that the 
International Dairy Federation (IDF) had proposed a guideline 
maximum level of 0.05ìg/kg in bulk milk. At its 1992 session, 
CCFAC agreed to forward a proposed draft maximum level of 
0.05ìg/kg for Aflatoxin M1 in liquid milk to the Codex Commission 
for acceptance at Step 5 despite statements by several countries that a 
level of 0.5ìg/kg was sufficient for consumer health protection. (…)  
JECFA reported that the difference in theoretical additional risk of 
liver cancer between the two levels was negligible. A number of 
delegations cited this determination in supporting a draft maximum 
level of 0.5ìg/kg. However, the EU stressed that 0.5ìg/kg was higher 
than the current level and would not be acceptable to EU consumers 
in view of health concerns. Some delegations noted that the level of 
0.05ìg/kg seemed not to be achievable in some regions of the world. 
They also stated that a reduction in the maximum level might entail a 
significant reduction in the availability of milk in developing 
countries and would, therefore, have nutritional implications. (…) ” 
1404 
 
There is a general impression that trade disputes spilling over into rather 
‘technical’ international organisations such as Codex, IPPC and OIE have led to 
a ‘politicization’ of the latter.1405 With respect to food safety controversies in 
particular, Josling et al. observed that  
                                                 
1404 W. Bruce Traill, Rachel Bedouin, Katharine Gourlie, Jerri Husch, Alicia Lustre (eds.), 
Report of the Evaluation of the Codex Alimentarius and other FAO and WHO Food 
Standards Work (FAO/WHO, November 15, 2002), para. 184, box 3: Maximum Level for 
Aflatoxin M1 in Milk. A standard prescribing a maximum level of 0.5ìg/kg was finally 
adopted in 2001.  
1405 From such findings, however, one should not deduce an increase in the number of trade 
disputes without further consideration. For instance, at a workshop entitled Food Safety Risk 
Assessment at the International Level: Can Multilateral Institutions Encourage Unbiased 
Outcomes? held at the World Trade Institute in Bern, Switzerland, on May 18, 2009, no direct 
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“… because of the heightened legal status of its standards under the 
SPS agreement and its wide coverage in the area of food standards, 
the work of the Codex bodies has become especially sensitive. As a 
result, the prevailing judgment is that of the three standard-setting 
institutions referenced in the SPS agreement, the SPS agreement has 
politicized decision making within Codex more than in the other 
standards organisations.” 1406 
 
The ‘politicization’ of organisations commissioned to develop international 
standards ‘based on science’ is reflected by a tendency to decision-making by 
vote rather than by consensus.  With respect to food safety issues in particular, 
Josling et al. noted the following cases of majority rule and dissent:  
 
“(1) the two-year debate over the 1995 Codex ‘Statements of 
Principle’, (2) the 1995 vote on Codex beef hormone standards, (3) 
the 1997 vote on Codex mineral water standards, and (4) the failure 
of Codex to adopt JECFA’s recommended standard for recombinant 
bovine somatotropin (rbST), a synthetically produced version of a 
naturally occurring hormone intended to increase milk production.” 
1407 
 
However, the new role assigned to international standard setting organisations 
by the SPS Agreement not only leads to a politicization of science, but also to a 
scientification of the political debate. For instance, the Codex evaluation report 
identified the discussion of scientific questions by risk managers as the main 
reason for prolonged standard setting exercises. Explicitly, the report noted that 
“[o]ne result of CCFAC not receiving draft standards from JECFA is that 
CCFAC spends a lot of time discussing risk assessment issues that rightly 
belong in JECFA and this slows down decision making”.1408 The intrusion of 
scientific discussion into the realm of risk management is interpreted as a 
consequence of the science-based approach implemented in the SPS Agreement. 
Because henceforth no arguments other than scientific ones are heard, risk 
managers, i.e. government representatives, were virtually compelled to invoke 
‘science’ for justifying their respective messages. Paradoxically, though, the 
science-based approach of the SPS Agreement did not achieve to separate risk 
                                                                                                                                                        
causality between the entry into force of the SPS Agreement and the number of formal 
requests tabled at relevant international bodies, e.g. Codex, the SPS Committee and the WTO 
DSB, was established.  
1406 Tim Josling, Donna Roberts and David Orden, Food Regulation and Trade. Toward a 
Safe and Open Global System (Institute for International Economics, 2004), p. 43.  
1407 Tim Josling, Donna Roberts and David Orden, ibid. 
1408 W. Bruce Traill, Rachel Bedouin, Katharine Gourlie, Jerri Husch, Alicia Lustre (eds.), 
Report of the Evaluation of the Codex Alimentarius and other FAO and WHO Food 
Standards Work (FAO/WHO, November 15, 2002), para. 184. 
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assessment and risk management once and for all, but induced, in fact, a mutual 
permeability between the two. Without any dash of irony, one may thus state 
that the positivist attempt for enforcing impermeable barriers between facts and 
values and between science and politics has effectively caused some sort of 
osmosis between the two.  
 
In rather similar ways, the dispute settlement system of the WTO gets blocked 
by prolonged disputes. Most prominent, there are the Hormones case and the 
subsequent Continued Suspension case. As argued by many observers, also the 
Biotech case may see a next episode.  
 
It is now argued that increased persistence of trade disputes and their spill-over 
effects into international organisations, thereby delaying the setting of 
international standards, has to be taken into account. Seen in this way, pending 
trade disputes and frustrated standard-settings at the international level should be 
accounted for as welfare costs similar to those allegedly caused by differing 
regulation.1409  
 
Following the critical approach suggested here, persistent WTO disputes, 
particularly those concerning novel foods with ‘credence’ characteristics, e.g. 
hormone-treated meat and GMOs, are perceived as consequences of a too 
narrow range of policy options available under the current SPS Agreement. 
Therefore, it is proposed to widen the range of available policy options, but 
without opening the Pandora’s box unleashing a relativist ‘anything goes’. A 
wider range of available policy options and scientific pluralism would ease 
tensions in the SPS framework in general.  
 
In particular, implementing the critical approach would lead to a reassortment of 
respective roles of science and law in international risk assessment. The science-
based approach of the SPS Agreement and in particular certain of its 
interpreters, such as the panels in the Hormones and in the Continued 
Suspension cases, assigned the role of arbitrator in trade disputes to ‘science’. 
Attempts for choosing ‘science’ for impartial arbiter in trade disputes are 
standing in the positivist tradition. The assignment of the role of impartial 
                                                 
1409 It has to be noted that economic benefits allegedly arising from the harmonisation of 
standards are controversial. Josling et al., for example, observed:  
“However, the normative basis for harmonization is not overwhelming, and 
there is little evidence to indicate that international standards in foods have 
succeeded notably in opening up trade. Therefore, it must be concluded that 
international standards have improved the functioning of food markets, but more 
by improving the quality of regulation, which mostly benefits consumers, than 
by reducing transactions costs of exporting to specific countries, which delivers 
more benefits to exporters” (Tim Josling, Donna Roberts and David Orden, 
Food Regulation and Trade. Toward a Safe and Open Global System (Institute 
for International Economics, 2004), p. 204).  
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arbiter to ‘science’ makes only sense under the presumption that ‘science’ is 
able to produce ultimate and objective ‘truth’. Following Popperian 
epistemology, the critical approach rejects the presumption of an objective and 
ultimate scientific ‘truth’. Rather, the critical approach suggested here 
emphasises the requirement to respect possibilities and limitations of both, 
science and law. From such a critical viewpoint, scientific controversies should 
be fought out with scientific arguments, whereas political conflicts should be 
addressed with political negotiations, deliberation and legal proceedings. 
Starting with the question what science can and what science cannot, it is 
referred to Catherine Button. In short, Button explained that science and 
scientific justification is not tantamount to the legitimacy of an SPS measure. 
Button put it that 
 
“… [S]cientific justification is not a litmus test for protectionism. In 
other words, the existence or non-existence of a scientific 
justification is not determinative of protectionism. Some measures 
without a scientific basis will be protectionist and others will not. 
Conversely, some regulations motivated by protectionist impulses 
may nevertheless be scientifically justifiable.” 1410 
 
 On the other hand, the requirement for scientific justification enables to discern 
whether an SPS measure at issue is necessary or unnecessary to protect human, 
animal or plant life and health: “By impugning SPS measures without a proper 
scientific basis, the SPS Agreement not only identifies instances of 
protectionism parading as health protection, it also identifies instances in which 
markets are unnecessarily closed by scientifically unsupported health 
measures”.1411 However, even in case an SPS measures is considered necessary 
to protection human, animal or plant life and health, the determination of the 
appropriate level of protection will still require additional, extra-scientific 
argumentation. To make it short, the critical approach considers science to be an 
indispensable tool for (a) weighing arguments whether an SPS measure may be 
necessary, and (b) for balancing whether the envisaged level of protection may 
be appropriate. Thus, scientific justification is an indispensable feature 
qualifying SPS measures for further examination. Figuratively speaking, science 
is perceived as some sort of watershed, discerning between SPS measures 
coming along without any scientific foundations, thus rebuttable from the outset, 
and SPS measures qualifying for further proceedings. It is from this perspective 
that the term ‘scientific justification’ reveals its true meaning: it shall justify an 
SPS measure, i.e. a political decision. Hence, in the SPS context, ‘science’ never 
stands alone; it is always carried along with a political objective. That is the 
                                                 
1410 Catherine Button, The Power to Protect. Trade, Health, and Uncertainty in the WTO 
(Hart Publishing, 2004), p. 45.  
1411 Catherine Button, ibid. p. 45 (original emphasis).  
 476 
reason why ‘science’ in the SPS context should be addressed as a necessary, yet 
alone insufficient component of a political objective or legal claim. Scientific 
justification is a necessary part bolstering the principal argument, that is, the 
SPS measure, but not the principal issue itself. 
 
In rather similar ways as the watershed image, Catherine Button referred to 
science as an organising principle:  
 
“[S]cience’s promise of value-neutrality has, in some respects, 
turned out to be illusory. Perhaps science never really promised to be 
entirely value-free; when international trade negotiators chose 
science as the benchmark of legitimate health regulation, they 
probably imputed to science a greater degree of value-neutrality and 
a greater degree of certainty than science would have claimed for 
itself. Time, and the experience of decisions being made under the 
SPS Agreement, have shown that science is not entirely value-free 
and that uncertainty is a feature of scientific risk assessment, not 
anathema to it. While this dose of reality does mean that science can 
no longer be regarded as an uncomplicated and uncontroversial 
means by which to determine when trade must give way to health, its 
value as an organising principle survives.” 1412 
 
On the other hand, however, the critical approach disagrees with any positivist 
attempts to assign science the role of impartial arbitrator in trade disputes. This 
role, it is argued, belongs to law. Only law, for instance, is able to decide 
whether a scientifically justifiable SPS measure may be nevertheless motivated 
by protectionist intent. This counts all the more for decisions on the 
appropriateness of levels of protection. Only law is able to decide whether the 
choice for a level of protection higher than that provided by the relevant 
international standard seems to be motivated by protectionist intent or not. 
Emphasising the need for broadening the narrow focus on scientific questions to 
other, non-scientific issues, Catherine Button found:  
 
“When WTO panels review health measures under the SPS 
Agreement, they are not only dealing with underlying scientific 
questions, such as whether the particular substance is harmful, but 
also with hybrid questions which draw in other kinds of expertise 
that are relevant to the questions such as whether the least trade-
restrictive measures has been employed. As Howe observes, the 
expertise that WTO panels need is situated at the intersection of 
science and regulation. (…) These non-scientific factors are 
                                                 
1412 Catherine Button, ibid. p. 229 (original emphases).  
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particularly important in determining the level of protection and the 
regulatory means for achieving that level …” 1413 
 
In effect, the critical approach focuses on genuine functions of science and law, 
respectively. The role of science is understood as inherently mercurial, driven by 
contradictory theories and debatable empirical findings. Hereby, science 
assumes distinct functions. One the one hand, science is an ally of economic 
progress. On the other hand, science can be applied to draw limits to economic 
endeavours considered too risky by society.  
 
The role of law, in turn, shall be defined by reference to the critical scientific 
method. At the interface between science and law at the international level, the 
following questions emerge: Who shall review and eventually falsify scientific 
evidence at the international level? In particular, who shall be the arbitrator 
between diverging scientific views expressed in trade disputes before the WTO 
dispute settlement body (DSB)? According to the positivistic proposal, scientific 
controversies are decided authoritatively and at the highest, i.e. international 
level by assumingly impartial scientific or technical organisations and experts. 
The ‘scientific truth’ thereby established may be absolute for the moment, but 
comes at the price of subjectivity, i.e. the subjective viewpoint of the very few 
deciding in that particular moment and in those particular expert committees. A 
critical approach, in contrast, relies on practical falsification through 
contradictory procedures. A critical approach may provide only relative 
scientific certainty, but keeps the door open for critical review, thus fostering 
progressive scientific knowledge. Whereas the positivistic approach pays for 
absolute ‘scientific truth’ with subjectivity, the critical method only achieves 
relative certainty, but obtains what Popper called ‘objective knowledge.’ 
 
In his book Social Epistemology (1988/2002), Steve Fuller addressed the 
problem of scientific authority and critical review. Summarising arguments 
made by proponents of an ‘open society’, such as Karl R. Popper in The Open 
Society and Its Enemies (1945) and Randall Albury in The Politics of Objectivity 
(1983), Steve Fuller noted:  
 
“Thus, if objective knowledge can be produced under the ‘open 
society,’ that fact would seem to legitimate the pursuit of liberal 
democracy in society at large. (…) Without necessarily 
compromising the objectivity of the research, this move toward 
politicization would force scientist to argue for their positions in a 
forum larger than the strictly professional ones to which they have 
grown accustomed. To ensure that this increase in democracy is a 
truly critical exercise, and not simply an exercise in informed 
                                                 
1413 Catherine Button, ibid. pp. 54-55 (footnote omitted).  
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consent, not only must the public cross-examine the scientists, but 
the scientists must also cross-examine each other in order to 
demystify one another’s rhetoric.” 1414 
 
From a sociological point of view, Ulrich Beck argued for some sort of forum 
on which opposing scientific views could be exchanged in open transparency. 
Beck started by discerning between two notions of science; classical laboratory 
science, on the one hand, and public discursivity, on the other hand. Beck 
recognised that both types of science have respective shortcomings. Beck 
observed that laboratory science “is systematically more or less blind to the 
consequences which accompany and threaten its successes”.1415 Public 
discussion, on the other hand, is “media-dependent, manipulable, sometimes 
hysterical and in any case devoid of a laboratory”, hence dependent on research 
carried out in the public domain (universities).1416 Basing on these 
considerations, Beck argued for some kind of “forum” on which opposing views 
could be played off. Beck noted:  
 
“In both cases, we are concerned with a completely different type of 
knowledge: on the one hand, specialised, complex, dependent on 
methodology, and, on the other, oriented towards fundamentals and 
fundamental errors (for instance in the setting of maximal acceptable 
levels, which cannot be corrected in an individual case). The goal 
ought to be to play the narrow-mindedness of laboratory science off 
against the narrow-mindedness of everyday consciousness and the 
mass media and vice versa (in Popper’s sense). For that, one requires 
stages or forums, perhaps a kind of ‘Upper House’ or ‘Technology 
Court’ that would guarantee the division of powers between 
technology development and technology implementation.” 1417 
 
Beck’s ‘Upper House’ or ‘Technology Court’ is apparently not to be confused 
with ideas such as the positivist proposal to establish an international scientific 
                                                 
1414 Steve Fuller, Social Epistemology. 2nd Edition (Indiana University Press, 2002), p. 286. In 
The Open Society and Its Enemies (1945), Karl R. Popper stressed on the mutual 
interdependency of critical (scientific) discourse and open i.e. democratic societies.  Nassim 
Nicholas Taleb summarised Popper’s considerations as follows:  
“Popper believed that any idea of Utopia is necessarily closed owing to the fact 
that it chokes its own refutations. The simple notion of a good model for society 
that cannot be left open for falsification is totalitarian” (Nassim Nicholas Taleb, 
Fooled by Randomness. The Hidden Role of Chance in Life and in the Markets. 
2nd Edition (Penguin Books, 2004), pp. 128-129).  
1415 Ulrich Beck, ‘The Reinvention of Politics: Towards a Theory of Reflexive 
Modernization’, in Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens and Scott Lash, Reflexive Modernization. 
Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order. Polity Press, 1994), p. 30. 
1416 Ulrich Beck, ibid. pp. 30-31. 
1417 Ulrich Beck, ibid. p. 31 (emphases added).  
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authority or earlier suggestions for the creation of a ‘Science Court’.1418 Quite 
the contrary, Beck suggested a forum where “the narrow-mindedness of 
laboratory science” could be played off against “the narrow-mindedness of 
everyday consciousness and the mass media and vice versa (in Popper’s sense)”.  
 
Rather than by the ‘Science Court’, Beck’s suggestion for a ‘Technology Court’ 
seems of having been inspired by Shrader-Frechette’s proposal for a ‘technology 
tribunal’. Stemming from her analysis that risk assessment inevitably implies 
controversies over values, Shrader-Frechette developed an adversarial approach 
to risk assessment. Shrader-Frechette explained her proposal for “adversary 
proceedings carried out in democratic, rather than elitist, fashion”,1419 as 
follows: 
 
“Pursuing the insight that several current methods of risk assessment 
have failed because analysts ignored the value components in their 
work, I believe that any fruitful method of risk analysis must 
explicitly address controversies over values. One of the best ways to 
do this is to pursue an adversary method of assessment, a method 
premised on the fact that desirable risk analyses are likely to be a 
product of rational interaction and compromise among those who 
disagree about how to evaluate a given risk.” 1420 
                                                 
1418 The idea of establishing a ‘Science Court’ was considered by the Carter Administration in 
1978, following suggestions of Arthur Kantrowitz (Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, Risk Analysis 
and Scientific Method. Methodological and Ethical Problems with Evaluating Societal 
Hazards (D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht/Holland, 1985), p. 207). In contrast to 
her proposal for a ‘technology tribunal’, Shrader-Frechette worked out two characteristic 
features of the (positivist) attempt for establishing a ‘Science Court.’ First, the panel of the 
‘Science Court’ was meant of being composed of scientists only, without involving 
laypersons. Second, the ‘Science Court’ was meant to consider scientific facts only and 
setting aside any policy questions or value issues (Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, ibid.). 
Kantrowitz himself condensed the idea of the Science Court as follows: “The purpose of the 
science court begins with the separation of facts from values and is an attempt to deal with the 
myth of the unprejudiced expert” (Roxanne S. Khamsi, ‘Courting the Facts. Arthur 
Kantrowitz and the History of the Science Court,’ in Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of 
Science (DUJS, 2000). However, despite his aim ‘to deal with the myth of the unprejudiced 
expert,’ Kantrowitz assigned the role of final judge to scientists themselves. In this respect, 
Khamsi observed that, according to Kantrowitz’ model, “[t]rained scientists would act as 
judges – although, to avoid bias, they would not be experts in the disputed issue. After 
hearing both sides present their evidence, including techniques and results, the panel of judges 
would render a decision” (Khamsi, ibid.). Hence, Kantrowitz’ model for a ‘Science Court’ 
conflates both the premise and the aim of positivism: based on the assumption that consent 
can be reached over facts if the latter are separated from values, positivism aims at 
establishing final ‘scientific truths’. On the Science Court, see also footnotes no. 166 and 819 
above.  
1419 Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, Risk Analysis and Scientific Method. Methodological and 
Ethical Problems with Evaluating Societal Hazards (D. Reidel Publishing, 1985), p. 208.  
1420 Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, ibid. p. 205 (emphasis added).  
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Shrader-Frechette called her model for public participation in an adversary 
setting ‘the technology tribunal’.1421 The technology tribunal operates at three 
distinct stages. In the first stage, a tribunal is established, “composed of 
scientists and citizens, to identify the significant questions of science, 
technology, and policy associated with the controversial issue in question”.1422 
At the second stage, “a panel of impartial scientists and laymen” is presiding 
over “an adversary proceeding”.1423 In detail, the adversary proceeding is meant 
to unfold as follows:  
 
“During this [adversary] proceeding, advocates debate the technical 
and policy questions that are in dispute. In addition to presenting 
their own cases, the debaters are able to cross-examine opponents 
and to criticize their arguments.” 1424 
 
At the third stage, finally, the panel of judges, i.e., “impartial scientists and 
laymen”, releases its decision “as to the scientific and policy factors relevant to 
the disputed questions”.1425 Obviously with view on a domestic policy 
environment, Shrader-Frechette continued that the decision of the panel shall 
made public, “and is designed to provide the basis for reaching political 
decisions through the democratic process”.1426  
 
Arguably, Popper, Beck and Shrader-Frechette have conceived that such fora for 
democratic risk discourses were assigned at respective domestic levels.  
 
However, it is argued that the idea of democratic risk discourse at the 
international level, in particular before the WTO dispute settlement body (DSB), 
is even more necessary than at respective national levels.  
 
In situations of scientific dissent in the wake of a trade dispute, opposing 
governments will try their respective best for providing scientific arguments in 
favour of their respective positions. The positions of opposing governments, in 
turn, are influenced by domestic pressure groups. Thus, finally, it is domestic 
policy shaping respective positions in trade disputes. Therefore, even if one 
assumes that particular segments of the scientific community are serving 
corporate interests, governments may be constrained to turn to alternative 
scientific experts due to public pressure. In other words, in cases where pressure 
                                                 
1421 Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, ibid. p. 206.  
1422 Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, ibid., pp. 206-207.  
1423 Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, ibid. p. 207 (emphasis added).  
1424 Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, ibid. p. 207 (emphasis added).  
1425 Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, ibid. p. 207 (emphasis added).  
1426 Kristin S. Shrader-Frechette, ibid. p. 207. Shrader-Frechette added the reservation that the 
panel’s decision shall be made public unless national security is at stake (Kristin S. Shrader-
Frechette, ibid.).  
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from civil society at domestic levels is overwhelming, it may outweigh 
corporate influence in scientific research and scientific risk assessment. An 
example of research activity induced by civic resilience was the protest of 
segments of civil society in European Countries against the introduction of 
genetically modified organisms. Switzerland is a telling example in this regard. 
In 2005, the Swiss people accepted a moratorium on the use of genetically 
modified organisms (GMOs) for agricultural purposes. In response, the 
government launched the National Research Programme (NRP 59) on ‘Benefits 
and Risks of the Deliberate Release of Genetically Modified Plants.’ For the 
first five years, 2005-2010, the NRP 59 was funded with 12 million Swiss 
Francs.1427 Expecting the final report of the NRP 59 in the year 2013, the 
government extended the moratorium accordingly.1428 
 
Considering these arguments, the establishment and strengthening of adversarial 
litigation procedures and contradictory dispute settlement systems at the 
international level are the order of the day. In this perspective, the current WTO 
dispute settlement system corresponds already rather well with the principle of 
adversarial procedures. With respect to scientific knowledge, adversarial 
disputes over sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) issues are of particular value. 
The fact that SPS disputes are usually reflecting underlying scientific 
controversies, and vice versa, adversarial procedures should be (re-)considered 
as veritable sources of knowledge. From this perspective, WTO panels and the 
Appellate Body are rapprochements of what Shrader-Frechette depicted as 
“panels of impartial scientists and laymen”. The floor provided by panels and 
the Appellate Body is considered as being a promising intermediate stage for 
organised ‘play-offs’ between ‘laboratory science’ and ‘public discursivity’ at 
the international level. In particular in highly contested SPS disputes, such as the 
Hormones and the Biotech cases, the trend towards transparent and adversarial 
risk discourse at the international level is well underway.  
 
Considering the requirement for adversarial procedural principles outlined 
above, the WTO dispute settlement system seems already well suited for 
accommodating scientific controversies at the international level. In this respect, 
a successive improvement of the handling of epistemological problems by 
panels and the Appellate Body can be observed. Lukasz Gruszczynski, for 
instance, established significant advancements of the capacity of panels and the 
                                                 
1427 See the website of the Swiss National Research Programme (NRP 59) on ‘Benefits and 
Risks of the Deliberate Release of Genetically Modified Plants’ at 
http://www.nfp59.ch/e_portrait_details.cfm (visited August 15, 2010).  
1428 See the media release of the Swiss Federal Office for the Environment (FOEN) entitled 
‘GMO-free agriculture: Federal Council in favour of extending moratorium,’ from July 1, 
2009, on the FOEN website  
http://www.bafu.admin.ch/dokumentation/medieninformation/00962/index.html?lang=en&ms
g-id=27843 (visited August 15, 2010).  
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Appellate Body to address complex issues of risk. In particular, Gruszczynski 
observed remarkable ameliorations between earlier SPS jurisprudence and the 
Appellate Body’s approach in the Continued Suspension case:  
 
“[A] part of the earlier jurisprudence subscribed to a simplified and 
incorrect conception of science and an overly technical view of risk 
assessment. Many concepts, such as insufficiency of scientific 
evidence or risk assessment, were defined in purely scientific terms 
without proper regard of their socio-cultural dimension. (…) 
Imposing a monolithic and imperialist vision of science on all WTO 
Members obviously cannot correctly account for all those elements 
and will generate questions as to the appropriateness of such a 
supervision system.  
The majority of the above concerns were, however, properly 
addressed by the Appellate Body in its recent US/Canada – 
Continued Suspension report. (…) For instance, insufficiency of 
scientific evidence was recognized as a relational category which 
may depend on normative values, such as the level of protection or 
the attitude of risk assessors. This recognition permitted the 
Appellate Body to acknowledge that insufficiency is a 
multidimensional concept that is determined not only by scientific 
developments but may also result from differences in the 
appreciation of available scientific information.” 1429 
 
Therefore, the current system, leading to controversial risk assessments, should 
be upheld in principle. On any account, the current system should not be 
replaced by a “monolithic and imperialist” scientific body at the international 
level absorbing critical or dissenting scientific considerations. Rather, one might 
think of revising the Understanding of Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes of the WTO in a way that in future SPS disputes, voices 
of civil societies are better heard, not less. In the medium term, ways should be 
explored for enabling public participation also in cases of scientific 
controversies at the international level, in particular in SPS disputes.1430  
 
                                                 
1429 Lukasz Gruszczynski, Regulating Health and Environmental Risks under WTO Law. A 
Critical Analysis of the SPS Agreement (Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 272-273 
(emphasis added).  
1430 Issues of transparency and public participation are also issues in Codex and related 
scientific expert bodies. The experts evaluating the Codex, for instance, came to the following 
conclusion: “We believe that consumers and other interest groups could be more actively 
involved in discussions by experts on risk assessment procedures and protocols and in expert 
advice on risk management and communication” (W. Bruce  Traill, Rachel Bedouin, 
Katharine Gourlie, Jerri Husch, Alicia Lustre (eds.), Report of the Evaluation of the Codex 
Alimentarius and other FAO and WHO Food Standards Work (FAO/WHO, November 15, 
2002), para. 193). 
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In fact, at the international level and in particular in trade disputes, the 
democratic element, i.e., citizens’ participation, is still wanting. This point 
requires attention because at the international level, decisions of the WTO DSB 
are marking the end of democratic processes at respective national levels; this 
stands in contrast to Shrader-Frechette’s model of a technology tribunal which is 
meant to prepare the ground for subsequent democratic processes enfolding at 
national levels. Transposing the adversary model of the technology tribunal at 
the international level, the ideal case would even consist of two democratic 
processes at respective domestic levels, leading to controversial results and 
conflicting trade policies. As examples, the transatlantic controversies over 
hormone-treated meat and biotechnology applications in agriculture and food 
production are invoked. In these cases, democratic processes, on both sides of 
the Atlantic, fuelled by respective domestic interest groups, have led to 
conflicting regulatory regimes and contradictory approaches to risks related to 
hormones and genetically modified organisms (GMOs) respectively. As 
foreseen by Shrader-Frechette’s model of the technology tribunal, the 
controversial approaches clashed at the international level, in the court rooms of 
WTO panels and the Appellate Body. However, panels and the Appellate Body 
themselves are not representatives of what Shrader-Frechette called ‘laymen.’ 
Rather, the term “laymen”, as used by Shrader-Frechette, is somewhat 
misleading in the WTO context. In WTO panels and the Appellate Body, the 
term “laymen” refers to the capacity of panellists of being not scientific experts, 
but predominantly trade lawyers. Taking the technology tribunal as a model, the 
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the WTO should be reformed in order to 
enable participation of laypersons in the literal sense of the word, i.e., civil 
society representatives from respective parties involved in the dispute as 
panellists or associate judges with voting rights.1431 In terms of an innovative 
proposal, one might think about assigning scientific questions to a ‘scientific 
jury’ of laypersons standing by the side of panels and the Appellate Body. In 
particular when scientific questions relevant for public health, animal welfare, 
development or the environment are at stake, it might be appropriate to 
disburden the DSB from resolving politically sensitive scientific questions by 
solitary decision. Marsha Echols, for example, postulated that “[c]onsumers 
should be permitted to comment on the existence and seriousness of a possible 
hazard, to present research and otherwise to help define the hazard”.1432 In 
particular when socio-economic considerations are at stake, it seems to make 
sense to complement the dispute settlement bodies with some sort of democratic 
component reflecting the range of different perspectives and interests involved. 
                                                 
1431 In this respect, the proposal suggested here goes further than that of other authors arguing 
that public participation is first and foremost a domestic problem. The latter position is 
represented, for instance, by Tracey Epps, International Trade and Health Protection. A 
Critical Assessment of the WTO’s SPS Agreement (Edward Elgar, 2008), p. 301.  
1432 Marsha A. Echols, Food Safety and the WTO. The Interplay of Culture, Science and 
Technology (Kluwer Law International, 2001), p. 154.  
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According to certain critics, the ability of the DSB to address complex scientific 
questions is limited.1433 On the other hand, the capability and suitability of 
deliberative models for deciding upon controversial scientific problems has been 
confirmed by recent research. Various studies, e.g. by Joanne Scott and 
Elisabeth Ehrensperger, have shown the suitability and applicability of 
deliberative models to transnational structures such as the SPS Committee1434 
and the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR).1435 Current 
examples for the validity of deliberative approaches under various cultural 
contexts are practices of ‘deliberative democracy’ applied in the Chinese coastal 
district of Zeguo, steered by Stanford professor James S. Fishkin and his team. 
According to a TIME magazine report, the process enfolds as follows:  
 
“Each year, 175 people are scientifically selected to reflect the 
general population. They are polled once on the major decisions 
they’ll be facing. Then they are given a briefing on those issues, 
prepared by experts with conflicting views. Then they meet in small 
groups and come up with questions for the experts – issues they want 
further clarified. Then they meet together in plenary session to listen 
to the expert’s response and have a more general discussion. The 
process of small meetings and plenary is repeated once more. A final 
poll is taken, and the budget priorities of the assembly are made 
known and adopted by the local government. It takes three days to do 
this. The process has grown over five years, from a deliberation over 
public works (new sewage-treatment plants were favored over road-
building) to the whole budget shebang. By most accounts it has 
succeeded brilliantly, even though the participants are not very 
sophisticated: 60% are farmers.” 1436  
 
                                                 
1433 With view on the earlier SPS jurisprudence in particular, Lukasz Gruszczynski, for 
instance, held that “[t]he WTO dispute settlement bodies seem to be poorly equipped to make 
complex scientific determinations as they simply lack relevant expertise” (Lukasz 
Gruszczynski, Regulating Health and Environmental Risks under WTO Law. A Critical 
Analysis of the SPS Agreement (Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 272). However, with view 
on recent jurisprudence, in particular the Continued Suspension case, Gruszczynski relativised 
his statement, recognising “that the deficiencies and failures of the case law … should not be 
seen as a criticism of the whole system but rather as an appeal for specific adjustments” 
(Lukasz Gruszczynski, ibid., p. 273).  
1434 Joanne Scott, The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (Oxford 
University Press, 2007), pp. 41-75.  
1435 Elisabeth, Ehrensperger, Die Allgemeine Erklärung der Menschenrechte als Modellfall 
der Deliberation. Theorie, Dokumente, Analyse (Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2006).  
1436 Joe Klein, ‘Tough Issues. What if we gave people real choices and real consequences and 
let them make decisions?’ in TIME, September 13, 2010, p. 17 (emphasis added).  
 485 
According to professor James Fishkin, an essential condition for the success of 
‘deliberative democracy’ is that people are given real power. In this respect, 
James Fishkin observed:  
 
“If people think their voice actually matters, they’ll do the hard 
work, really study their briefing books, ask the experts smart 
questions and then make tough decisions. When they hear the experts 
disagreeing, they’re forced to think for themselves. About 70% 
change their minds in the process. (…) If you give people real 
choices and real consequences, they will make real decisions.” 1437 
 
For these reasons, it is suggested to establish, based on Article 13 of the SPS 
Agreement a ‘scientific jury’. The ‘scientific jury’ shall be composed of true 
laypersons and decide upon scientific questions for the attention of the DSB. 
Following the model of ‘deliberative democracy’, the ‘scientific jury’ shall be 
organised independently from the DSB, preferably under the auspices of an 
independent research programme. Following findings of professor Fishkin, it 
shall be guaranteed that the ‘scientific jury’ has a real say on scientific matters in 
SPS disputes, if necessary by amending respective rules of procedure.  
 
More inclusive procedures before the DSB would also help to tackle another 
epistemologically sensitive problem, that is, how to consider minority scientific 
opinions. In this regard, Lukasz Gruszczynski observed that “the SPS case law 
has failed to establish clear criteria which could be used in the assessment of the 
credibility of minority scientific opinions”.1438 With view on proceedings in the 
Biotech case in particular, Gruszczynski observed that “[t]he panel ignored the 
minority opinions and decided a number of issues on the basis of what may be 
labelled as the best science approach”.1439 Furthermore, with regard to the 
Continued Suspension case, Gruszczynski noted that “the structure of the fact-
finding process (eg the formulation of questions to experts) and the arbitral 
choices between conflicting and contradictory opinions led to the practical 
exclusion of minority scientific views”.1440 As a major obstacle for the 
consideration of minority scientific opinions in SPS disputes, the requirement 
for specificity was identified by Gruszczynski:  
 
“One of the immanent features of minority scientific opinions is their 
lower level of conclusiveness and limited empirical basis (…). 
Sometimes they establish little more than the theoretical possibility 
of risk rather than a concrete causal relationship between a risk agent 
                                                 
1437 Joe Klein, ibid.; (emphasis added). 
1438 Lukasz Gruszczynski, Regulating Health and Environmental Risks under WTO Law. A 
Critical Analysis of the SPS Agreement (Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 137.  
1439 Lukasz Gruszczynski, ibid., footnote omitted)  
1440 Lukasz Gruszczynski, ibid., footnote omitted).  
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and an adverse effect. This is a place where a panel should be 
particularly careful. Rejecting such scientific minority opinions only 
because they do not meet a specificity requirement may indeed 
interfere with the right of WTO Members to establish their ALOP. 
This problem is particularly important if a particular area of 
scientific research is new (eg genetic manipulations).” 1441 
 
Putting more weight on inclusive procedures before the DSB would also 
increase transparency with regard to criteria applied for assessing the credibility 
of scientific opinions.  
 
Emphasising contradictory procedures for epistemological reasons does not 
mean to neglect polycentric and participatory (as opposed to court-centric and 
hierarchical)1442 procedures already in place in the SPS context. Emphasising the 
important role of the SPS Committee (Article 12 of the SPS Agreement), Joanne 
Scott noted:  
 
“[T]he activities of the committee may be tentatively cited as adding 
credence to constructivist accounts which place emphasis upon the 
value of argumentation and persuasion, and upon the possibility of 
deliberative learning. (…) The committee provides a framework for 
the inculcation of trust between Members. It seems also to induce a 
heightened sense of empathy with the situation of others, with this 
contribution to shifts in policy preferences which are not readily 
explicable in the language of self-interest.” 1443 
                                                 
1441 Lukasz Gruszczynski, ibid., p. 139. 
1442 Joanne Scott applied these terms for emphasising the role of the SPS committee vis-à-vis 
to the WTO dispute settlement system (see Joanne Scott, The WTO Agreement on Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary Measures (Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 74-75.  
1443 Joanne Scott, ibid. p. 75 (footnote omitted). It is before the background of that peculiar 
atmosphere of deliberative rapprochement in the SPS Committee that an alternative account 
of the Nile perch dispute shall be told.  At first, the reason provided above for the inaction of 
East African countries against scientifically unfounded EU safety measures was one of might: 
according to an anonymous WTO delegate, retaliatory power of small East African countries 
against the big EU is virtually nil. In the context of the work of the SPS Committee, however, 
Joan Scott provided an alternative explanation for the forgoing of formal WTO dispute 
settlement procedures:  
“The issue [i.e. EU safeguard measures relating to the importation of, inter alia, 
fish] was raised by Tanzania in the committee, which gained the support of the 
observer representative of the World Health Organization (WHO). The WHO 
representative observed that cholera was not only a problem in these four 
countries, and that at least 50 countries around the world were affected by 
regular outbreaks. He pointed to the ‘almost non-existing risk to countries 
importing food from cholera-affected countries’, and expressed the view that the 
European measure was not necessary. He  drew attention to the WHO guidance 
on the topic and to the finding that ‘[a]lthough there is a theoretical risk of 
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The importance of the SPS Committee as an alternative venue for the 
deliberative handling of conflicts over different risk paradigms was underlined 
by Sungjoon Cho, who noted:  
 
“Notably, an increasing number of SPS disputes have recently been 
resolved under the SPS Committee. Nearly thirty percent of “specific 
trade concerns” reported to the SPS Committee were addressed by 
discussions and consultations under the Committee process. 
Although those specific trade concerns handled in the SPS 
Committee may or may not involve controversies related directly to 
different paradigms of risk science, this extra-judicial peer review 
mechanism still offers an operable avenue for regulatory dialogue 
over risk science.” 1444 
 
Alas, it has to be stressed that also the SPS Committee is driven by executive 
branches of respective WTO Members. As Joanne Scott noted, representatives 
                                                                                                                                                        
Cholera transmission associated with some food commodities moving in 
international trade, this has rarely proved significant and authorities should seek 
means of dealing with it other than by applying an embargo on importation’. The 
WHO also assisted in ongoing bilateral consultations between the countries 
concerned. Though the EC objected that WHO involvement was not appropriate, 
it removed the measure following consultations and reassurances that the 
necessary guarantees to protect health were in place” (Joanne Scott, ibid. p. 53, 
footnotes omitted).  
Examples such as the EU safeguard measures against East African fresh produce importation 
were the reason for Joanne Scott stressing the importance of the SPS Committee’s capacity 
for deliberative conflict resolution and preventive peer review of SPS measures. In the case of 
EU safeguard measures against East African imports, these measures were reviewed against 
the benchmark of WHO standards in the SPS Committee. Scott described the peer review 
function of the SPS Committee as follows:  
“(…) WHO guidelines were called in aid of this proposition [i.e. to impugn the 
EU measures], representing default standards, departure from which was seen as 
requiring justification. It is evident that the standards according to which peer 
review [by the SPS Committee] proceeds are open-ended in the extreme. The 
standards are elaborated in dispute settlement, but the cases tend to be fact-
heavy and law-light, and concomitantly thin in the statements of precedential 
value which they offer. Against this backdrop, the role of the committee is not 
only passive in relation to these standards. It too constitutes a forum for their 
elaboration, operating as a contextualizing regime whereby the standards are 
elaborated in the course of consideration of specific problems. In the course of 
their repeated interactions, Members arrive at settled (though not necessarily 
authoritative, from the point of view of the dispute settlement bodies) 
understandings of the meaning of the agreement in context” (Joanne Scott, ibid. 
pp. 53-54, footnotes omitted, emphasis added).  
1444 Sungjoon Cho, ‘From Control to Communication: Science, Philosophy and World Trade 
Law’ (2010). Cornell International Law Journal, forthcoming. Available at SSRN:  
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1583023 (visited December 5, 2010; footnote omitted).  
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of WTO Members are usually either “diplomats attached to UN or WTO 
missions in Geneva, or specialists drawn from national ministries in SPS 
covered fields”.1445 Scott further observed that these government representatives 
may be accompanied by alternates and advisers and that “[i]t is not unknown 
(but seemingly not common) for Members to introduce persons connected to 
private undertakings – for example producer associations – as part of their 
delegation”.1446 Considering the manifold biases inherent in the SPS framework 
in favour of corporate interests, as explained at various occasions in the paper at 
hand, it is suggested to amend the rules of procedure of the SPS Committee. 
Such an amendment shall aim to achieve better balanced national delegations. In 
particular, there should be a requirement for national delegations for equal 
representation of potentially conflicting interest groups, i.e. industry 
representatives on the one hand, and delegates from consumer, environmental 
and animal rights NGOs on the other hand.  
 
However, the problem of proindustry biases of national delegations accredited to 
international bodies is not unique to the SPS Committee. Similar concerns have 
been raised with regard to Codex bodies. A striking example was the 
overrepresentation of corporate representatives in the Codex Committee on 
Pesticide Residues (CCPR):  
 
“Looking, for example, at the Codex Committee on Pesticide 
Residues (CCPR) – establishing maximum residue limits (MRLs) for 
pesticides in food – industry presence is striking. Lisa Lefferts of 
Consumer International reported: ‘The Global Crop Protection 
Federation delegation, which represents the pesticide industry, 
included 30 members at the 1998 meeting. Three of the four 
members of the Swiss delegation represent industry (Novartis and 
Nestec/Nestlé). Mingled into other delegations are representatives 
from Dow, Monsanto, and a multitude of multinational companies, 
from Avcare to Zeneca’.” 1447 
 
On such grounds, amending the rules of procedure of the SPS Committee only 
seems insufficient. Rather, it is suggested to align all international bodies 
relevant for SPS risk assessment with requirements for better balanced 
representation of interests. Therefore, the proposal for amending or establishing 
rules of procedure for national delegations to international bodies extents, in 
                                                 
1445 Joanne Scott, The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (Oxford 
University Press, 2007), p. 49.  
1446 Joanne Scott, ibid., footnote no. 22. 
1447 Helena Paul and Ricarda Seinbrecher, Hungry Corporations. Transnational Biotech 
Companies Colonise the Food Chain (Zed Books, 2003), p. 153; with footnote no. 22 
referencing to Lisa Lefferts, ‘Changing the Rules of the Codex Club’, 43 Pesticides News 
(March 1999) 6.  
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particular, to the Codex Alimentarius Commission, the World Organisation for 
Animal Health (OIE), and the Framework of the International Plant Protection 
Convention (IPPC).  
 
Taken together, the suggestions put forward in this paper are differing from both 
positivist and relativist proposals. On the one hand, the critical approach 
recognises science as an indispensable source of knowledge. On the other hand, 
however, the critical approach means to relinquish the ideal of objective, yet 
‘pure’ science. Rather, the critical approach is based on epistemological 
foundations, in particular the critical scientific method and the epistemological 
opposite objective – relative. Thus, implementing the critical approach means to 
re-contextualise science, exposing it to permanent criticism by peers and society 
at large. In this regard, the proposal at hand comes close to considerations put 
forward by Alexia Herwig, observing the following:  
 
“The contextualisation of science depends, in large measure, on the 
public availability of the scientific studies, and the clear articulation 
of its underlying assumptions and normative choices. For instance, 
how risk assessment is methodologically defined introduces 
variations in scientific findings as a result of the selection of the 
population group that is exposed; or of the appropriate factor by 
which to extrapolate from animal studies to humans; or of the 
selection of the relevant exposure level (common are lowest-
observable-effect and no-observable-effect). The decision whether or 
not to set a standard for a vulnerable population group results in the 
redistribution of risk, especially if the substance or technology brings 
benefits for other less susceptible population groups.”1448 
 
Turning to the practical implementation of the critical approach, the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) is considered an appropriate forum ‘larger than 
the strictly professional ones’ for the cross-examination of scientists at the 
international level. By doing so, controversial scientific positions put forward by 
conflicting parties would be openly scrutinised and discussed. Decisions taken 
by the WTO DSB, assisted by the ‘scientific jury’, will, in turn, cause 
repercussions at domestic levels of the parties involved. Thus, a critical 
discourse spanning from national levels to the international level and back again 
will constantly query established scientific paradigms. In the end, scientific 
disputes fought out before the WTO DSB might become the nucleus at the 
international level for more ‘open societies’ among WTO Members.  
 
                                                 
1448 Alexia Herwig, ‘Transnational Governance Regimes for Foods Derived from Bio-
Technology and their Legitimacy’, in Christian Joerges, Inger-Johanne Sand, and Gunther 
Teubner (eds.), Transnational Governance and Constitutionalism (Hart Publishing, 2004), 
[pp. 199-222], pp. 220-221. 
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Whereas the positivistic proposal implies an instrumentalisation of science in the 
service of a market-opening agenda, the role of science is conceived differently 
here, namely from an epistemological point of view. From an epistemological 
point of view, the role of science is to provide scientific insights for increased 
knowledge to the service of all. With respect to risk assessment in particular, 
science has to provide insights into short- and long-term risks based on scientific 
criteria, not based on economic preferences. In this regard, the words of the 
Appellate Body shall be recalled:  
 
“It is essentially to bear in mind that the risk that is to be evaluated in 
a risk assessment under Article 5.1 is not only risk ascertainable in a 
science laboratory operating under strictly controlled conditions, but 
also risks in human societies as they actually exist, in other words, 
the actual potential for adverse effects on human health in the real 
world where people live and work and die.”1449 
 
What applies for the SPS Agreement in particular should apply, all the more, for 
science in general:  
 
“We consider that the object and purpose of the SPS Agreement 
justify the examination and evaluation of all such risks for human 
health whatever their precise and immediate origin may be.1450 
 
Finally, a broader understanding of risk and science under the SPS Agreement 
would increase consistency with GATT Article XX jurisdiction. The Appellate 
Body in Brazil-Tyres, for instance, addressing risks deriving from climate 
change and global warming, refuted positivist inductivism and emphasised the 
importance of scientific theories, i.e., deduction, in risk assessment:  
 
“We recognize that certain complex public health or environmental 
problems may be tackled only with a comprehensive policy 
comprising a multiplicity of interacting measures. In the short-term, 
it may prove difficult to isolate the contribution to public health or 
environmental objectives of one specific measure from those 
attributable to the other measures that are part of the same 
                                                 
1449 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body report, para. 187.  
1450 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body report, para. 206. The Appellate Body continued: “We 
do not mean to suggest that risks arising from potential abuse in the administration of 
controlled substances and from control problems need to be, or should be, evaluated by risk 
assessors in each and every case. When and if risks of these types do in fact arise, risk 
assessors may examine and evaluate them. Clearly, the necessity or propriety of examination 
and evaluation of such risks would have to be addressed on a case-by-case basis. What, in our 
view is a fundamental legal error is to exclude, on an a priori basis, any such risks from the 
scope of application of Articles 5.1 and 5.2” (ibid.).  
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comprehensive policy. Moreover, the results obtained from certain 
actions—for instance, measures adopted in order to attenuate global 
warming and climate change, or certain preventive actions to reduce 
the incidence of diseases that may manifest themselves only after a 
certain period of time—can only be evaluated with the benefit of 
time. In order to justify an import ban under Article XX(b), a panel 
must be satisfied that it brings about a material contribution to the 
achievement of its objective. Such a demonstration can of course be 
made by resorting to evidence or data, pertaining to the past or the 
present, that establish that the import ban at issue makes a material 
contribution to the protection of public health or environmental 
objectives pursued. This is not, however, the only type of 
demonstration that could establish such a contribution. Thus, a panel 
might conclude that an import ban is necessary on the basis of a 
demonstration that the import ban at issue is apt to produce a 
material contribution to the achievements of its objective. This 
demonstration could consist of quantitative projections in the future, 
or qualitative reasoning based on a set of hypotheses that are tested 
and supported by sufficient evidence”.1451 
 
                                                 
1451 Brazil – Tyres, Appellate Body Report, para. 151 (emphasis added). In a footnote, the 
Appellate Body recalled its finding made in the context of Article XX(g) of the GATT 1994, 
where it had stated that "in the field of conservation of exhaustible natural resources, a 
substantial period of time, perhaps years, may have to elapse before the effects attributable to 
implementation of a given measure may be observable" (Brazil-Tyres, ibid., footnote no. 243, 
with reference to the Appellate Body report, US –Gasoline, p. 21, DSR 1996:I, 3, at 20).  
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ANNEX:  SYNOPSIS OF REFORM PROPOSALS  
 
In the following synopsis, proposals for reforming the SPS Agreement, as 
discussed above, are outlined in a contrasting manner. 1452  
 
Positivist Proposal Critical Approach Relativist Proposal 
   
Preamble 
   
Original Text 
   
Members, 
 
 Reaffirming that no Member should be prevented from adopting or enforcing 
measures necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, subject to the 
requirement that these measures are not applied in a manner which would constitute a 
means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between Members where the same 
conditions prevail or a disguised restriction on international trade; 
 
 Desiring to improve the human health, animal health and phytosanitary situation in 
all Members; 
 
 Noting that sanitary and phytosanitary measures are often applied on the basis of 
bilateral agreements or protocols;   
 
 Desiring the establishment of a multilateral framework of rules and disciplines to 
guide the development, adoption and enforcement of sanitary and phytosanitary measures 
in order to minimize their negative effects on trade; 
 
 Recognizing the important contribution that international standards, guidelines and 
recommendations can make in this regard; 
 
 Desiring to further the use of harmonized sanitary and phytosanitary measures 
between Members, on the basis of international standards, guidelines and recommendations 
developed by the relevant international organizations, including the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission, the International Office of Epizootics, and the relevant international and 
regional organizations operating within the framework of the International Plant Protection 
Convention, without requiring Members to change their appropriate level of protection of 
human, animal or plant life or health; 
 
 Recognizing that developing country Members may encounter special difficulties in 
complying with the sanitary or phytosanitary measures of importing Members, and as a 
consequence in access to markets, and also in the formulation and application of sanitary or 
                                                 
1452 Positivist positions were sometimes also characterised as objectivist. For relativist 
positions, the terms subjectivist, contextualist and constructivist are used for expressing 
similar, albeit not identical meanings.  
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phytosanitary measures in their own territories, and desiring to assist them in their 
endeavours in this regard;   
 
 Desiring therefore to elaborate rules for the application of the provisions of 
GATT 1994 which relate to the use of sanitary or phytosanitary measures, in particular the 
provisions of Article XX(b)1453;   
 
 Hereby agree as follows:  
   
Comment 
In the preamble, the paramount role of science for the application of the SPS Agreement is 
not mentioned. 
   
From an objectivist point of 
view, that omission could be 
considered as a desideratum 
to be addressed in a revision 
of the SPS Agreement. 
 
From a critical perspective, 
science is perceived as 
necessary, but not sufficient 
component of risk 
assessment. Hence, an 
explicit reference to science 
would be no priority.  
Subjectivists, on the other 
hand, would insist on the 
current wording. 
Subjectivists can also agree 
with the current phrasing of 
the harmonisation objective, 
because its open wording 
allows a reading whereby 
recognition of international 
standards takes place on a 
voluntary basis. 
   
Article 1 
 
General Provisions 
   
Original Text – no comments  
   
Article 2 
 
Basic Rights and Obligations 
   
Original Text  
   
1. Members have the right to take sanitary and phytosanitary measures necessary for 
the protection of human, animal or plant life or health, provided that such measures are not 
inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement.   
 
2. Members shall ensure that any sanitary or phytosanitary measure is applied only to 
the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health, is based on scientific 
principles and is not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence, except as provided 
for in paragraph 7 of Article 5. 
 
3. Members shall ensure that their sanitary and phytosanitary measures do not 
                                                 
1453 In this Agreement, reference to Article XX(b) includes also the chapeau of that Article. 
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arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminate between Members where identical or similar 
conditions prevail, including between their own territory and that of other Members.  
Sanitary and phytosanitary measures shall not be applied in a manner which would 
constitute a disguised restriction on international trade. 
 
4. Sanitary or phytosanitary measures which conform to the relevant provisions of this 
Agreement shall be presumed to be in accordance with the obligations of the Members 
under the provisions of GATT 1994 which relate to the use of sanitary or phytosanitary 
measures, in particular the provisions of Article XX(b). 
   
Comment 
   
Paragraph 2 of Article 2 expresses the basic principle of the science-based approach of the 
SPS Agreement. In the same way, Article 2 and Article 5, which should “constantly be 
read together”,1454 are forming the backbone of an objectivist interpretation of the SPS 
Agreement. Furthermore, the first clause of paragraph 2 of Article 2 limits the application 
of SPS measures to the narrow scope of sanitary and phytosanitary objectives, thus 
excluding other objectives such as ethical concerns.  
 
Positivists insist on the 
current wording of  
Article 2.  
From a critical viewpoint, 
the important watershed 
function of science in risk 
assessment, discerning 
between scientifically 
justifiable SPS measures and 
initially rebuttable ones, is 
acknowledged. Hence, there 
is no requirement for a 
rephrasing of Article 2. 
A subjectivist attempt for 
reforming the SPS 
Agreement would primarily 
focus on the cancellation of 
the second and the last 
clause of paragraph 2 of 
Article 2 of the SPS 
Agreement, at least. 
 
Positivist Proposal Critical Approach  Relativist Proposal 
   
Article 2.2 
   
2. [Original Text]  2. [Original Text] 2. Members shall ensure 
that any sanitary or 
phytosanitary measure is 
applied only to the extent 
necessary to protect human, 
animal or plant life or health 
[2nd and 3rd clause deleted]. 
   
Article 3 
 
Harmonization 
   
Original Text 
                                                 
1454 EC – Hormones, Appellate Body Report, para. 180.  
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1. To harmonize sanitary and phytosanitary measures on as wide a basis as possible, 
Members shall base their sanitary or phytosanitary measures on international standards, 
guidelines or recommendations, where they exist, except as otherwise provided for in this 
Agreement, and in particular in paragraph 3. 
 
2. Sanitary or phytosanitary measures which conform to international standards, 
guidelines or recommendations shall be deemed to be necessary to protect human, animal 
or plant life or health, and presumed to be consistent with the relevant provisions of this 
Agreement and of GATT 1994. 
 
3. Members may introduce or maintain sanitary or phytosanitary measures which 
result in a higher level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection than would be achieved by 
measures based on the relevant international standards, guidelines or recommendations, if 
there is a scientific justification, or as a consequence of the level of sanitary or 
phytosanitary protection a Member determines to be appropriate in accordance with the 
relevant provisions of paragraphs 1 through 8 of Article 5.1455 Notwithstanding the above, 
all measures which result in a level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection different from 
that which would be achieved by measures based on international standards, guidelines or 
recommendations shall not be inconsistent with any other provision of this Agreement.   
 
4. Members shall play a full part, within the limits of their resources, in the relevant 
international organizations and their subsidiary bodies, in particular the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission, the International Office of Epizootics, and the international and 
regional organizations operating within the framework of the International Plant Protection 
Convention, to promote within these organizations the development and periodic review of 
standards, guidelines and recommendations with respect to all aspects of sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures. 
 
5. The Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures provided for in paragraphs 
1 and 4 of Article 12 (referred to in this Agreement as the "Committee") shall develop a 
procedure to monitor the process of international harmonization and coordinate efforts in 
this regard with the relevant international organizations. 
 
   
Comment 
 
                                                 
1455 Footnote no. 2 to this paragraph reads as follows: “For the purposes of paragraph 3 of 
Article 3, there is a scientific justification if, on the basis of an examination and evaluation of 
available scientific information in conformity with the relevant provisions of this Agreement, 
a Member determines that the relevant international standards, guidelines or 
recommendations are not sufficient to achieve its appropriate level of sanitary or 
phytosanitary protection.” 
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From a positivist 
perspective, there is no room 
for higher levels of 
protection than those 
provided by ‘universal’ 
science, expressed by 
international standards. 
Hence, objectivists aim at 
abrogating Article 3.3 of the 
current SPS Agreement.  
The reform proposal put 
forward by the critical 
approach implies a shift 
from the objective of 
substantive harmonisation of 
SPS measures to the 
objective of a procedural 
harmonisation of SPS 
measures. The first and 
objective element of the 
critical proposal consists of 
a strong incentive for WTO 
members to commission 
international organisations 
with the task to carry out 
risk assessments shall ensure 
state-of-the art risk 
assessments and scientific 
integrity. Thereby, a 
relativistic ‘anything goes’ 
in SPS trade regulation shall 
be prevented. The second 
and relativist element of the 
critical proposal consists of 
enlarging the policy space of 
national risk managers. 
Taken together, the 
objective and the relative 
element of the proposed 
critical approach shall 
encourage critical scientific 
discourse at the international 
level, following the 
epistemological opposite 
objective – relative.  
 
 
From a constructivistic point 
of view, the undesirability of 
enforced harmonisation is 
emphasised. An enforcement 
of harmonisation is implied 
in the presumption of 
GATT/WTO compatibility 
of SPS measures which 
‘conform to’ international 
standards. Whereas 
constructivists might agree 
that harmonisation can be a 
useful tool for trade 
facilitation, they reject 
harmonisation as exclusive 
and paramount objective 
enforced to the detriment of 
other legitimate purposes. 
Constructivists, taking 
differences of perception as 
a ‘sovereign right’, refute 
the idea that international 
standards are becoming 
quasi-mandatory, as 
happened through the SPS 
Agreement. Therefore, first, 
subjectivists might suggest a 
wording consistent with the 
sixth clause of the preamble. 
Second, subjectivists would 
turn down the privilege for 
SPS measures conforming to 
international standards, as 
contained in paragraph 2 of 
Article 3. Third, 
constructivists would 
reformulate paragraph 3 of 
Article 3 as a truly 
“sovereign right” of 
Members, hence abrogating 
the requirement for scientific 
justification. 
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Positivist Proposal Critical Approach  Relativist Proposal 
   
Article 3.1 
   
1. [Original Text] 1. [Original Text] 1. [Members shall 
further the use of 
harmonized sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures, on 
the basis of international 
standards, guidelines and 
recommendations developed 
by the relevant international 
organizations, including the 
Codex Alimentarius 
Commission, the 
International Office of 
Epizootics, and the relevant 
international and regional 
organizations operating 
within the framework of the 
International Plant 
Protection Convention, 
without requiring Members 
to change their appropriate 
level of protection of human, 
animal or plant life or 
health.] 
   
Article 3.2 
   
Positivist Proposal Critical Approach Relativist Proposal 
   
2. [Original Text] 2. Sanitary or phytosanitary 
measures [based on risk 
assessments carried out by 
international organisations] 
shall be deemed to be 
necessary to protect human, 
animal or plant life or 
health, and presumed to be 
consistent with the relevant 
provisions of this Agreement 
and of GATT 1994. 
 
2. [Deletion] 
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Article 3.3 
   
3. [Deletion] 3. [Original Text] 3. Members may 
introduce or maintain 
sanitary or phytosanitary 
measures which result in a 
higher level of sanitary or 
phytosanitary protection 
than would be achieved by 
measures based on the 
relevant international 
standards, guidelines or 
recommendations [rest 
deleted]. Notwithstanding 
the above, all measures 
which result in a level of 
sanitary or phytosanitary 
protection different from 
that which would be 
achieved by measures based 
on international standards, 
guidelines or 
recommendations shall not 
be inconsistent with any 
other provision of this 
Agreement. 
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WTO Cases  
 
EC – Hormones: EC – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
 
- Panel Report WT/DS26/R/USA, WT/DS48/R/CAN, final report 
circulated August 18, 1997; 
 
- Appellate Body Report WT/DS26/AB/R/USA, 
WT/DS48/AB/R/CAN, adopted February 13, 1998.  
 
Australia – Salmon: Australia – Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon 
 
- Panel Report WT/DS18/R, final report circulated June 12, 1998; 
 
- Appellate Body Report WT/DS18/AB/R, adopted November 6, 
1998. 
 
Japan – Agricultural Products: Japan – Measures Affecting Agricultural 
Products 
 
- Panel Report, WT/DS76//R, final report circulated October 27, 1998; 
 
-  Appellate Body Report, WT/DS76/AB/R, adopted March 19, 1999. 
 
EC – Biotech: European Communities – Measures Affecting the Approval and 
Marketing of Biotech Products 
- Reports of the Panel, WT/DS291, 292, 293/R, adopted November 
21, 2006. 
  
Brazil – Tyres: Brazil – Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres 
 
- Panel Report, WT/DS332/R, final report circulated June 12, 2007; 
 
- Appellate Body Report, WT/DS332/AB/R, adopted December 27, 
2007. 
 
United States – Continued Suspension: United States/Canada – Continued 
Suspension of Obligations in the EC – Hormones Dispute 
 
- Panel Reports, WT/DS320/R, WT/DS321/R, final reports circulated 
March 31, 2008;  
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- Appellate Body Reports, WT/DS320/AB/R, WT/DS321/AB/R, 
adopted November 14, 2008.  
